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MYCENAEAN *IJO(S)*

Argument. Mycenaean shows *ijo* and *i-65*. It is most improbable that *ijo* is a personal name; it must be 'son'. For *i-65* *iju* has been posited and this is linked with *ijewe* and *iwe* (= $\text{ul}\acute{\epsilon}\text{f}\epsilon\text{i}$ and $\text{ul}\text{f}\epsilon\text{i}$, = Homeric $\text{ul}\acute{\epsilon}\text{i}$ and uli respectively). But *ijewe* 'to the son' depends on a doubtful interpretation of Tn 316 r 10, while *iwe* = $\text{ul}\text{f}\epsilon\text{i}$ in X 8176 is a blind guess; there is no reason why Mycenaean should have omitted *w* in writing the equivalent of $\text{ul}\acute{\upsilon}\text{s}/\text{ul}\acute{\upsilon}\text{s}$. *ijo* and *i-65* are one and the same word, = ios 'son'. Vestigia of this ios remain in Homer in verses where $\text{ul}\acute{\upsilon}\text{s}$ has to be scanned dibrach. ios acted on $\text{ul}\acute{\upsilon}\text{s}$ to produce $\text{ul}\acute{\upsilon}\text{s}$ and thus make the heteroclite noun. ios 'son' became obsolete possibly owing to homonymic clash with los 'one'. Schwyzler's and Buck's findings that los in inscrr. = 'is, idem, $\text{\text{ἐκείνός}}$ ' denied.

In a letter to "Nestor" of August 1st 1963, p. 269, M. Lejeune wrote "On a reconnu le nom mycénien du 'fils' dans (dat. sg.) *ijewe* (PY Tn 316) et (nomin. sg.) *i-65* (PY Ae 344, An 218, Jn 725, Sn 64), qui peut être aussi un anthroponyme $\text{\text{ἰών}}$, et dans les trois exemples de *ijo* que présente KN V 1523 . . ."

While Lejeune considers that *ijo* in Au 102 *may* be = 'son', but may also be a personal name, Luria, writing in Glotta 40/1962 p. 2 had no doubt but that *ijo* = 'son' was 'ein Phantasieprodukt', and held that it must be a personal name, as previously proposed by Meriggi and accepted in *Docs* p. 419.

The view that *ijo* = 'son' in that MY tablet was argued by me in BICS 6/1959 p. 17f. Since then in TAPA 52/1962 Part 7 there has been published MY V 659. Now while Au 102 is a list of men, V 659 is a list of women¹, and in that list occurs "*otowowije tukateqe 2*". This can only mean "O. and (her) daughter 2 (women/persons)"; and this is about as close as any parallel well can be to "*warapisiro ijoge 2*" of Au 102, which must be recognised unequivocally as "W. and (his) son, 2 (men/persons)". In the light of V 659 it hardly seems possible any longer to doubt that *ijo* means 'son', and to think that the word could possibly represent a personal name 'Ion'.

¹ But is this so? Chadwick takes all the names as being of women, and finds some difficulty. It is theoretically possible that the names are mostly of women, but include some men — husbands and wives and daughters (lines 2, 6, 8, and edge.). Even line 5 might be 'O. and (his) daughter'. There is nothing inherently impossible (though probably without parallel in our documents) in a list containing both sexes.

And as to this name Ion, it must be pointed out that the Ion known to Classical Greece is the son of Xouthos and Kreusa. This Xouthos is one of the three sons of Hellen (Aiolos, Xouthos, and Doros). It would seem therefore that Ion is a late recruit to mythology to account for Ἴωνες (< Ἰόφωνες). The suggested 'Ion' for Au 102 could not be such an Ion, as he would have to have a digamma, as in the possible dative *Iawone* KN X 146. The 'Ion' would have to have some other origin. What origin? It seems impossible for *ijo* to be anything but 'son'.

Lejeune goes on: "Il est donc seulement possible que le mycénien ait possédé des formes thématiques du type υἱός; il est sûr, en revanche, qu'il présentait les formes (héritées) d'un thème en -u- (d'où la probabilité que *i-65* soit à lire *i-ju*)". This means that he considers that there is the bare possibility of *ijo* representing υἱός, but that it is quite certain that *i-65* shows a form in -u- (υἱός). "Mais", he continues, "au gén. sg. et au dat. sg. ce thème en -u- avait, en grec homérique, deux types de flexion, d'une part υἱός, υἱῖ, d'autre part υἱέος, υἱέῖ. Le second type est attesté, en mycénien, par dat. sg. *i-je-we* (υἱέφει) à Pylos. On a *sans doute* [my italics] à présent, à Cnossos, un exemple du premier type dans le fragment X 8176 . . .]-JO *i-we*[. Si en effet le second mot (à en juger par le blanc qui suit *we*) est complet, il ne comporte guère d'autre lecture envisageable que υἱέφει (le mot précédent étant un génitif d'anthroponyme probablement en -οιο)".

It seems clear that Lejeune cannot envisage the possibility of there being a word *ijo* 'son' unless such a word is connected with υἱός. Next, finding in Homer the two forms υἱέῖ and υἱῖ, he asserts that the former is attested by Pylion *ijewe*, and the latter, beyond all doubt, in the tiny Cnossos fragment X 8176; again not envisaging the possibility of an *iju* existing in Myc. unless connected with υἱός. The possibility of Mycenaean possessing a word *ijo/i-65* wholly unconnected with υἱός/υἱός has been automatically excluded. To my mind the connecting of (hapax) *ijewe* with υἱέῖ is a leap in the dark, and the finding that (hapax) *iwe* = υἱῖ (υἱέφει) is still more hazardous.

In order to establish a connexion of the Mycenaean words with Greek υἱός/υἱός, it is of course necessary to explain the absence of the waw from the former. Lejeune suggests two possible explanations — (1) that the initial *i-* is a (poor) approximation to the diphthong υι in a system where otherwise it is the *i* that always is badly treated; "on dira, il est vrai, que c'est le premier élément qui

est noté pour *-a-* rendant αι, pour *-e-* rendant ει, pour *-o-* rendant οι; mais ce sont là des diphtongues décroissantes à la différence de υι". I comment on this that the operative vowel, the most important vowel, in υι is υ, just as the former of the two vowels is the more important and operative in the other three diphthongs; and that is presumably why they are written even if the *i* is omitted; the fact that the mouth is opening rather than contracting in saying υι seems no good reason why the scribe should have departed from normal spelling usage and written the subordinate, not the main, vowel; later (alphabetical) inscriptions all show the υ, the only instance of its omission being the ostrakon (Hesperia 19/1950 p. 385) where a semiliterate voter has scratched *ios* when he meant *huios* (Jaan Puhvel in Myc. Studies 1964, p. 170); this is in no sense a parallel to the Myc. spelling, and is of no evidential value: (2) "L'autre explication est celle qui fait intervenir une dissimilation régressive de υι en υ sous l'action d'un υ dans la seconde partie du mot . . .", a phenomenon with no observable parallel, as Lejeune states, seeing that υίος/υιός is the only instance in Greek of this initial diphthong. I comment. — But is this the only instance of initial υι? In our usual texts, yes. But Hsch. gives υιόν and υιήν (connected with vines) as well as υιήω· βοτάνη, and also υιλη· όμῆλος. Georgiev compares the *wejewē* of KN Gv 863 and *weje[we]* of PY Er 880 with Hsch.'s υιήν· όμπελον, and makes the words = 'vines', a reasonable identification in view of (a) the context with the ideogram *174, which is repeated in Gv 864 with the word *puta* preceding (φυτόν, 'a cutting, slip', cf. Iliad 18. 57, 438), and (b) the shape of ideog. *174, which is quite intelligible as representing a vine: in Gv 863.2 the word is spelled out (cf. K 740), contrasting with *su-(ka/kia)* only for 'figs', while in 864.1 the word is not spelled out (cf. *208 alone in K 434 etc), but in 864.3 it is qualified by *puta* (= '[vine]-slips' — the sense may be 'newly-planted vines' or the like)². Gallavotti in Myc. Studies 1964, p. 59, considers *wejewē* = 'vines' more uncertain as an identification than *weewija* = υειος, but I do not think those doubts justified. *Wejewē* as representing 'vines' and as showing the initial υι of Hsch.'s words seems to me a far safer identification than many others that have general acceptance.

Since we have one probable υι- represented in Myc. with an initial *w*, there is a *prima facie* case for expecting that if υίος/υιός

² I have not had the advantage of seeing Georgiev's discussion.

were in our tablets, the *w* would be written. Moreover, Lejeune's "regressive dissimilation", begs the question that *i-65* = *iju*.

Let me first discuss *iwe*, and then *ijewe*. *Iwe*; we can have no idea what sort of a tablet X 8176 is a fragment of. There is a presumption that it is a bit from the left of a tablet; and the *-JO* might be part of an *-oio* genitive, and it *might* be the gen. of a man's name. But there is nothing like certainty even on these small points. The *-JO* could equally well be the end of the name of a man — or of a ploughbullock — in the nom. sing. But even accepting that *-JO* is gen. of a man's name, it is still the blindest of blind guesses to say that *iwe*, owing to its problematical resemblance to Hom. *ῥῖ* (*ῥίφει*), is the Myc. equivalent of that Greek word. So far from there being "no doubt" that *iwe* = *ῥῖ*, there is no shred of evidence to support the assertion. Even if the word is complete in itself, as Lejeune, perhaps rightly, thinks (is there no divider?), it still might have a meaning other than 'to the son'.

Next, as regards the equation *ijewe* = *ῥίφει*: this involves a review of the evidence which seems to have produced a general consensus of opinion that *65 = *ju* — apart from Luria who makes it *ni*₂. *Ju* was first mooted by Palmer in BICS 2/1955 p. 43; and as he says³ the first diagnosis was based on the distribution of the sign — always after a front vowel, thus suggesting a glide. *Di-65-pata* was made *διύφαντα* 'patterned'; *epi-65-ko* yielded *ἐπιζυγον* (cf. Hsch. *ἐπιζύγιον* and *ἐπιζυγίς*); and later *pe-65-ka* gave *πεπλυκα*. "A number of scholars then independently identified *i-65* as *ῥς* 'son', and Ventris suggested that *ijewe* = *ῥέφει* was the dative of this word".

1. Let me first deal with *ijewe*. Bennett's Pylos Texts I (1951) read Tn 316 r 10 as *dirimio diwe ijewe*: PT II (1955) read *diwe* (no dots): Docs. (1956) read *diwo* (no dots) — "the second word appears to be *diwo* rather than Bennett's *diwe*": Palmer in *Eranos* 53/1955 read *diwe*: Thumb-Scherer (*Handbuch der Gr. Dialekte*, 1959, II p. 343) read *diwo* (following Docs., I presume): similarly Ephron in *Minos* 7/1961 p. 70f: Palmer (MGT cit.) on the one hand at p. 47 quotes this *diwe* as evidence for *diwe* = *Δίφει* (perhaps he intended to refer to r 9), but on the other hand at p. 262 in the full discussion of this text he reads *diwo* and translates "For *Dirimio*, son of Zeus". He explains that VC emended to *ije* < *re* > *we* unneces-

³ L. R. Palmer, *The Interpretation of Mycenaean Greek texts*, Oxford, 1963 (MGT)

sarily, since *ijewe* is the expected dative of *ijus* 'son'. (I presume that VC found difficulty in accepting *iju(s)* as representing υἱός with initial υ unrepresented). Palmer admits that "Dirimio has no etymological parallel in attested divine nomenclature"; but he thinks it is natural enough to include the words 'son of Zeus' after this alleged 'name of a god' (p. 413). To me it seems utterly *un-natural* for such a description to be included in such an inventory text as this — totally different from the case of Διὸς υἱὸν ἔκθρόλον Ἀπόλλωνα in epic verse: if "Drimios" were son of Zeus, the fact would be obvious and familiar, and it would be quite unnecessary and out of place to record the fact in this tablet — unless of course there are two Drimio, and one had to be distinguished from the other⁴! Now (so I learn from a letter received from him) Bennett reads "*diwo*. Perhaps *diwo*, but certainly not *diwe*", and I suppose I must now acquiesce in that reading⁵. If *diwo* represents Dios (Διὸς), all that can be said is that if two further hypotheses are accepted (a) that there was a divinity Drimios, and (b) if it is natural in a tablet to find the fact recorded that he is 'son of Zeus', then it is possible to draw a conclusion that *ijewe* might mean 'to the son'. (It could, of course, mean grandson, nephew, shrine etc.; or even the original *ije* < *re* > *we* might be correct). But these cumulative hypotheses are so many possible cumulative errors. (I may add that I am at a loss to understand how what was once *diwo* and then *diwe* is now *diwo*, possibly *diwo*. I am left with an uneasy feeling that there has been some 'wishful thinking' here — though this may be only the reflex of my own wishful thinking!)

2. *di-65-pata* = διφραντός. Had any figure, 3 or upwards, followed this word, a neuter Plural *diuphanta* (sc. *pauea*₂) would have had every chance of being accepted as an interpretation of the word in this CLOTH context. As it is however, since it is followed by the figure 1, Palmer (MGT) is forced to interpret it as "διφραντός (?)",

⁴ cf. KN V 1523.4 and 5, whether that gives Zowijo son of Pimanor and Philoitias son of Pimanor, or (Mühlestein, *Die oke-Tafeln*, p. 9 fn. 2) Pimanor s/o Zowijo and Pimanor s/o Philoitias.

⁵ Before getting Bennett's letter I had written: "Apart from the difficulty of 'Drimios' however the whole case for *ijewe* = "son' and consequently the case for its being dative of **ijus* rests on whether we read *diwe* or *diwo* here. As I see the matter, I, and everyone else must accept Bennett's reading, until it is shown to be wrong; and since he reads *diwe*, the reading *diwo* is no more than wishful thinking . . . There is no justification for reading *diwo* merely to support a possible translation, and set up in consequence a god 'Drimios'".

another example of an occupational personal name, cf. *kakeu*", p. 296. On pp. 20 and 413 he spells it with a capitel Δ "proper name of a weaver". I am not clear whether he makes it an occupational name 'weaver' or a personal name 'Weaver'. Secondly, the final entry of the tablet (line 6) *dawo tosa pate etc.* suggests rather that the preceding words of this unusual and exceptionally obscure tablet refer to kinds of cloth rather than to men's or women's names. Diuphantas (from δῖα + ὑφαίνω, I presume) is no more than a guess, if it is a man's name, Weaver; and if it is a trade-name 'weaver', like *kakeu*, one would expect it to occur more frequently, and with a man's name following. Its solitary occurrence leaves it open to grave doubt as an identification. Thirdly, the question arises whether *dia* would elide in Mycenaean, or whether there would be, as so often, hiatus.

3. *epi-65-ko* and *pe-65-ka* = *ἐπίζυγον and *πέρζυγα, neut. pl. of ἐρίζυξ. These are certainly attractive identifications, if the contexts are 'building materials' (but is the argument circular?), and it is unfortunate that Palmer has to go so far afield to find obscure words in late Greek with totally different meanings (see LSJ) from those he gives to the Mycenaean words, on which to base his identifications, which consequently become purely 'etymological' (though none the worse for that perhaps). Rather, the difficulty lies in the view that, with *epi* and *peri* prefixed, the stem **yug-* preserved the I. E. semivowel, while otherwise changing it to **zug-*. If ζύμη is cognate with Sk. *yūs* and *yūsan* the word *arepozoo* would conflict with Palmer's hypothesis. But secondly, even allowing *epi-65-ko* = *epijuko* = *ἐπίζυγον, the difficulty arises as to what the first element of *pe-65-ka* is. At p. 443 Palmer makes it περ(ι)ιυγα 'tie-beams' (?); at p. 367 " = πέρζυγα, neuter plural of ἐρίζυξ"; at p. 20 περίιυγα. He compares the similar formation (p. 294) *par-wrg* > *parwoko*. While elision of *para* in *parwoko* in the Aeolic manner might be accepted, I question whether **peri-jug* would elide the -i of *peri*. *Api* (ἀμφί) does not elide in *apia₂ro* (? Ἀμφιάλος), but *apo/apu* elides in *apeo* etc. *Peri* is somewhat different; it shows no elision in Attic, while in, later, Lesbian-Aeolic, — if that is any parallel — we find πέρροχος and Πέρραμος for περίοχος and *Πέριαμος (Schwyzer G. G. I 274). One would expect in Mycenaean some such treatment as in Aeolic, or hiatus: one would expect therefore the *r* to be expressed in the writing, **peri-65-ka* or the like. *Pejuka* (= **peri-juga*) is therefore very doubtful.

Vn 46.11 reads *tatomo arowo epi-65-ko* 1. Palmer makes *tatomo* = $\sigma\tau\alpha\theta\mu\acute{o}\varsigma$ 'upright standing post'; *arowo* seems to be taken (p. 410) as an adjective describing *tatomo*; *epijuko* (p. 417) "word apparently describes *tatomo* or *arowo*: $\epsilon\pi\acute{\iota}\zeta\upsilon\gamma\omicron\varsigma$ 'tie-beam' vel sim." If it is an adjective, then the line reads 'one *arowo* (? upright) tie-beam post', which seems to make little sense. An upright post, $\sigma\tau\alpha\theta\mu\acute{o}\varsigma$, cannot be a tie-beam (cross-beam) at the same time — horizontally perpendicular.

Vn 879.1 and 2 have *pe-65-ka* twice. The connecting of the word with carpentry is entirely dependent on the identification of *etokija* (which also occurs in Vn 46) with $\epsilon\tau\omicron\tau\acute{o}\chi\iota\alpha$ (another late Greek word with an entirely different meaning) for which Palmer proposes "posts, etc., forming framework of half-timbered construction", a good etymologising of the word, but by no means certain.

The remaining few words containing sign 65 are of little help, but, such as they are, they tend to support rejection of *ju* — KN Fs 3 *a-65-manake*, PY En 74.9 *e-65-to* (? "always after a front vowel", MGT p. 20), KN Dv 1492 *wo-65-ro* (unidentifiable), U 49 *ri-65-no* (surely this must be the place-name *rijo*no); X 1403 *wi-65-teu* looks more like the nominative of the name which in PY has gen. and dat. *wijatewo|we* (and so supports neither *ju* nor *jo*); but there are other names with *wijo-* (*wijokade*, *wijogota*, *wijorojo*) which rather support *jo* than *ju* for X 1403.

Furthermore the question arises why, if sign 65 = *ju*, it was not used in such hiatus as *diuja* and *kiuro*.

So the view that *65 = *ju* rests on a series of guesses based on the four words *di-65-pata*, *epi-65-ko*, *pe-65-ka*, and *i-65* when read in conjunction with *ijewe* and taken, purely conjecturally, as being the nominative of that word (with the very feeble, if any, support of *iwe*). Each of these might be correct; they may equally be wholly wrong. For my part, I prefer to rely, for *65 = *jo*, on Au 102 *ijoqe* read with Jn 725.8 *i-65-qe*, and to link it up with Homeric formulas which seem to point to an original $\iota\omicron\varsigma$, having nothing to do with $\upsilon\acute{\iota}\varsigma$. I am not prepared to accept any of Palmer's proposals for the four words mentioned, and I note that of the other words containing *65, *wi-65-teu* may-be, and *ri-65-no* certainly is on my side. I continue to hold that *i-65* = *ijo(s)*; and I consider that this word influenced, before becoming obsolete, $\upsilon\acute{\iota}\varsigma$ to the extent of giving that word a variant form $\upsilon\acute{\iota}\omicron\varsigma$ (which gradually became normal for all cases, till for Hellenistic Greek nothing of $\upsilon\acute{\iota}\omicron\varsigma$

υῖός is connected. What I am concerned to stress is that the **sūius* (or whatever) of υῖός had a long *u* to yield υῖός (?υῖός), and the **sisios* (or whatever) of *ijo/i-65* had a short *i* to yield ιός.

Thus there were two entirely separate, albeit somewhat similar-sounding, words for 'son', one derived from some form of **su*, and cognate with Sk. *sūnu*, which took the form of υῖός, and another (possibly from **sēi*) which took the form *ijo(s)*. The former is not attested in Mycenaean: the latter is not attested in Greek, *except vestigially* in those ancient formulaic verses in which υῖός has to be scanned unnaturally, as well as probably in a few more verses where violence is done to the rhythm by the substitution of υῖός, a composite word, a compromise between υῖός and ιός in order to eliminate the obsolete ιός while still preserving the ancient and indispensable formula.

I would say that ιός 'son' (attested in a Cypriot inscription; see later) may be added to the „Arcado-Cyprianisms” in Homer to which Bowra first drew attention in CQ 20/1926 p. 168f. and JHS 54/1934 p. 54f.

I tabulate the 14 lines⁷ in which υῖός/υῖέ/υῖόν have to be scanned with a short first syllable:

a) 1/2 feet H 47 “Εκ|ορ, υῖ|έ Πριάμοιο = Λ 200 = O 244 (contrast Δ 338)

b) 2/3 feet B 566 Μηκιστ|ῆος υῖ|ός Ταλαῖονιδας ἀνακτος = Ψ 678

The Ionic reading Μηκιστ|έος υῖ|ός reduces the difficulty, but introduces another, of making -έος long in arsis.

c) 3/4 feet A 489 Διογενῆς, Πηλ|ῆος υῖ|ός, πόδας ὠκύς Ἀχιλλεύς
Z 130 οὐδὲ γάρ οὐδὲ Δρύ|αντος υῖ|ός, κρατερὸς
Λυκόοργος

Δ 473 ἐνθ’ ἔβαλ’ Ἀνθεμ|ωνος υῖ|ὸν Τελαμώνιος Ἀίας

I 84 ἡδ’ ἀμφὶ Κρεί|οντος υῖ|ὸν Λυκομήδεα (contrast
T 240 καὶ Κρειοντιάδην Λυκομήδεα)

Π 21 ὦ Ἀχιλεῦ, Πηλ|ῆος υῖ|έ, μέγα φέρτατ’ Ἀχαιῶν =
T 216 = λ 478 compare and contrast B 566
above. (Schol. V gives Πηλέος υῖέ· οὕτως
Πτολεμαῖος, οἱ δὲ ὑπομνηματισάμενοι Ἰακῶς.
This would make Πηλ|εος υῖ|ε)

d) 4th foot E 612 καὶ βάλεν Ἀμφιον, Σελάγ|ου υῖόν,| ὅς ρ’ ἐνὶ
Παισῶι

⁷ The figure I gave in BICS was 13. I inadvertently omitted T 216 = Π 21.

P 575 ἔσκε δ' ἐνὶ Τρώεσσι Πόδ|ης, υἱὸς| 'Ηετίωνος
 590 ἔσθλ' οὖν δ' ἐνὶ προμάχοις, Πόδ|ην υἱὸν| 'Ηετίωνος

In a), b) and c) a trochee becomes an iambus, in d) a dibrach. In these lines there could have been used the alternative forms Πριαμίδης, Κρειοντιάδης, Πηληϊάδης, *'Ανθεμωϊνιάδης, *Μηκιστιάδης and *Δρυαντιάδης. The fact that such patronymic forms were *not* used raises a strong presumption that the genitive plus υἱός forms reflect ancient formulaic expressions, which have somehow or other survived (albeit with υἱός substituted for ἰος, I would say).

In N 185 we read 'Αμφίμαχον, Κτεάτου υἱ' 'Ακτορίωνος, where υἱ' represents accusative of υἱός (υἱϝ'), and the question arises why υἱόν, as in P 590, was not used. Similarly in N 792 Πάλλμυν τ' 'Ασκάνιον τε Μόρμυ θ', ὅτ' 'Ιπποτίωνος⁸. Here Ebeling (Lexicon Hom. p. 357 2nd col.) takes υἱ' as dual (? three men!) "ubi Strabonis υἱόν", while on p. 358 he takes it as accusative. Strabo's reading seems preferable for rhythmic and formula/pattern reasons, the verse then being comparable with those of d) above.

All these verses seem to cloak an original ἰος/ιε/ιον under the guise of υἱός, υἱόν, υἱ', to which the original (but later obsolete) ἰος was altered even at the expense of most unnatural scansion. This is another instance of the modernisation to which Mühlestein drew attention in *Athenaeum* 46/1958 fasc. IV p. 364—5; ἀνδροτῆτα and ἀνδρεῖφοντη simply do not scan, and similarly υἱός, υἱέ, υἱόν do not scan, except by being tortured into compliance.

In addition to these verses I would refer to M 331 τοῦε δὲ ἰδὼν ῥίγησ' υἱός Πετewο Μενεσθεύς. In no other line is ῥίγησε elided thus in this position (O 436 466⁹ E 596 A 345). And in B 527 there is similar elision of ἡγεμόνευ' (necessary indeed in the case of B 540), which does not occur in B 563 601 627 740. ἡγεμόνευεν υἱός Πετewο Μενεσθεύς would be comparable with B 627. Or even ἡγεμόν|ευεν υἱ|ός would have been in accord with the 3/4 foot scansion of A 489 etc. c) above. The fact that ῥίγησεν and ἡγεμόνευεν are not written here suggests the suppression of an original ἰος, involving, in the second case, the cacophonous and tongue-twisting -ευ' υἱ-. Page

⁸ In Z 514 father and son are killed together, but the tragedy is not commented on, as one would have expected it to be.

⁹ Allen's Oxford Text has not 'Αἰὼς δὲ ῥίγησε but Τεύκρος δ' ἐπρίγησε (as it has ἐγώ γε throughout the *Iliad* but ἐγώ γε throughout the *Odyssey*). I take both as equivalent. Had Homer been asked whether there was any difference, he might have, in A. D. Godley's words, "replied with a dignified air: What the digamma does anyone care?"

(History and the Homeric Iliad, p. 145f.) points out the presumable antiquity of Menestheus son of Peteos; and the formula $\nu\acute{\iota}\delta\varsigma \Pi\epsilon\tau\epsilon\omega\omicron$ M. would fit well in these lines as well as in Δ 327 (see BICS 6 § 34).

There is yet another pattern of formulaic verse where it seems reasonable to suspect that an earlier $\iota\omicron\varsigma$ has been masked, and levelled to $\nu\acute{\iota}\delta\varsigma$. We find lines beginning with $\epsilon\tilde{\upsilon}\rho\epsilon(\nu)/\epsilon\tilde{\upsilon}\rho\omicron\nu/\delta\epsilon$ such as A 498 = O 152 ω 298, B 169 = Λ 473 χ 401 ψ 45, Δ 89 = E 169, Δ 365, E 355 (β 408 κ 408) etc. $\epsilon\tilde{\upsilon}\rho'$ is normally elided only in thesis, after $\tau\acute{o}\nu \delta'$, $\tau\acute{o}\upsilon\varsigma \delta'$ etc., Γ 125 Z 321 371 etc., and in ω 123 173 after $\tau\acute{o}\nu \gamma'$ and $\alpha\tilde{\upsilon}\tau\acute{o}\nu$ in the preceding vv. 122 172. But apart from M 121 (non-formulaic — Wall) $\epsilon\tilde{\upsilon}\rho'$ $\epsilon\pi\iota\kappa\epsilon\kappa\lambda\iota\mu\acute{\epsilon}\nu\omicron\varsigma \sigma\alpha\tilde{\nu}\iota\delta\omicron\varsigma$, the sole $\epsilon\tilde{\upsilon}\rho'$ (elided) in arsis and at the beginning of a line, and where a $\delta\epsilon$ would be expected, are Λ 197 = O 239, and Δ 327 $\epsilon\tilde{\upsilon}\rho'$ $\nu\acute{\iota}\delta\omicron\nu \Pi\epsilon\tau\epsilon\omega\omicron$. It seems distinctly probable therefore that here again the original formula was $*\epsilon\tilde{\upsilon}\rho\epsilon \delta'\iota\omicron\nu \Pi$, a formula which would agree with those already proposed above.

It must be observed that the shortening of $\nu\acute{\iota}\delta\varsigma$ is not comparable with the normal shortening of a diphthong before a vowel; nor is it comparable with the dibrach scansion of $\omicron\iota\omicron\varsigma$ in N 275 Σ 105 η 312 υ 89, all in the 2nd thesis, except for two instances only in the 4th thesis. $\nu\acute{\iota}\delta\varsigma/\acute{\upsilon}\varsigma$ does not depend for its initial makron on the fact of its being a diphthong, but it probably has an inherent long μ , cf. Sk. $s\bar{u}nu$. It is thus unlike $\omicron\iota\omicron\varsigma$ (which is not $*\omega\iota\omicron\varsigma$). Nor is the internal correction of $\iota\lambda\alpha\omicron\varsigma$ and $\eta\rho\omega\omicron\varsigma$ comparable.

One further point may be noticed as possibly of significance, namely that besides λ 478 (= the Π 21 formula) the Odyssey has only one other instance of the short scansion of $\nu\acute{\iota}\delta\varsigma$, viz., that at v. 270 in the same Book in the Catalogue of Heroines. It would seem therefore that the dibrach/iambus form of $\nu\acute{\iota}\delta\varsigma$ is for all practical purposes a purely Iliadic phenomenon, marking, I would say, the retention — but in garbled form — of an ancient formula; i. e. the vestigia of that ancient formula. The so-called 'younger epic', except for the instances in λ , lacks this archaic vestige.

Thus it would seem that the earliest Singers had at their disposal, as already stated, two words for 'son', $\iota\omicron\varsigma$ and $\nu\acute{\iota}\delta\varsigma$. This conclusion seems to fit a) the existence of verses in which the forms $\nu\acute{\iota}\delta\varsigma$ etc. of the version of the Iliad which has survived display the most awkward scansion, and, in the case of $\epsilon\tilde{\upsilon}\rho'$ $\nu\acute{\iota}\delta\omicron\nu$ a considerable divergence from normal formula; and b) the difficulty, or rather the impossibility, of reconciling Myc. *ijo(s)* with Greek $\nu\acute{\iota}\delta\varsigma/\nu\acute{\iota}\delta\varsigma$ as being the same word. Indeed I have gone further and proposed for

the acceptance of scholars the view that original *υῖός* became *υῖός* *only under the influence of* *ιος*, and that this is the only way of explaining the heteroclite declension of that word.

But why should *ιος* have become obsolete? I would put forward as the reason for its obsolescence either (or both combined) of the following — a) The epic formulae *Τυδέος* etc. **υῖός/υῖόν* at the end or middle of a verse, **υῖός Φόρβαντος* etc. for the beginning or middle, would have made the *υῖ*-word more normal, as more constantly occurring, and of more value than the dibrach *ιος* (and perhaps helped to make it commoner in every-day speech, and so submerged *ιος*) while the still surviving *ιος* (the only form giving a handy vocative) could have modified *υῖός* to the extent of giving it a heteroclite nom., voc., and acc. sing. and thus modified *Τυδέος* etc. **υῖός/ν* to *υῖός*; b) there was homonymic clash between *ιος* 'son' and *ἰός* 'one', the word which occurs in Z 422 *ἰῶι κίον ἤματι*, X 477 *ἱῆι ἄρα γιγνόμεθ' αἴσηι*, Δ 437 *ἱά γῆρυς* etc.

This last proposal involves me in a discussion of *ἰός*, *ἱά* in the phrases just quoted. According to Buck (Greek Dialects, 114.1) only the fem. of this occurs in Aeolic inscriptions in the form *ἱά*. Thus, for instance, (Schwyzer¹⁰, 590, from Larissa) *στάλλας λιθίας δῦας . . . τὰμ μὲν ἱαν . . . τὰμ μὰ ἄλλαν* (But Doric, Gortyn, inscr. on the other hand uses *μίαν*!) Scholars seem to have accepted the view that the feminine *ἱά*, **ἱᾶς*, **ἱᾶι* (Hom. *ἱῆς*, *ἱῆι*) is the only *real* form of this word, and that the neuter (= masc.) form in Z 422 is only secondary, built from the fem. form. See Schwyzer Gr. Gr. p. 588. This view seems to have arisen from the (subsequently rejected) view of Schmidt that from an old flexion "*μια*(*)", **ἱᾶς*, **ἱᾶι* (aus ***siās* für **s[m]jās* usw.)" arose Hom. *ἱῆς*, *ἱῆι* and a new form Aeolic *ἱά(ν)*, and *ἰῶι* of Z 422. Usually now, says Schwyzer, *ἱά* (of Δ 437) is referred to the **i-* of Lat *is* etc. On the other hand he quotes Hesych. for Cretan *ἱτρον· ἔν*, as showing a basic *i(o)* = 'one' (enlarged analogically on *διττός*, *τριττός*). Frisk (Gr. etym. Wörterbuch p. 702) gives *ἱά*, *ἱαν* as occurring in a few isolated cases in Lesb., Thess., and Boeot. (Korinna), *ἱῆς* and *ἱῆι* (Homer), *ἰῶι* (Z 422), and *ἰόν* in a Messenian inscription, "wohl Nachbildung von Z 422"¹¹. He follows Buck and Schwyzer

¹⁰ Schwyzer, Dial. Graec. Exempla Epigraphica potiora, 1960 = DG; his Griech. Grammatik, Vol. I = Gr. Gr.

¹¹ The view that Messenia could have adopted into daily speech an unusual Homeric word is surely quite untenable. The inscr. he refers to is Andania (Schw. DG 74.126) discussed in my next paragraph.

in making the oblique cases of masc. *ἰος* which occur in the Gortyn inscr. = 'ein und dieselbe, ein und derselbe' auch (die, der) eine' im Gegensatz zu 'die, (der) andere: derjenige'. Frisk gives no separate entry for *ἰος*. Schwyzer (DG p. 433) gives a separate entry for *ἰα* cf. *μηδεῖα* (of the Larissa inscr. quoted above) 'one', and a separate entry (p. 435) for *ἰός is*, Gortyn VII 23 etc., and *idem* for his 74.126 (Andania inscr.). Frisk does not seem to commit himself to agreement with the view which connects *ἰα* 'one' and the other, masculine/neuter, forms with Lat. *is*; Schwyzer does seem to do so in his Gr. Gr. p. 588.

The view that an adjective can exist ab initio in the fem. only, from which neut. *ἰῶι* (Z 422) is analogical, is surprising. There seems no reason why an adj. should exist in fem. only; with no pre- or co-existing masc./neut. form, especially in view of Cretan *ἴτρον*, clearly based on *ι*- 'one'.

Four inscriptional occurrences have to be reckoned with. A. Schw. DG 74.126 (Andania). (Ten men to be selected annually by show of hands; not to be younger than 40 years of age) *μηδὲ δις τοὺς αὐτοὺς τὸν γ'ἰὸν ἐνιαυτόν*, and not the same men twice in/for the *ἰὸν* year/term. It is for this passage that Schwyzer makes *ἰός* = *idem*. But in the first place I cannot see why, if *ἰός* here = 'same', the word *αὐτόν* was not used (or, conversely, why not **τοὺς ἰούς*) in view of line 7 *ἐκ τᾶς αὐτᾶς φυλᾶς*, 11 *τὸν αὐτὸν ὄρκον*, § 5 *ἐπὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ἱερῶν*, (unfortunately *τούτου τοῦ ἔτους* seems to be a suppletion) 66 *ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτό*. I admit that in § 18 line 90 we have *τὸν μὲν ἕνα . . . τὸν δ' ἄλλον*, but if *ἕνα* is a synonym for *ἰὸν*, so would *τὸν γ'ἰὸν* be for *τὸν αὐτόν*. But in the second place 'the same ten men in the same year' does not make sense; it is illogical — men may be the same, but the year cannot be the same: even 'the same men twice for the one year/term' is not very logical, if 'in two successive years/terms' is meant. If however we take note of the particle *γε*, the phrase becomes more meaningful — 'not the same ten men twice, at any rate not together in *one* term of office'. Clearly what the law wanted to prevent was the same body of men being re-elected together, though some of them might presumably be reelected, provided some fresh blood was introduced.

B. Gortyn VII 23 *ὀπιεῖσθαι ἰοι τοι ἐς το πρειγίστο*

C. Gortyn VIII 7—8 *ἀποδατεῖσθαι δὲ τὸν κρεματόν ἰοι*

D. Gortyn IX 28—9 *ἐπιμολένν ἰο πρὸ το ἐνιαυτο*.

These are discussed by Buck in *Classical Philology* 1/1906 p. 409f.

He considers that "Cretan $\lambda\acute{o}\varsigma$ ¹² is used as a pronoun, while $\iota\alpha$ is the numeral in Aeolic". This "difference in use is one that can be paralleled among other related forms e. g. Sk. *ena* = a weak demonstrative, cognate with Lat. *unus* (*oinos*) . . .". He makes $\lambda\acute{o}\varsigma$ therefore equivalent to $\acute{\epsilon}\kappa\epsilon\acute{\iota}\nu\omicron\varsigma$, which agrees with Schwyzer's *is*, but not with Schwyzer's *idem*. I dispute this view, and consider that in these instances also $\lambda\acute{o}\varsigma$ means 'one, single, alone'.

I agree with Buck's statement of the law (p. 410) under the four headings. But I consider that the phrase B above means 'she shall marry the son of the eldest paternal uncle alone', where Buck translates "She shall marry that one [i. e. $\acute{\epsilon}\kappa\epsilon\acute{\iota}\nu\omicron\iota$] who is the son of the eldest". One cannot be quite sure of Cretan idiom; but surely, to judge from Attic or other Greek, the inclusion of a demonstrative adjective of any kind in the way posited by Buck and Schwyzer would be most abnormal — $\gamma\alpha\mu\epsilon\acute{\iota}\sigma\theta\alpha\iota$ $\acute{\epsilon}\kappa\epsilon\acute{\iota}\nu\omicron\iota$ $\tau\acute{\omega}\iota$ $\acute{\epsilon}\kappa$ $\tau\omicron\upsilon$ $\pi\rho\epsilon\sigma\beta\acute{\iota}\sigma\tau\omicron\upsilon$! If $\acute{\epsilon}\kappa\epsilon\acute{\iota}\nu\omicron\iota$, or its equivalent, were in fact used in such a phrase it could only mean 'that person already referred to'; and this would not fit the context here, since no person has been referred to. So, in the absence of any particularising intention, the use of $\lambda\acute{\omega}\iota$ (allegedly = $\acute{\epsilon}\kappa\epsilon\acute{\iota}\nu\omicron\iota$) here would be grossly redundant — $\acute{\omicron}\pi\upsilon\epsilon\theta\theta\alpha\iota$ $\tau\acute{\omega}\iota$ $\acute{\epsilon}\varsigma$ $\kappa\tau\lambda$ would be the normal and adequate words to express the meaning intended. The inclusion therefore of the word $\lambda\acute{\omega}\iota$ would only be justifiable if it meant $\mu\acute{\omicron}\nu\omega\iota$. The sense of the law is that the girl is to be married *only* to the eldest uncle's son — to the eldest uncle's son *alone*.

C. Buck translates "but she shall give a share of the property to that one", adding "i. e. to the aforesaid discarded groom-elect . . ." (p. 409). And in his GD¹³: "But they shall give to him (the rejected groom-elect) his proper share of the property." I, on the contrary, translate "The (other half) share of the property shall be alienated ($\acute{\alpha}\pi\omicron\delta\alpha\tau\epsilon\theta\theta\alpha\iota$) to one person only". Even for Buck the equation $\lambda\acute{\omega}\iota$ = $\acute{\epsilon}\kappa\epsilon\acute{\iota}\nu\omicron\iota$ is awkward here, since we would surely expect $\alpha\upsilon\tau\acute{\omega}\iota$ in this phrase rather than $\acute{\epsilon}\kappa\epsilon\acute{\iota}\nu\omicron\iota$ or its equivalent, just as we find $\alpha\upsilon\tau\acute{\omicron}\nu$ in I 46, IV 16, IX 39.

This phrase must be read in connexion with, and in the light of, the previous clauses — VII 40f. 'If a person legally entitled to the

¹² I do not know the authority for the accentuation. I follow Buck and Schwyzer in this matter.

¹³ = Introduction to the Study of the Gk Dialects 1928, and The Greek Dialects, 1935

hand of the heiress, being a major himself — and she being mature and willing to be married to him — does not wish to marry her, the (other) kinsmen of the heiress shall take the matter to Court, and the judge shall decree that one of them shall?/may marry her within two months. If he does not marry her as decreed, she, keeping all the property, (shall marry) the next legally entitled claimant, if there is such. (50) If there is not a (?next) claimant (of her hand), she may marry a suitor of her tribe whom she wishes. If, being mature, she does not wish to marry the legally entitled claimant, or if the legally entitled claimant is immature and she does not wish to wait for him (to mature), the heiress shall take the house, if in the city, and its contents, and of all the remaining property a moiety and marry any suitor of her tribe she wishes. The other moiety shall be handed over to the single legally entitled (rejected) claimant”.

I take this phrase to mean that the moiety goes to one ἐπιβάλλον only, and is not claimable by, or to be split up between, the rest of her father's kin. Such latter claim, except for this definite prescription of law, might well have been urged in view of III 27, 28, VII 10, X 46, and VII 27—29, in which last clause, again, it is laid down that if there is only one heiress, she shall be married to only one ἐπιβάλλον — “The (one) legally entitled person, not several, shall have the heiress, if there is only one (heiress)” (here, as usual, the article marks the subject of the verb). Without such a legal delimitation it could have been open to the father's kin to claim that the moiety not retained by the heiress should be divided equally among all the possible ἐπιβάλλοντες κηδεσται. VII 28, 29 lays down that the heiress can be claimed by the eldest possible alone, not by several, and the moiety can be claimed by him alone, and is forfeited to him alone, (as a *sauf douleur* perhaps). (Note that the moiety rule probably applies, somehow or other, to VIII 25, where the word διαλακόνσαν recurs). The statements of the law, as Buck rightly says, are very compressed; they leave a lot to the imagination; but it seems clear that the point is that the moiety the heiress forfeits goes only to the possible husband who loses her, not to others. ἰῶι therefore means not ‘to that man’ but ‘to him alone’.

D. Buck translates “If anyone dies who has gone surety . . . or another (stands in such relations) to him, one shall bring a suit against said person before the end of the year” (i. e. *lo* = ἐκείνου = αὐτοῦ?) The context here is somewhat obscure, and even the

reading slightly doubtful. I consider that here again *lo* cannot mean *ἐκείνου* Buck's "said person" (contrast *ε τούτοι ἄλλος*) but must mean 'one, alone' and goes with the following words *πρὸ το ἐνιαυτοῦ*, and that the law lays down a time-bar of one year (cf. VII 46 two months, XI 48 twenty days). It must be noted a) that, if *lo* = *ἐκείνου* = Buck's "said person", then that 'said person' is a dead man in one case (and the man who "stands in a such relations to him" in the other); b) in which case one would expect *ιον* (gen. pl.); c) again, why *lo* and not *αὐτοῦ* as in I 46, IV 16, IX 39? d) *πρὸ το ἐνιαυτο* is a set phrase (cf. IV 4), and if *lo* = *ἐνος, μόνου* (my view) its preceding the phrase would be normal (or it could be emphatic, "before the expiry of *one* year"); e) even if we took *lo* as 'it' neut. ('the cause of action at law') instead of Buck's 'said person' (masc.), it would still be strange in view of the normal use of *αὐτόν* for the neuter (Buck, GD § 125.2).

The prescriptions of IX 24f. are — If a man dies against whose estate claims arise from past transactions (going surety, liability under a decree for money, and other [unintelligible] items) or whose estate has claims against another (*ε τούτοι ἄλλος*), the claims must be contested within one year of his death (in the inevitable absence of the deceased respondent/applicant¹⁴ and decided a) in the case of (claim of execution of) a decree (*νίκας*) already pronounced, on the evidence of the judge who gave the decree, the clerk of court, if still alive and ?still functioning as such (*πολιτατεύει*), and of the persons claiming execution; b) in the case of surety . . . of the claimants alone; c) IX 38 39 in the case of a claim of the deceased('s estate) against another, on the oath of the respondent (*ἄλλος*) and witnesses (for the deceased's estate).

That is to say, *ἐπιμολένν/ἐπιμολεῖ* are used impersonally, intransitively or 'absolutely' both in IX 28 "Suit shall be brought" and 31 "if suit be brought". This verb does not, as Buck's version implies, govern the words *lo* and *νίκας*. *lo* goes with *ἐνιαυτο*; and *νίκας* is 'genitive of the Matter involved, (Buck GD § 171, and note on I 1)¹⁵, as passim in this Code. If Buck's view is right, and *ἐπιμώλειν* = 'bring a suit *against*' and requires, and has, an object

¹⁴ The deceased('s estate) is Respondent when the case is brought against it, and it is Applicant in the second case (*ε τούτοι ἄλλος*) when the estate bring the suit.

¹⁵ For exactly the same usage in Oscan see his Grammar of Oscan and Umbrian, p. 197 § 270

(personal and emphatic) in the former sentence, *lo*, in the gen. case, why has it not an object in the second case?; if, in the second case, it is claimed that the verb governs *νίκας*, then it cannot mean 'bring suit against', since you cannot bring a suit 'against' a decree. *ἐπιμωλέω* must therefore be impersonal and intransitive¹⁶, and therefore *lo* must connect with the following words, and therefore cannot mean *ἐκείνου* (and *ἐκείνου* *πρὸ τοῦ ἐνιαυτοῦ* would not make sense).

Close consideration therefore of these alleged cases of Cretan *lós* as meaning *ἐκείνος* (Buck) or *is* and *idem* (Schwyzer) does not seem to justify such interpretations, but makes it necessary to treat the word as meaning 'one, alone' in order to extract the full sense from the phrases in which it occurs.

But there is yet another instance of an inscription where there is an *lós* in dispute. See Glotta 40/1962 p. 1—3, where Luria finds another *is* or *idem*. Mitford in JHS 80/1960 p. 191 reads Hoffman 106 as 'Ἀρισταγόραι το 'Ονασιφόκο ἐπέστασε 'Οψατες ὁ 'Ιρασίοιο το *lo* αὐτο τὸ μνάϊο(ν) τόδε. Ops., son of Ir., set up this memorial to Irasios' father Ar. son of On¹⁷. Thus Mitford not only finds an *-oio* genitive, but also an *lós* 'son' in this Paphian inscription. "Nor has *lós*" he writes "— or for that matter *vlós* — been as yet attested in our dialect; but we may point to *Φηίός* of sixth-century Nemea . . . which differs solely in its retention of digamma". Luria rejects this interpretation, reads the first name as Aristagoras, rejects Mitford's reading from Opsates to *-oio*, and makes the last six words = "dies Denkmal von ihm selbst". Denn *ὁ lós* ist = lat. *is*, hom. *ὁ*, att. *αὐτός* usw.", and quotes the four passages, A, B, C, D, given above in support. (It will be noted that while Luria makes not *lós*, but *ὁ lós* = *is*, he uses *αὐτός*, rather than *ἐκείνος*, as its Attic equivalent). But while it is just conceivable that *lós* could mean *is* and/or *idem*, and that *τόν γ' ὁν ἐνιαυτόν* might mean 'the same year', etc., I cannot believe that 'of himself' could be rendered by such a massive accumulation as *τοῦ ἰοῦ αὐτοῦ* — at the best this could only mean 'of the same person (*τοῦ ἰοῦ*) himself (*αὐτοῦ*), 'eiusdem ipsius', 'of the very self-same man', which would surely be quite the oddest sort of expression to use, and not in the

¹⁶ Similarly *μολέω* and *ἀντιμολέω* do not govern an object; the former is followed by accusative and infinitive in I 14. All three forms of the verb seem to mean 'litigate, file a suit' or the like; and the preverb *ἐπί* does not seem to carry the sense of 'against' any more than the preverb *ἀντί* seems to have any value.

¹⁷ Four generations, as in Hor. Od. III. 6. 46—81

least comparable with the *εἰκόνα τῆνδ' αὐτοῦ* which Luria quotes from Side as a parallel, which is a natural way of expressing 'this portrait of himself'. Moreover *μνάϊον* ('memorial') can hardly be equated with *εἰκόνα*. (On the other hand, for the order of words [subject after verb] as in Mitford's interpretation, I would compare *ἐπέστασεν Φο θάψας*, quoted by Luria, *Kadmos* 2/1963 p. 72, as slightly supporting Mitford). I note that Puhvel (*Myc. Studies* 1964, p. 72) also rejects Luria's interpretation.

To me of course an *ιος* 'son' authenticated in Cypriot is welcome. But I deprecate Mitford's immediate reaction, similar to everyone else's, of automatically wanting to link it with *υἱός*. If no satisfactory explanation of absence of initial *u* or digamma can be given for *Myc.*, and if we strike exactly the same absence of *u* or *F* in Cypriot — accepting Mitford's *το ἰο αὐτο* 'of his son' as reasonable — should not attempts to make *Myc. ijo/i-65* and *Cypr. ἰός* to equal *Gk. υἱός* be once and for all abandoned? Cannot both words be taken off the bed of Procrustes, and recognized for what they are, the one a dibrach, the other a trochee, completely separate entities?

I have had to discuss *ἰος*, *ἰα* 'one' in order to support my proposal of homonymic clash accounting for the obsolescence of original *ἰος* 'son'. But perhaps we should recognize something more here than homonymic clash pure and simple. In this particular case it can readily be imagined that the sound for 'son' and for 'one' could have carried with it something of the ill-omened, the inauspicious, the unlucky; a man might well avoid speaking of his (or another's) son as his *ἰος*, lest the gods (always ready to play a nasty trick) make it so; make his son his only (son). The magic interconnexion between words and the external world is a thing to be reckoned with as of great importance. (Perhaps there was a reverse effect on *ιος* 'one' also, and both of the pair of homonyms suffered from the uneasy feeling aroused by the homonymy. May-be *ἰα* was not so open to objection!)

People tend to avoid making statements which God might cause to come true: an Indian Musulman will not turn a beggar from his door by saying he has nothing to give him; he says *Daulat hai* There is wealth (= plenty); he does not say *Put out the lamp* or *Clear the table*, but *Increase the lamp/table* (*baṭṭi/mez barhāo*) lest God should take his words literally (too literally). The spoken word may have implications far more complex than the speaker's obvious meaning. And the simple mind does not know the word 'homonym', nor the facts behind it. A friend in Australia was

seriously warned to avoid touching the weed called 'St. John's wort' — "it will give you warts"; as indeed it might, as the next instance shows. In 1921 in India enquiring where a clerk was, I learnt that two days earlier he had been nipped on the hand by my mongrel terrier as he was removing registers from the floor of the dais of my Court; he was poisoned and was very ill, because the dog was a '*bīsā kuttā*' (a'twenty-ish' dog, i. e. he had a dew-claw on each of his four legs — a fact I learned for the first time — instead of the normal one or two; so he had 20 claws altogether). Luckily I was able to explain that there was no connexion whatever between *bīs* (< *vimśati*) and *bīs* (< *viṣa*; a third *īoṣ*!). The realization of the non-connexion between '20' and 'poison' saved the man's life. To the simple, uneducated, mind wort and wart, *bīs* and *bīs*, *īoṣ* 'son' and *īoṣ* 'one' *are*, or can be, one and the same thing.