

The Hittite Military on the Offensive and Defensive
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For over 600 years, Hatti controlled much of the Anatolian plateau and could count itself as one of the great powers of its age. It was usually able not only to dominate the lesser powers in its neighborhood, but also to hold its own against other contemporary great powers such as Assyria, Egypt, Babylon, Mittanni, and Yamhad (Aleppo). The last three suffered fatal or near fatal reverses at Hittite hands. No country can accomplish this without having efficient military capabilities.

Unfortunately, much remains unknown about the Hittite military. There are no contemporary descriptions of the army, nor handbooks of tactics and strategy. So we must rely on gleanings from a small archive of letters from a frontier post (Tapigga, modern Maşat Höyük), references to military campaigns in annals or other historical texts, found at the capital, Hattusa (modern Boğazköy), magic-rituals for the military, and scattered references in other texts.

The Hittite Military on the Offensive---The Campaign

Permission for a campaign needed to be asked of the gods. When the Hittite king went to war, the thousand gods of Hatti "ran before the army" and, if they failed to do so, the inevitable result would have been a military defeat. Keeping the gods happy was always a royal imperative. Since prospective campaigns could interfere with the king's celebration of the gods' festivals, however, hard choices had sometimes to be made. How religious and military imperatives sorted out depended on the personality of the king. Suppiluliuma I in reestablishing Hittite dominion over much of Anatolia and conquering Syria from Mittanni missed some festivals. These missed festivals haunted his son, Mursili II. Mursili himself, when he ascended the throne, with foes sharpening their swords all around, nevertheless spent his accession year propitiating the gods.¹

Before a prospective campaign, the gods were asked about a number of different countries that might require military attention, and were asked to give permission for a campaign against each one. Then, the gods were given a list of potential leaders or combinations of leaders for that campaign, and they were again asked to approve or disapprove each one. It should be noted that the gods were not actually asked to choose

¹KBo 3.4 i 16-23, ed. A. Götze, AM 20f., tr. G. del Monte, *L'annalistica ittita* 57-59.

either the front or the leader. Instead, they were relied upon to eliminate fronts or leaders unacceptable to them. It was left to the king to choose which of the acceptable options he wished to implement.²

Like the Arabian Gulf states of today, the Hittite empire was basically a family corporation, with most major positions held by members of the family. Not all Hittite generals³ were members of the extended royal family (*salli hassatar*), but many certainly were.

The king (*hassu*) was the commander in chief. This does not merely mean, as it does in the modern USA, that he was ultimately responsible for all military decisions, although he was, but rather that the king was expected to lead his troops in person, a custom that survived in England up to the reign of George II. Whether this implied that he fought in the thick of the battle like Sargon II of Assyria or whether he went on campaign and directed the action of the battle from a nearby height as did Sennacherib of Assyria is unknown.

The king's second in command was his son the Crown Prince (*tuhkanti*). After Suppiluliuma I took over Mittannian possessions in Syria, he made one of his sons hereditary King of Kargamis and another son King of Aleppo. Thus, a new layer of military command in the empire was created: kings of appanage states, who ranked just below the crown prince. By the time of the battle of Qadesh another such kingdom, Hakis (on Hatti's northern frontier), had been created for Muwattalli II's brother Hattusili, who was already *GAL MEŠEDI*.⁴

Originally third in command (but later fourth) was the officer whose title was written with the Sumero-Akkadian derived word signs *GAL MEŠEDI*. This office was normally filled by the king's brother, but lacking a brother, the king's second son could fill it. The title literally signifies that the holder is the commander of the inner ring of royal guards, guards who carry a spear somewhat reminiscent of a hauberk (see discussion, under weapons). However, it is quite clear that the *GAL MEŠEDI* also led armies or units of armies in the field.

In our earliest texts mentioning officers other than the king (from the time of Hattusili I), the fourth rank appears to have been filled by an official known as the Chief Herald (*GAL NIMGIR*) and by a member of the king's household, the Chief Cupbearer

²See R. Beal, *FsPopko* 32, 34.

³The Hittite officer corps is discussed in more detail in my book *The Organisation of the Hittite Army*, *THeth* 20 (1992), 297-520, 527.

⁴The kingdom of Hakis was reabsorbed by the crown when Hattusili usurped the throne. Created later were appanage states of Tarḫuntassa, Tummana and Isuwa.

(GAL SAGI = *RAB ŠĀQÊ*). Not long after these texts were written, the title Chief Herald disappears, while the chief cupbearer is confined to duties involving cupbearing. Thereafter this fourth (later 5th) rank is filled by another official originally of the royal household, the Chief Wine Steward (GAL GEŠTIN), whose duties henceforth appear to have nothing to do with wine, but with command of units of troops.

In the fifth rank originally stood the Overseer of One Thousand Chariot Fighters. There were two men holding this rank at one time. At some point within the Old Hittite period, this term was replaced by the term Chief of Chariot Fighters (GAL LÚ.MEŠŠÛŠ). Each of the pair was further designated by either “of the Right” or “of the Left”.

On the same level and also coming in right and left were Chiefs of the UKU.UŠ-troops. The UKU.UŠ-troops were the most important part of the standing army, but it is unclear how they were armed. When the Chief of the UKU.UŠ is mentioned leading troops in the field, his command includes chariotry. The title is not attested before the reign of Mursili II, but since UKU.UŠ troops are attested much earlier, the title may be far older.

Also on the level of these officers are officers known as the Chiefs of the Shepherds (GAL NA.GADA). Again this is a right and left pair. Ordinary NA.GADA-shepherds and for that matter SIPA-shepherds, also occur in right and left, but are so far unattested in military context. It is not clear, despite their titles, if there was any difference in the types of troops these six officers commanded. Perhaps the titles simply indicate the commanders of the left and right of the vanguard, center and rearguard.

Below these ranks are to be found provincial governors, who occasionally had to take independent military initiative. Below these were four ranks seldom called upon to take independent command: “overseers of clansmen” (UGULA LIM ŠĒRI), “weighty men” (LÚ.MEŠDUGUD) of various grades, “good men” (LÚ.MEŠSIG₅)/bosses of ten, (roughly equivalent to modern captains, lieutenants and sergeants, and corporals respectively), and ordinary soldiers.

Once the king had decided (with the gods’ advice) who was to lead, then he and his officers planned out in great detail a number of possible routes and strategies of campaign. These too were presented to the gods to approve or reject. Again the king could choose which of the acceptable ones to utilize.⁵

Now, very likely in the late spring, it was time to assemble the troops.⁶ The Hittites had a standing army, who had spent the winter eating rations in their quarters.

⁵See R. Beal, *FsPopko* 32-34..

⁶For more on acquisition and maintenance of Hittite soldiers see R. Beal, *THeth* 20:37-127.

The standing army consisted of UKU.UŠ and *šarikuwa*-troops, but it is not clear what the difference was between the two.⁷ Campaigns against lesser enemies were sometimes conducted with just these forces. It is unclear what percentage of these were men who had voluntarily made the army their career. In addition to such career soldiers, various districts of the empire, probably the less settled ones, had by treaty to provide a set number of troops, who were not individually integrated into the army, but rather served together in their own units under their own officers, a captain from the district and sergeants from each village. These then served, usually far from home, as standing army and garrison soldiers, and their units continued to be known by their district of origin.⁸

At some point in the early days of the kingdom it appears that there were soldiers who received land in lieu of pay, and who had associates to help them farm the land. The system continued for various civilian jobs, but there is no evidence in the written records that it survived as a form of military service.⁹

When the numbers of standing army troops were considered insufficient for the task at hand, the king could also call up his subjects for military service as part of their regular obligations to the state. These levies were known as *warris ÉRIN.MEŠ-za/ÉRIN.MEŠ NĀRĀRI*, literally “help-troops”.¹⁰ Additionally, on occasion the Hittites could employ irregulars/nomads (*SUTU*)¹¹ and when really desperate, slaves and freebooters (*HAPIRU*).¹²

When inducted into army, the officers and men swore a number of oaths calling down blood curdling curses on themselves, acted out in analogy, should they turn traitor. To cite just one example: “He places wax and sheep fat in their hands and then throws these into the flame, and says as follows: ‘Just as this wax melts and just as the sheep fat dissolves, may he who transgresses the oath and deceives the king of Hatti melt like wax and dissolve like mutton-fat.’ And the soldiers say: ‘So be it.’”¹³ Interestingly, the troops were expected to disobey illegal orders: “But if that prince or lord (appointed to command the field army) parades some evil plan before you and offends My Majesty, seize him and send him to My Majesty and I My Majesty will personally come and investigate the matter.”¹⁴

⁷R. Beal, THeth 20:37-55.

⁸Ibid. 71-104.

⁹Ibid. 55-56, idem., AoF 15 (1988) 269-305.

¹⁰R. Beal, THeth 20:56-71.

¹¹Ibid. 104-108.

¹²Ibid. 108-112.

¹³Ed. N. Oettinger, StBoT 22, tr. B.J. Collins, CoS 1:165-168.

¹⁴KUB 13.20 i 26-28, cf. 16 (MH/NS), ed. S. Alp, Belleten XI/43:392f., 407, CHD P 259.

Finally the king could write to lesser kings who were tributary to him and order them to send their army to become *sardiya/TILLATU* troops for the imperial army.¹⁵ Their king had already sworn an oath to the Hittite king to do this, and presumably his troops had sworn to him.

In addition to loyalty oaths, the officers received written instructions from the king concerning their duties and behavior on campaign. One interesting passage instructs them not to abuse their men. “In the past [when] you [attack]ed Kilimu[na], you ordered [your] common [soldiers]: ‘Eat your soldier breads q[ui]ckly. Do double duties. [Let] them [not] allow you off duty.’ By such means you caused [your troops] to rebel. [Instead] you shall [say] as follows: ‘May these oath gods seize him who does such a thing and destroy him along with his wife and children.’”¹⁶

The officers also received magical help. The commander, his horses, his chariot and his implements of war were anointed with oil.¹⁷ Then figurines were made labeled with the names of the Hittite commander and his opponent, the first of clay and the second of cedar. These appear to have then been thrown into a fire, where the former became stronger and the latter burned up.¹⁸ The chariot horses too underwent a special purificatory ritual.¹⁹

Many of the units had to march long distances to reach the front. The army of Kargamis in Syria played a role in the defeat of Arzawa on the Aegean coast and troops from Aegean coastal states and from the Pontic kingdom of Hakpis fought at the Battle of Qadesh in central Syria.

While on the march through friendly territory, the troops were provided with rations, and the baggage train was reprovisioned from storehouses along the route. It was part of the treaty obligations of tributary states to support an army passing through or operating from their territory. If the troops desperately needed an animal they could requisition it, but it had to be returned or paid for later.²⁰ They were under strict orders not to rape or plunder in friendly territory.²¹ Even when suppressing a disturbance they

¹⁵R. Beal, THeth 20:117-127.

¹⁶KBo 16.25 i 23-29, tr. with restorations courtesy of H. A. Hoffner (personal communication).

¹⁷KUB 30.42 i 8-14, ed. E. Laroche, CTH p. 162.

¹⁸KUB 7.61 obv. 4-8, tr. H.G. Güterbock, CHM 2 (1954) 386 n. 44.

¹⁹KBo 10.44 w. dupls. KUB 29.56, KUB 51.14 ed. B. Rosenkranz, Or NS 33 (1964) 253-255. On all these rituals see R. Beal, in M. Meyer and P. Mirecki, Ancient Magic and Ritual Power (Leiden: Brill, 1995) 66f.

²⁰R. Beal, THeth 20:129-137.

²¹G. Beckman, DiplTexts² 164 § 18. (Pahḫuwa text).

were under orders only to plunder the guilty.²² Presumably in enemy territory they could supplement their rations with booty.

The various units would reach a rendezvous point and a review would be held. If there were troubles on more than one front different armies could be sent out to fight simultaneously on each front. While Suppiluliuma was besieging Kargamis, units were detached to aid Qids (mistakenly known to modern students as Qadesh) against an Egyptian attack.²³ Later Prince Telipinu was left besieging Kargamis while his father was up north in Tummanu and Ištahara.²⁴ An even more spectacular example of the Hittite ability to fight on several fronts simultaneously is seen from the reign of Mursili II. In this king's 9th year, Gen. Kurunta was sent to suppress revolts in Nuhasse and Qids (Qadesh); Nuwanza, the GAL GEŠTIN was sent north to head off an invasion from Azzi-Hayasa, while the king himself went to reestablish order in Kargamis.²⁵

When the army reached the border of the enemy a ritual would be held presenting a justification for the war to the enemy's gods in an effort to lure the enemy's gods over to the Hittite side, or at the very least to get them to abandon their protégés.²⁶ Often a legal justification for the war and a challenge to battle would also be sent to the enemy king.²⁷ For instance: "I (Mursili II) sent a messenger to Uhhaziti (king of Arzawa) with the message: 'Because I repeatedly requested back my subjects who fled to you and you wouldn't give them back to me, and you called me a child and belittled me, now come, let us fight one another and let the Stormgod, my lord, decide our lawsuit.'"²⁸ Four years later "I sent a messenger to Pihhuniya (King of the Kaskans) with the message: 'Send out to me my subjects whom you took and led down into Kaska.' Pihhuniya wrote back to me as follows: 'I will not give anything back to you. And if you come to fight me, I will not take a stand to fight you anywhere in my own territory, I will come to your land and I will take a stand to fight you in the midst of your land.' When Pihhuniya had written this

²²G. Beckman, *Dipl. Texts*² 15f. (Ismerika treaty).

²³Ed. H.G. Güterbock, "The Deeds of Suppiluliuma", *JCS* 10 (1956) 94, 97, tr. G. del Monte, *L'annalistica ittita* 135-137.

²⁴KBo 5.6 i 31-ii 15, ed. Güterbock, *JCS* 10 (1956) 91-92, tr. G. del Monte, *L'annalistica ittita* 134f.

²⁵Ed. A. Götze, *AM* 104-131, tr. G. del Monte, *L'annalistica ittita* 91-98.

²⁶E.g. R. Beal, in M. Meyer and P. Mirecki, *Ancient Magic and Ritual Power* 67f.

²⁷E.g. KBo 7.14 i 1-7, ed. S. Rosi, *SMEA* 24 (1984) 118f. n. 40; KBo 14.6 i 15-16, ed. H. G. Güterbock, *JCS* 10 (1956) 81; KUB 34.23 ii 11-23, w. dupl. KBo 12.27, ed. H. G. Güterbock, *JCS* 10 (1956) 84f.; KBo 3.4 iii 93-95, continued by KUB 14.17 iii 1-19 w. dupl. KUB 26.79 i 1-12, ed. *AM* 96-99; and even in a case of rebellion in the Apology of Hattusili III iii 68-72, ed. H. Otten, *StBoT* 24:22f..

²⁸KBo 3.4 ii 9-14, ed. A. Götze, *AM* 46f., tr. G. del Monte, *L'annalistica ittita* 63.

back to me and did not give my subjects back to me, I went to fight him and attacked his land.”²⁹

The hope was to get the enemy to sue for peace without a fight. Failing that, it was hoped that the enemy would come out and fight a decisive battle, after which the enemy army would dissolve in panic and its leaders would flee never to be seen again, leaving the country to be reorganized by the victorious Hittites, and either incorporated or handed over to some sympathetic local prince. How the Hittites accomplished this is usually not clear. Surprising the enemy was certainly a tactic to be used if possible. Suppiluliuma I did not attack Mittanni the way the Hittites had for centuries, advancing through the anti-Taurus passes or through Kizzuwatna (Cilicia) into the Mittannian held tributary states of Syria. Rather he marched due east through Isuwa (on the Murad Su), before turning south and crossing the Ergani Pass and heading directly for the Mittannian heartland and its capital. Having scattered the Mittannian army eastward and sacked the capital, he could turn westward and attack his real target Syria from both west and east.³⁰

In the prelude to the so called battle of Qadesh, geography prevented Muwattalli II from suddenly attacking Egypt from an unexpected direction. Instead, he placed his army behind the city of Qids (“Qadesh” is a modern misreading), while sending supposed deserters to the Egyptians to tell Ramses II that the Hittite army was still far to the north in Aleppo. This had the expected effect on the intelligence-less Egyptians and the vain-glorious king of causing him to set out with a quarter of his army to try to conquer as much of supposedly undefended Syria as he could. This allowed Muwattalli to sweep out of his hiding place and surprise the now separated Egyptian second corps and annihilate it and turn on the suddenly aware Ramses and his 1st corps before the spread out 3rd and 4th corps had time to get into action. Whether the Hittites always had such an advantage in intelligence (in both senses) is not clear, but this time this allowed the surprise attack which won the day, allowing Muwattalli to recover Amurru and to push south into Egyptian territory.

Generally when the Hittites and the enemy met, the result was a battle. However in rare instances it appears that a battle of champions was used to settle the matter.³¹

If the enemy would not come out and fight, other tactics could be tried. The Azzi-Hayasans were avoiding either cooperating or fighting by angering Mursili II, then when his army approached agreeing to cooperate, then going back to hostility the

²⁹KBo 3.4 iii 71-86, ed. A. Götze, AM 90-93, tr. G. del Monte, *L’annalistica ittita* 70; R. Beal, CoS 2:87.

³⁰Historical prologue to the Šattiwaza Treaty, tr. Beckman, *DiplTexts*² 42f.

³¹H. A. Hoffner, CBQ 30 (1968) 220-225.

moment he went home. Eventually, Mursili invaded. The Azziyans were soon defeated by Nuwanza, the Chief of the Wine. Thereafter they avoided daylight battle, hoping to destroy Nuwanza's forces at night, but Nuwanza was warned and ready, so the attack never came. Thereafter the Azziyans refused to fight at all and retreated behind two powerful border fortress-cities, Aripa and Dukkamma. Mursili first took on Aripa, a city sitting on a high rocky crag and powerfully defended. Mursili took the city by storm and gave it over to his troops for sacking. When Mursili arrived below Dukkamma, they had heard about the taking and thorough sack of Aripa and offered terms--the garrison would join the Hittite army if the city wasn't plundered. Mursili accepted the terms and kept the bargain. Hearing of the fall of the two powerful fortresses, the elders of Azzi-Hayasa came to Mursili and surrendered. The capture of a nearly impregnable fortress and its subsequent rough treatment, created the psychological conditions for Mursili to accomplish his further objectives in Azzi-Hayasa with little further bloodshed.³²

In the time of king Hantili II(?) the Hittites lost the northern third of their kingdom and a number of important cult centers to the decentralized Kaska people.³³ This left the once centrally located capital, Hattusa, dangerously close to an enemy who preferred infiltration and looting easy targets, and ambushing unwary troops and travelers. This was an enemy that melted away as soon as a Hittite reprisal force approached leaving the Hittites no one to fight. Here Hittite tactics were to march into whatever part of Kaskan territory was hostile at that particular moment, loot and burn as many towns and villages and their crops as they could in the hopes that eventually the men of the district and their neighbors who saw themselves as next would either become alarmed at the damage or would get cornered and in either case would stand and fight against the numerically superior Hittite army or would agree to terms. In the worst case the Hittites had enriched themselves with Kaskan cattle and could hope that they would have a year or two of peace while the Kaskans rebuilt.

On occasion a bit more subtlety could be used to good effect. Mursili II reports that he wanted to wipe out the Kaskan leader Pittagatalli and his nine thousand soldiers. Mursili knew he would need to move rapidly to catch Pittagatalli, so he left his baggage train behind in a safe fort and prepared his men for a rapid march. However, Pittagatalli was alert and had pickets posted. If Mursili had tried to attack Pittagatalli, he and his army would have disappeared before Mursili arrived. So Mursili set off in the evening against a different foe. In the middle of the night, partway there, he turned and, marching all night long, suddenly bore down on Pittagatalli, catching the enemy troops by surprise

³²KBo 4.4 iii 61-iv 37, ed. AM 132-139, tr. G. del Monte, *L'annalistica ittita* 98-100.

³³Apology of Hattusili III, iii 46, ed. H. Otten, *StBoT* 24 (1981) 20f.

and routing them.³⁴ In addition to forced and night time marches, Mursili used fog cover to conceal the movement of his troops (lit. “The valiant Stormgod, my lord, had summoned the god Hasammili, my lord, for me, and he had concealed me, so no one saw me.”) And so he caught the town of Piggainaressa sleeping.³⁵

Naturally this sort of campaign against the Kaska meant avoiding falling into ambushes one’s self, as happened to the unfortunate golden chariot fighter mentioned in a letter from the frontier fortress at Tapigga: “You wrote to me how the enemy [set] an ambush for thirty teams of horses at Panata and that the golden chariot fighter [was a man] of appearing and turning, yet afterwards the enemy killed him.”³⁶ Mursili mentions that it was due to the movement of birds that he realized that he himself was about to lead his army into an ambush, and so avoided such a fate.³⁷ Sometimes the main army, when, for instance, busy building fortifying or when weighted down with plundered animals, crops and other booty, would rest, while sending out detachments in various directions to complete the destruction.³⁸ At other times the sending out of detachments was part of the plan. “The king will sleep in Sapinuwa but the army will camp in Hanziwa. He will pass below Suppiluliyā and strike Sahuzimisa. They will dispatch general [...]-luwa with some irregulars³⁹ and he will attack the town of Daha[...]. They will dispatch Maniyaziti with some irregulars and he will attack it up from behind from the direction of Kuwarina. Asduwari and Timitti will strike it frontally from the direction of Kammama.”⁴⁰

In one curious case, the Hittites successfully adopted the tactics of the barbarians. While Suppiluliuma I was busy for many years defeating Mittanni and conquering Mittanni’s Syrian possessions, the province of Pala, to the northwest of Hatti was completely overrun by the Kaska. No fortified towns remained. Suppiluliuma named his nephew Prince Hudupianza, as governor of Pala, but could not afford to give him an army. With only a few men, and making their beds in the mountains, Hudupianza did not give the enemy peace in any part of Pala. He chose his battles carefully and was undefeated. For twenty years he maintained a Hittite presence in Pala, without his uncle

³⁴KBo 5.8 iii 11-36, ed. AM 156-159, tr. G. del Monte, L’annalistica ittita 111.

³⁵KBo 4.4 iii 29-39, ed. AM 126-129, tr. G. del Monte, L’annalistica ittita 97.

³⁶HKM 26:3-9, ed. CHD P 134.

³⁷KBo 5.8 i 14-23, ed. AM 148f., tr. G. del Monte, L’annalistica ittita 107f.

³⁸DŠ 28 i 31-38, ed. H.G. Güterbock, JCS 10 (1956) 91, tr. G. del Monte, L’annalistica ittita 134; and KBo 5.8 iv 12-20, ed. AM 160-163, tr. G. del Monte, L’annalistica ittita 112f.

³⁹ÉRIN.MEŠ ŠUTI, perhaps irregular troops armed/dressed like Sutean tribesmen, see R. Beal, THeth 20:104-108.

⁴⁰KUB 22.51 obv. 10-15, w. dupl. KUB 50.108:7-11, translit. R. Beal, THeth 20:471 n. 1745, tr. R. Beal, FsPopko 33.

or cousins being able to send him much aid. Eventually Mursili was able to send him some troops and he was able to rebuild some fortified towns and capture some people to settle them. Although the Kaska were still too many for him to drive them out, by guerrilla tactics he managed to begin the reconquest from the guerrillas. Finally, after twenty years Mursili was able bring the main army to the northwest to help him finish clearing Pala and neighboring Tummana of barbarians.⁴¹

Sometimes surprise and psychological warfare were insufficient. The enemy retreated into a fortress. Our earliest text reports that Pithana of Kussara took the city of Kanis by storm at night, capturing its king. His son, Anitta, makes a point that his father did no harm to the people of Kanis, which he proceeded to make his capital. Later Anitta attacked Salatiwara. The king and his sons (according to Anitta) abandoned their land and cities and took up a position along the Hūlana river. Anitta burned their cities, but in the end had to besiege the Salatiwarans until they surrendered.⁴²

The siege of the rebellious city of Zalpa by Labarna I and Hattusili I⁴³ presents a fairly typical, if drawn out siege. The king went to Zalpa “and built around Zalpa”, presumably referring to siege works built for blockading, and “for two years he sat below/beside.” He demanded the ringleaders be handed over, but the men of the city refused. So he pressed/harried the city and the citizens began dying. Eventually Labarna, stating the justice of his cause to his own army and to the besieged Zalpans “I am your king”, led his army in storming and taking the city.⁴⁴ Later, Hattusili I reports that three times he attacked the gates of Hahha before taking the city.⁴⁵

However, sieges too could sometimes be won by some clever strategy. Mursili II chased Aparru into the fortress of Lakku. Aparru apparently tried to break out and there was a battle in the gate, in which the Hittites were successful. Aparru retreated back into the city, but was killed, presumably by those who preferred a more passive defense. The new leaders of Lakku must have felt happy with their decision when Mursili was forced by the approaching winter to break off the siege and return with his army to Hattusa for the winter. However, what the whole army could not accomplish, the unexpected return of Hittite general Tarhini and his troops managed, and the city fell.⁴⁶

⁴¹KBo 5.8 ii 8-44, w. dupl. KBo 16.8 + KBo 16.14 + KBo 34.44 ii, ed. AM 152-155, , tr. G. del Monte, *L'annalistica ittita* 109-110, w. dupl. and joins added by Kammenhuber, OrNs 39 (1970) 548f., Groddek, AoF 23 (1996) 102f.

⁴²E. Neu, StBoT 18:10f. obv. 5-7, 14f. rev. 64-72. The text of the latter is broken, so the progress of the campaign is far from clear.

⁴³For the dating and historical situation see R. Beal, FsHoffner (forthcoming).

⁴⁴KBo 22.2 rev. 10-15 (OS), ed. H. Otten, StBoT 17:12f.

⁴⁵KBo 10.2 iii 6-8, ed. F. Imparati, SCO 14 (1965) 52f.

⁴⁶KBo 2.5 iii 50-iv 10, ed. AM 190-193, tr. G. del Monte, *L'annalistica ittita* 129.

The siege of Uršu text, apparently describing events in the reign of Hattusili I, gives our best description of a siege, as well as showing the inherent stresses that occurred during a prolonged siege. “Construct a battering ram (GIŠGUD.SI.AŠ) of Hurrian type and let it be put in place. Make a ‘mountain’ (*huršanu*) and put it in place. Cut a great battering ram from the mountains of Haššu and let it be put into place. Begin to pile up earth.”⁴⁷ ... ‘We will bring a (siege) tower (AN.ZA.GÀR) and a battering ram.’”⁴⁸

From this text we learn that the Hittites employed several different types of siege equipment. The text mentions a “great battering ram”, the trunk of which needed to be sufficiently large that only a tree from certain mountains would suffice. This seems to have been a different object from a Hurrian ram, for the orders to build each are given separately. It is unclear what a “mountain” was, but since it was made and moved into place, it is likely to have been some type of siege machine (perhaps a type of tower or platform different from the AN.ZA.GÀR-tower).⁴⁹ The soldiers are ordered to be ever vigilant against people slipping in and out of the besieged city,⁵⁰ not to mention against enemy sorties.

In this text the city continued to hold out. The battering ram broke. Rams and siege towers promised by allies failed to materialize. Messengers managed to slip in and out of the city rather freely. Hittite generals promised to set fire to the gates, but the attack was continually postponed. The king in exasperation asks “Why have you not given battle? Do you stand on chariots of water, or have you yourselves turned to water? ... If you had fallen on your knees before him (the enemy king), you would certainly have killed him, or at least frightened him. ... Are the puppies wearing the helmets?”⁵¹ We know from other sources that in the end Hattusili I succeeded in capturing the city.⁵²

⁴⁷KBo 1.11 obv. 15-16 (Hatt. I?), ed. G. Beckman, JCS 47 (1995) 24f.

⁴⁸Ibid. 28-33. Previous translators have taken the penultimate sentence as a statement. However, it makes more sense to see it as a rhetorical question. They remind Iyaya that the Hittites have their own towers, so that Iyaya’s deception will not affect the ultimate outcome of the siege; they simply do not wish to go to the bother of transporting them when one is so close at hand.

⁴⁹AHw 360 “Belagerungsdamm”; A. Kempinski, AÄAT 4:35 “Belagerungswall”; Beckman, JCS 47 (1995) 24, 26 “siege-works”. CAD H (1956) 254 considers it to have been a “siege ramp”, however a siege ramp is not made and then put into place. Beside, the piling up of dirt for the siege ramp is mentioned two lines later.

⁵⁰KBo 11.1 rev. 23-24.

⁵¹Beckman, JCS 47 (1995) 23-27.

⁵²KBo 10.1 obv. 7-9, ed. Cl. Saporetti, SCO 14 (1965) 77, 80, KBo 10.2 i 16-21, ed. F. Imparati, SCO 14 (1965) 44f.

Many generations later, a letter from an officer to the king concerns the failure to take the city that he is besieging. Knocking down the wall and hacking through it are failing, because the wall is particularly thick and there is a moat.⁵³ Since such setbacks meant that sieges could be prolonged and since disease tends to take a tremendous toll not just on the besieged but on the besiegers as well,⁵⁴ there are a number of magic rituals designed to rid army camps of disease and magically pass it over to the enemy.⁵⁵

After Suppiluliuma I's great victory over Mittanni (see above), Suppiluliuma, needing to deal with the northern frontier, left the job of subjugating the province of Kargamis to his son Telipinu, "Priest" (i.e. appanage king) of Kizzuwatna. Telipinu managed to subjugate the province of Kargamis but the great fortress city of Kargamis, on the Euphrates held out. When the campaign season ended, Telipinu took the bulk of his troops and returned to Hatti, leaving Lupakki with 600 men to watch over Kargamis from Murmuriga, where, in line with the usual Hittite practice of wintering an army in the field, they would have built a fortified camp. The Mittannians seeing a chance to avenge their recent defeats and to save their empire soon had the besiegers under siege themselves. Suppiluliluma moved with the whole army toward Syria, but sent a faster moving column under Crown Prince Arnuwanda and Zita the GAL *MEŠEDI* to relieve the siege. The Mittannians tried to stop the advancing column but were defeated, Lupakki was relieved, and Suppiluliuma settled in to besiege Kargamis himself. Although the text is broken, it appears that the siege also involved boats on the Euphrates. The final phase of the siege lasted seven days, and on the eighth it was stormed, and a fierce battle ensued, but the city was taken. The people and metal items were carried off from the Lower City, but Suppiluluma was very careful to see to it that no harm came to the temples in the Upper City.⁵⁶

For his campaign against the major western Anatolian state of Arzawa, Mursili II summoned the army of his brother the king of Kargamis. After the two armies had joined, Mursili set off for Arzawa. Piyama-Kurunta, son of the dying king of Arzawa, led the Arzawan army across his border taking his stand along the Astarpa River in Walma. Mursili was victorious, and pursued the surviving Arzawans down the river

⁵³KBo 18.54 rev.

⁵⁴See for example during one of Suppiluliuma's campaigns against the Kaska, ed. H.G. Güterbock, "The Deeds of Suppiluliuma", JCS 10 (1956) 90, tr. G. del Monte, *L'annalistica ittita* 133.

⁵⁵See R. Beal, in M. Meyer and P. Mirecki, *Ancient Magic and Ritual Power* (Leiden: Brill, 1995), 69-73.

⁵⁶KBo 5.6 ii 9-46, iii 26-43, ed. H. G. Güterbock, JCS 10 (1956) 92-95, tr. G. del Monte, *L'annalistica ittita* 135-137.

valley clear across Arzawa. The Arzawan king evacuated Apasa (Ephesos) by sea, leaving the capital to Mursili. However, many other Arzawans took refuge in the city of Puranda and on Mount Arinnanda. Mursili tells us that Arinnanda was a high, rocky, wooded place that jutted out into the sea. Since it was impossible for horses to climb, Mursili led his troops up on foot and vanquished some of the defenders. The remainder he proceeded to starve into surrender. Since this had taken some time, winter's ice was at hand. Mursili tried to talk Puranda into surrender, but failed and so retreated to the Astarpa River, where he built a fortified winter camp. The following spring he faced a Puranda reinvigorated by the leadership of a returned Arzawan prince, Tapalazunauli. When Mursili arrived, Tapalazunauli came down from the city to fight. When the battle went badly for the Arzawans, they retreated back into the city. Mursili cut off its water supply and settled down for siege. Seeing the situation, Tapalazunauli tried to break out with his family and some of his people. Mursili found out and gave chase, capturing many of the escapees, but not the prince. Meanwhile the siege continued until Mursili stormed and took the city.⁵⁷

When central Syria took advantage of the death of Mursili's brother, Sarri-Kusuh, the Hittite viceroy of Syria, and king of Kargamis to revolt, Mursili was preoccupied elsewhere. Therefore he sent general Kurunta to lay waste the rebellious lands of Nuhasse and to besiege their cities until they submitted or until Mursili could get there. In Nuhasse, Kurunta's scorched earth policy was successful. The siege of Qids, the largest of the rebellious states ended differently--with treachery. Niqmadda, son and heir of king Aitakkama, seeing the progress of the siege and the city's dwindling grain supply, killed his father and threw the body over the walls and surrendered to the Hittites. Niqmadda was sent to Mursili, who although thoroughly disapproving of parricide, decided that it was the work of the oath gods and so returned Qids to Niqmadda.⁵⁸

While the Hittites seem largely to have preferred to keep their feet on dry land, on occasion a navy was necessary.⁵⁹ Since there is no mention of a standing navy, presumably when naval vessels were needed, orders were sent to the governors in all the Hittite ports to requisition all of the merchant vessels in port. Tributary states such as Ugarit and Amurru were also required to contribute their vessels to the effort. We have a letter from a Hittite official to the King of Ugarit ordering him to quickly outfit and send to Hatti 150 ships.⁶⁰ In a letter the king of Ugarit laments that his army is with the

⁵⁷AM 48-67, G. del Monte, *L'annalistica ittita* 63-67, 79-84.

⁵⁸KBo 4.4 i 39- ii 15, ed. AM 110-115, tr. G. del Monte, *L'annalistica ittita* 93.

⁵⁹See R. Beal, *THeth* 20 (1992) 203-211.

⁶⁰RS 18.148, ed. J. Nougayrol, *PRU* 5:88f. no. 62.

Hittites and his fleet is in the Luqqa lands (Lycia) presumably also with the Hittites, since this has left Ugarit itself defenseless.⁶¹ Arnuwanda I claimed control over Alasiya (Cyprus), indicating an ability in the Middle Hittite period to project Hittite military strength overseas. Texts from the late empire tell of Tudhaliya IV reconquering Cyprus, while Suppiluliuma II tells of fighting three sea battles and then landing troops on Cyprus to again conquer the island.⁶² In addition, riverine craft seem to have been involved in Suppiluliuma I's siege of Kargamis.⁶³

When despite preparation and planning, the gods permission, and the best of strategy, "it gets scary in the field for a lord of the army or when all goes right for the enemy in battle and it goes badly for our boys, one performs a ritual." Through analogic actions and recitation the enemy warriors are to be rendered powerless. Then the Hittite troops are reminded: "The gods march on our side. The former kings speak on our behalf. ... The gods have given boys to our army with manhood and bravery."⁶⁴

"If the troops are defeated by the enemy, they perform the far-side-of-the-river ritual. On the far side of the river they cut in half a person, a billy goat, a puppy and a piglet. Half of each they place on this side and half on that side. In front they build a gate of hawthorn. Overtop they draw a rope. In front, on either side, they light a fire. The troops go through the middle. When they reach the river they sprinkle them with water. Afterward they perform the ritual of the battlefield for them in the usual way." In other words whatever impurity caused the defeat was magically sucked off by the halved creatures, scraped off by the thorn bushes and rope, burned off by the fire and washed off by the water. With morale restored, the army could then march on to victory.⁶⁵

When a city was captured by force, it was generally plundered and burned. The booty (people, animals and other valuables) was divided between the Hittites and their allies, with equals getting equal rights, and lesser allies lesser amounts.⁶⁶ Then the Hittite share was divided between the king and his troops.⁶⁷ The civilians, however, were not intended to be otherwise harmed. Removing them from enemy lands deprived any enemy who might rise in the defeated area of valuable manpower and tax revenue. Also,

⁶¹RS 20.238, ed. J. Nougayrol, *Ugaritica* 5 (1968) 87-89 no. 24.

⁶²KBo 12.38 iii 2-14, ed. H.G. Güterbock, *JNES* 26 (1967) 76-78.

⁶³KUB 34.25:8-11, ed. H. G. Güterbock, *JCS* 10 (1956) 94, tr. G. del Monte, *L'annalistica ittita* 135f.

⁶⁴KUB 7.58, see tr. by R. Beal, *CANE* 1:552.

⁶⁵KUB 17.28 iv 45-56, ed. H. M. Kümmel, *StBoT* 3:151f., B.J. Collins, *JCS* 42 (1990) 219f. w. n. 44, cf. R. Beal, in M. Meyer and P. Mirecki, *Ancient Magic and Ritual Power* 74f.

⁶⁶Cf. Beckman, *DiplTexts*² 21 (Sunassura)

⁶⁷KBo 3.4 ii 41-45 and passim.

people were a valuable thing to the Hittites, who ruled a country with more available land than there were people. At the capture of the Arzawan Mt. Arinnanda the king's share of civilian captives was some 15,500 people.⁶⁸ Most of these people, now known as transportees (*arnuwala*), were brought to Hatti, given vacant land, food and seed, and several years of tax holiday in the hopes that they would turn into productive Hittite taxpayers.⁶⁹ The troops' share of the captives were presumably put to work on their farms or sold as slaves. A portion of the king's share of both people and other valuables was dedicated to the gods in thanks for the victory. Sometimes if the defeated people were considered victims of their leaders, the captured leaders were carried off, while the people were left in peace. Often a defeated land would be handed over to a friendly member of the old ruling family, who would sign a treaty with the Hittites, and would be allowed to resettle his land, now as an ally and protected friend.

The Hittite Military in Defense---Fortifications⁷⁰

The Hittites were not always on the offensive. They had also to face invasions by neighboring countries. In Hantili I's reign it was said that Hurrians troops were like foxes infesting the bushes.⁷¹ In Hantili II(?)'s reign the northern third of the kingdom, including the residences of a number of important gods, was lost to the barbarian Kaska. During Tudhaliya III's reign we are told that enemies came from all directions and seized much Hittite land, and that even the capital city, Hattusa, was burned.⁷² Annals often mention that while the field army was fighting off one invader, other neighbors took advantage of the situation to attack.⁷³ With such problems homeland defense was of paramount importance.

Also, as we mentioned above, when a Hittite field army needed to winter away from home a fort (*BÀD KARAŠ*)⁷⁴ was built to house them. While this afforded the army some protection, such a hastily built fort was no match for a determined invader. In

⁶⁸KBo 3.4 ii 40-45, ed. A. Götze, AM 56f., tr. G. del Monte, *L'annalistica ittita* 64f.

⁶⁹KUB 13.2 iii 36-41, tr. G. McMahon, CoS 1:224, and Law § 112, ed. H.A. Hoffner, LH107f.

⁷⁰Information not otherwise footnoted is from K. Bittel, *Hattusha, Capital of the Hittites*, R. Naumann, *Architektur Kleinasien*² (1971); Neve, *Hattuša, Stadt der Götter und Tempel* (1992-1993).

⁷¹KBo 7.15 i 2 (Telipinu proclamation), w. dupl. KBo 3.1 i 42, ed. THeth 11.20f., CHD P 143, tr. Th. van den Hout, CoS 1:195.

⁷²KBo 6.28 obv. 6-15, ed. A. Goetze, Kizz. 21f.

⁷³Eg. KBo 5.8 ii 8-18, ed. A. Götze, AM 152f., tr. G. del Monte, *L'annalistica ittita* 109.

⁷⁴These are discussed by R. Beal, THeth 20:22 n. 82.

a series of oracular question the gods were asked if the enemy would penetrate the Hittite army camp during the night and/or during the day.⁷⁵ To meet both of these threats, the Hittites developed the art of fortification.

Hittite cities were walled almost by definition. Hittite circuit walls were built on an artificial rampart which formed a glacis to make life harder for besiegers. On this rampart was built a stone casemate wall, that is two parallel stone walls connected at intervals by stone cross-walls, the little rooms between the walls being subsequently filled in with rubble. The casemate of the older Lower City circuit wall of Hattusa had an 3m thick outer wall of and 2.7m thick inner wall with the filled room 2.10m wide, yielding a total thickness of the wall of 7.8m.⁷⁶ The similar earlier wall at Sarissa (Kuşaklı) was 8.4m., that of Alaca Höyük ca. 8m, and Alişar 5-7.5m thick. Later walls are not as thick. The Upper City's wall at Hattusa was 4.25m thick and the later wall at Sarissa 3.6m.⁷⁷ Atop the stone wall was built a mudbrick wall at least 6m high, which itself was topped by a chemin-de-ronde and by crenellations⁷⁸ to shelter defending archers. The glacis was often, if not always, paved.⁷⁹

Every so many meters a rectangular tower protruded forward and upward from the wall.⁸⁰ These were two stories taller than the chemin-de-ronde, built in the half-timbered style typical of Hittite (and pre-cement Turkish) domestic architecture. The lower room was lit on the city-side by four triangular windows formed by crossed beams. The upper room had two vertically rectangular windows on the cityside and one on each side overlooking the wall. Each window was furnished with shutters that could be barred. The roof was crenellated. Rain gutters were also provided.⁸¹ In the older Lower City

⁷⁵KUB 52.18 iii 1-11, cf. R. Beal, THeth 20:22 n. 82.

⁷⁶R. Naumann, Architektur Kleinasiens 254. The wall of Büyükkaya is similar if a bit thinner, outer wall max. 2.5m., inner wall 1.8m. to 2m. The crosswalls forming the casemates are 1.3-1.5m thick. P. Neve, ArAnz 1994:298.

⁷⁷A. Schachner, MDOG 131 (1999) 76 w. nn. 4-5.

⁷⁸See the wall portion of the clay model in R. Naumann, Architektur Kleinasiens 256 abb. 327-328, K. Bittel, Hattusha pl. 10b.

⁷⁹The paved glacis at the Sphinx gate in the Upper City has now been completely restored. Elsewhere, see the plan in P. Neve, ArchAnz 1993 636 abb. 15a.

⁸⁰Casemate walls with frequent towers built atop a rampart can also be seen at Kuşaklı, although here the stone portion of the wall and gate-towers is little more than a tall foundation. Most of the tower and wall, like more modern Turkish (both Anatolian and Uzbek) architecture, was half-timbered with mud-bricks afterwards packed in between the timber frames. See A. Müller-Karpe, MDOG 129 (1997) 104, A. Schachner, MDOG 130 (1998) 129, MDOG 131 (1999) 73, 79.

⁸¹R. Naumann, Architektur Kleinasiens 256 abb. 327-328, K. Bittel, Hattusha pl. 10b. The half timbering is found archaeologically at Kuşaklı, see A. Schachner, MDOG 130 (1998) 129. For the shutters see KUB 31.86 ii 13-15, ed. CHD L88a, THeth 20 427 n.

wall of Hattusa the towers were 7 to 15.8m wide and protruded 2 to 4.5m. They were separated by 13 to 28.60m of curtain wall. In the newer Upper City city wall the towers were 7-8m wide, protruded 4.3 to 6.3m and had a more uniform 22 to 26m. of curtain wall between them. On Büyükkaya the towers were 10-10.5m. wide and generally protruded 2.5m., although three towers protruded 5-6m and one protruded 10m. Between them ran 18-20m. of curtain wall.⁸² A tower was placed on protruding points where the wall made a turn.⁸³ Much, if not all, of the Upper City's circuit wall had a second lower outer wall--a single wall, not a casemate wall--with small towers/bastions corresponding to the curtain wall of the main circuit. The north wall of Büyükkaya had a similar outer wall, built in the late New Hittite period, subsequent to the main wall, but no towers have yet been found on it.⁸⁴ Hittite walls tended to be faced with cyclopean masonry, large irregular blocks cut to fit carefully together with the space behind such stones filled with smaller stones. The whole thing was then plastered.⁸⁵ Various sections of the city of Hattusa were separated from one another by city walls, the Lower City from the Upper City as well as from the west city, and Büyükkaya from the north city. Some, at least, of these inner walls were once outer walls in an earlier stage of the development of the city, but they appear to have been more or less kept up afterwards as inner lines of defense.

Gates were protected by massive towers, into which usually ran both the main curtain wall and the outer wall, where this existed. Generally there was one tower on either side of the gate, although the smaller north west gate of the Lower City and the north and west gates on Büyükkaya had only one tower, against which the downward sloping edge of the approach road-ramp abutted.⁸⁶ The Sphinx gate and the northeast gate (upper plateau gate) of the Upper City simply ran through the middle of a normal tower.⁸⁷ In most cases each gate had two doorways aligned with one another, with a gate chamber in between. The width of the doorways in the larger gates is ca. 3m., while the width of the three smaller gates was 2.70, 2.3 and 2.0m. The two leaves of the outer door

1595, tr. McMahon, CoS 1:223 § 22. For rain-gutters see KUB 31.86 ii 1-4, ed. CHD L-N 186, tr. McMahon, CoS 223 § 20.

⁸²P. Neve, *ArAnz* 1994:299f.

⁸³For example on the east plateau's wall, see P. Neve, *ArAnz* 1993:646.

⁸⁴The building (out of spolia) of an outer north wall at Büyükkaya resulted in the blocking of access to the north gate. Similarly, the building of two corner towers in the outer wall blocked the stairways leading toward the Sphinx gate. J. Seeher, *ArAnz* 1997:325, 1999:319f., 328. Seeher speculates that a dangerous situation toward the end of the empire necessitated this strengthening of the defenses.

⁸⁵KUB 31.86 ii 15-17, ed. CHD P 397, tr. McMahon, CoS 223 §22.

⁸⁶P. Neve, *ArAnz* 1994:300.

⁸⁷P. Neve, *BoHa* 17:4; P. Neve, *ArAnz* 1993:644-648.

and two leaves of the inner door all opened into the central gate chamber. Large holes in the masonry on either side of the doorway allowed the insertion of heavy beams to block the doors' being opened. Thus the central gate chamber could be defended whether the attack was coming from outside or inside the city. The south gate in the west side of the old Lower City wall, the east gate of Büyükkaya⁸⁸ and the southeast gate at Kuşaklı⁸⁹ are different in having three doorways and two gate chambers. Unfortunately, the pivot stones and beam holes are not preserved, so the placement of the doors is not clear.

The so called "King's Gate" and the Lion gate had ramps leading up to them that ran alongside the wall before requiring a right angle turn into the gate, thus forcing attackers taking the easiest route to the gate to survive fire from the walls. The so called "King's" gate had in addition a short L shaped section of casemate wall extending outward from the tower to another smaller tower looking directly down the gate chamber. A similar strengthening of the defensibility of a gate can be seen in the east gate of Büyükkaya and southwest gate at Kuşaklı.⁹⁰ The other less monumental gates at Boğazköy, and Kuşaklı, as far as they have been excavated, seem to have had simple straight access. The narrow northeast gate of the Upper City of Hattusa lead directly to a small gate in the outer wall. Many of the gates had sewers passing beneath the floor of the gate.⁹¹

Another feature of Hittite fortifications are the many postern gates (*lustani*). These are corbel-arched passageways, wide enough for one soldier to walk, that pass through the earth rampart under the circuit wall, debouching some distance on either side of the wall. These would have allowed the city's defenders to sneak behind a besieger's assault force and either attack them from behind or burn their camp. Eight of these posterns have been found so far, 80-100m apart, running beneath the walls around the Lower City of Hattusa, with three more running under the wall enclosing Büyükkaya,⁹² and one, now known as Yerkapı running under the south (Sphinx gate) bastion of the Upper City. These passages in the Lower City wall were given extra protection by closer set towers on the circuit wall.

⁸⁸See plan in KBo 42 p. xvii.

⁸⁹A. Schachner, MDOG 130 (1998) 129-135.

⁹⁰P. Neve, ArAnz 1994:297, A. Müller-Karpe, MDOG 129 (1997) 137.

⁹¹P. Neve, ArAnz 1993:644-648.

⁹²Büyükkaya's posterns are discussed by P. Neve, ArAnz 1994:306-312.

The posterns themselves had doors that could be barred to prevent outsiders gaining entry to the city.⁹³ At least some had a small guard's room built just inside the outside entranceway.⁹⁴ While these posterns date mainly from the earlier phases of the city's construction, the most famous postern, Yerkapı, which runs 71m through the massive artificial terrace built at the high point of the Upper City, dates from a later phase of Hattusa's construction.⁹⁵ This passage is around 2.4m wide and around 3m high in the center. A similarly impressive postern has been found at the site of Alişar.⁹⁶ The city now called Alaca Höyük also had postern gates, one of which prevents a clear line of sight through it by having a right angle turn halfway along. Near the city-side end there is a recess placed on either side of the passage, perfect for concealing a defending soldier or two unseen until it was too late for anyone trying to creep through the passage from outside. There is also a 25cm hole in a roof slab that may at one time have served to make life unpleasant for intruders. At Ugarit, a Hittite tributary in Syria, the height of the passage is ca 5m and the floor, rather than a ramp consists of low steps. Horses could have been ridden though, if necessary.

Although not yet found archaeologically, instructions for fortifying cities require that a moat be dug 3m deep and 2m across, and paved with stone before being filled with water.⁹⁷

It was the responsibility of the governor of an urbanized province (*utniyasha/HAZANNU*) to oversee the watch. At night the governor or his representative oversaw the bolting of the gates and the placing on the gate of a seal, to prevent anyone sneaking someone through. In the morning the governor, the headman of the town (*MAŠKIM URU*) and an overseer of clansmen (*UGULA LĪM*) or some other lord of the city all checked to see that the seal was intact before breaking it and reopening the gate.⁹⁸ On the gates and along the circuit wall pairs of guards/stand-watchmen (*haliyatalla/LÚEN.NU.UN*) were stationed by the two headmen under the governor's

⁹³KUB 31.86 ii 13-15, ed. THeth 20:427 n. 1595, CHD L-N 88, tr. CoS 1:223 § 22.

Archaeological evidence for the door on the inside end of a postern see P. Neve, *ArAnz* 1994:310. Stone doorframes were found at both ends Yerkapı, see P. Neve, *BoHa* 17:5f.

⁹⁴For this at Yerkapı see P. Neve, *BoHa* 17:5f. It is 1m wide and 1.6m. deep. The guard also had a seat carved into the rock of the doorframe on the outside of the doorway.

⁹⁵So too apparently does the middle postern ("No. 2") on Büyükkaya, see P. Neve, *BoHa* 17:7.

⁹⁶A postern gate running under a casemate wall has also been found in Hittite controlled Işuwa, at Korucutepe, apud A. Schachner, *MDOG* 130 (1998) 134.

⁹⁷KUB 31.86 ii 8-12, tr. McMahon, *CoS* 1:223 § 21.

⁹⁸F. Daddi Pecchioli, *OA* 14 (1975) 102f.; cf. R. Beal, *THeth* 20:437-442. For archaeological evidence of this practice see A. Schachner, *MDOG* 131 (1999) 77f.

supervision. At Sarissa (Kuşaklı) a set of steps set into the inside of the city circuit wall beside the city gate allowed the watchmen up onto the wall. In the first watch (of 3) of the night a herald called out “Fires out!”. In the second watch the herald reminded the watchmen on the walls “Watch out for fire!”.⁹⁹ In the morning the guards on the walls were to scan the perimeter carefully and give a report to their superior before descending.¹⁰⁰ Pairs of guards were also placed at various strategic places within the city.¹⁰¹ While the noun “patrolman” (*weheskatalla-*) is attested, it is not yet clear whether patrolmen patrolled Hittite cities.¹⁰²

At Hattusa, water in time of siege could be gotten from the brook which ran through the city, from a number of springs within the city walls or from a number of large artificial stone lined ponds.¹⁰³ A 118m long by 33-40m wide granary building, with a thirty two underground rooms, ca. 6m wide and 13-16m long, and an estimated 4m high, has been found below the citadel in the old town. It is estimated that the rooms, when full, would have contained 7,000-9,800m³ of grain, or enough to feed 23,000-32,000 people for a year. The rooms so far sampled contained barley, eincorn wheat, peas and beans.¹⁰⁴ At least eleven more gigantic underground granaries, these freestanding, were located atop Büyükkaya. These ranged in size from 6m by 6m to 12m by 18m.¹⁰⁵ These appear to have been built after the ones in the Lower City burned.¹⁰⁶ For their defense, the new granaries were built on a naturally defensible height, whose portion of the city circuit walls was further strengthened by an outer wall built at the expense of blocking up one or more city gates, and whose only path from the city was blocked by a gated cross wall running from the city wall to the cliff-face.¹⁰⁷ A large complex of storerooms, some with huge pithoi embedded in their floors, formed part of the complex of the Stormgod and Sungoddess of Arinna’s temple. Such supplies would have been important in time of

⁹⁹KBo 13.58 iii 13-18, ed. F. Pecchioli Daddi, OA 14 (1975) 104f. w. modified translation R. Beal, THeth 20:258f. w. n. 970. For Kuşaklı see A. Schachner, MDOG 131 (1999) 74f.

¹⁰⁰KUB 13.1 + 885/z i 9-11, w. dupl. KUB 31.108:7-9, ed. Beal, THeth 20:256f. w. n. 967.

¹⁰¹KUB 26.9 + Bo 69/1256 i 4-27, ed. H. Otten, OrNS 52 (1983) 134-137, w. modified translation, R. Beal, THeth 20:257f. For guards see THeth 20:251-264

¹⁰²THeth 20:260f.

¹⁰³J. Seeher, ArchAnz 1996:331-337, 1997:331, 1998:216f., 1999:334, 336, P. Neve, BoHa 12:128-131.

¹⁰⁴J. Seeher, ArchAnz. 2000:356-367; cf. id., ArchAnz 1999:332-334 where it is estimated that each room contained 170 metric tons of grain.

¹⁰⁵J. Seeher, SMEA 42 (2000) 261-301, ArchAnz 1997:318-326, ArchAnz 1998:224-230, 1999:320-321, 329f.

¹⁰⁶Suggestion of Seeher, ArchAnz. 2000:367.

¹⁰⁷J. Seeher, ArchAnz. 1998:230f.

siege, not to mention in time of famine, or simply to pay the standing army and bureaucracy. Presumably smaller versions of such structures will be found in other cities as they are excavated, since Telipinu's edict mentions many cities with "storehouses".¹⁰⁸

Within the circuit walls of the city was found a citadel. At Hattusa the citadel sits atop a natural crag, virtually unscalable on two sides, with the city spilling down the steep slope on a third side. Despite the city defenses and natural defenses, it was walled on all four sides. Its two main gates connected it to the outside of the city, what was later to become the Upper City. The south western gate stood directly beside a gate into the city. The southeastern gate is poorly preserved but apparently gave vehicular access to the citadel. The citadel held the royal residence and center of government. There were a number of pillared courtyards, separated from one another by monumental propylaea. Facing onto the courtyards were a pillared audience hall, archive buildings, residences, a religious structure, many buildings of unknown function and a large water basin. The courtyard from which one entered the royal palace was guarded by two types of guards, who could thus keep an eye on each other. Twelve *MEŠEDI*-guards lined the side along the palace facade, and twelve spearmen guarded the opposite side of the courtyard. All carried spears. Should any of the guards feel a call of nature, he was supposed to tell the guard in front of him, who was to tell the next guard up the line and so on until the commander of ten of guards was informed. The commander of ten then told the Chief of the Guards (*GAL MEŠEDI*), if he was present, that a guard needed "to go to the pot", and the Chief was then to give permission.¹⁰⁹

Curiously, no recognizable temples are found on the citadel; the main temple is at the foot of the slope in the midst of the Lower City, and many others are scattered about especially in the Upper City.¹¹⁰ In the later New Kingdom, Büyükkaya was turned into a second citadel, as we mentioned above, in order to protect its granaries.¹¹¹ Other Hittite cities in so far as they have been excavated also followed the common pattern of having a citadel and a lower town. At Alişar the citadel gate is approached through a passage between two diagonally protruding walls.¹¹²

¹⁰⁸Cf. Th. van den Hout, CoS 1:198 § 37-38.

¹⁰⁹For guards see H.G. Güterbock and Th. van den Hout, The Hittite Instructions for the Royal Bodyguard, AS 24 (1991), and R. Beal, THeth 20:212-231.

¹¹⁰By contrast, the main temples of Kargamis were in the citadel according to KBo 5.6 iii 32-38, ed. Güterbock, JCS 10 (1956) 95, G. del Monte, L'annalistica ittita 136.

¹¹¹J. Seeher, ArchAnz. 1999:330f.

¹¹²Alişar, plan in Naumann, Architektur Kleinasien² 229 fig. 293. Maşat Höyük also has a citadel and lower town, but the expected citadel and city walls have not yet been located.

Small fortified towns such as Tapigga (now Maşat Höyük) served as seats for the governors of the border provinces (lit. “Lords of the Lookout-towers” *awariyas isha/BĒL MADGALTI*). Rather much is known about these officials thanks to the preservation of a text of instructions for them¹¹³ and thanks to an archive of letters of such an official at Tapigga.¹¹⁴ The governor was ordered to look after the fortified towns and fortresses, especially those facing the enemy. He was given exact instructions on the dimensions of fortress walls, moats, gutters and shutters. He was to be careful that no one dug into a city wall, nor built an inn or stable up against it, nor set fires close to it that could set alight the wood superstructures of the wall. He was to see to it that the ponds were free of debris and the sewers were cleaned. The size of fire logs and the amount of them to be stored up in fortresses was specified. He was to supervise the watch and all other military activity in his district, defending not just the fortresses but also the crop-bearing fields, while keeping the king constantly informed. Captured deserters and cowards were also to be sent to the king. For security reasons, foreigners seeking to trade in his district were to be allowed only into specifically designated cities. This is all in addition to his civilian legal and administrative duties.¹¹⁵

Beyond these frontier towns there were lookout towers (*auri*). These were manned by day by lookouts (*LÚNÍ.ZU*). They were to “sweep” the main roads for signs of the enemy, reporting anything suspicious to their superior. Whether “sweeping” meant “scanning” or literally looking for footsteps on swept dirt roads and paths is unclear. The lookouts were overseen by patrolling sergeants. In the evening the lookouts returned to the town, herding the farmers and herders and their animals into the city for the night. They were then to bar and bolt the gates and the posterns, and then set up their beds so that anyone trying to open a gate or postern would wake them.¹¹⁶ In times of trouble the people were kept inside the city and the lookouts kept watch at their towers day and night.¹¹⁷

¹¹³Translated recently by G. McMahon, CoS 1:221-225.

¹¹⁴S. Alp, *Hethitische Briefe aus Maşat Höyük*, TTKY VI/35 (Ankara, 1991).

¹¹⁵See tr. by G. McMahon, CoS 1:221-225, and discussion of this office by Beal, THeth 20:426-436.

¹¹⁶KUB 13.1 i 20-27, w. dupls., ed. THeth 20 n. 966, *ibid.* i 11-12, 35-36.

¹¹⁷KUB 13.2 i 7-8 and HKM 46.

Pihana, King of Kussara & Kanesh
Anitta King of Kussara & Kanesh (son)
...
Huzziya I
...
Tudhaliya I
PU-Sarruma (son of Tudhaliya I)
Labarna I (son-in-law of PU-Sarruma)
Hattusili I (grandson of PU-Sarruma)
Mursili I (grandson of Hattusili I)
Hantili I (brother-in-law of Mursili I)
Zidanta I (son-in-law of Hantili I)
Ammuna (son of Zidanta I)
Huzziya II (son of Ammuna)

List of Hittite Kings

Telipinu (son in law of Ammuna)
Tahurwaili (grandson of Ammuna)
Alluwamna (son-in-law of Telipinu)
Hantili II (son of Alluwamna)
Zidanta II (nephew of Hantili II?)
Huzziya III (?)
Muwattalli I (?)
Kantuzili (son? of Huzziya III)
Tudhaliya II (son of Kantuzili)
Arnuwanda I (son-in-law of Tudhaliya II)
Hattusili II (regent?, brother? of Arnuwanda I)
Tudhaliya III (son of Arnuwanda I)
Suppiluliuma I (son of Tudhaliya III)
Arnuwanda II (son of Suppiluliuma I)
Mursili II (son of Suppiluliuma I)
Muwattalli II (son of Mursili II)
Mursili III (Urhi-Tesub) (son of Muwattalli II)
Hattusili III (son of Mursili II)
Tudhaliya IV (son of Hattusili III)
Arnuwanda III (son of Tudhaliya IV)
Kurunta (son of Muwattalli II)
Suppiluliuma II (son of Tudhaliya IV)