

**CONCEPTUAL METAPHORS IN ENGLISH AND SHONA: A CROSS-
LINGUISTIC AND CROSS-CULTURAL STUDY**

by

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DEDICATION

**To my father, the late Samuel Taurai Machakanja and my mother, Adeline
Machakanja.**

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Topic: Conceptual Metaphors in English and Shona: A Cross-linguistic and Cross-cultural study

ABSTRACT

The study is a comparative analysis of conceptual metaphors in English and Shona. The objectives of this study were: to compare the metaphorical expressions of English and Shona in the same or similar domains in order to establish on the one hand whether there are similarities and/or differences cross-linguistically and cross-culturally in the metaphorical construal of reality between these two languages and on the other hand, to establish what the underlying motivation is for the similarities and the differences between these two unrelated languages. The thesis also explores the reasons for the similarities in terms of particular assumptions underlying conceptual metaphors, that is, embodiment and ecological motivations.

Key words. conceptual metaphor, source domain, target domain, conceptual mapping, epistemological correspondences, ontological correspondences, conceptual schema, cross-linguistic, cross-cultural, ecological, embodiment, cultural and universal.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background

Work on metaphor has been carried out mainly in English but the findings in the studies have been claimed to be applicable to all languages. Nothing substantial has been done on metaphor in African languages in general, or Shona in particular. Shona is a Bantu language spoken by people in most parts of Zimbabwe in Southern Africa. Shona is an agglutinating language. That is, according to Lyons (1968:187) a language in which the words are typically made up of a series of morphs with each morph taking the place of a morpheme.

1.2 Problem Definition

The main studies on metaphor have been carried out in English. The problem, however, is that, the insights into conceptual metaphors found to apply to English have been generalised to apply to language. The question that needs to be addressed now is whether Shona conforms to these claims made about metaphor and if it does why? Alternatively, whether it does not conform to these claims, why not?

1.3 Objectives

The objectives of this study were:

- To apply insights on metaphorical mappings to an African language, that is, the Shona language.
- To reconstruct the ontology and the epistemology of the conceptual domains involved in the mapping in metaphorical linguistic expressions. [The main methodology that

Lakoff and Johnson (1980) propose is that in order to understand the nature of metaphorical mappings you need to do a conceptual analysis of the conceptual domains but they do very little of this.]

- To compare conceptual metaphors in English and Shona in order to test the extent to which the claims that embodiment accounts for similarities in conceptual metaphors in languages while ecology accounts for differences in conceptual metaphors in languages.

1.4 Hypotheses

According to Kovecsesc cf (2002: 171) there are two hypothesis related to conceptual metaphors which can be summarised in the words below.

It is possible for different languages and cultures to conceptualise certain phenomena in similar ways because of the universal aspects of the human body. [English and Shona] cultures have similar ideas about their bodies and seem to see themselves undergoing the same physiological processes in given situations.. When a metaphorical concept has such an experiential basis, it can be said to be embodied.

And further (2002: 183)

There can be differences in the ‘range’ of conceptual metaphors that cultures have available for the conceptualisation of particular target domains. Two languages can share the same conceptual metaphor but the metaphor will be elaborated differently in the two languages. Broader cultural context, the principles and the key concepts in a given culture may bring about cultural variation. Natural and physical environment (ecological factors), the environment in which a culture is located can bring about cultural variation.

1.5 Significance of the study

This study departs from other theses on metaphor in that, whereas Lakoff and Johnson (1980) and subsequently others, proposed that in order to understand the nature of metaphorical mapping you need to do a conceptual analysis of the conceptual domains, they do very little of this type of analysis. In this study, an ontological and epistemological reconstruction of domains is done and a conceptual application of the ontology is also carried out. Another contribution that this study is making is that very little has been done on metaphor in African languages in general and Shona in particular. This study carries out a comparative study of conceptual metaphor between English and Shona.

1.6 Methodology

I am going to compare conceptual metaphors in English and Shona at the conceptual level to see the extent to which Shona conforms to the claims made about metaphor for language and if so, why? If it does not why? These two languages are structurally incomparable. English is both an isolating and agglutinating language. That is, according to Robins (1988:377)

English is in fact a fairly mixed type of language in respect of the three types.... Invariable words such as prepositions, conjunctions, and adverbs, are isolating in type: they exhibit no formal paradigms, in many cases they are monomorphemic (e.g. since, from, as, when, seldom, now) and their grammatical status and class membership are entirely determined by their syntactic relations within the rest of the sentences in which they occur, without formal mark of these appearing in their own word structure. Morphologically complex words, in which individual grammatical categories may be fairly easily assigned to morphemes strung together serially in the structure of the word, exemplify the process of agglutination. Illegalities (...), ungodliness (...), unavoidable (...), stabilizers (...) are examples from English of agglutinative word structure.

Shona on the other hand is mostly agglutinating. Shona exhibits the characteristics that Lyons (1968:187) claims are typically associated with this language type. Shona makes use of

prefixes, for example, ‘ma- ruva’ “flowers”, ‘mu-danga’ “in the kraal”, ‘ma-tanga’ “kraals”, ‘aka-pinda’ “he went in”, ‘ari-mumba’ “he is in the house”, ‘to-enda’ “we are going”, to convey grammatical functions such as plurality, possession and prepositional value and so on. Therefore, to make the comparison possible, I will do ontological and epistemological reconstructions of the domains.

1.7 The Structure of the thesis

The thesis is divided into five chapters in addition to the present chapter which constitutes chapter one. Chapter 1 introduces the study. It outlines the statement of the problem, research objectives, the significance of the study and the hypotheses. It also gives an outline of the thesis structure.

Chapter 2 gives a survey of the contemporary literature on the theoretical issues in the domain of conceptual metaphors. The chapter addresses several pertinent theoretical issues such as, the relation between the source domain and target domain, the direction of mapping between the source domain and the target domain, and the issue of universality and culture specificity of conceptual metaphor.

Chapter 3 will present an in-depth survey of Lakoff and Johnson’s (1980) analysis. Detailed analyses of these metaphors will be presented for the purposes of comparison with the Shona metaphors.

Chapter 4 compares body - based conceptual metaphors in English and Shona.

Chapter 5 looks at ecological factors as an explanation for similarities and differences between English and Shona conceptual metaphors.

Chapter 6 summarizes the findings of the study and summarizes the answers to the questions raised at the beginning of the thesis. It also derives some conclusions from the study and provides some recommendations.

CHAPTER 2

A SURVEY OF CONTEMPORARY LITERATURE ON THE NATURE OF CONCEPTUAL METAPHORICAL MAPPING

2.1 Introduction

This chapter is a critical survey of the relevant literature on the nature of conceptual metaphorical mapping. The aim is to establish a theoretical framework in terms of which the main objective of the thesis, namely a comparative study of conceptual metaphors in English and Shona could be conducted.

2.1.1 Metaphor

The classical understanding of metaphor differs considerably from contemporary thought on the subject. Aristotle cited in Eubanks (1999) says that metaphor is a two part expression. Something is something else. Aristotle maintains that a metaphor has two main discursive locations namely the place where it has originated from and the place to which it has been transferred. He claims that it is made of two parts which can be easily extracted or concealed because all metaphors can be stated as similes and all similes as metaphors.

According to Aristotle the two parts of a metaphor work on each other by sharing some obvious feature. Max Black (1962) offers a different view of metaphor. He calls Aristotle's theory a comparison theory in which there are pre-existing similarities between compared terms. Black offers an alternative view in which he claims that when we say 'man is a wolf' we do not simply project the pre-existing characteristics of a wolf onto man but rather newly

involve man in a system of commonplaces or an 'implicative complex' about wolf. According to Black (1962) the metaphor 'man is wolf' influences both our idea of man and wolf. Metaphor theory has since undergone a revolutionary change.

Lakoff and Johnson (1980) claim that our conceptual system, in terms of which human beings both think and act, is basically metaphoric in nature. Further, Lakoff and Johnson (1980) claim that the way we as humans think, what we experience, and what we do everyday, is very much a matter of metaphor. Metaphor then seems to function at the conceptual level. That is, at least, according to Lakoff and Johnson, metaphor is a cognitive instrument whereby we conceive of our world. On the other hand, we communicate these metaphorical conceptual construals in expressions that reflect the metaphoric nature of the concept, viz. metaphorical linguistic expressions.

According to Lakoff and Johnson (1980:05), in metaphor interpretation, we understand one kind of thing or experience in terms of something else of a different kind. For example, in the conceptual metaphor, ARGUMENT IS WAR, we understand argument in terms of war. What we are saying is that, the structure of war is mapped onto the structure of argument to the extent that we see similarities between war and argument. According to Lakoff and Turner (1989: 38 – 39) the mapping is unidirectional: we use metaphor to map certain conceptual properties of a conceptual source domain onto a conceptual target domain thereby creating a new understanding of the target domain. That is, the mapping takes place at the conceptual metaphor level.

2.1.2 Metaphor and Culture

Another issue that Lakoff and Johnson (1980) discuss is the question whether all cultures share the same conception of the world. A certain class of metaphors seems to be universal. These are a result of our bodily interaction with the physical environment. We can, therefore, say they are products of embodiment. An example of a metaphor that is an outcome of embodiment is the conceptual orientational metaphor, GOOD IS UP. This conceptual metaphor is a result of our spatial orientation. However, some conceptual metaphors are culture specific. Different cultures may have different value systems that may result in different interpretations of experiences from other cultures. In other words, the same experience by, on the one hand, an English person and, on the other hand, a Shona person may be interpreted differently. Metaphorical construals are also directly linked with the conceptual creativity of human beings and the metaphors that are created on the spot are called novel metaphors. These metaphors may become conventionalised. For the purposes of this study, I will not deal with novel metaphors. My focus will be on universal metaphors and culture specific metaphors. I am going to compare English and Shona to see the extent to which metaphors are invariant in the two cultures.

Lakoff and Johnson (1980) have a particular assumption about how the nature of metaphor may be understood, namely, the ontology and epistemology of a domain underlying the mapping in conceptual metaphors. In my survey, I will try to show how they see this issue. In this respect they show what the exact mapping from the ontological and epistemological point of view is. They show why there are source domains (SD) and target domains (TD). For the purposes of this survey I will rely mainly on Lakoff and Johnson (1980) but in the

survey it will become clear that there are many issues that Lakoff and Johnson (1980) did not clarify, such as the nature of the mapping between conceptual domains. I will use other sources on such contentious issues.

In this chapter, I am going to survey the relevant literature on metaphor. In particular I am going to look at the following aspects of metaphor:

- What is the nature of metaphor?
- What is involved in metaphorical mapping (ontology and epistemology)?
- What is the nature of the mapping from one domain to another or vice versa (direction)?
- What is the nature of the relation in the mapping, that is, how many domains are involved?

For the purposes of comparison, the survey will find out whether conceptual metaphors are universal or culture specific.

According to Lakoff and Johnson (1980), conceptual metaphor is when we understand one conceptual domain in terms of another conceptual domain. Kovecses (2002:04) puts it differently when he states that:

When we talk and think about life in terms of journeys, about arguments in terms of wars, about love in terms of journeys, about theories in terms of plants...

This is, according to Kovecses then, what we mean by conceptual metaphor.

These two domains have been called by various terms in the studies of metaphorical mapping.

The following are some of the terms:

Table 2.1: The various terms used for the two domains in the studies of metaphorical mapping

The domain from which concepts originate	The domains to which concepts are mapped
Source	Target (e.g. Lakoff and Johnson, 1980)
Vehicle	Tenor (e.g. I. A. Richards, 1936)
Base	Target (e.g. Gentner, 1983)
Filter	Target (e.g. Hausman, 1986)
Lens	Target (e.g. Hausman, 1986)
Vehicle	Topic (e.g. Kelly and Keil, 1987; Black, 1979)
Qualifier	Target (e.g. Hausman, 1986)

I will use Lakoff and Johnson's terminology of referring to the two domains, namely *source* and *target* for the simple reason that I will be relying on Lakoff and Johnson's conceptual metaphor theory for most of the time. Where it might create confusion by using these terms, I will use the terminology of the relevant individual.

2.2 Directionality

It has already been pointed out that in the studies of metaphor, conceptual metaphor is normally defined as some relation between two domains of knowledge namely, a source domain and a target domain (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980). There is some contention as to the direction of mapping between the two domains. First, there is the school of thought that says that mapping is unidirectional. That is, from source domain to target domain. The main proponents of this view are Lakoff and Johnson (1980). Contrary to this view is the school of

thought that subscribes to the opinion that the mapping between the two domains is bi-directional. The main protagonist of this claim, Black (1979), says that the mapping is from the source domain to the target domain and vice versa. There is a third school of thought which suggests that the direction of the mapping is neither of the two discussed so far. It argues that what happens is blending of the two domains, that is, the target domain and the source domain (Croft and Cruse, 2004).

According to Lakoff and Johnson (1980), the two domains that take part in the conceptual metaphor have special names. The conceptual domain from which we draw metaphorical expressions to understand another conceptual domain is called the *source domain* (SD) while the conceptual domain that we understand through the source domain is the *target domain* (TD). Basically Lakoff and Johnson (1980), Lakoff and Turner (1989) and Lakoff (1993) say the same thing about the direction of the mapping of the ontological and epistemic correspondences between the SD and the TD. Therefore, I will use Lakoff and Turner's discussion of the issue as it is more detailed.

2.2.1 Uni-directionality

Lakoff and Turner (1989:62) categorically state that metaphorical mapping goes in one direction. Lakoff and Turner (1989) clearly spell out that uni-directional mapping is from SD to TD and not the reverse. Lakoff and Turner (1989) disagree with those who claim that the mapping in conceptual metaphors is bi-directional. Lakoff and Turner (1989) use the example of the conceptual metaphor LIFE IS A JOURNEY and make the claim that we organize our understanding of life in terms of a journey. According to Lakoff and Turner (1989:62):

We map onto the domain of life the inferential structure-underlying journey, but we do not map onto the domain of journey the inferential structure underlying life.

To support their claim, Lakoff and Turner (1989) point out that properties of life such as waking and sleeping cannot map onto journeys. In addition Lakoff and Turner (1989) point to the fact that we do not assume that travellers can have only a single journey as people can have only a single life. Lakoff and Turner (1989) conclude, therefore, that the direction of mapping in metaphors originates from a source domain to a target domain.

In order to argue their point further, Lakoff and Turner (1989:132) demonstrate that it is possible for two different conceptual metaphors to involve the same domains: for an example MACHINES ARE PEOPLE and PEOPLE ARE MACHINES. The difference would be which one of the domains will be source and which one will be the target domain for each respective metaphor. To illustrate this point, Lakoff and Turner (1989) point to the conceptual metaphor MACHINES ARE PEOPLE and make the specific claim that the conceptual metaphor, MACHINES ARE PEOPLE, allows us to think of machines as having attributes of people. In addition, Lakoff and Turner (1989) claim that when we switch this metaphor around to PEOPLE ARE MACHINES different deductions are made because different attributes are mapped between the two domains. Machines are people in that they need to be treated with care. People are machines because people sometimes function automatically, without thinking, just like machines. What Lakoff and Turner (1989) mean is that you will end up with different interpretations depending on which of the two domains is functioning as source domain and which is the target domain. Lakoff and Turner (1989) from these observations, conclude that mapping in conceptual metaphors is unidirectional and not bi-directional. They come to this conclusion because when the relation between the source domain and the target domain is

switched, that is, the source domain and target domain exchange roles, the meaning that is created will change because the mapping always comes from the source domain to the target domain. It is the characteristic attributes of the source domain that are mapped onto the target domain.

2.2.2 Bi – directionality

The basis of the interactive theory largely championed by Black (1979) is that the two domains in the metaphorical mapping, the vehicle and the tenor, that is, source and target, are bi-directional in the way they interact with each other. According to Black (1979:72):

In the simplest formulation, when we use metaphor we have two thoughts of different things active together and supported by a single word, or phrase, whose meaning is a result of their interaction.

Black (1979) explains this theory in more detail stating that the metaphor is like a filter.

According to Gibbs (1994:235) Black explains the theory as follows:


In a statement like “Man is a wolf” there are two subjects - *the principal subject*, Man and *the subsidiary subject*, Wolf. The purpose of understanding the metaphorical statement is not so much that the reader shall know the standard dictionary meaning of “wolf”, or be able to use that word in a literal sense.... These commonplaces are what a layman would say about wolves without special thought. They are those things held to be generally true about wolves. To an expert, the system of commonplaces may include half - truths or downright mistakes. Literal uses of the word “wolf” normally commit the speaker to the acceptance of a set of standard beliefs about wolves that are the common possession of the members of some speech community. A speaker who says “wolf” is normally taken to be implying in some sense of that word that he is referring to something fierce, carnivorous, treacherous, and so on. The idea of a wolf is part of a system of ideas not clearly defined, and yet sufficiently clear to admit of detailed enumeration. Metaphorically calling a man a “wolf” has the effect of evoking the wolf – system of related commonplaces. If man is a wolf, he preys upon other people, is fierce, hungry, engaged in constant struggle, a scavenger and so on. Each of these implied

assertions has to be made to fit the principal subject (the man) either in normal or abnormal senses. If the metaphor is appropriate, fitting each of the assertions to the principal subject can be done – up to a point at least. A hearer will be led by the wolf – system of implications to construct a corresponding system of implications about the principal subject (man). These implications will not be those comprised in the commonplaces normally implied by literal uses of “man”. The new implications must be determined by the pattern of implications associated with the literal uses of the word “wolf”. Any human characteristics that can without undue strain be talked about in “wolf – language” will be made prominent, and any that cannot, will be ignored.

Gibbs (1994:235), however, shows that Black’s (1979) interactive theory fails to identify any criterion for deciding which attributes of the implicative complex of the vehicle domain (wolf) fit the implicative complex of the topic domain (man). A variation of this interactive view claims that the topic and the vehicle terms in the metaphor cause reciprocal changes in meaning. One of the protagonists of this view, Hausman (1989), explicitly argues that either of the key terms may function as the lens or filter or as a vehicle (source domain) of a metaphor. The interaction view maintains that in a metaphorical expression such as Shakespeare’s “The world is an unweeded garden”, if the world is regarded through the qualifier or filter, that is, “ unweeded garden”, then so too will “unweeded garden” be regarded through the filter “the world”. The interaction view suggests that both terms mutually affect the meaning of each other. In short, the interactive theory claims that metaphorical mapping is bi-directional. According to Black (1979:74-77):

If man is seen as wolf, so too is wolf seen as a man in “Man is a wolf” in the sense that in one respect the characteristic attributes of a wolf are seen in man while in the other respect the characteristic attributes of man are seen in wolf.

This is what the interaction view mean when it claims that the vehicle (source domain) and the tenor (target domain) are bi-directional. The relation between the two conceptual domains can be presented graphically as follows:



Lakoff and Turner's (1989) contention with the bi-direction claim may leave us with the impression that Hausman's (1989) interpretation is incorrect and yet Hausman may have actually been talking about blending, another view of the direction issue between the two domains in metaphorical mapping; namely a selection of attributes from both the source domain and the target domain onto a newly established intermediate domain. This view has come to be known as blending; to which we now turn in the next section.

2.2.3 Blending

Croft and Cruse (2004:207) claim that metaphor, apart from involving the activation of two domains, also involves a kind of blending of two domains. Croft and Cruse (2004:207) point out that this blending becomes weakened and eventually disappears altogether as a metaphor becomes established (ibid). Croft and Cruse (2004:207) claim that the blending model is not in competition with Lakoff and Johnson's (1980) model but presupposes it. According to Croft and Cruse (2004:207), Conceptual Metaphor Theory works with two domains and correspondences between them, but the Blending Theory operates with four mental spaces. Croft and Cruse (ibid) point out that whereas Conceptual Metaphor Theory domains are permanent structures, Blending Theory's spaces are partial and temporary representational structures constructed at the point of speaking. Croft and Cruse (2004:207) point out the following:

[...dynamically, input spaces and blends under construction recruit structure from more stable, elaborate, and conventional conceptual structures...]

Two of the spaces in the Blending Theory correlate with the source domain and target domain of Conceptual Metaphor Theory except that they are more partial. That is, they are not as clearly defined as they are in Conceptual Theory. Croft and Cruse (2004) add to the source and target domain initially, a generic space, which represents what the target and source domains have in common; second and most important, there is the blended space, where selected conceptual material from source and target spaces is combined to form a new conceptual space. According to Croft and Cruse (2004:207):

In a metaphoric blend, prominent counterparts from input spaces project to a single element in the blended space – they are ‘fused’. A single element in the blend corresponds to an element in each of the input spaces.

Croft and Cruse (2004) claim that the two input spaces have separate roles: the material in the target space acts as topic, while the material in the source space “provides a means of reframing the first for some conceptual or communicative purpose...” Croft and Cruse (2004) point out that the blended space, however, does not only contain a selection of properties drawn from the two input domains; it also contains new material that arises from the elaboration of the conceptual blend on the basis of encyclopaedic knowledge.

According to Grady et al. (1999), Conceptual Metaphor Theory deals with mappings between only two conceptual domains while Blending Theory typically uses a four-space model. See diagram below:




Figure 2.1: The Blending theory

These spaces include two ‘input’ spaces (which in the case of metaphors r Input Space 2 and target domains, respectively, of Conceptual Metaphor Theory and a ‘generic’ space that represents conceptual structure that is shared by both inputs, and the ‘blend’ space where material from the inputs combine and interact. Grady et al. (1999) point out that when one uses the following example: “The committee has kept me in the dark about this matter”, a Blending Theory explanation would include the following spaces:

- an input space drawing on the domain of vision in which a person (‘A’) is surrounded by darkness;

- another input space, drawing on the domain of intellectual activity, in which a committee has withheld information from an individual (A);
- a mapping between spaces specifying that (A) and ('A') are to be taken as one and the same person, and that the person's inability to see corresponds to unawareness etc;
- a generic space containing shared material that the two inputs have in common; and
- the blended space in which a committee is causing an individual to remain in the dark.

Grady et al. (1999: 103) highlight the fact that in a blend the 4-space model (see diagram above) material is projected from both the source and target spaces to the blend. In contrast, in the Conceptual Metaphor Theory, there is a unidirectional projection in which mappings are from the source to target. Grady et al. (1999) argue that the main motivation for the Blending Theory is that the four-space model can account for phenomena that are not explicitly addressed by mechanisms of the two-domain model (ibid). Grady et al. (1999: 103) illustrate the nature of Blending with a further example:

“This surgeon is a butcher.”

This is intended as a damning report about an incompetent medical practitioner. Initially it would appear as if it is a straightforward projection of the source domain butcher on to the target domain surgeon. Grady et al. (1999) claim that this analysis of the cross-domain relationship, however, cannot by itself explain a crucial element of the statement's meaning viz. the surgeon is incompetent. They point out that a butcher under normal circumstances is competent at his job and may be highly respected. The idea of incompetence is, therefore, not being projected from source to target (Grady et al, 1999:103).

Grady et al. (1999:104) argue that the Blending Theory gives reasons for the inference as follows:

- the blend inherits some structure from each of the inputs
- from the target input space, structured by the domain of SURGERY it inherits such elements as the identity of a particular person being operated on, the identity of another person who is performing the operation, and perhaps details of the operating room setting.
- From the source input space which draws on the domain of BUTCHERY, it inherits the role 'butcher' and associated activities such as cutting flesh in a rough way.

Grady et al. (1999) suggest that the two input spaces share some structure, represented in the generic space, in which a person uses a sharp instrument to perform a procedure on some other being, in the one case alive; in the other case, dead. Grady et al. (1999:104) maintain that apart from inheriting partial structure from each input space, the blend develops emergent content of its own, which results from the placing together of elements from the three input spaces. Grady et al. (1999) maintain that the BUTCHERY space projects a means-end relationship incompatible with the means-end relationships in the SURGERY space. They add that in butchery, the goal of the procedure is to cut up a dead body of an animal (carcass) and then sever its flesh from its bones. However, the default goal in surgery is to heal the patient. They add that the incongruity of the butcher's intention with the surgeon's goals leads to the central inference that the surgeon is incompetent. Grady et al. (1999) argue that this emergent property of the blend cannot be captured very clearly within a Conceptual Metaphor Theory type of analysis focusing on correspondences and projections from source to target only.

Three processes are distinguished in Blend Theory: ‘composition’, ‘completion’ and ‘elaboration’. According to Grady et al. (1999:107), composition involves the projection of content from each of the input spaces into the blended space. They add that in some cases this process involves the ‘fusion’ of elements from the input spaces, for example, in the case where the blend contains only the single individual who is associated with the butcher from one space and the surgeon from another. Completion according to Grady et al. (1999: 107) is the filling out of a pattern in the blend, brought about when the structure projected from the input spaces matches’ information in long-term memory, that is, encyclopaedic information. They explain that when we mentally project a butcher into an operating room, we end up introducing the notion of incompetence and/or malice into the scene as well, in order to make sense of the scene. We complete our understanding of the scenario of a surgeon being a butcher by introducing a new feature of the person triggered by juxtaposing elements from both input spaces. The idea of destructive, inappropriate action brings to mind the idea of an incompetent surgeon (cf. Grady et al. 1999:107). Grady et al. (1999) point out that the completion process is often a result of emergent content in the blend. They also argue that elaboration is the simulated mental performance of the event in the blend, which may continue indefinitely. For example we might move from the picture of a surgeon carving up a patient to the even more grotesque image of a surgeon packaging the patient’s tissue as cold cuts (Grady et al. 1999:107).

2.3 What is the nature of the relation between conceptual domains?

2.3.1 One-to-one Domain Mapping

LOVE IS A JOURNEY

Lakoff (1993) uses the conceptual metaphor LOVE IS A JOURNEY to discuss the issue of the nature of the relation between the domains. Lakoff (1993) points out that technically the

above conceptual metaphor can be understood as a mapping from a source domain to a target domain. Entities or properties in the domain of love that is, the lovers, their common goals, their difficulties, the love relationship correspond systematically to entities and properties in the domain of journeys, that is the travellers, destinations, impediments, vehicle. For the purposes of this study I will follow the approach of Lakoff and Johnson (1980) to represent conceptual metaphors in capital letters. In the conceptual metaphor LOVE IS A JOURNEY, Lakoff (1993:206) explicates the metaphorical mapping as follows:

The lovers are *travellers* on a journey together, with common life goals seen as *destinations*. Their *relationship* is their *vehicle* in which they travel and it allows them to pursue the goals of their relationship together. Their relationship is seen as fulfilling its purpose as long as it allows the couple to make progress towards their common goal. The *journey* isn't easy. There are *impediments* and there are points (*cross-roads*) where a decision has to be made about which direction to go and whether to keep travelling together.

The following mapping correlations therefore hold:

Table 2.2: Metaphorical Mapping between Conceptual Domains

JOURNEY	→	LOVE
travellers	→	lovers
vehicle	→	relationship
impediments	→	difficulties
destinations	→	goals

According to Lakoff (1993:06) the LOVE IS A JOURNEY metaphor is not made up of any particular word or expression but the mapping of properties across conceptual domains from the source domain of journeys to the target domain of love. The ontology and epistemology of travel map onto the ontology and epistemology of love. Lakoff (1993) claims that the mapping between the domains is unidirectional. The direction of the mapping is from the source domain to the target domain. He bases this claim on the fact that the relevant linguistic expressions expressing properties or aspects of love originate in the journey domain as is

illustrated by the following metaphorical expressions (see also the analysis of the expressions on p. 155ff):

Our relationship has *reached a dead end street*.

Look how far we have *come*.

It has been a *long, bumpy road*

We can't *turn back* now.

We're at a *crossroads*

We may have to *go our separate ways*.

The relationship isn't *going anywhere*

We're *spinning our wheels*.

Our relationship is *off the track*

The marriage is *on the rocks*

We may have to *bail out* of this relationship.

It has been established that there is a logical possibility of a one-to-one, a one- to- many, a many-to-one, and many-to many domain relationships in the conceptual metaphor mappings. In the orthodox one-to-one domain relationship, a single source domain maps onto a single target domain. In the one- to- many domain relationship the mapping should be from a single source domain to many target domains. In the many- to- one domain mapping, several source domains could map onto one target domain. In the many-to-many domain mapping, several source domains could map onto several target domains. The one-to-one domain relationship is the one we have been referring to all along. In next section we now turn to the others.

2.3.2 One-to-many domain mapping

Lakoff and Johnson (1980), Kovecses (2002) and Morgan and Bales (2002) highlighted and explored the one- to-many domain mapping. The one-to-many domain mapping is a situation where there is one source domain being mapped to several target domains. Examples of the one-to-many domain mapping include the conceptual metaphors LOVE IS A CONTAINER, LIFE IS A CONTAINER and an EVENT IS A CONTAINER. What we are seeing in these conceptual metaphors is that Container as a source domain is being mapped onto three different targets. That is, Love, Life and Event. These three conceptual metaphors are discussed in more detail below. Consider the illustrations below.

LOVE IS A CONTAINER

He is *in* love.

He fell *in* love.

She is *filled with* love.

LIFE IS A CONTAINER

I've had a *full* life.

Life is *empty* for him.

There is *not much left* for him in life.

Her life is *crammed* with activities.

Get *the most out of* life.

His life *contained* a great deal of sorrow.

Live your life *to the fullest*.

We can analyse the above English examples in the following ways:

In the first example we have the prepositional phrase 'in love'. 'In' is the preposition indicating containment while 'love' is the noun indicating the container. In the next example the idea of containment is found in the prepositional phrase 'out of trouble'. The preposition 'out of' signals 'exit', 'out of' containment and the noun 'trouble' indicates the container. In the next example we have the prepositional phrase 'out of the coma'. The preposition 'out of' tells us that there is containment while the noun phrase out of 'the coma' indicates the container. In the last example the prepositional phrase 'into shape' contains the preposition 'into' which shows containment. While the noun 'shape' expresses the container.

EVENTS ARE CONTAINERS

According to Lakoff and Johnson (1980) Johnson (1987) and Lakoff (1993), events are perceived as containers in English. One talks of getting into or out of an event. Metaphoric expressions in English such as the following illustrate this point:

The country has just come *out of a war*. (war: event as a CONTAINER)

The allies got *into the war*. (war: event as a CONTAINER)

He came *out of the competition*. (competition: event as a CONTAINER)

He went *into the competition*. (competition: event as a CONTAINER)

The English metaphorical expressions can be analysed in the following ways:

The first example of a container event has a prepositional phrase 'out of a war'. This consists of a preposition 'out of' which tells us that there is containment and the noun phrase 'a war' which is both an event and a container. That is, the event is construed as a container. The next

example has the prepositional phrase 'into the war'. The preposition 'into' indicates containment while the noun phrase that remains, 'the war', indicates the container. In the remaining two examples we have the expressions 'out of the competition' and 'into the competition' respectively. Both are prepositional phrases with the prepositions 'out of', 'into' respectively indicating containment and the noun phrase 'the competition' indicating the container.

It needs to be pointed out that although Lakoff and Johnson (1980) discussed at great length the Container metaphors under Ontological metaphors we notice that Lakoff (1993) comes back to them when he presents the EVENT STRUCTURE metaphor. According to Lakoff (1993) we use Ontological metaphors to understand events, actions, activities and states as containers as well. In the EVENT STRUCTURE metaphor Lakoff (1993) says that in the metaphorical mapping STATES ARE LOCATIONS, states are bounded regions in space, that is, containers. Similarly, in the conceptual metaphor CHANGES ARE MOVEMENTS, these are movements into and out of bounded regions, that is, containers. Lakoff (1993) points out that we speak of being in or out of a state, of going into or out of it, of entering or leaving it, of getting to a state or emerging from it.

Johnson (1993) also regards containment as an aspect of the Event Structure although he does not state this explicitly. It seems, however, that when he talks about locations he is alluding to containers implicitly to containment. He argues that the metaphorical concept STATES ARE LOCATIONS, is responsible for linguistic expressions such as:

He is *in love*. (love: State as a LOCATION)

While we are *in flight* please remain seated. (flight: State as a CONTAINER)

Stay *out of trouble*. (trouble: State as a CONTAINER)

Lakoff and Johnson (1980) explore the one-to-many domain mapping in *Metaphors We Live By* and Lakoff (1993) alludes to them in the Event Structure metaphor when he deals with the conceptual metaphors LIFE IS A JOURNEY, LOVE IS A JOURNEY and A CAREER IS A JOURNEY. It must be pointed out that Lakoff and Johnson (1980) or Lakoff (1993) do not use the term Metaphor Family or the expression one-to-many domain mapping. Morgan and Bales (2002), who introduced the notion of metaphor families, talks of a linguistic phenomenon we may refer to as a one-to-many conceptual domain mapping in conceptual metaphor. Morgan and Bales' (2002) description of metaphor families includes COMPETITION, COOPERATION and CONNECTION among her examples of metaphor families.

Let me now return to Morgan and Bales' analysis of the metaphor families. Morgan and Bales (2002:03) explains that the metaphor family COMPETITION involves the following ontological schema: two separate competitors, a goal that the two want to achieve and a situation in which only one of the two entities can achieve the goal. This sets up a win/lose situation. Another characterization of the metaphor families is that they have central members, that is, those members which by their very nature have the basic characteristics for the metaphor group and are likely to be broadly interpreted within a culture even if never personally experienced by a given individual. Morgan and Bales (2002:03) singles out Hand-to-Hand Combat, War, (team) Sport, Games, Races and Predation as core members of the metaphor family COMPETITION. Morgan and Bales (ibid) points out that Business, Politics,

the Law, Marriage, the Economy, Society, one's Career and Life though outside the core members of the competition family are often framed as competition.

Morgan and Bales (2002) elaborates her ontological schema by claiming that each of the core members of the COMPETITION family has in common typically two competitors (two opposing sides). (N.B. even in a war situation where you may have more than two opposing sides; they can, in the final analysis, be grouped into two opposing sides). That is, an opposing side including its allies, a goal or prize and a set up in which only one of the two can 'win' (ibid). Morgan (2002) explains that there is no way to have a typical fight, war, (team) sport, game, race or predator/prey relationship without one side 'winning' (A claim that is obviously false. This is not the only possible outcome. The outcome can be a draw, a truce or stalemate and so on. The outcome can be an abandonment of the contest with no winner or loser decided. Therefore, to set the win/lose criterion for core membership into the COMPETITION family without explaining the other possible outcomes may be misleading.)

An analysis of the core members of the COMPETITION family listed by Morgan and Bales (2002), except for Predation, shows that they all meet the criterion of having a goal that both competitors want to achieve. In the case of Predation, however, the situation is different in that the predator and the prey have different goals. The predator wants to catch and eat the prey while the prey wants to escape from the predator and not be eaten. Morgan and Bales (2002) does not note this exception. In my opinion Predation is, therefore, not a core member of the COMPETITION family because it does not meet one of the criteria. I also wish to point out that although War has been listed as a core member of the COMPETITION family it is

different from the others. In (team) sport, races, and games what motivates the competition is to win in a friendly manner whereas in War, the competitors can only achieve their goal by killing each other. Furthermore, there are war scenarios as a Cold War where there are no guns fired and no one is killed. The goal of this war is different in that the intention is to keep the opposition constantly in fear of reprisal if they dare to take any military action.

The following are metaphoric expressions that Morgan and Bales (2002:03) says evoke the COMPETITION metaphor family by 'trigger' words:

The incumbent beat the challenger. (POLITICS IS HAND – TO – HAND COMBAT)

An article on computer prices called 'computer wars'. (BUSINESS IS WAR)

The prosecutor threw the defence a curve ball. (THE LAW IS A TEAM SPORT)


The cover of a December 2001 Wired magazine, which illustrates stories on the changing nature of war with the phrase 'The new rules of engagement, and two chess pieces. (WAR IS A GAME)

The presidential election is a real horse race this time. (POLITICS IS A RACE)

It's a dog eat dog world out there. (LIFE IS PREDATION)

2.3.3 Many-to-one domain mapping

Lakoff and Johnson (1980) identify a number of concepts that act as source domains of one target concept. Although they do not come out directly to say that these are many-to-one domain mapping, we can see through analysis that they are so. The Lakoff and Johnson (1980:47ff) give the following are examples:



IDEAS ARE PLANTS

His ideas have finally come to *fruition*.

That idea *died on the vine*.

That's a *budding* theory.

It will take years for that idea to *come to full flower*.

He views chemistry as a mere *offshoot* of physics.

Mathematics has many *branches*.

The seeds of his great ideas were *planted* in his youth.

She has a *fertile* imagination.

Here's an idea that I would like to *plant* in your mind.

He has a *barren* mind.

IDEAS ARE FOOD

We're really *turning*, (*churning*, *cranking*, *grinding*) out new ideas.

We've *generated* a lot of ideas this week.

He *produces* new ideas at an astounding rate.

His intellectual *productivity* has decreased in recent years.

IDEAS ARE COMMODITIES

It's important how you *package* your ideas.

He won't *buy* that.

That idea won't just *sell*.

There is always a *market* for good ideas.

That's a *worthless* idea.

He has been a source for *valuable* ideas.

IDEAS ARE RESOURCES

He *ran out of* ideas.

Don't *waste* your thoughts on small projects.

Let's *pool* our ideas.

That's a *useless* idea.

He is a *resourceful* man.

We've *used up* all our ideas.

That idea will *go a long way*.

IDEAS ARE MONEY

Let me put in my *two cents' worth*.

He is *rich in* ideas.

That book is a *treasure trove* of ideas.

He has a *wealth* of ideas.

IDEAS ARE CUTTING INSTRUMENTS

That's an *incisive* idea.

That *cuts right to the heart* of the matter.

That was a *cutting* remark.

He's *sharp*.

He has a *razor* wit.

He has a *keen* mind.

She *cut* his argument *to ribbons*.

IDEAS ARE FASHIONS

That idea went *out of style* a long time ago.

I hear Sociology *is in* these days.

Marxism is currently *fashionable* in Western Europe.

That idea is *old hat*.

That's an *outdated* idea.

What are the *new trends* in English criticism?

According to Kovecses (2002:84):

[...][S]peakers of English have several conceptual metaphors for the concept of argument; that is they resort to several source domains in understanding a

single target domain – argument. This is typical of target domains. We use not just one but a number of source concepts to comprehend them. The question inevitably arises: why should this be the case? Why don't we just have one conceptual metaphor for a given target? The answer is straightforward in light of what we have shown in the previous two sections in the chapter: Since concepts (both target and source) have several aspects to them, speakers need several source domains to understand these different aspects of target concepts.

For example the various aspects of the concept of argument, such as content, progress, and strength, will be comprehended via such conceptual metaphors as AN ARGUMENT IS A CONTAINER, AN ARGUMENT IS A JOURNEY, and AN ARGUMENT IS A BUILDING. In many cases, arguments such as these enable speakers to make sense of various target concepts. Kovecses (2002:84) poses the following questions:

But how does this actually happen? How do several metaphors jointly produce an understanding for a given target domain? To get an idea of this, I will discuss the concept of happiness in some detail, as it is jointly characterized by a number of conceptual metaphors. Below is a list of the metaphors that speakers of English most commonly use to talk about happiness as an emotion. (The word *happiness*, in many of these instances, is replaceable and is often replaced by the word *joy*.) In the discussion of each of these metaphors, I will point out the most important mappings between the source and the target of this emotion.

The first three conceptual metaphors all give happiness an “upward orientation.” The upward orientation of these metaphors makes the concept of happiness coherent with a number of other concepts; through the up metaphors, it gets a highly positive evaluation.

BEING HAPPY IS BEING OFF THE GROUND

She was *on cloud nine*.

I was just *soaring* with happiness.

I'm *six feet off the ground*.

After the exam, I was *walking on air* for days.

BEING HAPPY IS BEING IN HEAVEN

That was *heaven* on earth.
I've died and *gone to heaven*.
It was *paradise* on earth.
I was *in seventh heaven*.

HAPPY IS UP

We had to cheer him *up*.
They were in *high* spirits.
Lighten *up*.
She lit *up*.

HAPPINESS IS LIGHT

He *radiated* joy.
There was a *glow* of happiness in her face.
When she heard the news, she *lit up*.
There's nothing to worry about, *brighten up*.
She was *shining* with joy.
Her face was *bright* with happiness.

HAPPINESS IS VITALITY

He was *alive* with joy.
I'm feeling *spry*.
I felt *vivacious*.
That *put some life* into them.
She's *animated* with joy.
I got a *big charge* out of it.

HAPPINESS IS A FLUID IN A CONTAINER

The sight *filled* them with joy.
I *brimmed over* with joy when I saw her.
She couldn't *contain* her joy any longer.
He *bubbled over* with joy when he got his presents.
She *overflowed* with joy.
I was *bursting* with happiness.

HAPPINESS IS A CAPTIVE ANIMAL

I couldn't *keep* my happiness to myself.
She *gave way* to her feelings of happiness.
His feelings of joy *broke loose*.
He couldn't *hold back* tears of joy.

HAPPINESS IS AN OPPONENT

She was *overcome* with joy.
Happiness took *complete control* over him.
He was *knocked out*!
She was *seized* by joy.

HAPPINESS IS A RAPTURE

It was a *delirious* feeling.
I was *drunk* with joy.
The experience was *intoxicating*.
I'm on a *natural high*.
I'm *high* on life.

A HAPPY PERSON IS AN ANIMAL (THAT LIVES WELL)

He was as happy as a *pig in slop*.
She was *chirping like a cricket*.
He was as happy as a *clam*.
He was happy as a *pig in shit*.
He was happy as a *horse in hay*.
She was *crowing* with excitement.
He was *wallowing in* a sea of happiness.

HAPPINESS IS A PLEASURABLE PHYSICAL SENSATION

I was *purring* with delight.
She was *crowing* with excitement.
He was *wallowing* in a sea of happiness.
I was *tickled pink*.

HAPPINESS IS INSANITY

They were *crazy* with happiness.
She was *mad* with joy.
I was *beside myself*.

HAPPINESS IS A NATURAL FORCE

She was *overwhelmed* with joy.
We were *carried away* with happiness.
He was *swept off his feet*.
I was *bowled over*.
They were *transported with joy*.

According to Kovecses (2002:88):

This description results from the metaphorical mapping in the conceptual metaphors we have seen and constitutes a large portion of the concept of HAPPINESS. This is what we mean by understanding a concept jointly by several metaphors. However, the characterization of the concept of HAPPINESS as given above is incomplete. Thus, it is not claimed that the entire concept is metaphorically structured. Certain further aspects of it are structured by other than metaphorical means, including metonymy and literal concepts.

According to Kovecses (2002) Lakoff and Johnson did not provide an explanation for the existence of the many-to-one mapping. Thus Kovecses (2002:) points out that a more complete description of the ontology of HAPPINESS would look like this:

Cause of Happiness

You want to achieve something

You achieve it

There is an immediate emotional response to this

Existence of Happiness

You are satisfied

You display a variety of expressive and behavioural responses including brightness of the eyes, smiling, laughing, jumping up and down, and, often, even crying.

You feel energized.

Table 2.3: Mappings of each of the metaphors for happiness

<u>Mappings</u>		
Metaphor	Aspects of Source	Aspects of Target
BEING HAPPY IS BEING OFF THE GROUND	the goodness of being “up”	the goodness of happiness
BEING HAPPY IS BEING IN HEAVEN		
HAPPY IS UP	the goodness of being “light”	the goodness of happiness
HAPPINESS IS LIGHT	the energy of light	
HAPPINESS IS VITALITY	the energy of vitality	the energy that accompanies happiness
HAPPINESS IS A FLUID IN A CONTAINER	the quantity of the fluid trying to keep the fluid inside	the intensity of happiness trying to control happiness the inability to control intense

HAPPINESS IS A CAPTIVE ANIMAL	the inability to control a large quantity of the fluid the inability to hold the animal back	happiness the inability to control happiness
HAPPINESS IS AN OPPONENT	the inability to withstand the attack of an opponent	the inability to control happiness
HAPPINESS IS A RAPTURE	the physical pleasure of rapture the lack of control in a state of rapture	the emotional pleasantness of happiness the lack of control in happiness
A HAPPY PERSON IS AN ANIMAL (THAT LIVES WELL)	the satisfaction of the animal	the harmony felt by the happy person
HAPPINESS IS A PLEASURABLE PHYSICAL SENSATION	the pleasurable physical sensation	the harmony felt by the happy person
HAPPINESS IS INSANITY	the mental lack of control over insanity	the emotional lack of control over happiness
HAPPINESS IS A NATURAL FORCE	the inability to resist the force the physical pleasure of rapture	the inability to control happiness the emotional passivity

2.4 What is the nature of the metaphorical mapping between conceptual domains?

In exploring this issue, we will contrast the two major approaches to metaphor, namely the interactive view and the conceptual structure view. The interactive view claims that the mapping between the source domain and the target domain can be explicated in four different models, namely, the Salience Imbalance model, the Domains Interaction model, the Structure Mapping model and the Class Inclusion model. I will give a more detailed description of each one of them in the next sections.

2.4.1 The Interactive View

2.4.1.1 The Salience Imbalance model

In the imbalance model, according to Gibbs (1994:240), there is a vehicle and a topic in which these two terms depict concepts that are likely to have in common a lot of characteristics which have considerable salience for both terms. Gibbs (1994) points out that in literal utterances the salience is high in both the vehicle and the topic terms. Gibbs (1994)

exemplifies this with reference to “sermons are like lectures”. This utterance is literal, and there is high evidence of similarities in both “sermons” and “lectures” because the two terms are oral addresses given to a group of people. According to Gibbs (1994) in the case of similes and metaphors the vehicle and the topic share characteristics. However, these characteristics should be highly prominent for the vehicle term and not so salient for the topic term. Using an example such as “sermons are like sleeping pills”, Gibbs (1994) says that the characteristic “inducing drowsiness” is more prominent in relation to sleeping pills than to sermons. In contrast, Gibbs (1994) argues that the utterance “sermons are like grapefruit” is not a usual likeness utterance in that there are no clear salient features of grapefruit that are shared with sermons.

According to Gibbs (1994) for a likeness utterance to be meaningful there should be high salience of vehicle features. In addition, Gibbs (1994) says that there should be more asymmetry of likeness and meaningfulness in metaphorical likeness than in utterances of either literal or unusual similarity. According to Gibbs (1994) there is higher salience of attributes involved in the vehicle than in the topic in metaphorical likeness utterances whereas there is less salience between the vehicle and the topic in other kinds of likeness utterances such as similes. Using my own examples, take for compare the likeness utterances such as the following:

1. LOVE IS A JOURNEY
2. His hair is as white as snow.

According to the Saliency Imbalance model there is less saliency or similarity between JOURNEY (vehicle) and LOVE (topic) in the metaphorical utterance but more saliency or similarity between “snow” (vehicle) and “hair” (topic) in the simile. Now let us turn to another claim which the Interactive view makes.

2.4.1.2 Domains Interaction model

Tourangeau and Sterberg (1982) propose an alternative model for the understanding and appreciation of the nature of the metaphorical mapping between conceptual domains namely the Domains Interactive model. They suggest that one needs to carry out a similarity analysis both within domains and between domains. According to Tourangeau and Sterberg (1982) the extent to which the attributes of a vehicle (or source) domain are structurally similar to the attributes of the topic (or target) domain is measured by the likeness that is inherent in the very nature of the domains. Tourangeau and Sterberg (1982) further claim that the degree to which the vehicle and the topic are similar is measured by what are seen as common attributes between the domains. They add that this similarity is reflected in the vocabularies of the vehicle and the topic. According to Tourangeau and Sterberg (1982) the metaphor will be very suitable if the vehicle and the topic are very different and if the domains are unrelated or when there is incoherence between the domains. This is so mainly because of the sharp contrast between the domains. If we are to take the example of the conceptual metaphor ARGUMENT IS WAR, we see that these two domains are totally unrelated such that to see similarities between them brings to focus those characteristic attributes one had not seen in that light before. Now let's turn to the Structure Mapping model.

2.4.1.3 The Structure Mapping model

According to Gibbs (1994:243) we need to distinguish between analogy, metaphor, and literal likeness. According to Gibbs (1994) an analogy is the mapping of information from a base domain onto a target domain across a similar system of relations between the two domains. In other words, it is the mapping of the inferential structure of a source domain onto a target domain in such a way that correspondences in one domain are mapped onto correspondences of another domain. Put differently, it is when the ontology of one domain maps onto the ontology of another domain. According to Gibbs (1994) one can postulate two clear informational conditions on the understanding of a comparison from the parts of a comparison expression. Initially it is the similar attributes between the vehicle and the topic that are very important, not just the descriptions of the objects. This means that the objects in the two domains which are being compared do not have to be alike. Gibbs (1994) points out that the second consideration is that the characteristic attributes that are mapped from source domain to target domain are determined by a rule of systematicity. According to Gibbs (1994) it is possible to distinguish different types of likeness using the criteria of whether the similarity is based on relational structure, description of objects or both relational structure and description of objects. Gibbs (1994) identifies three types of similarity. These are analogies, mere appearance matches, and literal similarity matches. He points out that analogies dispense with descriptions of objects and retain relational structure; mere appearance matches retain descriptions of objects but do away with relational structure and finally literal similarity matches preserve both relational structure and description of objects.

According to Gibbs (1994) metaphors can, therefore, be divided into three partially overlapping categories. We have attributional metaphors that are mere appearance matches because they convey common object attributes. There are also relational metaphors that can be analysed as analogies because they put across a relational structure common to the target and the source. Gibbs (1994) takes Shakespeare's lines "Look he is winding up the watch of his wit; by and by it will strike" and points out that the intended commonalities have nothing to do with the object attributes of a watch (a glass face, metal cogs and so on). Instead, the metaphor puts across the common relational structure of a person setting a mechanism that will later produce seemingly spontaneous external effects. Finally, there are double metaphors. These are a mixture of pure relational and attributional matches. An example is "Plant stems are drinking straws for thirsty trees". This metaphor conveys both the common attributes "long, thin, tubular", and the common relational structure "sucks fluids up from lower to a higher place in order to nourish some life form". Finally, let's turn to the Class Inclusion model.

2.4.1.4 The Class Inclusion model

Gibbs (1994:246) makes the claim that the Class Inclusion theory differs from previous proposals in its suggestion that all metaphors are class inclusion utterances. Gibbs (1994) gives the following example: "My job is a jail" and argues that metaphors are not interpreted by changing them into similes (e.g. My job is like a jail). Gibbs claims that metaphors are class inclusion utterances in which the topic of the metaphor (my job) is assigned to a diagnostic category (jail) with properties such as a place (entities that restrict one against one's will, are unpleasant, and are difficult to escape from.)

2.4.2 The Conceptual Structure View

Lakoff and Johnson (1980:03) claim:

The way we think, what we experience, and what we do everyday are very much a matter of metaphor. Actions, events, and objects are understood in terms of ‘structurally meaningful wholes within experience or so - called (“experiential gestalts”)’.

Lakoff and Johnson (1980) exemplify their claims with reference to the conceptual metaphor ARGUMENT IS WAR. They maintain that this metaphor structures not only the way we talk about arguments e.g. “he attacked the weak point of my argument”, “to defend a position”, “her criticisms were right on target”, “he shot down my best arguments”, but also the very way we conceive of and carry on arguments. Lakoff and Johnson (1980) say that the metaphorical meaning is based upon projections of one common gestalt structure (WAR) onto another (ARGUMENT). In his 1993 work Lakoff elaborates Johnson and his theory of conceptual metaphor. It is in this work that he explains the nature of the mapping between the source domain and the target domain. He uses the conceptual metaphor LOVE IS A JOURNEY to illustrate his claims. According to Lakoff (1993:207) the ontology that constitutes the LOVE IS A JOURNEY metaphor arises from the mapping of the ontology of travel onto the ontology of love. According to Lakoff (1993:207) in the ontology of travel we can distinguish the following:

TWO TRAVELLERS are in a VEHICLE, TRAVELLING WITH COMMON DESTINATIONS. THE VEHICLE can encounter some IMPEDIMENTS and get stuck, that is, it can become non-functional. If the travellers do nothing they will not REACH THEIR DESTINATIONS. There are a limited number of alternative actions that they may take when they get stuck in their journey. They can try to get the vehicle moving again by fixing it or getting it past the IMPEDIMENT that stopped it.

They can remain in the non - functional VEHICLE and give up REACHING THEIR DESTINATION.

They can abandon the VEHICLE.

The alternative of remaining in the non - functional VEHICLE takes the least effort, but does not satisfy the desire to REACH THEIR DESTINATION.

Lakoff's (1993) conceptual view of the nature of the mapping between the source and target domains is further elucidated by means of the Invariance Principle. He maintains that image schemas typical of the source domains (containers, paths etc.) are mapped onto target domains (categories, linear scales, etc). According to Lakoff (1993) the Invariance Principle states that:

Metaphorical mappings preserve the cognitive topology (that is, the image schema structure) of the source domain, in a way consistent with the inherent structure of the target domain. The Invariance Principle guarantees that for container schemas, interiors will be mapped onto interiors, exteriors onto exteriors, and boundaries onto boundaries; for path schemas, sources will be mapped onto sources, goals onto goals, trajectories onto trajectories, and so on.. One cannot find cases where a source domain interior is mapped onto a target domain exterior, or where a source domain exterior is mapped onto a target domain path.

To conclude this section I would like to summarize and contrast various claims subsumed in the Interactive view and the Conceptual Structure view.

The literal similarity statements, as expressed by the Salience Imbalance theory, contain two terms denoting concepts that are likely to share many attributes, at least some of which have high salience for both. On the other hand, the Domains Interaction theory says that the within – domains similarity measures the extent to which the attributes of the vehicle (or source) domain are structurally similar to attributes of the topic (or target) domain. Between - domains similarity measures the extent to which the vehicle and the topic resemble each other, as

measured by the overlap in their vocabularies. The Structure Mapping theory claims that analogy as expressed metaphorically is a mapping of knowledge from one domain (source) onto another (the target) that puts across a similar system of relations among the objects in both the vehicle and the target domains. The Class Inclusion model assumes that the understanding of each metaphorical utterance depends on some unique, novel act of mapping information from a source onto a target domain. The Conceptual Structure view claims that there are two domains in conceptual metaphors. These are the source domain and the target domain. The ontology or characteristic attributes of the source domain are mapped onto the ontology or characteristic attributes of the target domain. And the invariance principle maintains that the attributes of a path, container etc. will be mapped onto a path, a container and so on.

2.5 Universal conceptual metaphors

Kovecses (2002:163) maintains that there is no simple answer to the question whether there are any conceptual metaphors that can be found in all languages. Kovecses (2002) proposes that the best approach to find an answer to this question is to look at some conceptual metaphors that one can find in some languages and then check whether the same metaphors exist in typologically very different languages. Kovecses (2002) points out that if they exist in these languages as well we can postulate that they may be universal. Further research should enable us to establish with reasonable confidence whether they are universal conceptual metaphors or not. Kovecses (2002:163) argues that if we discover that the same conceptual metaphor exists in several unrelated languages we are faced with an additional question why

this conceptual metaphor exists in such different languages and cultures. In an attempt to illustrate this Kovecses (2002:163) cites the conceptual metaphors for happiness as follows:

BEING HAPPY IS BEING OFF THE GROUND

BEING HAPPY IS BEING IN HEAVEN

HAPPY IS UP

HAPPINESS IS LIGHT

HAPPINESS IS VITALITY

HAPPINESS IS FLUID IN A CONTAINER

HAPPINESS IS A CAPTIVE ANIMAL

HAPPINESS IS AN OPPONENT

HAPPINESS IS A RAPTURE

A HAPPY PERSON IS AN ANIMAL (THAT LIVES WELL)

HAPPINESS IS A PLEASURABLE PHYSICAL SENSATION

HAPPINESS IS INSANITY

HAPPINESS IS A NATURAL FORCE.

Kovecses gives examples in which these conceptual metaphors occur in English, Chinese, and Hungarian. Kovecses (2002) emphasizes that these three languages are typologically completely unrelated and represent very different cultures of the world. Kovecses (2002:165) then questions how it is possible for such different languages and cultures to conceptualise happiness metaphorically in such similar ways. He proposes three possible answers to this question:

- it is an accidental occurrence,

- it is a case of one language borrowing from the other language,
- or it is a question of the conceptual metaphors being motivated by universality so that they occur in these cultures.

Kovecses (2002:163) proposes the following explanatory hypothesis for the existence of so-called universal metaphors:

The reason is that, as linguistic usage suggests, English-speaking, Hungarian, Japanese, Chinese people appear to have similar ideas about their bodies and seem to see themselves as undergoing the same physiological processes when in a state of anger, duh, ikari, nu and so forth. They all view their bodies and body organs as containers. And, also linguistic evidence suggests, they respond physiologically to certain situations (causes) in the same ways.

Kovecses (2002) compares the metaphorical expression ANGER IS A HOT FLUID IN A CONTAINER as manifested in the conceptual metaphor in English, Hungarian, Japanese, Chinese, Zulu, Polish, Wolof and Tahitian. Kovecses (2002) starts with the study of the conceptual metaphor in English. He states that English examples such as “You make my blood *boil*,” “*Simmer* down!” “Let him *stew*” presuppose a container. According to Kovecses (2002:166) all the preceding examples assume a container (corresponding to the human body), a fluid inside the container, as well as the element of heat as a property of the fluid. It is the hot fluid or more precisely the heat of the fluid that corresponds to anger.

According to Kovecses (2002:166) we map our knowledge of the behaviour of hot fluids in closed containers onto the concept of anger. Kovecses gives us the following examples of entailments from the conceptual metaphor in English:

WHEN THE INTENSITY OF ANGER INCREASES, THE FLUID RISES: *His pent-up anger welled up inside him.*

INTENSE ANGER PRODUCES STEAM: *Billy's just blowing off steam.*

INTENSE ANGER PRODUCES PRESSURE ON THE CONTAINER: *He was bursting with anger.*

WHEN ANGER BECOMES TOO INTENSE, THE PERSON EXPLODES: *When I told him he just exploded.*

WHEN A PERSON EXPLODES, PARTS OF HIM GO UP IN THE AIR: *I blew my stack.*

WHEN A PERSON EXPLODES, WHAT WAS INSIDE HIM COMES OUT: *His anger finally came out.*

According to Kovecses (2002) the conceptual metaphor ANGER IS A HOT FLUID IN A CONTAINER is almost identical in Hungarian. That is, there are no significant differences in the Hungarian expressions compared to the expressions in English. According to Kovecses the only difference between the two languages is the addition in Hungarian of the head being construed as the main container that can hold the hot fluid. Below are Kovecses (2002:167) examples of translations from Hungarian.

“Wrath built/ piled up in him/her.”

“Anger welled up inside him/her.”

“He was all steam.”

“He was fuming alone/by himself/ herself”.

“His anger almost burst him/her”.

“He /she almost exploded with anger”.

“He/ she could hardly hold his/her anger inside”.

“He/ she burst with anger”.

“He/she exploded with anger”.

“I do not tolerate your outburst”.

“He/she is on the ceiling again”.

“Anger burst out of him/her”.

“He/she burst out”.

Kovecses (2002) points out that the major difference between English and Hungarian is that in Hungarian (in addition to the body as a whole) the head can function as the principal container that can hold the hot fluid. Japanese is reported to be different from both English and Hungarian in that apart from the body as a whole, the stomach / bowels area is seen as the principal container for the hot fluid that corresponds to anger. Below are translations of the Japanese linguistic expressions which exemplify the conceptual metaphor (Kovecses, 2002:167).

“The intestines are boiling”.

“Anger seethes inside the body”.

“Anger boils the bottom of the stomach”.

Kovecses (2002) is quick to point out that despite these differences there are similarities between English and Japanese. He gives us the following examples:

“My anger kept building up inside me”.

“She got all steamed up”.

“Smoke was pouring out of his head”.

“I suppressed my anger”.

“My mother finally exploded”.

“My patience bag burst”.

“My anger exploded”.

Kovecses (2002:168-170) goes on to exemplify the similarities of the ANGER metaphor in English and other languages such as Chinese, Zulu, Polish, Wolof and Tahitian. Kovecses (2002:171) concludes that all these similarities in all these unrelated languages can attributed to embodiment.

In conclusion one can say that universal conceptual metaphors are a result of the way our bodies interact with the physical environment. This is to say that there are bound to be similarities in the ways unrelated language types and different cultures conceptualise certain experiential phenomena.

2.6 Cultural Variation in conceptual metaphor

Kovecses (2002:183) notes that in addition to universality there will also be cultural variation in the same conceptual metaphors occurring in different languages. He suggests the following possibilities of cultural variation:

- variation in the *range* of conceptual metaphors for a given target.
- and variation in particular *elaborations* of conceptual metaphors for a given target.

Kovecses (2002:183) further distinguishes between two kinds of cultural variation, that is, cross – cultural (intercultural) and variation within – culture (intracultural). He claims that there can be differences in the range of conceptual metaphors that languages and cultures have available for the conceptualisation of particular target domains. He bases his observations on a study of metaphor relating to Emotions. Kovecses (2002) points out that studies carried out by Lakoff and himself have revealed that metaphors for anger found in English have also been found in Japanese. However, it has also been found that there is a large number of anger expressions that group around the Japanese concept of *hara* (literally *belly*). This culturally significant concept is unique to Japanese culture and so the conceptual metaphor ANGER IS IN THE HARA is limited to Japanese.

Zulu, according to Kovecses (2002:184) shares many conceptual metaphors with English. In addition, Zulu has other conceptual metaphors that do not exist in English. Kovecses (2002:184) gives the example of the Zulu metaphor that involves the heart. ANGER IS (understood as being) IN THE HEART. Kovecses (2002) observes that when the heart metaphor occurs in English it is associated with love, affection, and the like. In Zulu it is associated with anger and patience – impatience, tolerance – intolerance.

Kovecses (2002:184) then concludes that different languages may elaborate conceptual metaphors differently. He points out that English, for example, has the conceptual metaphor ANGER IS A HOT FLUID IN A CONTAINER and he adds that one metaphorical elaboration in English is that the hot fluid produces steam in the container (cf. *He's just blowing off steam*). This particular elaboration is absent in Zulu.

Hungarian and English share the conceptual metaphors THE BODY IS A CONTAINER FOR EMOTIONS and ANGER IS FIRE. However, there is a difference in the way in which the two cultures elaborate these conceptual metaphors. The body and fire inside it are often elaborated in Hungarian as a pipe, where there is a burning substance inside a container. This elaboration seems to be unique to Hungarian (Kovecses 2002:184).

Kovecses (2002:186) identifies two main causes of cross – cultural variations. These are:

- broader cultural context (the governing principles and the key concepts in a given culture)
- and the natural and physical environment in which different cultures are located.

Kovecses (2002) claims that the governing principles and key concepts will be seen to differ from culture to culture or from cultural group to cultural group. Kovecses (2002:186 –7) maintains that at a generic level (that is the general conceptual metaphor) a given metaphor is very similar across cultures. However, at a specific level we can notice important differences cross-culturally in this metaphor.

The following quotation captures what Kovecses (2002:187) assumes about the effect of the natural and physical environment on conceptual metaphors:

The natural and physical environment shapes a language, primarily its vocabulary, in an obvious way; consequently, it will shape the metaphors as well. Given a certain kind of habitat speakers living there will be attuned (mostly) subconsciously to things and the phenomena that are characteristic of that habitat and they will make use of

these things and phenomena for the metaphorical comprehension and creation of their conceptual universe.

2.7 Conclusion

In conclusion, I would like to summarize the main findings of this chapter. The literature survey on metaphors revealed that there are different views on the following issues:

- What is the nature of the relation between conceptual domains? Is it unidirectional or bi – directional or blending; what is the nature of mapping between conceptual domains?
- What is the nature of motivation for the universality of certain conceptual metaphors and the motivation for cultural variation of certain conceptual metaphors?

The survey also showed that there are three schools of thought on the issue whether the relation between the conceptual domains is unidirectional, bi – directional or blending. The conceptual structure view claims that the relation between the source domain and the target domain is unidirectional. The mapping is from the source domain to the target domain. Lakoff and Turner claim that we see and understand the target domain through the characteristic attributes of the source domain.

The interactive view argues that the relation between the source domain and the target domain, that is, between the vehicle and the tenor is bi – directional. It maintains that the vehicle and the topic effect reciprocal changes on each other. The protagonists of this view argue that if we were to take a metaphoric expression such as the “world is a stage” the world is seen through the relevant characteristic attributes of a stage and a stage is seen through the

relevant characteristic attributes of the world. When one analyzes these two views, Lakoff and Turner's (1989) unidirectional approach to the relation between source and target domains in metaphorical mapping perspective seems to be more plausible. Their analyses clearly show that the relation between the source domain and the target domain is unidirectional, that is from source to target. Their claim is supported by the observation that when the relation of a source and a target domain is reversed, a different interpretation is the result. If we take for instance the metaphor PEOPLE ARE MACHINES we are saying people and machines share specific characteristics such as having parts that operate in special ways such as idling steadily or accelerating and that they may fail to function, require repairing and so on. According to Lakoff and Turner (1989) when we say that MACHINES ARE PEOPLE, a different inferential structure gets mapped onto machines. Machines are seen as having certain characteristics of people. This permits us to make such statements as "The computer is punishing me by wiping out my buffer".

Croft and Cruse (2004) bring in the Blending Theory in which they maintain that what happens to the source domain and the target domain is a blending or fusion of some of their respective characteristics, thereby creating a new conceptual space separate from the two. The Blending Theory makes a lot of sense because it reconciles the differences that result from the polarized Interactive and Conceptual Metaphor views. In fact, this view of what is happening to the source and target domains has gained a lot of ground in Cognitive Linguistics. I am not going to dwell much on this issue because this is not one of the objectives of this study. The literature survey has also revealed that there are universal conceptual metaphors and it has been established from previous studies that these universal metaphors are motivated by

embodiment. The literature survey has also revealed that there are conceptual metaphors that can be explained by cultural and /or ecological or environmental variations.

The main aim of this study is to compare English and Shona conceptual metaphors to see the extent to which they are similar or different. Two hypotheses guide this research; the one, embodiment claiming that humans experience their environment through their bodies and hence also construe the world in terms of their bodily experiences. The other, claims that cultural differences may arise because of differences in environments or ecologies. Such differences give rise to different construals of reality and hence also in the conceptual metaphors of different languages. Since English and Shona are structurally incomparable languages, it will be necessary to do an ontological and epistemological reconstruction of the domains in order to compare the conceptual metaphors at this level.

CHAPTER 3

CONCEPTUAL DOMAINS AND METAPHORICAL MAPPING IN ENGLISH

3.1 Introduction

In this chapter a critical survey of the analysis of Orientational metaphors and Container metaphors done by Lakoff and Johnson (1980) and the analysis of the Event Structure metaphor done by Lakoff (1993) and Johnson (1993) is presented. I will specifically present selected Orientational, Container, Event Structure metaphors in the sections which follow because I find that Lakoff and Johnson (1980) focused mainly on these and their theory on conceptual metaphor is based largely on these. It is my intention to compare English and Shona conceptual metaphors because I am likely to gain some insights into the comparable aspects of the two languages by focusing on these conceptual metaphors which have been studied thoroughly. I will also give the conceptual schema of each type of conceptual metaphor at the end of each section.

Where necessary, reference is made to other linguists who also studied conceptual metaphors such as Turner (1987), Kovecses (2002), Croft and Cruse (2004). These sources give us a broad perspective of current views and approaches to the theory of metaphor in Cognitive Linguistics in a specific language. In their study of metaphor, Lakoff and Johnson (1980), distinguish between a conceptual metaphor and linguistic expressions that are instantiations of the conceptual metaphor. According to Lakoff and Johnson (1980), conceptual metaphor refers to a conceptual system where one domain, which is the source domain, maps onto another domain, which is the target. As a typical example of conceptual metaphor, consider the example ARGUMENT IS WAR. In this conceptual metaphor two domains, argument and

war are related. War is the source domain (SD), which maps onto argument, the target domain (TD).

Lakoff and Johnson (1980) claim that in order to understand conceptual metaphors we have to reconstruct the ontological and epistemological correspondences that are mapped from the source domain to the target domain. Lakoff (1993) exemplifies the mapping of ontological and epistemic correspondences in a few conceptual metaphors only. That is, LOVE IS A JOURNEY, LIFE IS A JOURNEY and A CAREER IS A JOURNEY and the Event Structure conceptual metaphors. For the rest of their conceptual metaphors they give instantiations of the conceptual metaphors only. If, according to Lakoff and Johnson (1980) the understanding of metaphor is so crucially dependent on the understanding of the ontological and epistemological essences of the relevant domains, then one would expect to find such analyses in all the discussions of the various conceptual metaphors. This, unfortunately, is not the case. For this reason I am going to do a reconstruction of the ontology and epistemology of the domains.

3.2 Orientational Metaphors

According to Lakoff and Johnson (1980:14), Orientational metaphors involve the mapping of attributes in the domain of spatial orientation onto other conceptual domains. Typically orientations such as UP/DOWN and BACK/FRONT constitute source domains with attributes that are mapped onto target domains such as states and emotions. Lakoff and Johnson (1980) explicate the ontology and epistemology motivating Orientational metaphors by claiming that these spatial orientations are based on the nature of the human body and the way the body

operates in our physical environment (ibid). Human beings walk erect. This means that they have the ability to overcome the gravitational force. As a result of this the erect body has a positive connotation and the prostrate posture has a negative one. This is the reason why UP has positive connotations. By way of illustration of the class of Orientational metaphors Lakoff and Johnson (1980) refer to the expressions such as: *I am feeling low; my spirits rose*. Lakoff and Johnson (1980) work backwards from the metaphorical expressions to the conceptual metaphors. Given their claims about epistemology and ontology, the proper way of analysing the conceptual metaphors would obviously be to reconstruct the epistemological and the ontological aspects of the domains involved in conceptual metaphor. Consider, for example a possible ontology for vertical spatial orientation.




Figure 3.1: Ontology of vertical space.




Figure 3.2: Ontology of horizontal space

Figure 3.1 shows that there are two domains: the orientation domain (source domain) and the states domain (target domain). The orientation domain maps onto the states domain. Embodiment motivates the mapping. So this is where the values get to be associated with the spatial orientation. The level position signifies a neutral position and it is neither good nor bad. If the position is on the level in both the ORIENTATION domain and the STATES domain, this is neutral. We can say that any position above LEVEL is good and any position below LEVEL is bad. Prostrate is not so good or bad. Therefore GOOD IS UP, BAD IS DOWN and LEVEL IS NOT SO GOOD OR BAD. It can, therefore be concluded that we can also have UP (above norm) or DOWN (below the norm) or LEVEL (neutral).

The above figure also illustrates the Ontological mapping of the horizontal spatial Orientation. According to this spatial orientation we experience the world with the front part of our bodies. This is construed as good. Therefore anything that is in front of us is good. FRONT IS GOOD. Anything that is behind us is bad. BACK IS BAD.

Before we go on to see how actual metaphorical expressions subsume this conceptual ontological schema we first need to make a few comments on metaphorical expressions. It would appear that metaphorical expressions consist of the following elements:

- a) One or more linguistic elements in an expression from the source domain used as an expression in the target domain.

b) Optionally, some or other linguistic expression that designates the target domain involved in the mapping. Below are examples of metaphorical expressions in which the source domain represented by *up*, *rose*, and *high* respectively as the domain designator.

I'm feeling *up*.

My spirits *rose*.

You are in *high* spirits.

Thinking about her put me in *high* spirits.

The metaphorical expressions above show the mapping of the UP orientation onto emotional state. We also see that the DOWN orientation is mapped onto the emotional states in the following expressions:

I'm feeling *down*.

I'm *depressed*.

My spirits *sank*.

He is really *low* these days.

Examples of metaphorical expressions that allude to the level plane in the domain of vertical orientation as a source domain are:

He is *level*-headed.

Be *level* with me.

My presentation of data will inevitably appear to be repetitive. This, however, is deliberate.


The purpose of the repetition is to show that a whole range of states: emotions, consciousness,

wakefulness, asleep, economy, health, social stratification, etc all allude to the ontology of vertical orientation. I would like to emphasize the point that all the three points on the vertical orientation, that is, UP, LEVEL and DOWN are involved in the mapping to states. In the examples that are given below it will be observed that the ontology and epistemology of vertical Orientation is mapping onto the ontology and epistemology of states.


We can reclassify Lakoff and Johnson's conceptual metaphors and their instantiations according to two categories, that is, those that are above level and those that are below level.

HAPPY IS UP: SAD IS DOWN


I'm feeling up.



My Spirits rose.




You are in high spirits.




We must also analyse the metaphorical expressions that have been listed as instantiations of the conceptual metaphor SAD IS DOWN. Assuming that calm, composed etc represent the norm for emotional state; then high, excited etc. will be above level and down, depressed etc. will be below level in the emotional state. The analysis reveals that the domain of vertical orientation is being mapped or projected onto the domain of emotions. The following examples illustrate the below level of the conceptual metaphor:


I'm feeling down.




I'm depressed.




He is really low.



My spirits sank.



I fell into a depression.




CONSCIOUS IS UP: UNCONSCIOUS IS DOWN


Lakoff and Johnson (1980) also present an analysis of the conceptual metaphor CONSCIOUS IS UP: UNCONSCIOUS IS DOWN. The vertical orientation UP is mapped onto the target domain of states, which is consciousness in the CONSCIOUS IS UP conceptual metaphor.

Below are analyses of some of the linguistic expressions.

Wake up.




I'm up already.




A similar mapping of the vertical orientation domain ONTO the domain of states, that is, UNCONSCIOUSNESS is seen in the following sentence:


He fell asleep.




He dropped off to sleep.



He sank into a coma.




He is under hypnosis.




HEALTH AND LIFE ARE UP: SICKNESS AND DEATH ARE DOWN

The conceptual metaphors HEALTH AND LIFE ARE UP: SICKNESS AND DEATH ARE DOWN involve the mapping of the ontology and epistemology of the vertical orientation domain onto the ontology and epistemology of states, particularly health. Lakoff and Johnson (1980) give a list of metaphorical expressions for which I have reconstructed the ontology and the epistemology of the mapping of this type of orientation metaphor.


He is at the peak of his health.



He fell ill.




Lazarus rose from the dead.




HAVING CONTROL OR FORCE IS UP: BEING SUBJECT TO CONTROL OR FORCE IS DOWN

The orientational metaphors **HAVING CONTROL OR FORCE IS UP: BEING SUBJECT TO CONTROL OR FORCE IS DOWN** are an illustration of the mapping of the ontology and epistemology of vertical orientation onto the ontology and epistemology of states {power}. Lakoff and Johnson (1980) give us a list of metaphorical expressions, which are instantiations of the above orientational metaphors. Below is a reconstruction of the ontology and epistemology of the domains involved.


I have control over her




I'm on top of the situation




He is at the height of his power




He is in the high command.




He's in the upper echelon




His power rose.




He ranks above me in strength.




He is under my control.




He fell from power.




His power is on the decline



He's my social inferior.




He's the low man on the totem pole




MORE IS UP: LESS IS DOWN

The orientation metaphors MORE IS UP: LESS IS DOWN illustrate the mapping of the ontology and epistemology of the vertical orientation domain onto the ontology and epistemology of states for an example quantity, reading material and economics. A reconstruction of the ontology and epistemology of the domains involved in the metaphorical expressions that are instantiations of the conceptual metaphor reveals the mapping:

My income rose.




His income fell last year.




GOOD IS UP: BAD IS DOWN

The Orientational metaphor GOOD IS UP: BAD IS DOWN involves the following underlying domains: the vertical orientation domain (source) and state domain {economy} or {value}, (target). Lakoff and Johnson (1980:16) list a number of metaphorical expressions, which, they claim, are instantiations of the conceptual metaphor. The following analysis reveals the mapping of the ontology and epistemology of the vertical orientation domain onto ontology and epistemology of the state domain.


We hit a peak last year.




Things are looking up.



He does high quality work



It has been downhill ever since.



From the examples above it would appear that there are three main positions in the ORIENTATION domain and in the STATES domain of these orientational conceptual metaphors; the norm or level position, and then either a position above the norm or a position below the norm. The norm position is neutral; it may have either or both positive or negative connotations. However, a position above and below the norm will have positive or negative connotations respectively.

Lakoff and Johnson (1980) only discuss the vertical (UP/DOWN) orientation and exclude the horizontal (FRONT/BACK) orientation. This omission means that a whole range of metaphors has been left out. The conceptual metaphors FRONT IS GOOD/BACK IS BAD is pervasive in English. My summary of the conceptual schema of the orientational metaphors reveals the metaphorical linguistic expressions that arise from this conceptual mapping. For instance when we hear someone saying: 'He put on a good front' or 'I'm looking forward to seeing you', we appreciate that these metaphorical expressions arise from the FRONT IS GOOD conceptual metaphor. When someone says: 'He turned his back on me', we realize that this linguistic expression arises from the conceptual metaphor BACK IS BAD.

Here is a summary of the conceptual schema of orientational metaphors.

Table 3.1: Conceptual Schema of English Orientational metaphors

Motivation		Embodiment	
Possible Status		Universal	
Conceptual Domains:	Source domain	→ Target Domain	
	Orientation	→ States	
Specific metaphorical mappings:	Source domain		Target domain
	Orientation	Up Level Down	Values Health Power
	Orientation	Front Back	Economics Etc
Implementation at the Metaphorical level			
Vertical Orientation			
1.UP	1. Happy is up (My spirit rose)	2. Good health is up (I am on my feet)	3. Good finance is up (His salary rose)
2.LEVEL	Level is neutral: (She is level headed)	Neither good nor bad (Be level with me)	
3. DOWN	1. Sad is down (I am feeling low)	2. Bad health is down (I am down with flue)	3. A bad economy is down (The economy slumped)
Horizontal Orientation			
1. FRONT	FRONT IS GOOD	(He put on a good front)	(I am looking forward to seeing you)
2. BACK	BACK IS BAD	(He turned his back on me)	

3.3 Container Metaphors

Lakoff and Johnson (1980) did not reconstruct the ontology and epistemology of the conceptual domains involved in the mapping in metaphorical linguistic expressions. Instead, they inferred the conceptual metaphors from the metaphorical expressions when they were analyzing the CONTAINER metaphors. They do not give an adequate schema or ontology of containers. If we start by explicating the ontology of containers, we will be able to see what

the mapping of containment involves. This will also lead to an explication of the metaphorical expressions that arise from the ontology. The ontology of container metaphors is understood through the analysis of one-dimensional, two-dimensional and three-dimensional containment. It is on the basis of our experience with the concept of containment that we come to have container metaphors. Johnson (1987) claims that we are intimately conscious of our bodies as three-dimensional containers into which we put things (food, water, air) and out of which things emerge (food and water, wastes, air and blood and other things as well). Johnson (1987) maintains that the concept of containment is developed in us from birth in that we experience constant physical containment in our surroundings. For example, we experience going in and out of rooms. We experience putting objects into containers and so forth. We can represent the ontology of containers by means of the following diagrams:




Figure 3.3: One – dimensional, two – dimensional, and three – dimensional containers

Below is the reconstruction of the ontology of a one- dimensional container

- One dimensional a line
- It may have a beginning.
- It may have an end.
- The line may therefore be a bounded space.
- A line may involve progression or direction.

A two dimensional container

- Is a flat bounded space.
- It has a width and a length.

- Something can be inside or outside the bounded space.


A three-dimensional container

- A three-dimensional container has delimited space with an inside and an outside through which things go in and out.
- A three-dimensional container can become full or empty.
- A three-dimensional container can only contain volume of matter relative to the space inside.
- Three-dimensional containers can be closed off.


The following are examples which illustrate the mapping of the ontology and epistemology of containment onto the ontology and epistemology of one dimensional containment.

One dimensional container


He is on course for completing his doctoral degree



He is off course for the running of the Presidency




He is in line for promotion.




Below are examples of the mapping of the ontology and epistemology of the domain containment onto the ontology and epistemology of the state domain.

This state of mind will send him straight to hell



Lets take another state; the three dimensional state.

I am within the rules






Figure 3.4: Two-dimensional container

Two-dimensional containers are typified by having a length and a width as shown in the diagram above. This is a flat bounded space. An example of such a container is a football field. We therefore, can talk of passing 'through' the field. That is, going from one end of the field through the middle to the other end of the field or we can talk of being 'on' the field, that is within the bounded space of the field or/and we can talk of being 'outside' the field, that is outside the bounded space of the field. Strangely enough, it would seem that two - dimensional containment is not involved in metaphorical mapping in English.

Three-dimensional container

An explication of the ontology of the three dimensional containment brings out a number of things. Take a look at the following three-dimensional figure:




Figure 3.5: Three-dimensional container

Three-dimensional containers have length, width and height as shown in the diagram above. As a consequence of the three-dimensional space (this is presumably the most typical container) we can talk of putting something 'in' a box, going 'out of' or going 'into' a house. It is this ontology of containers that is mapped onto states, events and actions. Below are examples of metaphoric expressions that illustrate this.

You are in trouble.

We have entered the war.

He is *out of contention* for the presidency.

3.3.1 Visual fields are containers


The ontology of containers helps us to understand a conceptual metaphor such as

VISUAL FIELDS ARE CONTAINERS:


The ship is coming into view.

This metaphorical expression is a result of the fact that visual fields are regarded as containers, that is, bounded regions. Beyond the boundaries you cannot see anything. Therefore, what is visible is considered to be within the bounded (one - dimensional) space. English prepositions such as 'in' and 'out' typically express containment-based metaphors in English. Below such container-based metaphorical expressions are analysed:


I have him in sight.



He is out of sight.



He is in my line of vision.



These are container - based expressions in that when you look ahead you have a visual field. This visual field is not limitless even when we take into account peripheral vision. The field is bounded. Therefore, whatever falls within the line of vision is considered to be contained in it. If you are looking directly ahead at an object, you are looking in a straight line of vision. The bounded space is a straight line from where you are up to as far as you can see.

3.3.2 Events, Actions, Activities and States

According to Lakoff and Johnson (1980:30):

We use metaphors to comprehend events, actions, activities, and states. Events and actions are conceptualized metaphorically as objects, activities as substances, states as

containers. A race for example is an event, which is viewed as a discrete entity. The race exists in space and time, and it has well-defined boundaries. Hence we view it as a CONTAINER OBJECT, having in it participants (which are objects), events like the start and finish (which are metaphorical objects) and an activity of running (which is a metaphorical substance). Thus we can say of a race:

Are you in the race on Sunday? (race as CONTAINER OBJECT)

Are you going to the race? (race as OBJECT)

Did you see the race? (race as OBJECT)

The finish of the race was really exciting (finish as EVENT OBJECT within CONTAINER OBJECT)

There was a lot of good running in the race (running as a SUBSTANCE in CONTAINER)


I couldn't do much sprinting until the end (sprinting as SUBSTANCE)

Half-way into the race, I ran out of energy (race as CONTAINER OBJECT)


He's out of the race now (race as a CONTAINER OBJECT)

According to Lakoff and Johnson (1980) activities in general are perceived metaphorically as SUBSTANCES. Activities are perceived as entities that have a beginning and an end. The following are examples of activities that are conceptualized as contained objects:

In washing the windows, I spilled water all over the floor.



How did Jenny get out of washing the windows?



Outside of washing windows, what else did you do?

What else did you do?	OUTSIDE OF WASHING WINDOWS
TD: DESIGNATOR: ACTIVITY	SD: CONTAINER {THREE DIMENSIONAL} → TD: ACTIVITY


How did you get into window washing as a profession?

How did you as a profession?	GET INTO WINDOW WASHING
TD: DESIGNATOR: ACTIVITY	SD: CONTAINER {THREE DIMENSIONAL} → TD: ACTIVITY


He's immersed in washing the windows.

He's immersed	IN WASHING THE WINDOWS.
TD: DESIGNATOR: ACTIVITY	SD: CONTAINER {THREE DIMENSIONAL} → TD: ACTIVITY


I put a lot of energy into washing the windows



I get a lot of satisfaction out of washing windows.



There is a lot of satisfaction in washing windows.




Washing is viewed as a container into which energy is put. Therefore, getting into the activity entails containment. Washing is perceived as a contained activity out of which something (satisfaction) could be taken. Washing is seen as an activity which has a beginning


and an end. This beginning and end subsumes a one-dimensional span. The beginning and the end of the activity bound the region in between. Therefore, what happens during the activity is within the bounded region. This is construed as containment. In all these cases the preposition 'in' signals containment. Lakoff and Johnson (1980) maintain that activities are perceived as containers with regard to the energy and the materials required for them and for their by- products which may be perceived as in them or emerging from them.

Lakoff and Johnson (1980) also explain that various kinds of states may be conceptualised as containers. Below are illustrations of the mapping of the ontology and epistemology of containment onto the ontology and epistemology of states.


He's in love.




He's coming out of the coma.




I'm steadily getting into shape.



I entered a state of euphoria.



I fell into a depression.



Love, coma, shape, euphoria, depression are all construed as a container into or out of which one can get. The prepositions 'in', 'out of', 'into', and the verb 'entered' all convey the idea of containment, either one-dimensional, two-dimensional or three-dimensional.

We can conclude this section by commenting that Lakoff and Johnson (1980) do not explicate container conceptual metaphors fully. The following table is a summary of the conceptual schema of the container metaphors.

Table 3.2: Conceptual Schema of the Container metaphors

Motivation	Embodiment	
Possible Status	Universal	
Conceptual Domain	Source Domain Container	Target Domain Events States
<u>Specific Metaphorical Mappings</u>		
Source Domain One-Dimensional (line) Two-Dimensional (enclosed flat surface) Three-Dimensional (enclosed volume)		Target Domain Washing Race Race, Love, Trouble, coma
<u>Implementation at the Metaphorical Level</u>		
Source Domain One-Dimensional	Target Domain Don't Step out of line	
Three-Dimensional	I am in love	

3.4 The Event Structure Metaphor

According to Lakoff (1993:219), the various aspects of the event structure such as states, changes, actions, causes, purposes and means, are characterized cognitively through metaphor in terms of space, motion and force. Lakoff (1993:219) characterises the ontology of Event Structure as follows:

States are bounded regions in space.

Changes of states are movements into or out of bounded regions.

Processes are movements into or out of bounded regions.

Processes are movements (MOTION).

Actions are self-propelled movements (MOTION).

Causes are forces.

Purposes are destinations.

Means are paths to destinations.

According to Lakoff the ontology of an event could be represented as

SOURCE → ENTITY → PATH → DIRECTION

A closer inspection of this representation shows that it is in fact incomplete if applied to specific events such as travelling. In such cases elements such as means, need to be added. A more detailed ontology should perhaps include the following




Figure 3.6: Revised ontology of travel

In the diagram ‘ means’ is the method of travel, that is, walking, driving, sailing or flying and medium refers to whether one is travelling by air, road, or sea. Lakoff's (1993) analysis has limitations because of the method he used. He seemed to have abstracted the conceptual structure of the Event Structure from a representative sample of metaphorical expressions, that is, inductively.

The ontology of MOTION can be explicated as follows:

1. Direction – moving away from point A to point B on a horizontal plane.
2. Direction - moving up to point X from a neutral position on a vertical plane or down to point X from a neutral position on a vertical plane.
3. Medium – on surfaces, by air, by water.
4. Means – on foot, by car, by plane, by ship.
5. Obstruction - There may be impediments or diversions.

In analysing the Event Structure metaphor I will rely on Kovecses (2002) whose presentation of Lakoff's (1993) analysis of the metaphor is simpler and easier to follow. According to Kovecses (2002:136) the structure of events is conceptualised as follows:

PROGRESS IS MOTION: The Service will continue *to stagger from crisis to crisis*.


ACTION IS SELF –PROPELLED MOTION: Scientists *have taken a big step* in understanding Alzheimer's disease.

MEANS ARE PATHS: Let's hope he can *keep* the team *on the road* to success.


CHANGES ARE MOVEMENTS: The province is quite close to *sliding into* a civil war.

According to Lakoff (1993) there is a widespread system of metaphors that involves correspondences outlined earlier called the Event Structure metaphor. Kovecses (2002:135) examines metaphorical expressions which are instantiations of the metaphor. Below are conceptual analyses of the event structure metaphorical expressions.


They fell in love




He went crazy




The hit sent the crowd into a frenzy.




We have taken the first step.




He finally reached his goals.




She went from fat to thin through an exercise programme.




Let's try to get around this problem.




The flow of history....



We fell behind schedule on this project.




You should move on with your life.



According to Kovecses (2002:135) the target domains of the Event Structure metaphor involve various aspects of events.

The aspects of events include states that change, causes that produce changes, change itself, action, and so on. These various aspects of events are understood metaphorically in terms of such concepts as location, force, and motion.

Figure 3.7 The system of mappings of Event Structure



According to Kovecses (2002:136) we conceptualise change in terms of motion. He points out that in an utterance such as “That is very low by the standards of the mid 1980’s when China’s economy *galloped* ahead”, galloping is a form of movement but not only movement but motion that is causing change at a good pace. Kovecses (2002) looks at the epistemology of CHANGES ARE MOVEMENTS which is a sub-mapping in the Event Structure metaphor. One such entailment of the metaphor is that lack of control over change will be viewed as lack

of control over motion. Below are instances of entailments of the conceptual metaphor listed by Kovecses (2002:136).

LACK OF CONTROL OVER CHANGE IS LACK OF CONTROL OVER MOVEMENT:

Decisive steps had to be taken to stop the country from *sliding* into disaster.

ACCIDENTAL CHANGES ARE ACCIDENTAL MOVEMENTS:

He gives the following instantiations for the metaphor:

Many important scientific discoveries *have been stumbled across* by accident.

The customs men were obviously happy that they *had stumbled on* a major drug-trafficking ring.

ACTION IS SELF-PROPELLED MOTION

Scientists *have taken a big step* in understanding Alzheimer's disease.

The setting up of stock exchanges is *an important step on the road to* a free market economy.

If you feel that you have reason to be worried, *the first step* is to make an appointment to see your family doctor.

Many sales people have the mistaken belief that making a sale is the *last step in* the selling process.

According to Kovecses (2002:137) self- propelled motion involves some kind of stepping and this explains why it is used to comprehend actions in general. An entailment of this metaphor is MANNER OF ACTION IS MANNER OF MOTION. We get this entailment because the

way movement occurs can be used to conceptualize the manner of the action. The examples and the instantiations that follow illustrate this point.

SPEED OF ACTION IS SPEED OF MOTION:

Cooper *moved quickly into the fast lane* of Hollywood.

He was still adapting to life *in the fast lane*.

...seven days of good food, fine wine, and living *in the slow lane*.

CAREFUL ACTION IS CAREFUL MOTION:

It was a gradual process which could only be carried out *step-by-step*.

The book is full of facts, advice, and a *step-by-step* guide; it's just like having an expert at your side.

SIMILAR ACTION IS SYNCRONIZED MOTION:

Moscow is anxious *to stay in step with* Washington.

They have found themselves *out of step* with the Prime Minister on this issue.

According to Kovecses (2002:137) progress can be understood metaphorically as movement forward in the metaphor PROGRESS IS MOTION FORWARD. However, progress is also a kind of change and it is therefore conceptualized as motion. This change is special because it is conceptualized as motion forward. Below are some entailments as well as the instantiations that Kovecses gives for this metaphor.

RATE OF PROGRESS IS RATE OF MOTION FORWARD:

The Service will continue *to stagger* from crisis to crisis.

The marriage *staggered on* for a little while longer.

The state government has *lurched from* one budget crisis to another.

The company *stumbled* in the late 1980's when it rushed a new machine to the market and allowed the costs to soar.

He had a depressing three years, during which he *stumbled from* one crisis to another.

MEANS is another important aspect of the event structure metaphor. According to Kovecses (2002:137):

MEANS in the Event Structure metaphor are comprehended as paths. The understanding of the word *through* requires the notion of path. In addition, there are distinct kinds of paths and several of them are used metaphorically. Most commonly in English the words, *route*, *road*, *avenue*, and the word *path* itself are employed for this purpose.

The following examples are instantiations of the entailment of the Event Structure metaphor Kovecses (2002:138):

By the time she was sixteen she had decided that education would be the best *route to* a good job.

Marriage is not the only *route to* happiness.

The *route towards* a market economy would be a difficult one.

Let's hope he can keep the team *on the road to* success.

He must be well aware in private that the people need reassurance if they are *to travel along the road of* reform.

She has explored all the *available avenues* for change.

Allison made it clear that she was eager *to pursue other avenues*.

This can prevent you from seeing which *path to take* in your career.

A very long time ago I decided on a change of career-*path*-I was going to be a flight steward.

The president said his country would continue *on its path to* full democracy.

This job isn't *a path to* riches.

Kovecses (2002:138) sums up his analysis of the Event Structure metaphor by stating

Provides metaphorical understanding for a large number of abstract concepts, such as state, cause, change, and so on. These abstract concepts converge on the super-ordinate concept EVENT of which they constitute various aspects. The constituent abstract concepts are metaphorically conceived as physical location, force, motion, and so on.

The table below is a summary of the conceptual schema of the Event Structure metaphors.

English Event Structure Metaphors

Table 3.3: Conceptual schema of the Event Structure metaphor

Motivation	Cultural and ecological Experiences	
Possible Status	Non – universal	
Conceptual Domains:	Source Domain	Target Domain
	Structure of Events	Cultural and Ecological Experiences
Specific Metaphorical Mappings		
1. CAUSES ARE FORCES 2. PURPOSES ARE DESTINATIONS 3. DIFFICULTIES ARE IMPEDIMENTS 4. CHANGES ARE EMOTIONS 5. MEANS ARE PATHS		
Implementation of the Metaphorical Level		
1. The home run brought the crowd to its feet 2. Lets forge ahead 3. We are at an impasse 4. I'm in love 5. Do it this way		

3.5 Conclusion

Lakoff and Johnson's (1980) analysis of the Orientational metaphors and Container metaphors has some limitations. They seem to have started from the metaphorical linguistic expressions in order to explicate the conceptual metaphors. This resulted in some inconsistencies and

gaps. For example, Lakoff and Johnson (1980) do not discuss or exemplify the horizontal orientation and the conceptual metaphors that show the mapping of the front and back horizontal orientation onto emotional states, health states or economical states. This is because they did not start with a conceptual schema for Orientation, Container and Event. The fact that the Orientational metaphors, the Container metaphors and the Event Structure metaphors are understood through the metaphorical linguistic expressions does not reveal such issues as what motivates the conceptual metaphors, or whether the conceptual metaphors are universal or culture specific.

Chapter 4 will compare selected English Orientational metaphors and Container metaphors discussed in Chapter 3 with comparable metaphorical expressions in Shona to see the extent to which they are similar. The chapter will also compare selected English Event Structure conceptual metaphors discussed in Chapter 3 to see if similar or different Event Structure conceptual metaphors exist in Shona.

CHAPTER 4

COMPARING BODY BASED CONCEPTUAL METAPHORS IN ENGLISH AND SHONA

4.1 Introduction

The previous chapter examined metaphorical mappings in English with reference to Orientational, Container, Event Structure metaphors. The aim of the analyses and reconstruction of the ontology and the epistemology of the domains involved in Lakoff and Johnson's linguistic expressions was to establish a framework for a comparative analysis of English and Shona metaphorical mappings. Comparing languages at the metaphorical linguistic level may prove unprofitable for a number of reasons.

1. The linguistic systems of languages differ and may, therefore, not be comparable at this level.
2. My hypothesis (that conceptual metaphors are motivated by either embodiment or cultural/ecological considerations) needs some conceptual framework where similarities and differences can be identified partly because the range of metaphorical expressions may differ from language to language but also selections at the conceptual level may differ from language to language.

The objective of Chapter 4 is to compare conceptual metaphors in English with similar conceptual metaphors in Shona. English and Shona are two typologically unrelated languages and represent very different cultures. According to Kovecses (2002:165) it is possible for such different languages and cultures to conceptualise specific concepts in similar ways. The first

hypothesis I wish to apply cross-linguistically is the one suggested by Kovecses (2002). Kovecses (2002:165) suggests that there is some universal motivation for the metaphors to emerge in these cultures. Kovecses (2002:165) claims that the near-universality of such metaphors is motivated by universal aspects of the human body. In order to get a better understanding of the languages I wish to compare, there is a need to establish to which language type they belong. In this regard, I will start with Lyons (1968:187) who claims that languages are frequently categorised into structural types (...), as isolating, agglutinating and inflecting (or fusional). Robins (1988:376) says that this classification has been associated with Schlegel, a German linguist of the late eighteenth century and early nineteenth century.

According to Lyons (1968) an isolating (or ‘analytic’) language is “one in which all words are invariable”. The language that is regarded as a good example of an isolating language is Vietnamese. According to Lyons (1968:187) the question whether a language is isolating or not is obviously a matter of degree. English, according to Robins, is a ‘fairly’ mixed type of language because we can illustrate the three types of languages from English. Robins (1988:377) claims that:

Invariably words such as prepositions, conjunctions, and many adverbs, are isolating in type; they exhibit no formal paradigms, in many cases they are monomorphemic (e.g. since, from, as, when, seldom, now) and their grammatical status and class membership are entirely determined by their syntactic relations within the rest of the sentences in which they occur, without formal mark of these appearing in their own word structure. Morphologically complex words, in which individual grammatical categories may be fairly easily assigned to morphemes strung together serially in the structure of the word, exemplify the process of agglutination. Illegalities (...), ungodliness (...), unavoidable (...) stabilizers (...) are examples from English of agglutinative word structure.

According to Lyons (1968:187)

An agglutinating language is one in which the words are typically composed of a sequence of morphs with each morph representing a morpheme.

We can classify Shona as an agglutinating language because it exhibits the characteristics that Lyons (1968:187) claims is typically associated with this language type. Shona makes use of class prefixes as exemplified in the following: mu – danga ‘in the kraal’, ma- ruva, ‘flowers’, pa – musha, ‘at the homestead’ to convey grammatical functions. From the brief description of the two languages, English and Shona, we can conclude that they are to a large extent different. I am now going to apply the hypothesis that claims that humans experience their environment through their bodies and hence also construe the world in terms of their bodily experiences. The hypothesis goes on to claim that because of this embodiment there are universal conceptual metaphors.


Let us now compare conceptual metaphors in English with conceptual metaphors in Shona. We have already analysed Orientation metaphors, Container metaphors and Event Structure metaphors in English. I am going to use them as a basis for the comparison. Therefore, it will be necessary to repeat some of them in order to make the comparisons clear. I will briefly revisit the English Orientational metaphor each time I wish to make a comparison with Shona Orientational metaphors. First of all I am going to look at the conceptual metaphors HAPPY IS UP: SAD IS DOWN. Below is a comparison of English and Shona linguistic expressions which illustrate the mapping of the ontology and epistemology of vertical and horizontal domains onto the ontology and epistemology of the state domain.

HAPPY IS UP: SAD IS DOWN


English

HAPPY IS UP

My spirits rose.




You're in high spirits.




SAD IS DOWN


I'm depressed.



My spirits sank.



I fell into a depression.




(Cf.Lakoff and Johnson, 1980)

Shona


Akasvetuka nekufara.

[He jumped with delight.]




Akabata denga nekufara.

[He touched the sky with happiness.]




Mumanzi weJazz unondisimudzira pamweya.

[Jazz music lifts me up in spirit.]




Mharidzo yakamusimudzira moyo.

[The sermon lifted his heart.]



Akabatiswa pasi nemusikana wake.

[He was made to touch the ground by his girlfriend.]




In the Shona metaphorical expressions we see that words such as *unondisimudzira*, *akasvetuka* relate to the orientation schema in that both words mean upward movement. This, therefore, gives them a positive connotation. On the other hand, *akabata deng*, and *akabatiswa pasi* refer to downward movement. This means that they have negative connotations. It is because of the embodiment hypothesis that we find these similarities between English and Shona Orientation conceptual metaphors. There are sufficient grounds to believe that the two conceptual metaphors are universal since it will be more than coincidence for them to occur in both languages.


English and Shona both have the conceptual metaphors HAVING CONTROL IS UP: BEING SUBJECT TO CONTROL IS DOWN. I am now going to reconstruct the ontology and the epistemology of the domains involved in linguistic expressions. In English we find the following metaphoric expressions:

English


I have control/ over her.




He is in a superior position.




He is at the height of his power.




His power rose.



He is under my control.



He fell from power.



(cf. Lakoff and Johnson 1980:15)


The English metaphorical expressions either have a positive connotation or a negative connotation depending on whether the expressions of the orientations are above or below the level orientation. The following orientation words have a positive connotation: *over*, *on top*, *superior height*, *rose* and the following have negative connotations: *under*, *feel*.

We are now going to do a reconstruction of the ontology and epistemology of the domains involved in similar Shona metaphorical expressions.

Shona


Ari pasi *petsoka dzangu*.

[He is underneath my feet.]




Ari pamusoro pangu kubasa

[He is on top of me at work.]



Vanoshanda pasi pake vakawanda.

[Who work below him are many.]




In Shona the word *pamusoro* has positive connotations. The word *pasi* has negative connotations. The first word, *pamusoro* indicates the upwards orientation, with the metaphorical meaning, being good. Therefore, it is good. The second word *pasi*, shows the downward orientation, with the metaphorical meaning being bad. Therefore it is bad. This similarity between the UP and Down Orientations in English and Shona can only be explained by the embodiment hypothesis. That is, the orientation of the body and the concomitant meanings.

Another conceptual metaphor that is found in English as well as in Shona is as follows:


MORE IS UP: LESS IS DOWN

According to the orientation ontology the word MORE is interpreted as being similar to UP because when you have more of anything its level goes up. Similarly, LESS is interpreted as DOWN because when anything is less its level goes down. Therefore in the following metaphorical expressions the orientation words that are interpreted as MORE will have positive connotations and those that are interpreted as LESS will have negative connotations. Below is a sample of English metaphoric expressions that are instantiations of the conceptual metaphor.

My income rose last year.



His income fell last year>



(Cf. Lakoff and Johnson 1980:16)

The word *rose* has a positive connotation because it is interpreted as being UP. The words *down* and *fell* on the other hand have negative connotations because they are interpreted as being DOWN.

Shona

Mitengo yezvinhu iri kukwira zuva nezuva.

[The prices of things are going up everyday.]

Mitengo	yezvinhu zuva nezuva iri	KUKWIRA.
TD: DESIGNATOR: CHANGE OF STATE {FINANCE}	D: CHANGE OF (Vertical) ORIENTATION {DOWN} → TD: CHANGE OF STATE {FINANCE}	
BELOW LEVEL		

Dhora remuZimbabwe rakadhona.

[Dollar of Zimbabwe fell.]

Dhora remuZimbabwe	RAKADHONA.
TD: DESIGNATOR : CHANGE OF STATE {ECONOMY}	D: (Vertical) ORIENTATION {DOWN} → TD: CHANGE OF STATE {ECONOMY}
BELOW LEVEL	


Mutengo we zwinhu wakawa nemusana.

[The price of goods fell on its back.]

Mutengo we zwinhu nemusana	WAKAWA
TD: DESIGNATOR : CHANGE OF STATE {ECONOMY}	D: CHANGE OF (Vertical) ORIENTATION → TD: CHANGE OF STATE {ECONOMY}
BELOW LEVEL	

Mabhazi akakwira.


[Bus fares went up.]



Following the same explanations given for the English orientation words we see that the following Shona orientation words are interpreted as having either positive or negative connotations depending on which side of orientation they appear. The orientation word *kukwirwa* is normally interpreted as having positive connotations since it is UP, but because the orientation word is being used in the context of price increases it is interpreted with negative connotations. This is a situation which is ironic in that the orientation words actually convey the opposite meaning. A few additional Shona expressions that involve upward orientation are given below and they are positive .


Ari kusimukira pabasa.

[He is rising at his work place.]



AKASIMUDZIRA mhuri yake.


[He raised his family.]



The orientation words *aripas* and, *rakadonha* have a negative connotation as the examples below show.


Akazvininipisa.

[He humbled himself.]



Akadzikisira hunhu hwake.


[He lowered himself character.]



An interesting contrast in the interpretation of orientation in Shona is exemplified in the following two expressions in which the upward or downward orientation may be seen to be negative or positive depending on whose perspective is selected.


Anozvitarisira pamusorosoro.

[She looks at herself very high.]



Anozvitarisira pasi.

[He looks down on himself.]



The above examples serve to illustrate that Orientational metaphors are universal or at least that they are not culture- specific since they are found in both English and Shona. Lakoff and Johnson (1980) have proposed that what makes Orientational metaphors universal is the issue of embodiment. In all cultures people experience life with their bodies. They experience or interact with the physical environment with their bodies. And because the bodies are universal, people tend to construe their experiences of the world in the same way.

In table 4.1 on the next page a summary of Shona orientation metaphors and the Shona conceptual schema of orientation is given.

Shona Orientational Metaphors

Table 4.1: Shona Conceptual schema of Orientation

Motivation		Embodiment	
Possible Status		Universal	
Conceptual Domains:	Source domain	→	Target Domain
	Orientation	→	States
Specific metaphorical mappings:	Source domain		Target domain
	Orientation	Up Level Down	Values Health Power
	Orientation	Front Back	
Implementation at the Metaphorical level			
Vertical Orientation			
1. UP	1. Happy is up (Akabata denga nekufara)	2. Good health is up (Vanotamba)	3. Good economy is up (Peyi yangu yakwira)
2. LEVEL	Level is neutral:	Neither good nor bad	
3. DOWN	1. Sad is down (Zvechikoro zvinondidzikisira mweya) [Schooling puts me down in spirit]	2. Bad health is down (Ari pabonde mazuva ano) (He is down on the sick bed)	3. A bad economy is down (Dhora rakadonha) [The dollar fell down]
Horizontal Orientation			
1. FRONT	FRONT IS GOOD (Aneusu hwakasununguka) [He has a relaxed face]		
2. BACK	BACK IS BAD (Akandipira gotsi) [He gave me his back]		Akandifuratira [He turned his back on me]

4.3 Container Metaphors

Discussions concerning Container metaphors in the preceding section revealed that there are three types of bounded spaces; a one-dimensional space, represented by a line, a two-dimensional space, that is typically a bounded space specified by length and a width and a three-dimensional space bounded by a length, a width and a height. The ontology and

epistemology of containers map onto the ontology and epistemology of states, activities and events. According to Lakoff and Johnson the concept of containment is universal because it has its origins in embodiment. Lakoff and Johnson (1980:29) claim that:

[...] people are containers that are clearly demarcated from the rest of the world by the outside of their skins. The rest of the world is outside us. Every one of us is a Container with a delimited surface and an in-out orientation. We use the ontology or our understanding of containers to understand events, actions activities as substances and states as containers.

We have already discussed the container metaphor with reference to a ‘race’ in Chapter 3 and we have seen that Lakoff and Johnson (1980) say that a race is construed as a container in English. To refresh our minds here are some of the English linguistic expressions.

Are you *in* the race on Sunday?

Halfway *into* the race, I ran out of energy.

He is *out of* the race now.

The containment which is being illustrated here is one-dimensional. *In the race* is a prepositional phrase. *In* is a preposition signalling containment and *the race* is a noun phrase indicating the container. In the second example *into the race* is a prepositional phrase. *Into* is a preposition showing containment while *the race* is a noun phrase indicating the container. In the third example, *out of the race* is a prepositional phrase. *Out* is a preposition showing containment while *the race* is a noun phrase showing the container. Similarly in Shona we can consider a queue as a one dimensional container. A queue, which, in fact, is a line, has a beginning and an end point. Anything that falls in between is considered to be in a line or queue. We can, therefore, say in Shona:

Buda mugwara.

[Get out of the way.]

In contrast to English, which expresses containment among other things prepositionally, Shona uses a prefix to signal containment. The Shona example can be analysed in the following ways: *abuda mugwara* is a statement. *Abuda* is an utterance with the verb to be in the third person singular (He has come out). *Mu* is a locative noun class prefix indicating containment. The noun *mugwara* is the container.

Other metaphorical expressions in Shona that are a result of one-dimensional containment are as follows:

Akapinda *mumujaho*.

[He got *into* the race.]

Akabuda *mumujaho*.

[He came *out of* the race.]

In the next Shona examples above, the verbs *pinda* and *buda* are motion verbs indicating movement into and out of respectively. Therefore, they contribute to the sense of containment. *Mu* is a locative class prefix indicating containment. The noun *mujaho* indicates the container. The noun *mujaho* is the container.

4.3.1 Activities are Containers

Lakoff and Johnson (1980:31) point out that activities are construed as containers. This is so because activities have a beginning and an end. The two end-points (beginning and end)

define a bounded region. The following English expressions illustrate the conceptual metaphor ACTIVITY AS CONTAINER.

In washing the windows, I spilled water all over the floors.

How did Jenny *get out of* washing the windows?

Outside of washing the windows, what else did you do?

How did you *get into* window washing as a profession? He is immersed *in washing* the windows.


(Cf. Lakoff and Johnson 1980:31)

The above metaphorical expressions can be analysed as follows: In the first example *in washing* is a prepositional phrase introduced by the preposition **in**. The preposition indicates containment. *Washing* is a gerund or present participle functioning as a noun, which is the container. In the next example *out of washing* is a prepositional phrase introduced by the preposition *out of* signalling containment and *washing* in all the examples is a gerund or present participle functioning as a noun signalling the container. In the last example from English, the expression *into window washing* is a prepositional phrase introduced by the preposition *into* indicating containment. *Window washing* is a noun phrase consisting of a noun and a gerund indicating the container.

Similarly, in Shona we find that activities such as running, singing, working, fighting and dancing are viewed as activities and therefore containers. They are viewed as one-dimensional containers with a beginning and an end with clearly bounded regions. Below are reconstructions of the ontology and epistemology of the domains involved.


Ishasha mukumhanya.

[He is a champion in running.]




Ishasha mukuimba.

[He is a champion in singing.]




Inyanzvi mukubika.

[She is an expert in cooking.]




Igamba mukurwa.

[He is a champion in fighting.]



Inyanzvi mukutamba.

[She is a champion in dancing.]



In Shona the locative class prefix *mu* expresses containment, thus the prefix *mu-* in *mukumhanya* reflects the containment significance and the noun *kumhanya* the container. Similarly, the *mu-* in *kuimba*, *kubika*, and *kutamba* indicates containment while the verbs indicate the activity or container.

4.3.2 States are Containers

According to Lakoff and Johnson (1980) states are regarded as three-dimensional containers. This is because one can be in or out of a state. You can get into a state at some point and then

get out of it at another point. Lakoff and Johnson (1980:31) exemplify these observations with the following English metaphoric expressions:

He's *in love*.

We're *out of trouble*.


He's coming *out of the coma*.

Below are reconstructions of the ontology and epistemology of the domains involved in the Container metaphors LOVE IS A CONTAINER and LIFE IS A CONTAINER. Both the English and Shona reconstructions are given.


LOVE IS A CONTAINER

English


He is in love.



He fell in love.




She is full of love.



Shona


Rudo rwake rwakadzama.

[Her love is deep.]




Mwoyo wake uzere rudo.

[Her heart is full of love.]



Azere rudo.


[He is full of love.]




LIFE IS A CONTAINER

English


I've had a full life.




Life is empty for him.




There is not much left for him in life.




Her life is crammed with activities.



His life a great deal of sorrow.




Live your life to the fullest.



Shona


Ari mumatambudziko ehupenyu.

[She is in troubles of life.]




Mukurarama munotoda kungwara.

[In living it needs cleverness.]



Hupenyu hwangu huzere matambudziko.

[Life mine is full of troubles]



Here are more examples of states from Shona viewed as containers.

Ari *murudo*.

[He is *in love*.]

Ari *munyatwa*.

[He is *in trouble*.]

Ari *muhope*.

[He is *in sleep*.]

Ari *murima*.

[She is *in darkness*.]

Ari *mumatambudziko*.

[She is *in problems*.]


In the above examples *a-* is for concordial agreement indicating that it is the third person singular. *-ri* equals state. The locative prefix *mu-* indicates containment and the nouns; *rudo*, *nyatwa*, *rima* and *matambudziko* each signify the container. The above expressions reveal that the states *love*, *trouble*, *sleep*, *darkness* and *problems* are perceived as containers in both English and Shona. This confirms that container metaphors may be universal mainly because they are motivated by embodiment.

4.3.3 Events are Containers.


According to Lakoff and Johnson (1980), Johnson (1987) and Lakoff (1993), events are perceived as containers in English. You talk of getting into or out of an event. Metaphoric expressions in English such as the ones below illustrate the mapping of the ontology and epistemology of containment onto the ontology and epistemology of events. What follows are

reconstructions of the ontology and epistemology of the domains involved in the metaphoric expressions. In the examples analysed below multiple domain mappings take place in the sense of one domain mapping to an intermediate domain mapping onto a target domain. For example war equals event equals state equals container. The complex diagrams below represent an attempt to capture the complexities underlying the conceptual relations.


The country has just come out of a war




The allies got into the war



He came *out of the competition*



He went *into the competition*



The English metaphorical expressions can be analysed in the following ways:


The first example of a container event has a prepositional phrase *out of a war*. This consists of a preposition *out of* which tells us that there is containment and the noun phrase *a war* which is the container event. The next example has the prepositional phrase *into the war*. The preposition *into* indicates containment while the noun phrase that remains, *the war*, indicates the container. In the remaining two examples we have the expressions *out of the competition*

and *into the competition* respectively. Both are prepositional phrases with the prepositions *out of*, *into* respectively indicating containment and the noun phrase *the competition* indicating the container. Similarly in Shona, events such as ‘war’ and ‘competition’ are regarded as containers. The following metaphoric expressions illustrate this:

Shona


Akapinda muhondo

[He got into the war.]




Akabuda muhondo.

[He got out of the war.]




Akapinda mumakwikwi.

[He got into the competition]



Akabuda mumakwikwi

[He came out of the competition.]



The first two examples have the expressions *akapinda muhondo* and *akabuda muhondo*. The two expressions contain the following verbs *akapinda*, *akabuda* that denote movement into and out of a container respectively. The prefix *mu* indicates containment. The prefix is affixed to the noun *hondo* in both cases. The noun signifies the container. The following two examples contain the expressions *akapinda mumakwikwi*, *akabuda mumakwikwi*. The verb *akapinda* and the verb *akabuda* in the respective sentences signify movement into and out of a container respectively. The prefix *mu* attached to the noun *makwikwi* indicates containment

while the noun stands for the container. It needs to be pointed out that although Lakoff and Johnson (1980) discussed at great length the Container metaphors under Ontological metaphors we notice that Lakoff (1993) comes back to them when he presents the EVENT STRUCTURE metaphor. Lakoff (1993) claims that we use Ontological metaphors to understand events, actions, activities and states as containers.

He is *in love*.

While we are *in flight* please remain seated.

Stay *out of trouble*.

Below is a table illustrating the Shona conceptual schema of containers.

Table 4.2: Shona Conceptual schema of containers


<u>Motivation:</u>	Embodiment	
<u>Possible Status:</u>	Universal	
domain	Source Domain	Target
<u>Conceptual Domains:</u>	Container	Events
States		
Activities		
Actions		
<u>Implementations at the metaphorical level</u>		
Source domain	Target domain	
One-Dimensional	Wakabuda mugwara. [He went off course]	
Three-Dimensional	Vari murudo. [They are in love.]	

4.4 Body Sensory Perceptions


In this section I am going to consider the conceptual metaphor UNDERSTANDING IS SEEING. I would like to argue that UNDERSTANDING and SEEING are both universal concepts because they are bodily activities. I am going to carry out a reconstruction of the ontology and the epistemology of the domains that are involved in both the English and Shona metaphoric expressions that instantiate the above conceptual metaphor.

English:


It looks different from my point of view.




What is your outlook on that?




Now I have got the whole picture.




Let me point something out to you.




That's an insightful idea.




That is a brilliant remark




The argument is clear.




It was a murky discussion.




Could you elucidate your remarks.



It's a transparent argument.




The discussion was opaque.



Shona


Ndiri kuona zvaurikutaura.

[I see what you are saying.]




Ndiri kuona kurikuenda nyaya yacho.

[I can see where going the case.]




Mhosva yacho iri pachena.

[Crime the is in the open.]




Nyaya yacho yajeka.

[Story the is now clear.]




Nyaya iyi ichakandikwidibira.

[Story this is still covering me.]



Une maonero ako wega.

[You see your own way.]



Shona conceptualises understanding as seeing just as English conceptualises it. One explanation that can be offered here is that since understanding is mental activity, that is a

bodily activity it means that all cultures are likely to behave in the same way. This is embodiment motivating the conceptualisation.


In the next section I am going to be looking at the conceptual metaphor EDUCATION IS FOOD. First let me give the ontology of FOOD as source domain.

- People – store, buy, value food.
- People – cook, fry, boil food
- Food – is chewed, nutritious.
- Food – is sought after.
- People – get full, surfeit with food, fed up, enjoy, eat food

Below I have done a reconstruction of the ontology and epistemology of the domains involved in mapping in the English and Shona linguistic expressions.

English

We have generated a lot of ideas this week.



He produces new ideas at an astounding rate.

He new ideas at an astounding rate	PRODUCES
TD: DESIGNATOR: IDEAS {GENERATED}	SD: FOOD → TD: IDEAS{GENERATED}

His intellectual productivity has decreased in recent years.

His has decreased in recent years	INTELLECTUAL PRODUCTIVITY
TD: DESIGNATOR: IDEAS {GENERATED}	SD: FOOD {PRODUCTION} → TD: IDEAS {GENERATED}

Shona


Akatsenga mabhuku.

[He chewed the books.]

mabhuku	AKATSENGA
TD: DESIGNATOR: EDUCATION {PROCESS}	SD:FOOD {EAT} → TD: EDUCATION {PROCESS}


Akadya mabhuku.

[He ate the books.]




Akamedza mabhuku.

[He swallowed the books.]




Akasvisvina mabhuku.

[He sucked the books.]




Akamedza mabhii.

[He swallowed the letters.]




Chikoro chakamusiya ari mumbishi.

[School left him not cooked.]



Haana kubikwa achiibva nechikoro.

[Education did not cook him until done.]



We note that the conceptual metaphor EDUCATION IS FOOD is found in both English and Shona. This can again be explained by the embodiment hypothesis which I am alluding to all the time. Both EDUCATION and FOOD are common to all cultures. It is therefore, expected

that such a universal experience should be conceptualised in the same way by English and Shona.

Body States / Conditions / Functions

I would now want to turn to a phenomenon that I alluded to before, that is, the one -to- many domain mapping. Below is an example of this phenomenon where, respectively, patient are madness are source domains and love is the target domain.

LOVE IS A PATIENT

LOVE IS MADNESS

Health is an essential aspect of human living. Below the ontology of patients is given.


- Suffering from some or other sickness condition.
- Treatment of condition
- End result / consequence of condition (dying or recovering)
- Symptoms of the condition

Below are English and Shona reconstructions of the ontology and epistemology of the domains involved in the instantiations of the conceptual metaphor:


English

RELATIONSHIP {LOVE, MARRIAGE} IS HEALTH CONDITIONS


This is a sick relationship.




They have a strong healthy marriage.




The marriage is dead.




Their marriage is on the mend.



We are getting back on our feet.



Their relationship is in really good shape.




Shona

RELATIONSHIP {LOVE, MARRIAGE} IS HEALTH CONDITIONS


Rudo rwandionza.

[Love has made him thin.]




Awondeswa nerudo.

[He has been made thin because of love.]



Rudo Rwamupedza mafuta.

[Love has lost him fat.]



The reason why the above conceptual metaphor is common to both Shona and English can be accounted for by the hypothesis that claims that if the conceptual metaphor is motivated by embodiment, it is likely to be universal.

In the next section I am going to look at the conceptual metaphor RELATIONSHIP [LOVE] IS MADNESS [MENTAL CONDITION]. But first we need to start off with the ontology of madness if we are to understand the conceptual metaphor.


1. Consequences / symptoms of madness-sanity, insanity, uncontrolled behaviour, confusion, strange experiences / feelings in the head.
2. Causes of madness

3. Treatment of madness


Below are English and Shona metaphorical expressions that are a result of the conceptual metaphor RELATIONSHIP [LOVE]IS MADNESS.

English


I am crazy about her.



She drives me out of my mind.



He constantly raves about her.



He has gone mad over her.

He has gone over her	MAD
TD: DESIGNATOR: RELATIONSHIP {LOVE}	SD: MENTAL CONDITION {ABNORMAL}→ TD: RELATIONSHIP {LOVE}

I'm just wild about Harry.

I'm just about Harry	WILD
TD: DESIGNATOR: STATE {LOVE}	SD: MENTAL CONDITION {ABNORMAL}→ TD: STATE {LOVE}

I'm insane about her.

I'm about her	INSANE
TD: DESIGNATOR: STATE {LOVE}	SD: MENTAL CONDITION {ABNORMAL}→ TD: STATE {LOVE}

Shona


Azengaidzwa nerudo.

[Mad because of love he is.]

Nerudo	AZENGAIDZWA
TD: DESIGNATOR: SSTATE {LOVE}	SD: MENTAL CONDITION {ABNORMAL}→ TD: STATE {LOVE}


Apengeswa nerudo.

[He is mad because of love.]




Pfungwa dzapesana nerudo.

[His minds are not aligned because of love.]



Rudo rwamutenderedza musoro.

[Love go around has made his head.]



The conceptual metaphor BEING IN LOVE IS MADNESS is found in both English and Shona. Since madness is an illness that affects the body and since love is an emotion associated with the body, we can say that both are embodied. Therefore, the conceptual

metaphor in question is motivated by embodiment and it is, therefore not surprising that the metaphor is found in both English and Shona cultures.

4.5 Conclusion

The main objective of this chapter was to do a comparative analysis of the conceptual metaphors in English and Shona in order to see whether there were similarities. It was also hoped that it would be possible to confirm that conceptual metaphors which were motivated by embodiment would be the same for both English and Shona cultures. Orientational metaphors, Container metaphors are motivated by embodiment. Shona, like English, seems to have conceptual metaphors in the domain of RELATIONSHIPS, LOVE, EDUCATION and UNDERSTANDING. Since these two languages are unrelated and have not influenced one another the explanation for the universality of these metaphors must be accounted for in a different way. The embodiment hypothesis can account for the observations and is, therefore, confirmed.

CHAPTER 5

ECOLOGICAL FACTORS AS AN EXPLANATION FOR CONCEPTUAL METAPHOR SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES IN ENGLISH AND SHONA

5.1 Introduction

This chapter explores the validity of the hypothesis that cultural differences may arise because of differences in environments or ecologies. Such cultural differences give rise to differences in conceptual construals of reality and hence also in the conceptual metaphors of different languages.


5.2 Event Structure metaphor

According to Lakoff (1993), the ontology of the LIFE IS A JOURNEY metaphor can be applied as follows: life is assumed purposeful, that is, we are expected to have goals in life. Furthermore, Lakoff (1993) points to the fact that in the Event Structure metaphor ‘purposes are destinations and purposeful action is self-propelled motion toward a destination.’ A purposeful life is a long-term purposeful activity and hence a journey. Goals in life are destinations on the journey. The actions that one takes in life are self-propelled movements and the totality of one’s actions form a path one moves along. Choosing a means to achieve a goal is choosing a path to a destination. Difficulties in life are impediments to motion. External events are large moving objects that can impede motion towards one’s life goals. One’s expected progress through life is charted in terms of a life schedule, which is conceptualised as a virtual traveller one is expected to keep up with.


Lakoff (1993: 223) summarises the LIFE IS A JOURNEY metaphor by saying that the metaphor A PURPOSEFUL LIFE IS A JOURNEY makes use of all the structure of the Event Structure metaphor. Since events in a life are conceptualised as purposeful they are subclasses of events in general.

Below are reconstructions of the ontology and epistemology of the domains involved in metaphorical expressions that illustrate the mapping of the ontology and epistemology of journeys onto the ontology and epistemology of life.


He got a head start in life.




He is without a direction in life.




I'm where I want to be in life.




I'm at crossroads in my life.




He'll go places.



He has never let anyone get in his way.




He's gone through a lot in life.




Shona does not seem to have much on the Event Structure metaphor except for the conceptual metaphor HUPENYU RWENDO which is similar to the English conceptual metaphor LIFE IS A JOURNEY. The occurrence of this conceptual metaphor in Shona is inexplicable since there are no mapping elaborations comparable to the range of metaphorical expressions in English. The paucity of LIFE IS A JOURNEY metaphorical expressions in Shona is understandable given the fact that Shona culture does not have a typical journey infrastructural journey habitat- there are no harbours, networks, cross-roads and vehicles in Shona culture. The question is, where does RWENDO HUPENYU come from? The only possibility that could account for this expression in Shona is that it might have been borrowed from English or it might be a metaphorical loan.

Strangely enough, Shona has not extended the metaphorical borrowing to the rich and very range of metaphorical expressions that occur in English on the basis of the conceptual metaphor LIFE IS A JOURNEY. In English as Lakoff (1993), rightly observes the conceptual metaphor LIFE IS A JOURNEY encompasses various facets of life such as relationships in extended conceptual such as LOVE IS A JOURNEY. IS A JOURNEY metaphor. Below are reconstructions of the ontology and epistemology of the domains involved in the metaphorical expressions:


Our relationship has reached a dead end street.




Look how far we have come.




It has been a long, bumpy road.




We can't turn back now.




We're at a crossroads.




We may have to go our separate ways.




The relationship isn't going anywhere.




We're spinning our wheels.




Our relationship is off the track.



The marriage is on the rocks.




We may have to bail out of this relationship.




Another domain to which the conceptual metaphor LIFE IS A JOURNEY is extended in English is CAREERS ARE JOURNEYS. Lakoff (1993) points out that a career is another aspect of life that can be conceptualised as a journey. Lakoff elaborates this fact by claiming that because STATUS IS UP, a career is actually a journey upwards. Career goals are special cases of life goals. Below are reconstructions of the ontology and epistemology of the domains involved in the metaphorical expressions that show the mapping of the ontology and epistemology of journeys onto the ontology and epistemology of careers.


He clawed his way to the top.



He is over the hill.



She is on the fast track.



While English makes extensive use of the conceptual metaphor LIFE IS A JOURNEY in various domains or facets of life including relationships and careers as the examples above demonstrated, Shona completely lacks journey – based metaphorical expressions. As we have mentioned before, modern means of transport such as ships, and cars are not indigenous to Shona culture and hence the absence of metaphorical expressions relating to life relationships in Shona.

Even though Shona does not use the Event Structure conceptual metaphor LIFE IS A JOURNEY as the basis for metaphorical expressions in the same way as English does, Shona does utilize the Event Structure metaphors in a more basic sense as we have shown in the earlier part of this chapter.

5.3 War

Conflict is a world - wide phenomenon. Different cultures may use different names for it but it is definitely worldwide. It is therefore not surprising that both English and Shona experience it as part of their environment. In order to understand the conceptual metaphor LOVE IS WAR, we need to explicate the ontology of war. Below is the ontology of war.


ENGLISH

Table 5.1 The Ontology of war


Adversaries
Conflict
Strategy Defend Retreat Attack Manoeuvre Counterattack
Outcome Stalemate Truce Surrender Victory

Below is a reconstruction of the ontology and epistemology of the domains involved in metaphorical expressions instantiating the conceptual metaphor LOVE IS WAR.


He is known for his many rapid conquests.




She fought for him.




He fled from her advances.




She pursued him relentlessly.




He is slowly gaining ground with her.




He won her hand in marriage.




He overpowered her.




She is besieged by suitors.




He has to fend them off.



He enlisted the aid of her friends.




There is a misalliance if I've ever seen one.



Shona


Ane mavanga erudo.

[He has scars of love.]



Havachaonani pamusana pemukadzi wake.

[They don't see each other because of his wife.]



English and Shona conceptualise love as war. Shona, however, has a very limited range of metaphors compared to English. There is an interesting case in Shona where one of the musicians, Thomas Mapfumo, sings a song about love. The words go like this:

Vakomana musanditorere MaDerbra.

Vakomana mukanditorera MaDerbra: hondo neni!

[Guys don't take MaDerbra from me.

If you take MaDerbra from me: there's war with me!]

That English and Shona construe love as war may be explained by the fact that war and conflict, part of human nature, is a world –wide experience. It is as much a part of the English culture as it is of the Shona. The differences here may be the range and nature of warfare and conflict resolution between the two cultures.

5.4 Objects

There are several conceptual metaphors that are based on objects that people encounter in their physical environment. Below is the ontology of an object.


- An object is solid.
- An object can be found.
- An object can be hidden.
- An object can be sought.
- An object can be valuable.
- An object can be useless.
- An object has texture.
- An object has shape.
- An object has size.
- An object has colour.
- Etc.

Below are reconstructions of the ontology and epistemology of the domains involved in the mapping of the ontology and epistemology of objects onto the ontology and epistemology of wealth.


WEALTH IS A HIDDEN OBJECT

English


He is seeking his fortune.




He’s flaunting his newly found fortune.




She’s a gold digger.



He lost his fortune.




He's searching for wealth.



Shona


Tino tsvaga mari.

[We search for money.]




Upfumi hunoto tsvagwa.

[Wealth is sought.]




Akawana upfumi sekuseka.

[He found wealth like laughing.]



Ari kutsvaga hupfumi.

[He is looking for wealth.]



The reason why this conceptual metaphor is found in both English and Shona is because the concept wealth is found in both the English and the Shona environment. The English and the

Shona have wealth and the pursuance of wealth as part of their cultural ideals. The similarities between the two cultures as manifested in the similar metaphorical expressions confirm the hypothesis that cultural similarities or differences may arise because of differences in environments or ecologies and that such cultural similarities may give rise to differences in conceptual construals of reality and hence also the conceptual metaphors of different languages.


5.5 Money

Another typical English conceptual metaphor is TIME IS MONEY. The ontology of money is given below.


- Money is a valuable resource
- Money is a limited resource
- Money can be accumulated or wasted
- Money can be used up
- Can be saved

Below are reconstructions of the ontology and the epistemology of the domains involved in the linguistic expressions that reflect the mapping of the ontology and epistemology of money onto the ontology and epistemology of time in English.


You are wasting my time.




This gadget will save you hours.




I don't have the time to give you.




That flat tyre cost me an hour.




I've invested a lot of time in her.




You are running out of time.



Is that worth your while?



He's living on borrowed time.



In contrast to English, the conceptual metaphor TIME IS MONEY does not occur in Shona. This may be accounted for by the fact that in the traditional Shona culture money was not a commodity. Hence people do not conceptualise time in terms of money in the Shona culture.

5.6 Commodities

Let us now turn to another English conceptual metaphor, IDEAS ARE COMMODITIES.

Below is the ontology of commodities.


COMMODITIES ARE:

- Valuable Can be bought or sold
- Can be packaged
- Can be worthless


Below are reconstructions of the ontology and epistemology of the domains involved in the mapping of the conceptual metaphor IDEAS ARE COMMODITIES.

English


It's important how you package your ideas.




He won't buy that.




That idea won't just sell.




There is always a market for good ideas.



That's a worthless idea.



He has been a source for valuable ideas.



The concept of commodities is found only in English because the way of life of the English revolves around trade and commodities. It is part of their culture. Shona on the other hand does not have the concept commodities. This cultural difference between English and Shona explains the presence of and the absence of the conceptual metaphor IDEAS ARE COMMODITIES in English and Shona respectively.

5.7 Cutting Instruments


Another source for conceptual metaphor in English is cutting instruments. Hence the conceptual metaphor IDEAS ARE CUTTING INSTRUMENTS. Below is the ontology of cutting instruments.

CUTTING INSTRUMENTS ARE:


- Sharp
- Can hurt one
- Nature of cutting instrument
- Action of cutting instrument

Below are reconstructions of the ontology and epistemology of the domains involved in the linguistic expressions that illustrate the mapping of the ontology and epistemology of cutting instruments onto the ontology and epistemology of ideas in English.

That's an incisive idea.



That cuts right to the heart of the matter.



This conceptual metaphor seems to be present in the English culture and not in the Shona culture. This difference may be explained by the hypothesis that cultural similarities or differences may arise because of similarities or differences in environments or ecologies and that such cultural similarities or differences give rise to similarities or differences in conceptual construals of reality and hence also in the conceptual metaphors of different languages.

5.8 Fashions


We now turn to another conceptual metaphor, IDEAS ARE FASHIONS. Below is the ontology of fashions.

Fashions are:


- New
- Old / Outdated
- Stylish
- trendy

Bellow are reconstructions of the ontology and epistemology of the domains involved in the linguistic expressions that illustrate the mapping of the ontology and epistemology of fashions onto the ontology and epistemology of ideas in English.


That idea went out of style a long time ago.




I hear Sociology is in these days.




Marxism is currently fashionable in Western Europe.



That idea is old hat.



That's an outdated idea.




Shona

Similarly in Shona there are linguistic expressions that illustrate the conceptual metaphor IDEAS ARE FASHIONS. Below are some examples.


Pfungwa dzako ndedzekudara.

[Your ideas are old fashioned.]



Pfungwa idzodzo ndedzekare.

[Those views are old fashioned.]



The conceptual metaphor IDEAS ARE FASHIONS is found in both English and Shona cultures. This similarity may be explained by the fact that the two peoples may have similar cultural experiences in relation to ideas. For instance, the concept that something is new or old is common to most cultures.

5.9 Plants


Let us now look at another conceptual metaphor found in English, namely IDEAS ARE PLANTS. Let us begin by giving the ontology of plants.

- Plants have a life cycle.


- Plants have value for humans.
- Plants are living entities.
- Plants require management.
- Plants bear fruit / seeds

Below are reconstructions of the ontology and epistemology of the domains involved in the metaphorical expressions that illustrate the mapping of the ontology and epistemology of plants onto the ontology and epistemology of ideas in English.


His ideas have finally come to fruition.




That idea died on the vine.




That's a budding theory.




It will take years for that idea to come to full flower.




He views chemistry as a mere offshoot of physics.



Mathematics has many branches.



The seeds of his great ideas were planted in his youth.



(Lakoff and Johnson, 1980:47)

The above conceptual metaphor is found in English but not in Shona. Shona did not traditionally have a horticulture and hence lacked metaphorical expressions that derived from conceptual metaphor PLANTS ARE IDEAS.

5.10 Resources


Let us now look at the conceptual metaphor IDEAS ARE RESOURCES. Below is the ontology of resource.

The ontology of the concept resources is as follows:


- Resources are useful, essential.
- Resources are valuable.
- Resources can be used up.
- Resources are useful.
- Resources can be amassed.
- Resources can be wasted.

Below are reconstructions of the ontology and epistemology of the domains involved in the metaphorical expressions that illustrate the mapping of the ontology and epistemology of resources onto the ontology and epistemology of ideas in English.


He ran out of ideas.




Don't waste your thoughts on small projects.




Let's pool our ideas.




That's a useless idea.



He is a resourceful man.



We've used up all our ideas.




Shona

Below are some Shona expressions that are instantiations of this conceptual metaphor.


Usatambe nepfungwa dzangu.

[Don't play with my brains.]




Handina pfungwa dzekutambisa.

[I do not have ideas to waste.]



Usashandise pfungwa dzevamwe.

[Do not use other people's ideas.]



This conceptual metaphor is found in both English and Shona. The only likely explanation for this similarity is the fact that both English and Shona cultures experience ideas as resources.

According to Kovecses (2002:187):

The natural and physical environment shapes language, primarily its vocabulary, in an obvious way; consequently it will shape the metaphors as well. Given a certain kind of habitat, speakers living there will be attuned (mostly subconsciously) to things and phenomena that are a characteristic of that habitat; and they will make use of those things and phenomena for the metaphorical comprehension and creation of their conceptual universe. A good test case for this suggestion is a situation in which a language that is developed by speakers living in a certain kind of natural and physical environment is moved by some of its speakers to a new and very different natural environment. If this happens we should expect to find differences between metaphorical conceptualisation by speakers of the original language and that used by people who speak the 'transplanted' version.

So far we have seen that there are English and Shona metaphors that can only be explained through cultural and ecological factors as discussed by Kovecses (2002) explains. I would like to exemplify this through a song or at least part of the words of a song that was produced by a Zimbabwean musician. Alick Macheso is a sungura musician who usually sings most of his songs in Shona. On his 2005 CD entitled "Vapupuri Pupurai" (Witnesses Witness), there is a number 2 track entitled "Hupenyu imota".

HUPENYU IMOTA [LIFE IS A MOTOR VEHICLE] is obviously a conceptual metaphor. What is of significance about this musician is that he goes on to demonstrate what Lakoff and Johnson (1980) have been saying all along, that is that metaphors pervade our everyday lives. Alick Macheso alludes to aspects of a car as follows:

Mota yangu haina peturo: ndichafamba sei?

[My car has no fuel: I move how?]

Mota yangu haina oiri: inonoka.

[My car has no oil: it will knock]

Mota yangu haina maraitsi: ndinoona sei.

[My car has no lights: I will see how?]

Mota yangu yaponja: ndichafamba sei?

[My car has got a puncture: I will move how?]

Mota yangu haina mvura: inosiza

[My car has no water: it will cease]

Mota yangu haina mabiriki: ndichamira sei?

[My car has no brakes: I will stop how?]

The musician goes on to show the correspondences between life (the target domain) and a car (the source domain) as follows:

Mudumbu mangu hamuna chinhu, wadya sadza here?
[Stomach mine there is nothing, eaten sadza have you?]

Gumbo rangu raminyuka: ndichafamba sei?
[Leg mine is sprained: I walk how?]

Musoro wangu uri kutema: wanwa mapiritsi here?
[Head mine is cutting: have you drunk tablets?]
Hama dzangu handina meso: handione
[Relatives mine a have no eyes: I can't see]

Maoko angu akaremara: ndibateiwo?
[Hands mine are crippled: you me hold?]

Although there may not exist exact matches between the attributes in the concept Car and the concept Life, a deliberate attempt is made to establish correspondences between car and life.


Mota yangu haina peturo: ndichafamba sei? [My car has no fuel: I move how?]	Mudumbu mangu hamuna chinhu, wadya sadza here? [Stomach mine there is nothing, eaten sadza have you?]
Mota yangu haina oiri: inonoka. [My car has no oil: it will knock]	Gumbo rangu raminyuka: ndichafamba sei? [Leg mine is sprained: I walk how?]
Mota yangu haina maraitsi: ndinoona sei. [My car has no lights: I will see how?]	Musoro wangu uri kutema: wanwa mapiritsi here? [Head mine is cutting: have you drunk

	tablets?]
Mota yangu haina mvura: inosiza	Hama dzangu handina meso: handione
[My car has no water: it will cease]	[Relatives mine a have no eyes: I can't see]
Mota yangu haina mabiriki: ndichamira sei?	Maoko angu akaremara: ndibateiwo?
[My car has no brakes: I will stop how?]	[Hands mine are crippled: you me hold?]

This kind of conceptualisation of a life is clearly unique to Shona. I can hardly imagine English conceptualising Life as a Car. This example of the conceptual metaphor LIFE OF PERSON IS A CAR is a good example of an acculturationally motivated conceptual metaphor. Below are metaphorical expressions that illustrate the mapping of the ontology and the epistemology of the car onto the ontology and epistemology of the life of a person.


Kana washanda zvakasimba unoda kunwa peturo.

[If you have worked hard you will need to drink petrol.]




Ndaponja.

[I have punctured.]




Ndiri kufamba murima.

[I am travelling in darkness.]



Musoro wangu wanoka.

[My head has knocked.]



The above conceptual metaphor is culture specific though obviously of a newly acquired entity. Although we know that a car is part of the ecology of both English and Shona cultures, we also know that the English are more interested in the functioning of the car than its

physical attributes as the Shona are. This confirms the hypothesis about different cultural perspectives when conceptualising specific phenomena..

Now let us look at a conceptual metaphor that we find in Shona: HUPENYU MUTORO

[LIFE IS A BURDEN]

The ontology of a burden is as follows:


The nature of burden:

- Load / can be carried / can be an impediment
- Heavy
- Unpleasant
- Can be lifted
- Can be relieved of a burden

We come across a number of metaphorical expressions that arise from the conceptual metaphor ‘HUPENYU MUTORO’. Below are reconstructions of the ontology and epistemology of the domains involved in the linguistic expressions that illustrate the mapping of the ontology and epistemology of a burden onto the ontology and epistemology of life in Shona.


Hupenyu hwandiremera.

[Life is heavy for me.]




Ndiani achanditura mutoro uyu.

[Who will lift this burden from me?]




This way of conceptualising life is common to both English and Shona. English linguistic expressions worth noting are below.


Life's burdens are a cause for worry.



I have been carrying the burden on my mind.



Share your burden with others.




The explanation for the similarity can be found in the hypothesis that cultural similarities may arise because of similarities in environments or ecologies and that such cultural similarities give rise to similar conceptual construals of reality and hence also in the conceptual metaphors of different languages. People carried their loads before animals and vehicles became available.

The next Shona conceptual metaphor I would like to look at is HUPENYU IMHINDUPINDU [LIFE IS CHANGE]. Below are reconstructions of the ontology and epistemology of the domains involved in the linguistic expressions that show the mapping of the ontology and epistemology of change onto the ontology and epistemology of life.


Zvanhasi ndezveduwo.

[Today's (things) are now ours.]




Zuva nezuva rine zvaro.

[Day and day has its own things.]



Mazuva haafanani.


[Days are different.]




English

Below are English linguistic expressions that express the same idea.

Do not live in the past.



Tomorrow is another day.



Both English and Shona have the same conceptual metaphor because of cultural or ecological similarities or differences. In the comparison thus far I have mainly focussed on one – to – one domain mapping. Although it is not an objective of this thesis to focus on one – to – many or many – to – one domain mapping, it is interesting to note that Shona also attests to the many – to – one domain mapping as the metaphors in the following song show. I would also want to take us back a little to Chapter 3 where I discussed the phenomenon many- to – one domain mapping. I just want to mention that this phenomenon is also evident in Shona conceptual metaphors. For instance the late Shona musician Marshal Munhumumwe sang a song with the following conceptual metaphors:

Uchakarara nazvino here?

[Are you still asleep?]

Uchakarara nazvino here?

[Are you still asleep?]

Hupenyu mutambo: tamba ubudirire.

[Life is a game: play and succeed]

Hupenyu injuga: chova ukunde.

[Life is gambling: deal and win]

Hupenyu irwendo: famba usvike.]

Life is a journey: travel and get there.]

Hupenyu makwikwi: shinga uhwine.

[Life is competition: be brave and win.]

5.11 Conclusion

This chapter looked at English and Shona conceptual metaphors that are explained by similar cultural and ecological experiences as well as conceptual metaphors that are explained by different cultural and ecological experiences. It is seen that there are indeed conceptual metaphors that are found in both English and Shona which are a result of similar cultural and ecological experiences. Such conceptual metaphors include the following:

- EVENT STRUCTRE
- LOVE IS WAR
- WEALTH IS A HIDDEN OBJECT.
- TIME IS MONEY
- IDEAS ARE PLANTS
- IDEAS ARE RESOURCES

This chapter confirmed the hypothesis that cultural differences may arise because of differences in the environments or ecologies and that such cultural differences give rise to differences in conceptual construals of reality and hence in the conceptual metaphors of the different languages. For English some of the conceptual metaphors include those listed below.

1. IDEAS ARE PLANTS

2. IDEAS ARE RESOURCES

Shona conceptual metaphors include the following:

1. HUPENYU IMOTA.

(LIFE IS A CAR)

2. HUPENYU MUTORO

(LIFE IS A BURDEN)

3. HUPENYU IMHINDUPINDU

(LIFE IS CHANGE)

It's important to appreciate that in a thesis of this scope it is not possible either to cover all the conceptual metaphors in English and Shona that are motivated by similar cultural and ecological experiences or those English and Shona conceptual metaphors which are motivated by different cultural and ecological experiences. However, the hypothesis that cultural differences may arise because of differences in environments or ecologies and that such cultural differences give rise to differences in conceptual construals of reality and hence also the conceptual metaphors of different languages has clearly been confirmed.

CHAPTER 6

SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

6.1 Introduction

This chapter summarises the findings of the study and also draws conclusions concerning the hypotheses posed at the beginning of the study. The chapter will also make recommendations about areas of possible future research.

6.2 Summary

Metaphorical studies have been focused mainly on English. The objective of this research was to apply insights on metaphorical mappings to an African language. Nothing or very little has been done in an African language on metaphorical mapping. For this purpose, a comparative study of English and Shona metaphorical expressions was done. The main methodology that Lakoff and Johnson propose in order to understand the nature of metaphorical mapping is the reconstruction of the ontology and the epistemology of the domains that are involved. I did this in my research. In this thesis, I compared the reconstructed ontology and epistemology of the domains involved in the metaphorical expressions of English with those of Shona in order to establish, on the one hand, the similarities and / or differences cross-linguistically or cross-culturally in the metaphorical construal of reality between these two languages and, on the other hand, to establish what the underlying motivation is for the similarities and differences between these two unrelated languages. Two hypotheses guided this research, the one, embodiment, claiming that humans experience their environment through their bodies and hence also construe the world in terms of their bodily experiences. Kovecses (2002) claims

that it is because of this embodiment that we find cultures construing reality in the same way. That is, embodiment accounts for universality of conceptual metaphors. The other hypothesis claims that cultural differences may arise because of differences in environments or ecologies. Such cultural differences give rise to differences in conceptual construals of reality and hence also in the conceptual metaphors of different languages. Kovecses (2002:171) captures these hypotheses precisely in the following quotations:

It is possible for such different languages and cultures to conceptualise certain phenomena in similar ways because of the universal aspects of the body. [English and Shona] cultures have similar ideas about their bodies and seem to see themselves undergoing the same physiological processes in given situations. When a conceptual metaphorical concept has such an experiential basis it can be said to be embodied.

And, further on Kovecses (2002:183) says:

There can be differences in the “range” of conceptual metaphors that languages and cultures have available for the conceptualisation of particular target domains.

According to Kovecses (2002:184) two languages may share the same conceptual metaphor but the metaphor will be elaborated differently in the two languages. Broader cultural context, the governing principles and the key concepts in a given culture may bring about cultural variation. Natural and physical environment, the environment in which a culture is located can bring about cultural variation.

Lakoff and Johnson (1980) claim that in order to test whether two unrelated languages construe conceptual metaphors in the same way, one needs to reconstruct the ontology and epistemology of the domains involved in the metaphorical expressions and then compare the languages at the conceptual level. In this research, I reconstructed the ontology and the epistemology of the domains involved in the relevant metaphorical mapping and then compared the results for English and Shona. I also drew up conceptual schemas for


Orientation, Containment and Event Structure. I will make reference to the schemas as presented in the preceding sections for ease of comparison.

Orientation metaphors

The conceptual metaphorical expressions that are instantiations of the conceptual metaphor HAPPY IS UP: SAD IS DOWN were analysed. Reconstructions of the ontology and epistemology of the domains involved in the mapping were done for both English and Shona and the following results were obtained:

English:

I'm feeling up.




Although we do not have a linguistic expression in Shona that is exactly the same as the English one, we do have a linguistic expression that is similar at the conceptual level.

Compare the following:

Shona:

Mumhanzi we Jazz uno ndisimudzira mumwoyo.


[Jazz music elevates me in the heart.]




Another example is the conceptual metaphor HAVING CONTROL IS UP: BEING UNDER CONTROL IS DOWN. An analysis of this also shows that there are similarities at the conceptual level between English and Shona although the metaphorical expressions are not identical. Below are reconstructions of the ontology and epistemology of the mappings involved in the expressions in English and Shona.

English:

I have control over her.




His power rose.



Shona:


Ari pasi petsoka dzangu.

[He is under my feet.]



Ari pamusoro pangu kubasa.

[He is above me at work.]



These similarities are a result of the fact that these conceptual metaphors are motivated by embodiment. English and Shona both conceptualise the UP/DOWN orientation in the same way because these orientations are embodied.

The conceptual metaphors that are a result of the FRONT /BACK horizontal orientation were also compared. It was noted that the FRONT IS GOOD: BACK IS BAD conceptual metaphors were a result of embodiment. It was seen that there were similarities in the construal of reality between English and Shona as far as the FRONT/BACK orientation at the conceptual level. Below are some of the results of the comparison:

English:

I am looking forward to it.

I am looking to it	FORWARD
TD: DESIGNATOR: SOMETHING WANTED	SD: (VERTICAL) ORIENTATION {FORWARD} → TD: SOMETHING WANTED


He turned his back on me.

He turned on me	his BACK
TD: DESIGNATOR: ATTITUDE	SD: ORIENTATION → (HORIZONTAL} ORIENTATION {BACK} TD: CHANGE IN ATTITUDE

Shona


Akabva kumeso.

[He lost face.]



Akandipira gotsi.

[He gave me his back.]



A comparison of how English and Shona construe containment also yielded fascinating results. It was discovered that English uses prepositions such as ‘in’ ‘into’ ‘out of’ ‘inside’ ‘outside’ to express containment while Shona uses prefixes such as ‘mu-’ to express containment thus the prefix ‘mu-’ in ‘mudanga’ reflects the containment significance and the noun ‘danga’ the container. English also uses the construction motion verb + preposition + possessive. Examples of this are below:

The country has come out of the war.

The allies got into the war.


Container metaphors

For both English and Shona, Activities, States and Events are containers. These similarities can only be seen when one compares the linguistic expressions at the conceptual level.

Below are the comparisons:


English

He is immersed in washing windows.




Ishasha mukumhanya

[He is a champion in racing.]



English


He is in love.



Shona


Ari murudo.

[He is in love.]



English

The allies got into the war




Event Structure metaphor

The Event Structure metaphor has some aspects that are found in both English and Shona and other aspects that are unique to each of the languages. One good example is the LIFE IS A JOURNEY conceptual metaphor. The research has shown that both English and Shona construe life as journeys. This is explained by the fact that journeys are experienced in similar ways by English and Shona speakers. The similarities in the construal of life as journeys can

only be seen if one compares the reconstructions of the ontology and epistemology of the domains involved in the mapping in English and Shona linguistic expressions. Below is the comparison.

English


We have travelled a long way.



Shona

Rwendo rweupenyu rwakaoma.

[The journey of life is hard.]




Culturally based metaphors

The research also revealed that English and Shona have conceptual metaphors that are different. This was explained by the fact that cultural differences may result in differences in conceptual metaphors for the two languages. Below are some of the examples of different conceptual metaphors in the two languages. Take for example the conceptual metaphor IDEAS ARE PLANTS. A reconstruction of the ontology and epistemology of the domains

involved in the mapping revealed that whereas the conceptual metaphor occurs in English, it does not occur in Shona.


English

That idea died on the vine.



Another example in English is the conceptual metaphor IDEAS ARE RESOURCES which has the following metaphoric expressions:

That's a useless idea.



Examples of instances where we have Shona conceptual metaphors that do not seem to be found in English are the ones discussed under the conceptual metaphor HUPENYU IMOTA [LIFE IS A MOTOR CAR]. Reconstructions of the conceptual mappings of the domains involved need not be repeated here.

6.3 Conclusions

The research confirmed the two hypotheses, the one, embodiment, claiming that humans experience their environment through their bodies and hence also construe the world in terms

of their bodily experiences, and the other claim that cultural differences may arise because of differences in environments or ecologies. Such cultural differences may give rise to differences in conceptual construals of reality and hence also in the conceptual metaphors of different languages.

6.4 Recommendations

I did not explore the Event Structure metaphor in detail. I hope this is an area where further studies can be carried out. I also appreciate that blending is an important aspect of metaphor. The scope of this research did not allow an in-depth exploration of it. I, therefore, would like to recommend this area for further research. The findings of this research, especially with the claim by Lakoff and Johnson (1980) that metaphor is pervasive in everyday language, has implications for the teaching of languages. It is important to know how metaphors work. It is also important to know the similarities and differences in the use of metaphors when learning English as a second language. It might mean that there is need for a complete change in the approaches used if learners are to benefit from the instruction and be able to use language effectively. I would like to recommend that further research be conducted on metaphor and the teaching of language with the view of highlighting the effects of embodiment and cultural differences in the learning of second languages.

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