ZOLTÁN KÖVECSES

Metaphor in Culture

Universality and Variation

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To what extent and in what ways is metaphorical thought relevant to an understanding of culture and society? More specifically, can the cognitive linguistic view of metaphor simultaneously explain both universality and diversity in metaphorical thought? Cognitive linguists have done important work on universal aspects of metaphor, but they have paid much less attention to why metaphors vary both interculturally and intraculturally as extensively as they do. In this book, Zoltán Kövecses proposes a new theory of metaphor variation. First, he identifies the major dimensions of metaphor variation, that is, those social and cultural boundaries that signal discontinuities in human experience. Second, he describes which components, or aspects, of conceptual metaphor are involved in metaphor variation and how they are involved. Third, he isolates the main causes of metaphor variation. Fourth, Professor Kövecses addresses the issue of the degree of cultural coherence in the interplay among conceptual metaphors, embodiment, and causes of metaphor variation.

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Metaphor in Culture

Universality and Variation

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For Lacika, Ádika, and Zsuzsi,
with all my love

Contents

Preface and Acknowledgments

The general question that I will be concerned with in this book is the following: *To what extent and in what ways is metaphorical thought relevant to an understanding of culture and society?*

Clearly, any answer to this question forces us to consider issues typically discussed in two broad ranges of disciplines: cognitive science and the social sciences. Typical representatives of the former include contemporary cognitive psychology and cognitive linguistics, whereas a chief representative of the latter is anthropology in its several forms (symbolic, cultural, semantic, etc.). Metaphor has been of great interest to many anthropologists since the very beginnings of the field (see, for example, Fernandez, 1986, 1991). The general difference between the two ranges of disciplines in the handling of metaphor seems to be a slightly different focus on what they find most important in the study of metaphor. Whereas scholars in cognitive science tend to ask, "What is metaphor?" and "How does it work in the mind?" scholars in the social sciences tend to focus on the issue of "What does metaphor do in particular social-cultural contexts?"

Many anthropologists working on issues related to metaphor had found new inspiration for their work in the cognitive linguistic theory of metaphor that was first developed by George Lakoff and Mark Johnson in their widely read book *Metaphors We Live By* (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980). But it soon became clear that, although in many ways inspirational, this book (and much of the research that grew out of it; see Kövecses, 2002) does not in every way meet the needs

of anthropologists. One major reason for this was that, as a general tendency, cognitive linguists have overemphasized the universality of some of the metaphorical structures that they found and ignored the many cases of nonuniversality in metaphorical conceptualization (Fernandez, 1991).

This situation presents cognitive scientists and linguists working on metaphor with a challenge: *Can the cognitive linguistic view of metaphor simultaneously explain both universality and diversity in metaphorical thought?* I wish to take up this challenge and argue on the basis of a wide range of data that the cognitive linguistic view of metaphor can successfully perform this job. To be sure, in order for it to accomplish the task, it needs to be modified, revised, and supplemented in several ways. My major goal in this work is to develop such an "updated" and relatively comprehensive theory of metaphor that makes the theory more readily useful to people working on issues in the social sciences.

However, this apparently straightforward enterprise involves working through a large number of issues that often concern anthropologists who have an interest in metaphor (see, for example, Fernandez, 1986, 1991; Foley, 1997; Kimmel, 2001, in press; Shore, 1996). Such issues include (but are not limited to) the following:

- Do metaphors interact with other tropes, and if they do, how?
- Is there a "master trope," or are all tropes "equal"?
- How does the body provide for universality in metaphor, or does it do so at all?
- What's the best methodology to get metaphorical data?
- Does metaphor create certain kinds of experience, or does it simply reflect a preexisting literally understood experience?
- Do "conceptual metaphors" vary from culture to culture, and if they do, how?
- How does metaphor contribute to the understanding of specific situated speech events in culture?
- How does metaphor create coherence or incoherence in culture?
- How can the study of metaphor provide a link between cognitive science and anthropology, and what kind of link can it provide?

I do not claim that I will deal with every one of these issues, or that I will deal with them in the same depth. However, I will discuss most of

them in some detail, as well as some additional ones. The additional issues include the following:

- How do metaphors vary within (not just across) a culture?
- Do metaphors vary from person to person, and if they do, how?
- What are the causes of metaphor variation?
- What is the relationship between cross-cultural metaphor variation and translation?
- Are particular cultures characterized, or can they be characterized at all, by particular metaphors that "dominate," or are characteristic of, a particular culture? That is to say, are there any cultural "master" metaphors?

The attempt to answer these questions in a coherent way promises, I feel, to lead to a fairly good basis for a theory that can account for both universality and variation in metaphor.

The enterprise that I am about to embark on is very much in the spirit of several recent book-length publications on similar or related issues concerning metaphor and figurative language in general – both by cognitive scientists and by anthropologists (see, for example, Gibbs, 1994; Holyoak and Thagard, 1996; Kimmel, 2001; Palmer, 1996; Shore, 1996). Mark Turner's (2001) work is also important in this context; he examines the relevance of conceptual integration, or blending, to the study of social sciences. My goal is to do the same for metaphor. The present book, although sharing much of the background with these other works, has a unique focus in that it explores the issue of how and why conceptual metaphors are both universal and culture-specific, together with many of the concomitant questions mentioned previously.

In other words, this book is an attempt by me to make one possible version of the cognitive linguistic theory of metaphor more accessible to those who have an interest in studying the role of metaphor in complex social–cultural phenomena, such as emotions, politics, thought, and morality, as well as highly abstract cultural processes and entities such as time, life, and personhood. This way, I hope to continue the "debate" or dialog between cognitive linguists and anthropologists that was called for by James Fernandez more than 10 years ago (Fernandez, 1991: 8). I do not intend to do this by surveying the huge anthropological literature on metaphor; that would be a huge task

in itself. Instead, I try to offer a reasonably comprehensive metaphor theory of what I take to be issues relevant to social scientists on the basis of the data that I have collected or that have been accumulated by other cognitive linguists interested in the issue of metaphor variation. Anthropologists and other social scientists can then judge whether the theory I arrive at is valid when compared with their theories based on their own data. This way we can begin to work together toward building a better account of the role of metaphor in understanding our own cultures and those of "others."

   In trying to accomplish my goals, I use certain concepts, such as culture, that can divide entire schools of anthropologists in a much less sophisticated way than many anthropologists would. After reading certain chapters of the book in manuscript form, my friend Susan Gal gently reminded me that my use of the term *culture* suggests that I think of culture as a "bounded entity," a notion that is not really acceptable to many anthropologists today. My response to this is twofold: First, she is obviously right, but I find it very difficult to write about many of the issues discussed in the book without using phrases such as "this culture," "a culture," or "cultures." My excuse then in this case is an entirely practical one. Second, and on second thought inspired by her comment, it seems to me that given my account of the data it is possible for me to maintain a position of culture that is closer to her views than she thinks. If some metaphors are universal, as I think some are, then we cannot neatly divide the human world into "bounded entity–like" cultures that exclude each other because the universal metaphors point to an "overarching," or "underlying," layer of cultural experience – over and above the metaphors that may be culture-specific. In addition, I will argue that metaphorical concepts are often embodied, and hence cultural understandings based on them are also embodied. This embodiment makes meaningful not only language but also a wider range of cultural practices. The conception of culture as embodied practice (see Foley, 1997) also goes against any "thinglike" interpretation of culture by me.

On this note, I want to thank all the friends, colleagues, and students who have helped me with their comments and ideas and volunteered many examples that are mentioned, described, and analyzed in this book. They are, in alphabetical order: Réka Benczes, Enikő Bollobás,

January 2004
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Metaphor in Culture

Universality and Variation

1

Introduction

Metaphor and the Issue of Universality

What does metaphor have to do with culture? A short (and vague) answer may be that metaphor and culture are related in many ways. For example, one way in which metaphor and culture are connected in our mind arises from what we have learned about metaphor in school: Creative writers and poets commonly use metaphors, and because literature is a part of culture, metaphor and culture can be seen as intimately linked. After all, metaphor can be viewed as the ornamental use of language. Thus, metaphor and culture may be seen as being related to each other because they are combined in literature – an exemplary manifestation of culture. This is a possible way of thinking of the relationship, and I will deal with it in various places in the present work.

But this is not the kind of relationship between the two that interests me in the present context. I have in mind a much more fundamental connection between them that can be explained in the following way: In line with some current thinking in anthropology, we can think of culture as a set of shared understandings that characterize smaller or larger groups of people (e.g., D'Andrade, 1995; Shore, 1996; Strauss and Quinn, 1997). This is not an exhaustive definition of culture, in that it leaves out real objects, artifacts, institutions, practices, actions, and so on, that people use and participate in in any culture, but it includes a large portion of it: namely, the shared understandings that people have in connection with all of these "things."

When we think of culture in this way, the connection between metaphor and culture emerges in a straightforward manner within the cognitive linguistic framework initiated by George Lakoff and Mark Johnson's (1980) work *Metaphors We Live By*. One of Lakoff and Johnson's main points was that metaphor does not occur primarily in language but in thought. In other words, they argued that we actually understand the world with metaphors and do not just speak with them. (In the second chapter, I will present experimental evidence that proves the validity of this claim.) Thus, the shared understandings suggested by anthropologists as a large part of the definition of culture can often be metaphorical understandings. They can be metaphorical when the focus of understanding is on some intangible entity, such as time, our inner life, mental processes, emotions, abstract qualities, moral values, and social and political institutions. In such cases, the metaphors we use to understand these intangibles may become crucially important in the way we actually experience the intangibles in a culture. In short, on this view of metaphor, metaphors may be an inherent part of culture. (Interestingly, as I will show in chapter 9, there are anthropologists who accept the view of culture as in part comprising shared understandings without simultaneously embracing the view that metaphor, in the sense indicated, is an inherent part of it.)

Given this way of thinking about the connection between metaphor and culture, we can ask, *To what extent do people share their metaphors?* This seemingly trivial question becomes much more interesting and significant if we ask the larger and more significant question of which it forms a part: *To what extent do people around the world share their understandings of aspects of the world in which they live?* It is this question that is of particular interest to me in this book.

THE MAIN ISSUE: UNIVERSALITY AND VARIATION IN METAPHOR

According to the "standard" view of metaphor in the Lakoff–Johnson framework, metaphors are based on embodied human experiences (e.g., Lakoff and Johnson, 1999; Grady, 1997a, 1997b). For example, we metaphorically view affection as warmth (Kövecses, 1986: 101) because of the correlation in our childhood experiences between the

loving embrace of our parents and the comforting bodily warmth that accompanies it. This gives us the "conceptual metaphor" AFFECTION IS WARMTH. (The small capital letters indicate concepts, rather than words.) Thinking (by means of AFFECTION IS WARMTH) and talking (e.g., "We have a *warm* relationship") of affection in terms of warmth arise naturally from our embodied experience. Probably no one would be surprised to hear that affection is universally conceptualized as warmth, rather than coldness. To learn such "primary" metaphors is not a choice for us: It happens unconsciously and automatically. Because this is a universal bodily experience, the metaphor corresponding to it may well be universal. In other words, universal primary experiences produce universal primary metaphors.

And yet, when we look at metaphors in the world's languages, we have the distinct impression that there is a large number of nonuniversal metaphors as well, and that they may be just as numerous as the universal ones, if not more so. In other words, variation in metaphor appears to be just as important and common as universality (as pointed out, for example, by Kienpointner, n.d.). As I will show in later chapters, variation in metaphor takes many forms, and in one of the most common a particular abstract domain is understood in a variety of cross-culturally different ways. Examples of this kind of variation abound: Love is conceptualized as a JOURNEY, UNITY, HUNTING, and so forth, in many cultures, including English, Hungarian, and Chinese, but in certain dialects of Chinese LOVE IS FLYING A KITE (Yang, 2002); anger is understood as a fluid or gas in many cultures, but in Zulu anger is understood as OBJECTS IN THE HEART (Taylor and Mbense, 1998); life is commonly viewed as a JOURNEY or STRUGGLE, but in Hmong it is viewed as a STRING (Riddle, 2000).

If variation in metaphor is so common, we need to be able to provide an explanation for it. So we have a serious challenge: *How can we construct a comprehensive theory that can account for both the universality and the variation in our use of metaphor?*

To account for this, the standard theory of metaphor in the cognitive linguistic mold would continue as follows: There are many primary metaphors; in addition to AFFECTION IS WARMTH, we have

CAUSES ARE FORCES (e.g., "You're *driving* me crazy")
EVENTS ARE MOTIONS (e.g., "What's *going on* here?")

PROGRESS IS MOTION FORWARD (e.g., "We haven't made any *headway*")

PURPOSES ARE DESTINATIONS (e.g., "She's *reached her goal*")

DIFFICULTIES ARE IMPEDIMENTS (e.g., "Let's try to *get around* this problem")

In this view, primary metaphors may be put together in particular languages and cultures to form "complex" metaphors, such as LIFE IS A JOURNEY and LOVE IS A JOURNEY, in which they function as "conceptual correspondences," or "mappings," between the "source" domain of JOURNEY and the "target" domains of LIFE and LOVE. The combinations of primary metaphors may be language-specific. (I will provide several examples for this in later chapters, especially in chapter 3.) The point is that the primary metaphors are likely to be universal, whereas the complex ones that are formed from them are much less likely to be so. Cultures greatly influence what complex conceptual metaphors emerge from the primary metaphors.

In my view, all of this is surely part of the explanation, but there is a lot more that must be added to make the cognitive linguistic view of metaphor a more comprehensive and sophisticated account of both the universality and the variation of metaphor. In particular, I will suggest, among other things, the following:

- Universal experiences do not necessarily lead to universal metaphors;
- Bodily experience may be selectively used in the creation of metaphors;
- Bodily experience may be overridden by both culture and cognitive processes;
- Primary metaphors are not necessarily universal;
- Complex metaphors may be potentially or partially universal;
- Metaphors are not necessarily based on bodily experience – many are based on cultural considerations and cognitive processes of various kinds.

In other words, I claim that if we look at the currently available evidence in the world's languages and cultures, as well as within languages and cultures, what we find is that the present version of the cognitive linguistic view of metaphor is not comprehensive and

subtle enough to account for these data. Thus, my major goal in this book is to offer a more comprehensive and sophisticated version of the theory, one that is capable of accounting for the evidence available at the present time. No doubt, new evidence and data will present themselves as research continues, and it is our job constantly to modify the theory that is developed here.

COMPONENTS OF THE COGNITIVE LINGUISTIC VIEW OF METAPHOR

Before I go on to give a preliminary outline of the theory that I propose to handle the issue of universality and variation in metaphor, let me characterize the cognitive linguistic view of metaphor as I see it today. This theory of metaphor is a complex one. In it, metaphor is seen as being constituted by a variety of parts, aspects, or components that interact with each other. The components include the following:

1. Source domain
2. Target domain
3. Experiential basis
4. Neural structures corresponding to (1) and (2) in the brain
5. Relationships between the source and the target
6. Metaphorical linguistic expressions
7. Mappings
8. Entailments
9. Blends
10. Nonlinguistic realizations
11. Cultural models

Let me briefly explain each of these for the sake of those readers who are not intimately familiar with the cognitive linguistic view of metaphor that has developed from Lakoff and Johnson's (1980) work. (A book-length introduction to the past 20 years of the theory can be found in Kövecses, 2002.)

1–2. Metaphor consists of a source and a target domain such that the source is a more physical and the target a more abstract kind of domain.

Examples: Source domains: WARMTH, JOURNEY. Target domains: AFFECTION, LIFE, LOVE. Thus: AFFECTION IS WARMTH; LIFE IS A JOURNEY; LOVE IS A JOURNEY.

3. The choice of a particular source to go with a particular target is motivated by an experiential basis, that is, some embodied experience.
Examples: Affection correlates with bodily warmth; forces often act as causes; motion is a type of event.

4. Embodied experience results in certain neural connections between areas of the brain (these areas correspond to source and target).
Potential example: When the area of the brain corresponding to affection is activated, the area corresponding to warmth is also activated.

5. The relationship of the source and the target is such that a source domain may apply to several targets and a target may attach to several sources.
Example: The JOURNEY domain applies to both LIFE and LOVE, given the linguistic evidence in English.

6. The particular pairings of source and target domains give rise to metaphorical linguistic expressions; linguistic expressions thus are derived from the connecting of two conceptual domains.
Examples: "*warm* relationship" (from AFFECTION IS WARMTH), "*get around* a problem" (from DIFFICULTIES ARE OBSTACLES).

7. There are basic, and essential, conceptual correspondences, or mappings, between the source and target domains.
Example:
Conceptual metaphor:

LOVE IS A JOURNEY

Mappings:

travelers → lovers
vehicle → love relationship
destination → purpose of the relationship
distance covered → progress made in the relationship
obstacles along the way → difficulties encountered in the
    relationship

8. Source domains often map ideas onto the target beyond the basic correspondences. These additional mappings are called *entailments*, or *inferences*.

   Example: If love is conceptualized as a journey and the vehicle corresponds to the relationship, then our knowledge about the vehicle can be used to understand love relationships. If the vehicle breaks down, we have three choices: (1) we get out and try to reach our destination by some other means; (2) we try to fix the vehicle; or (3) we stay in the vehicle and do nothing. Correspondingly, if a love relationship does not work, we can (1) leave the relationship; (2) try to make it work; or (3) stay in it (and suffer).

9. The joining of a source domain with a target domain often results in blends, that is, conceptual materials that are new with respect to *both* the source and the target.

   Example: Take the sentence "He was so mad, smoke was coming out of his ears." In this example we have an angry person as the target domain and smoke (fume) in a container as the source domain. The target (the angry person) has no smoke emerging from it and the source (the container with hot fluid) has no ears. But the example conceptually integrates the two: We have a container that has ears that have smoke blowing out of them. This is a blend (Fauconnier and Turner, 2002 and chapter 11).

10. Conceptual metaphors often materialize, or are realized, in nonlinguistic ways, that is, not only in language and thought but also in social–physical practice and reality.

    Example: Given the IMPORTANT IS CENTRAL conceptual metaphor and its linguistic manifestations (such as "the *central* issue"), at meetings and various other social events important people (e.g., people in higher positions) tend to occupy more "central" physical locations in the setting than less important ones.

11. Conceptual metaphors converge on, and often produce, cultural models that operate in thought. These are structures that are simultaneously cultural and cognitive (hence, the term *cultural model*, or *cognitive model*), in that they are culturally specific mental representations of aspects of the world.

> *Example:* An integral part of our understanding of time is that
> it is an entity that moves. This is because our cultural model
> of time is based on (created by) the conceptual metaphor TIME
> IS A MOVING ENTITY.

Metaphorical Language

As is clear from the preceding characterization, in the cognitive
linguistic view metaphor is only derivatively a linguistic phe-
nomenon. It exists in language only because it exists in thought.
Linguistic metaphors (i.e., metaphors in language) are expressions
of metaphorical concepts in the brain's conceptual system. So, on
the one hand, metaphorical linguistic expressions make conceptual
metaphors manifest, and, on the other, we can use these metaphor-
ical expressions to arrive at metaphors in thought by means of hy-
pothetically assuming links between two domains that can, in turn,
be put to the test in psychological experiments (as I will show in
chapter 2).

   Because we often arrive at hypotheses as to what conceptual
metaphors we have on the basis of linguistic usage, it is important
to know what counts as a metaphorical linguistic expression. We can
ask what the criteria are on the basis of which we can decide what
counts as a linguistic metaphor. There can be different answers to
this question, and several researchers and research teams are trying
to develop an answer (see, for example, Steen, 1999; Cameron, 2003).

What Kind of "Thing" Is Metaphor?

It should also be clear from the preceding characterization that
metaphor, on the cognitive linguistic view, is not an exclusively lin-
guistic phenomenon. It seems to belong to language, thought, social–
cultural practice, brain, and body – with metaphor in thought being
essential. In other words, it can be suggested that metaphor is a

- linguistic
- conceptual
- social–cultural
- neural
- bodily

phenomenon, and that it exists on all of these different levels at the same time.

The idea that metaphor is all of these "things" has not always been accepted. I believe it has required several intellectual revolutions for us to recognize that metaphor is a many-sided phenomenon that involves not only language, but also the conceptual system, as well as social–cultural structure and neural and bodily activity. I personally believe that one of these intellectual revolutions took place in 1980 with the publication of *Metaphors We Live By* by Lakoff and Johnson. Lakoff and Johnson's main achievement in that book was that they made the claim that metaphors are conceptual in nature, that is, that they reside in the conceptual system, and not just in language (i.e., in linguistic meaning). To be sure, they were not the first to claim this. (Anthropologists have always thought of metaphor as a powerful conceptual device, rather than just a linguistic ornament.) They were the first to claim it in a systematic, generalizable, and experimentally testable way. As it turns out, time has proved them right, as I will show in chapter 2.

In my view, equally important was the step that made us see that metaphor is not simply linguistic and conceptual but also bodily in nature. This is the notion that metaphorical thought is embodied. It was again Lakoff and Johnson who made this claim most forcefully and systematically (Johnson, 1987; Lakoff, 1987; Lakoff and Johnson, 1999). Their ideas were followed up and refined by Joe Grady and his notion of primary metaphor (e.g., Grady, 1997a, 1997b). The main idea in all this work was that abstract thought, largely defined by metaphor, is the result of the way the human body constrains the way we think about abstractions such as time, emotion, morality, and politics.

And I believe that we are witnessing something crucially important again at the present time, when researchers are studying how the brain is equipped to govern metaphorical thought. Various models, or approximations, of this neural activity in the brain have been suggested and are the focus of attention in a variety of disciplines. I will say more about this in chapter 2.

But I also believe that the first major revolution occurred more than 2,000 years ago when Greek philosophers, such as Plato and Aristotle, recognized the existence of metaphor in language (and to some

extent also in thought). They were the first to point out in a serious way that there is such a thing as metaphor. This does not mean, however, that metaphor as a phenomenon had not existed previously. It certainly had, and it was widely used both by their contemporaries and by many generations of people preceding them.

These ideas concerning metaphor are embedded in a larger framework of philosophical claims made by Lakoff and Johnson (1999). It will be useful to consider them briefly here. Lakoff and Johnson suggest the following foundational propositions:

1. *Thought is largely unconscious*. This means that we cannot help thinking in the ways we do. We are not consciously aware of the way we think and reason, and we cannot think just anything.
2. *Abstract concepts are largely metaphorical*. This means that most of our nonphysical (social, psychological, etc.) reality is conceptualized via physical reality, that is, in terms of physical domains of experience.
3. *The mind is embodied*. This means that concepts derive their meaning through sensorimotor experience – either directly or indirectly (i.e., via metaphor).

Clearly, it is the second proposition that is of most immediate concern to us, but, as we will see in chapter 2 and throughout this book, the other two are just as crucial for a fuller understanding of the nature and significance of metaphor in culture.

A NEW LOOK AT THE ISSUE OF UNIVERSALITY AND VARIATION IN METAPHOR

What should a theory of metaphor that attempts to explain both universality and variation in the use of metaphor look like? At the very least, such a theory must be capable of answering questions such as the following:

1. Which metaphors are universal, and why?
2. Where is metaphor variation most likely to occur?
3. What are the aspects of metaphor that are most commonly affected by variation?
4. What are the causes of metaphor variation?

5. Do conceptual metaphors form a seamless fit with embodi-
ment, cultural experience, and cognitive processes? Do these
systems function together in a completely coherent fashion? If
not, how can we account for the conflicts among these various
systems that interact with metaphor?

It is mainly the first question that has occupied the attention of cogni-
tive linguists working on metaphor. The theory of primary metaphor
is the clearest and most explicit statement concerning the universality
of certain metaphors. Although I am largely in agreement with this
account of universality, the data we will consider lead me to suggest
several modifications to this general mode of explanation.

One of these is that whereas I find the notion of primary metaphor
important for developmental and cognitive purposes, I believe that
complex metaphors are more important to cultural considerations. It
is complex metaphors – not primary metaphors – with which peo-
ple actually engage in their thought in real cultural contexts. In a
way, primary metaphors often look "lifeless" in comparison to cul-
turally embedded complex ones. PURPOSES ARE DESTINATIONS sounds
like an artificial theoretical construct when we compare it to, say,
LIFE IS A JOURNEY, of which it forms a part. This is, of course, not
to diminish the importance of primary metaphor; rather, it is to ac-
knowledge its crucial cognitive role, but at the same time to acknowl-
edge the crucial cultural role of complex metaphor. I will suggest that
metaphors are just as much cultural as they are cognitive entities and
processes.

Another modification I will make in the standard cognitive lin-
guistic theory of metaphor is the following: I believe conceptual
metaphors (both the complex and primary kinds) have one or sev-
eral "meaning foci" (see Kövecses, 1995a, 2002). By this I mean that
each source domain contributes predetermined conceptual materials
to the range of target domains to which it applies. This conceptual
material is agreed upon by a community of speakers and represents
extremely basic and central knowledge about the source. In other
words, I believe that most source domains that apply to a variety of
targets have something like a "major theme or themes." JOURNEY as
a source domain has as its major theme the idea of progress (whether
we apply it to LIFE or LOVE); HEAT (though not WARMTH) as a source is

typically used to capture INTENSITY; and BUILDING is most commonly applied to some abstract STRUCTURE, LASTINGNESS, and CREATION. In other words, the main meaning focus is my way of talking about some of the same things that the notion of primary metaphor can explain. I find the notion of main meaning focus, or major theme, useful because of its "culture-sensitivity." It allows us to talk about ideas associated with a source domain agreed upon by a community of speakers. And it also allows us to capture interesting cross-cultural shifts in source domains and what they are connected with in the target. As an example, consider the well-known SEXUAL DESIRE IS HEAT primary metaphor as studied in English (Lakoff, 1987). On the view of primary metaphor, the mapping that characterizes this metaphor should be universal; heat should map onto the intensity of sexual desire. But in another language such as Chagga, studied by Emanatian (1995), heat does not map onto the intensity of sexual desire; instead, it maps onto the desirable qualities of the female partner (see chapter 10). In other words, the notion of main meaning focus seems to be more "culture-sensitive" than that of primary metaphor. Again, I do not see the two notions as being in competition with each other; rather, I see them as tools that capture two sides (the cognitive and the cultural) of the same (metaphorical) coin.

Interestingly, something like the notion of main meaning focus has received some attention in psycholinguistic experiments. I find a fairly close correlate of the notion in Ray Gibbs's experiments on the "nonlinguistic profile" of some typical source domains (see chapter 2). I also see this idea in Hoyt Alverson's insistence that all experience is intentional, that is, is conceived of "in a certain manner" (Alverson, 1991: 97). Experience that is conceived in a particular manner is captured by (often different) cultural models, as we see for the domain of sex in English and Chagga.

Since cognitive linguists have by and large ignored the issue of metaphor variation, they have not systematically sought answers to the remaining questions:

Of these, question (2) relates to what I call the *dimension* of metaphor variation. This is the idea that we need to find out, or, indeed, take an inventory of, the dimensions along which metaphors can vary. I will propose several such dimensions, including, most importantly, the cross-cultural and within-culture dimensions. In other

words, we need to find those boundaries that signal discontinuities in human experience.

Question (3) relates to the components of the cognitive linguistic view of metaphor. Here the issue is which *components*, or *aspects*, of metaphor are involved in cases of metaphor variation (or to what degree), which ones are not, and how they are involved. I will suggest, not surprisingly, that the experiential basis is less involved than, say, metaphorical mappings, and that these are in turn less involved than, say, metaphorical linguistic expressions.

Question (4) is perhaps the most exciting one. It asks us to explore the main *causes* of metaphor variation. I have found two large groups of such causes: differential experience and the differential application of (otherwise universal) cognitive processes. Both can create both interculturally and intraculturally different metaphors.

Question (5) bears on the issue of the degree of cultural *coherence* in the interplay among the conceptual metaphors, embodiment, and causes of metaphor variation. I will show that the coherence among these systems is partial most of the time (at least in the case of complex metaphors), but that we also find cases of complete coherence and, at the other extreme, very little coherence, or no coherence at all, among the systems.

The Structure of the Book

The structure of the book follows the order of the questions listed. The book is divided into four parts:

After this introductory chapter, Part I deals with the issue of the universality of metaphor (chapters 2 and 3).

Part II takes up the question of dimensions of metaphor variation – both cross-culturally and within-culture (chapters 4 and 5).

Part III is devoted to the issue of which aspects of metaphor are involved in the process of variation (chapters 6 through 9).

Part IV looks at the causes that result in variation, together with creativity, which I take to be a special kind of cause of variation (chapters 10 and 11).

Finally, the concluding chapter contains a brief and very tentative initial discussion of the interaction of the systems (embodiment, cultural experience, and cognitive processes) that participate in metaphor variation (chapter 12).

UNIVERSAL METAPHORS

2

Metaphor

From Language to Body, and Back

The main question I wish to address in this chapter is this: Why is it that many people who are familiar with the view of metaphor that originates from Lakoff and Johnson's *Metaphors We Live By* so often expect that metaphors in the cognitive linguistic view should be largely or mostly universal? And, related to this, why is it that people so often criticize this view for ignoring the apparent diversity of metaphors across and even within cultures? Eve Sweetser (in press) nicely captures this general attitude:

Almost every time I discuss bodily bases for human conceptual structures, metaphorical or otherwise, there is someone around who sensibly asks me how I could really believe such a story, given the amazing cross-cultural variety of such metaphorical models. How can I think, in the face of all this evidence, that the human body programs us inevitably to some single shared set of models of the world? (Sweetser, in press: 21)

To begin to see the most important reasons for this attitude, we have to survey some of the major ideas and recent developments of the cognitive linguistic theory of metaphor. However, a fuller answer to the questions raised here will only emerge in chapter 10, when I discuss the causes that lead to cross-cultural diversity in metaphorical conceptualization.

METAPHOR IN THE BODY

What does it mean more precisely that metaphor is in the body? In order to see this, imagine the following simple situation: You are working hard, let us say sawing or chopping wood, or you are doing some vigorous exercise, such as running or aerobics. After a while you are beginning to work up heat, you feel hot, and maybe you begin to sweat. We can say that the vigorous bodily activity produces an increase in body heat. Typically, when you engage in vigorous bodily activity, your body responds in this way. Similarly, when you are very angry, or when you have strong sexual feelings, or when you are under strong psychological pressure, your body may also produce an increase in body heat that manifests itself physiologically in a variety of ways. In all of these cases, the increase in the intensity of an activity or state accompanies an increase in body heat, and your body responds this way automatically. The correlation between the increase in the intensity of the activity or the state, on the one hand, and the production of body heat, on the other, is inevitable for the kind of body we have. We cannot prevent the correlation between intensity (of these activities and states) and body heat. This correlation forms the basis of a linguistic and conceptual metaphor: INTENSITY IS HEAT. But the correlation is at the level of the body, and in this sense metaphor is as much in the body as it is in language or thought.

Kinds of Embodiment

The recognition of the kind of correlation that exists in the body between intensity (of action or state) and heat gave rise to the *embodiment hypothesis,* which states that metaphorical thought is based on such correlated experience (Lakoff, 1987). Celebrated examples of such experience include the correlation between amount and verticality (yielding the metaphor MORE IS UP), purpose and destination (yielding the metaphor PURPOSES ARE DESTINATIONS) and intimacy and closeness (yielding the metaphor INTIMACY IS CLOSENESS). But this is not the only kind of embodiment that has been recognized.

We can have certain recurring bodily experiences that get a structure through constant repetition. We call these *image schemata*. Such structured bodily experiences include containment, force, moving

along a path, symmetry, and balance. Characteristically, these are extremely basic experiences that are commonly used in metaphorical thought. Metaphors such as STATES ARE CONTAINERS, EMOTIONS ARE FORCES, LIFE IS A JOURNEY, are all examples of how basic and repeated human experiences with limited structure provide an understanding for abstractions such as states, emotions, or life.

Correlations in experience and image schemata are two kinds of bodily experience that are commonly evoked in discussions of the embodiment hypothesis. But, as Gibbs (2003a, 2003b) notes, there may be several others. For example, he discusses "affordances" based on work by Glenberg (1997) as yet another form of embodiment. Glenberg proposes what he calls the "indexical hypothesis." This hypothesis has three main parts: (1) Words and phrases are indexed to objects in the environment or to perceptual symbols in long-term memory; (2) the affordance structures are derived for each object in the situation; (3) the listener combines or "meshes" the affordances according to the constraints on embodied possibilities in the real world. Take the following two sentences:

Art used the chair to defend himself against the snarling lion.
Art used the chair to propel himself across the room.

The first sentence meshes with the constraints on embodied possibilities in the real world. Picking up a chair and using it as a shield or weapon are afforded by the situation; given the kinds of bodies we have, what we can do with chairs is compatible with the meaning of the first sentence. But the second sentence is not. Given the characteristics of chairs and what we can do with them as humans, the meaning of the second sentence violates the "affordance structure" that can be derived from the situation. Not surprisingly, "afforded" sentences are judged to be more sensible than "nonafforded" ones. I would add that, also not surprisingly, nonafforded sentences are likely to be more metaphorical than afforded ones.

The main point of all this is to show that, as Gibbs emphasizes, embodiment takes a variety of forms. Some of these have been extensively discussed in the cognitive linguistic literature, but some of them have not. These "new" cases can in the long run lend further support to and indeed strengthen the embodiment hypothesis for metaphorical thought.

Ways of Studying Embodiment

We can informally distinguish between two modes of studying embodiment: in vitro and in vivo.

"In Vitro" Experiments. In the "in vitro" type of experiments researchers typically ask people to think about and report on their embodied experiences concerning domains that are known, on the basis of linguistic evidence, to be used as source domains in conceptual metaphors. However, in the experiments subjects are asked only about their experiences concerning the source.

   In a well-known series of experiments, Ray Gibbs (1992, 1994) asked his subjects about their embodied experiences concerning pressurized containers: What would cause the container to explode? Does the container explode on purpose or does it explode through no volition of its own? Does the explosion of the container occur in a gentle or a violent manner? People's responses to these questions were remarkably similar. They agreed that the explosion happens as a result of internal pressure caused by the increase in the heat of the fluid inside the container; that the explosion happens unintentionally; and that the explosion happens in a violent manner. This way, the researcher gets a nonlinguistic profile of the embodied experience of pressurized containers that is one of the source domains of intense emotional states such as anger. With the help of such nonlinguistic profiles certain predictions can be made about people's understanding of the target domains. This is possible only if in the course of understanding a target domain in terms of a source, the source preserves its basic, generic-level profile or image-schematic structure. For example, it can be predicted that when the pressurized container as source domain is used for anger, the loss of control over anger that angry people often experience is conceptualized as being caused by internal stress, as being unintentional, as well as being sudden and violent. These predictions, or hypotheses, concerning the conceptualization of anger proved to be accurate in a variety of tasks. For example, when people understand idioms for anger (such as *blow your stack, flip your lid, hit the ceiling*), they infer that the loss of control that these idioms describe is due to some internal pressure, that it is unintentional, and that it occurs in an abrupt and violent manner.

It is important to see that in these experiments the researcher attempts to find out about people's intuitions concerning their bodily experiences *before* any questions are asked concerning their judgments about linguistic expressions, their meaning, or their metaphorical status.

Gibbs and his associates have done a variety of studies along these lines. In another study, they explored the kinds of embodied experiences people have in connection with the source domain of hunger (Gibbs, Lenz, Lima, Francozo, 2004). They again found significant regularities concerning which experiences their subjects find most pertinent to hunger (e.g., thought of food makes one's mouth water or have an appetite) and least pertinent (e.g., becoming talkative or getting a fever). Results indicated that subjects systematically carry over their most pertinent experiences of hunger to the domain of desire when they talk and think metaphorically about desire (as in "I'm *starved for* affection" or "He *hungers for* power"). Thus we can predict which aspects of desire will be focused on given the DESIRE IS HUNGER metaphor. Overall, these studies show that nonlinguistic profiles, or image schemata, associated with typical embodied source domains preserve that structure in the target domain (Gibbs, 2003a, 2003b).

In my reading, these nonlinguistic profiles are the same kinds of structures that I call *main meaning focus* (see chapter 1 and Kövecses, 1995a, 2000b, 2002). It is such nonlinguistic profiles associated with source domains that are preserved for the structuring of the target. This is what was meant in chapter 1, in which I suggested that many source domains are in the business of mapping predetermined conceptual materials to the target.

"In Vivo" Experiments. Other cognitive psychologists study embodiment in metaphorical thought "in vivo." In other words, they try to find out how people think metaphorically as they engage in actual embodied action. The issue of how actual embodied action influences metaphorical thought was studied by Lera Boroditsky and Michael Ramscar (2002) in a series of innovative experiments. In one such study, the researchers asked people who were riding on a moving train a question to find out how they were thinking about time. Notice that the train ride is the actual embodiment of one of the source domains for time: the moving observer in the metaphor TIME

PASSING IS A MOVING OBSERVER, as in "We're *coming up on* Christmas" (as opposed to the metaphor TIME PASSING IS A MOVING OBJECT, as in "Christmas is *coming up on* us"). If people think and reason about time in terms of these metaphors and if the thinking or reasoning is influenced by embodied action people are actually engaging in during thinking and reasoning, in this situation people choose and use the TIME PASSING IS A MOVING OBSERVER metaphor over the MOVING OBJECT metaphor in the course of their reasoning, because they are engaged in an action in which they are actually moving observers (i.e., they are riding a train).

How can we check whether this is indeed the case? In the experiment, passengers on a train were presented with the following situation: They were told that a particular meeting that was scheduled to be held on the next Wednesday was rescheduled and moved forward 2 days. Then they were asked the question "What day is the meeting, now that it has been rescheduled?" If people use the MOVING OBSERVER metaphor in their reasoning, they must say that the meeting was moved to Friday, and if they use the MOVING OBJECT metaphor, they must say that it was moved to Monday. This is because "forward" is defined with respect to the moving observer, and the moving observer reaches farther points on the journey (or the corresponding later times) as he or she moves forward. That is, if the meeting was moved forward from Wednesday, then *forward* must mean Friday. However, if the person uses the MOVING OBJECT metaphor in his or her reasoning, the inference is different. In that case, *forward* is defined with respect to the object that moves toward the stationary ego, and in that scenario *forward* means "closer," that is, "earlier" in time to the stationary ego. This must result in these people's saying that the meeting was moved to Monday.

Overall, more people responded that the meeting was moved to Friday. This shows that the embodied experience of the train ride does play a role in the way people think metaphorically about time, and more generally, that their understanding depends on embodied experience in context. Actual embodied experience that fits a particular source domain for an abstract target domain can and does influence the way we think about the abstract target. The experiments that Boroditsky and Ramscar (2002) describe provide support for the embodied nature of meaning and thought.

However, Boroditsky and Ramscar also point out that the situation is trickier and subtler than this. They noticed that many more people on the train took the moving observer (or moving ego) perspective at the beginning and end of the train ride; fewer took that perspective in the middle of the journey. When people were asked about what day the meeting was moved to during the middle part of the journey, their responses revealed a much weaker preference for the MOVING OBSERVER metaphor than the responses by those passengers who were asked at either the beginning or the end of the journey. Boroditsky and Ramscar's explanation is that people are most likely to think about their journey at the beginning, and end of it; in the middle of it people relax, read, sleep, and so on: That is, they are much less concerned with the journey as such. They suggest "that people's thinking about time is tied to their thinking about spatial motion and not necessarily to the experience of motion itself" (p. 188).

METAPHOR IN THE BRAIN

We can separate the issue of metaphor in the body from the issue of metaphor in the brain only in an arbitrary way. It is the brain that runs the body, and if metaphor is in the body it must also be in the brain. The assumption in recent neuroscientific studies (see, for example, Gallese and Lakoff, 2003) is that when we understand abstract concepts metaphorically, two groups of neurons in the brain are activated at the same time; when one group of neurons (the source) fires, another group of neurons (the target) fires as well. This situation has given rise to the slogan "Neurons that fire together wire together." We can then assume that, for example, neurons corresponding to intensity and heat, respectively, are activated together in the brain when we think about the abstract concept of intensity in connection with certain events, activities, and states. Similarly, when we think about abstract amounts, such as prices, the neurons corresponding to amount and those corresponding to verticality (up–down) are coactivated in the brain. These coactivations of groups of neurons yield what we know as the primary conceptual metaphors INTENSITY IS HEAT and MORE IS UP (LESS IS DOWN).

In short, conceptual metaphors are ensembles of neurons in different parts of the brain connected by neural circuitry. The ensembles of

neurons located in different parts of the brain are the source and target domains, and the physical neural circuitry that connects them are the mappings. This allows us to see metaphor as physical (i.e., neural) structures in the brain. In learning a metaphor appropriate neural connections are "recruited" between different parts of the brain. This happens as a result of repeated and simultaneous neural activation of two brain areas. For example, as mentioned in chapter 1, the repeated and simultaneous neural activation of the emotion domain (region) and the temperature domain (region) in childhood and later on in life leads to the establishment of the appropriate neural circuitry between the two domains, yielding, as one case, the AFFECTION IS WARMTH metaphor.

The question arises, In which parts of the brain are the two domains located? According to this paradigm of research, the source domain is located in the sensorimotor system, whereas the target domain is found in higher cortical areas. This idea is the neuroscientific version of the notion of the embodiment of metaphor, which states that source domains typically arise from more concrete and physical sensorimotor experience, whereas target domains are less physical in nature.

The Kind of Brain Needed for Metaphorical Thought

What kind of brain is necessary for metaphorical thought? This question can be answered from several perspectives. One of them is a cognitive archaeological perspective. Steven Mithen (1996, 1998) suggests that the brain of humans before the Upper Paleolithic period in Europe (100,000 to 30,000 years ago) was a domain-specific brain. In it, cognitive domains related to tools, the natural world, and social interaction were isolated. There was no "communication" between these domains of experience; they were isolated from each other. This means, in effect, that these early humans were not capable of metaphoric thought. The great "revolution" took place in the Upper Paleolithic period when the domain-specific brain became more fluid and allowed the interpretation of knowledge in one domain in terms of knowledge in another domain. The result was a "cognitively fluid" brain. This newer kind of brain was capable of understanding one domain in terms of another. We know this from

some of the artwork and tools of the Upper Paleolithic period that have been found. For example, in cave drawings people may be represented as animals. We would say today that this was the beginning of the use of the PEOPLE ARE ANIMALS conceptual metaphor. In addition to this metaphor Mithen (1998: 171) provides several others:

> ANIMALS AND PLANTS ARE PEOPLE (anthropomorphism)
> PEOPLE ARE ANIMALS (totemism)
> ANIMALS AND PLANTS ARE STRUCTURED OBJECTS (objectification)
> PEOPLE ARE STRUCTURED OBJECTS (objectification)

A particularly interesting feature of these conceptual metaphors is that they provide a cognitive and metaphorical basis for such well known anthropological processes as anthropomorphism, totemism, and objectification. The ANIMALS AND PLANTS ARE PEOPLE metaphor underlies the notion of anthropomorphism; the PEOPLE ARE ANIMALS metaphor, that of totemism; and the ANIMALS AND PLANTS / PEOPLE ARE STRUCTURED OBJECTS metaphor(s), that of objectification. These conceptual metaphors and the large-scale processes they underlie are global design features of the brain/mind of modern humans. They represent global metaphoric potentialities, or principles, of a cognitively fluid brain.

However, in addition to these large-scale metaphoric processes, the human brain must have evolved more local potentialities, or principles, of metaphor production, or generation. Recent research on metaphor shows that many basic metaphors derive from local cooccurrences of experiential entities and events: intensity with heat, purposes with destinations, more with up, intimacy with closeness, and so on (Grady, 1997b; Kövecses, 1995a, 2002; Lakoff, 1990, 1993). These "primary" or "simple" metaphors arise from much more local associations of experience than the large-scale cognitive processes pointed out by Mithen. Several questions come to the fore once we consider together the metaphors based on global principles and the ones based on much more local associations. Did the local metaphors exist in the brain of early modern humans, or did they emerge only after the global ones? If the latter, when did this happen and why? Do the global and local metaphors represent two different modes of operation of the brain? Or, alternatively, can we interpret the global

metaphor suggested by Mithen as being just as local as the metaphors INTENSITY IS HEAT and INTIMACY IS CLOSENESS?

That metaphor is in thought, and not just in language, is a major claim of the cognitive linguistic view of metaphor. According to this view, the conceptual system (including conceptual metaphors) is based on the body and the brain. With respect to metaphor, the key suggestion is that abstract thought is based on correlations in bodily experience that result in well-established neuronal connections in the brain.

In cognitive linguistics, metaphor is a set of conceptual correspondences, or more technically, mappings, between two conceptual domains, a source and a target (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980; Kövecses, 2002). The correspondences between a source and a target domain make up a conceptual metaphor. It follows from this cognitive definition of metaphor that although most conceptual metaphors have linguistic instantiations in everyday language use (that is, they are expressed by means of metaphorical linguistic expressions), some of them do not. For example, if we think of a love relationship as two people collaborating on a work of art (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980), we may not find any linguistic expressions that reveal the conceptual metaphor; nevertheless, our thinking about love will be governed by it (if, e.g., we think that the love relationship requires dedication; that it involves shared responsibility; that love is active, rather than passive; that it requires shared values and goals). However, other conceptual metaphors reveal themselves in everyday linguistic expressions. Take, for instance, the conceptual metaphor ANGER IS A HOT FLUID IN A CONTAINER. This shows up in such metaphorical linguistic expressions as "*boil* with anger," "*simmer* down," and "*seethe* with anger." etc. The basic mapping, or set of correspondences, that defines the conceptual metaphor that underlies these expressions includes the following:

Source: HOT FLUID IN A CONTAINER Target: ANGER

the physical container → the angry person's body
the hot fluid inside the container → the anger
the degree of fluid heat → the intensity of anger
the cause of increase in fluid heat → the cause of anger

In the cognitive linguistic view, a conceptual metaphor is such a set of correspondences that obtains between a source domain and a target domain, where metaphorical linguistic expressions (i.e., linguistic metaphors) commonly make the conceptual metaphors (i.e., metaphors in the mind) manifest (though there may be conceptual metaphors that have no linguistic metaphors to express them).

Alternative Conceptualization

One of the remarkable features of metaphorical thought is that even our most basic target concepts can be construed in multiple ways. The metaphorical conceptual system is not monolithic – target concepts are not limited to a single source concept. Let us take as an example the abstract target concept of intensity. We have discussed the correlation between intensity and heat in previous sections. We can now say that this correlation forms the basis of the conceptual metaphor INTENSITY IS HEAT. However, heat is not the only source domain for this target domain, as shown in the following:

INTENSITY IS HEAT (e.g., "There was *heated* debate about the issue")
INTENSITY IS QUANTITY (e.g., "I care *a lot* about you")
INTENSITY IS SPEED (e.g., "*sudden* growth in the economy," "a *sluggish* economy")
INTENSITY IS STRENGTH (OF PHYSICAL EFFECT) (e.g., "The country was *hit hard* by the flood")

All these alternative conceptualizations of intensity are "primary" or "simple" metaphors that can jointly characterize particular "complex" metaphors. When they do, we can think of them as providing very strong motivation for the selection of particular complex images. One case in point would be the complex conceptual metaphor ANGER IS A HOT FLUID IN A CONTAINER. At least three of the four simple metaphors for intensity seem to characterize this complex metaphor: HEAT, QUANTITY, and SPEED. If we lose our *cool*, we become very angry; anger *welling up* in someone indicates less intense anger than anger *coming over* or *overcoming* someone; and a person *flaring up* is more intensely angry than someone doing a *slow* burn. But maybe the fourth intensity metaphor also plays a role in this anger metaphor. For instance, an out*burst* of anger indicates very intense anger as well as

the forcefulness of the outbreak. Be that as it may, the point is that the extremely simple local metaphors that are based on basic correlations in human experience jointly apply to this complex metaphor and make it a very natural conceptual metaphor for anger.

This situation shows very clearly that complex metaphors are based on simple ones, which are in turn based on tight, local correlations in experience. But the picture is not as neat as it seems given this example. We also find examples that suggest a conflict with the general picture as described here. In a television report on the impending war against Iraq early on in the year in 2003, I heard the statement "Our fears are *fueled by* acts of terrorism." The word *fuel* in this sentence suggests heat, and it seems that the sentence in which it occurs relies on the simple metaphor INTENSITY IS HEAT. However, the conceptualization of fear is conventionally based on cold, not heat (see Kövecses, 1990). The example, then, contradicts both the conventional conceptualization and the physiological embodiment of fear. This is a problem for the cognitive linguistic view of metaphor, which requires that no metaphors (either conceptual or linguistic) contradict the embodiment of metaphorical concepts. I return to this problem in the last chapter, in which I discuss such potential contradictions among the systems involved in metaphorical conceptualization (see chapter 12).

How Can We Study Metaphorical Thought?

Cognitive linguists, including me, often make claims about the existence of conceptual metaphors on the basis of certain linguistic expressions. We often claim that people "understand" a given target domain by recourse to one or several source domains. It is clear that such claims are not justifiable, because we as linguists are simply not in a position to determine whether people using those expressions indeed "understand" the target in terms of the source solely on the basis of some linguistic expressions deriving from a source and applied to a target. In addition to this problem, there is also the problem of what is meant by "understanding." When cognitive linguists are criticized for these claims, I now feel that the criticism is justified (see the discussion of this issue in Gibbs, 1998). All we can legitimately claim is that what we do is offer hypotheses concerning certain

metaphorical ways of understanding target domains on the basis of linguistic evidence. It is the job of researchers who are in the business of doing experiments concerning metaphorical cognition to test whether the particular hypotheses we offer have psychological validity.

The people who are in the business of doing experiments concerning metaphorical thought are cognitive psychologists. One of the first experiments to show that conceptual metaphors are real, that is, that they are in our conceptual system and not just in language, was done by Ray Gibbs and his associates (Gibbs, 1994; Gibbs and O'Brian, 1990). One of the tasks that Gibbs and his colleagues gave to subjects was a mental imagery task. Participants were asked to form mental images of idioms (e.g., *blow your stack, flip your lid, hit the ceiling*) and were asked a series of questions about their images (Gibbs and O'Brian, 1990). They found a remarkable degree of consistency in people's images relating to the idioms. People seem to form highly consistent mental images when given certain idioms with roughly the same idiomatic meaning (e.g., "getting angry"). Participants made use of the image-schematic knowledge that was mentioned in the previous section. They said that in the case of idioms such as *blow your stack*, the cause of losing control over anger is internal pressure, and that the loss of control is unintentional and violent. In other words, their responses were based on the source domain of a pressurized container (e.g., a hot fluid in a container). This means that in interpreting the idioms they relied on the conceptual metaphor ANGER IS A HOT FLUID IN A CONTAINER. If people's knowledge were not structured by such metaphorical mappings, there would be very little consistency in the images people have in connection with idioms with the same nonliteral meaning. What Gibbs and O'Brian showed was that people do indeed understand idioms relating to a given target domain (such as anger) in terms of conceptual metaphors (such as ANGER IS A HOT FLUID IN A CONTAINER).

In another kind of experiment, cognitive psychologists use priming as a device to see whether conceptual metaphors do indeed play a role in understanding metaphorical language. In a series of experiments, Lera Boroditsky (2001) studied the TIME IS HORIZONTAL/VERTICAL metaphor by making use of two kinds of primes: a prime for horizontal orientation and a prime for vertical orientation. The

distinction between horizontal and vertical primes is important because there are languages in which time is conceived of as being
oriented vertically, as well as horizontally. One such language is
Mandarin Chinese (as opposed to English, in which time is metaphorically viewed horizontally only). If the TIME IS HORIZONTAL/VERTICAL
metaphor is real in people's conceptual systems, then Mandarin
Chinese speakers should perform better at certain tasks when they
receive a vertical prime than speakers of English, and speakers of
English should perform better than Chinese speakers when they receive a horizontal prime. She hypothesized that speakers of Mandarin
should be faster in saying that a sentence such as "March comes *earlier* than April" is true after getting the vertical prime than speakers
of English, and speakers of English should be faster than Chinese
speakers after getting a horizontal prime. These predictions proved to
be correct. Mandarin speakers outperformed English speakers when
they received a vertical prime, and English speakers outperformed
Chinese speakers when they received a horizontal prime. The TIME IS
HORIZONTAL conceptual metaphor must exist in the head of speakers
of English, and when it is primed, it produces faster TRUE/FALSE
responses to such sentences as "March comes *earlier* than April in
speakers of English." And the same holds true for the existence of
the TIME IS VERTICAL conceptual metaphor in the head of Chinese
speakers.

The important point about this experiment is that the term *earlier* is
not metaphorical but literal, and yet people confronted with the sentence use for its understanding either the TIME IS HORIZONTAL or the
TIME IS VERTICAL metaphor. This situation shows that understanding
here is a long-term process in which a conceptual metaphor influences even the understanding of nonmetaphorical expressions such
as *earlier*. If there had been no long-term effect of these metaphors on
understanding the sentence, neither horizontal nor vertical priming
would have mattered.

What Role Does Metaphor Play in Online Understanding of Metaphorical Language?

But understanding is not only a matter of long-term memory. It also
involves the online, or real-time, understanding of language. One of

the greatest challenges to the cognitive linguistic view of metaphor is the claim that conceptual metaphors play no role in the process of online understanding. The specific claim is that we process metaphorical expressions online without (consciously or unconsciously) evoking or relying on metaphorical mappings.

The experiment conducted by Boroditsky (2001) discussed earlier can help us decide whether this challenge is appropriate. In the same experiment, half of the target sentences contained a spatiotemporal metaphor. The sentence was "March comes *before* April." This is different from the previous situation in that *before* is a metaphorical expression (unlike *earlier*) that is based on the TIME IS HORIZONTAL conceptual metaphor (together with such expressions as *ahead of, after, behind*). It can be suggested that if conceptual metaphors immediately affect online understanding, then people will respond faster to the TRUE/FALSE question after receiving the horizontal prime than the vertical prime. The result of this part of the experiment was that both the English and the Mandarin speakers performed better at this task after receiving the horizontal prime than after receiving the vertical prime. In other words, both English and the Mandarin speakers needed less time to respond to the questions when they were presented with a horizontal prime than with a vertical prime. This is because the horizontal prime was consistent with the conceptual metaphor underlying the metaphorical expression *before* in the target sentence "March comes *before* April" (i.e., with the conceptual metaphor TIME IS HORIZONTAL). The finding that the speakers of Mandarin Chinese were affected in the same way as speakers of English shows that they also made use of the TIME IS HORIZONTAL conceptual metaphor in their online understanding of the sentence, because this was the metaphor triggered by the metaphorical expression used in the sentence (*before*) and it was consistent with the horizontal prime.

In another study, Gibbs and his associates (Gibbs, Bogdonovich, Sykes, and Barr, 1997) took up the same question. In particular, they wanted to see how people immediately comprehend metaphorical idioms based on ANGER IS A HOT FLUID IN A CONTAINER, such as *blow one's stack*. Participants read stories ending with idioms, such as this, and then quickly gave lexical decision responses to letter strings that were presented to them visually. The letter strings

either were related to the conceptual metaphor underlying the id-
ioms or were unrelated to them. For example, a related letter string
was "heat," and an unrelated one was "lead." People responded
faster to the lexical decision questions after they were presented
with a related letter string than when they were with an unrelated
one, such as "lead." Findings in a variety of tasks were consistent.
All this research shows that people do make some use of concep-
tual metaphors when they comprehend metaphorical expressions
online.

<div align="center">METAPHOR IN LANGUAGE</div>

We need some kind of procedure to identify linguistic metaphors
in language use. This is because the study of linguistic metaphors
may provide a good clue to finding systematic conceptual corre-
spondences between domains (i.e., to conceptual metaphors). The
question is what are the best ways of finding metaphorical linguis-
tic expressions that may reveal underlying conceptual metaphors.
Here the methods of getting data might vary, depending on one's
interests in metaphor study (Deignan and Potter, 2004). Cognitive
linguists who are primarily interested in patterns and regularities of
thought typically use elicited data, whereas researchers who focus on
detailed language description typically use naturally occurring data,
as found in large corpora. This gap in methodology between more
cognitively oriented and more language-use-oriented researchers is
now narrowing. There seem to be two reasons for this. One is that
apparently irregular usages may eventually turn out to be system-
atic when found in large numbers in large corpora; the second is that
elicited data may be biased as a result of the disparity between what
people actually write and say and what they think they write and say
(Deignan and Potter, 2004).

   As an example of finding systematic patterning in metaphori-
cal linguistic expressions (hence possible systematic patterning in
thought), consider the many examples of linguistic metaphors in-
volving intensity and heat cited in the following sample of metaphor-
ical linguistic expressions identified by Alice Deignan (1995) in the
Bank of English – a huge corpus of naturally occurring English.

I have reanalyzed the expressions according to possible metaphorical entailments of the INTENSITY IS HEAT metaphor as revealed by the metaphorical expressions.

INTENSITY IS HEAT

THE HIGHEST DEGREE OF INTENSITY IS THE HIGHEST DEGREE OF HEAT

His eyes *blazed* intently into mine.

The president launched his antidrug campaign in a *blaze* of publicity.

The career that began in a *blaze* of glory has ended in his forced retirement.

CHANGE OF INTENSITY IS CHANGE IN HEAT

Then, in the last couple of years, the movement for democracy began *to heat up*.

The battle for the Formula One Championship *hotted up*.

In a clear bid *to take the heat out of* the rebellion, he authorized an interest rate cut.

I think that the Scottish problem might *cool off*.

CAUSATION IS STARTING HEAT (LIGHTING)

She has failed *to ignite* what could have been a lively debate.

The strike was *sparked* by a demand for higher pay.

MOTIVATION TO DO SOMETHING INTENSELY IS AN INTERNAL CAUSE OF HEAT

He said they were looking for someone with a bit of *spark* as the new technical director.

CONTROLLING THE SITUATION IS CONTROLLING THE HEAT

This proved insufficient *to dampen the fires* of controversy.

MAINTAINING INTENSITY IS MAINTAINING HEAT

The fact is that the very lack of evidence seems *to fan the flames* of suspicion.

The president warned that this will *fuel the fires* of nationalism.

A SUDDEN INCREASE IN INTENSITY IS A SUDDEN INCREASE IN HEAT

Dozens of people were injured as the fighting *flared up*.

Dale stayed clear of the disease for six years until it *flared up* last summer.

LATENT INTENSITY IS POTENTIAL HEAT

The government was foundering on an issue that had *smoldered* for years.

INTENSITY CEASING IS THE HEAT GOING OUT
　　Some were simply *burnt out*, exhausted.
　　. . . a *burnt-out* business executive.

This analysis of the linguistic metaphors reveals a great deal of pat-
terning. It strongly suggests (in the form of a hypothesis) that, at least
on an unconscious level, the linguistic metaphors manifest an elab-
orate conceptual structure as well. But we can perhaps take this hy-
pothesis one step further and suggest that the linguistic expressions
serve as indications of neuronal connections in the brain between
two sets of neurons (corresponding to intensity and heat). It may
well be that, in general, the frequency of occurrence of such linguistic
patterns may indicate the presence of real neuronal connections; the
more frequent and numerous the linguistic metaphorical expressions
linking two domains, the more stable the connections between them
in the brain may be.

WHY ARE METAPHORS UNIVERSAL?

Where does all this leave us? The cognitive linguistic view of
metaphor is powerful and rich. In it, metaphor is understood to ex-
ist on several interconnected levels. Perhaps the main idea is that
metaphorical thought is based on bodily experience and neuronal ac-
tivity in the brain. This idea provides the key to our initial question:
Why do people familiar with the theory expect most metaphors to
be universal? The answer is this: If metaphor is based on the way the
human body and brain function and we as human beings are alike at
the level of this functioning, then most of the metaphors people use
must also be fairly similar, that is, universal – at last on the concep-
tual level. And indeed, there may be many such universal conceptual
metaphors, as we'll see in the next chapter. However, I will also argue
on the basis of a large amount of evidence that metaphors vary con-
siderably on all levels of their existence – both cross-culturally and
within cultures – and that we can give a coherent explanation of this
variation that is maximally coherent with the view of metaphor pre-
sented in this and the previous chapter.

3

Universality in Metaphorical Conceptualization

Given what we have seen in the previous chapter, it should come as no surprise that at least some conceptual metaphors can be and are found in many languages. If some kinds of conceptual metaphors are based on embodied experience that is universal, these metaphors should occur – at least potentially – in many languages and cultures around the world. In this chapter, I investigate whether this is indeed the case. I present case studies that involve potentially universal metaphors on which work has been done in several unrelated languages. Although the number of these languages is relatively small in the case studies to be discussed, they are sufficiently diverse to suggest at least the possibility of universal – or near-universal – status. I want to emphasize that the claim is not that these metaphors embodied in universal experience must be found in all languages; the claim is that, given the universal experiences on which they are based, the metaphors *can* potentially be universal, but we should not expect them to show up in all languages.

THE CASE OF EMOTIONS

Emotions are commonly said to be private and heavily culturally dependent experiences that are inaccessible to others. For this reason, the language and underlying conceptualization of emotional experience are expected to be highly culture-specific. I later present data that

suggest that this claim or expectation should be taken with a grain of salt. This section repeats materials from my earlier work (Kövecses, 2000, 2002).

Happiness

It seems that several unrelated languages share several conceptual metaphors for particular emotion concepts. One of these concepts is happiness. There are a large number of conceptual metaphors for happiness in English (Kövecses, 1991a), of which three stand out in importance: HAPPINESS IS UP ("I'm feeling *up*"), HAPPINESS IS LIGHT ("She *brightened* up"), and HAPPINESS IS A FLUID IN A CONTAINER ("He's *bursting* with joy").

Interestingly enough, the Chinese linguist Ning Yu found the same conceptual metaphors in Chinese (Yu, 1995, 1998). Here are the metaphors with some examples in Chinese. (Ning Yu used the following grammatical abbreviations: PRT = particle, ASP = aspect marker, MOD = modifier marker, COM = complement marker, CL = classifier, BA = preposition *ba* in the so-called *ba*-sentences.)

HAPPY IS UP
> Ta hen gao-xing.
> he very high-spirit
> He is very high-spirited/happy.

> Ta xing congcong de.
> he spirit rise-rise PRT
> His spirits are rising and rising. / He's pleased and excited.

> Zhe-xia tiqi le wo-de xingzhi.
> this-moment raise ASP my mood
> This time it lifted my mood/interest.

HAPPINESS IS LIGHT
> Tamen gege xing-gao cai-lie.
> they everyone spirit-high color-strong
> They're all in high spirits and with a strong glow. / They're all in great delight.

Ta xiao zhu yan kai.
he smile drive color beam
He smiled, which caused his face to beam. / He beamed with a
  smile.

HAPPINESS IS A FLUID IN A CONTAINER

Ta xin-zhong chongman xiyue.
he heart-inside fill happiness
His heart is filled with happiness.

Ta zai-ye anna-buzhu xin-zhong de xiyue.
she no-longer press-unable heart-inside MOD happiness
She could no longer contain the joy in her heart.

Hungarian, a Finno-Ugric language, has the same conceptual meta-
phors, as can be seen in the following examples:

HAPPY IS UP

Ez a film feldobott.
this the film up-threw-me
This film gave me a high. / This film made me happy.

Majd elszáll a boldogságtól.
almost away-flies-he/she the happiness-from
He/she is on cloud nine.

HAPPINESS IS LIGHT

Felderült az arca.
up-brightened the face-his/her
His/her face brightened up.

Derűs alkat.
he/she bright personality
He/she has a sunny personality.

HAPPINESS IS A FLUID IN A CONTAINER

Túlcsordult a szíve a boldogságtól.
over-flow-past the heart-his/her the happiness-from
His heart overflowed with joy.

Nem bírtam magamban tartani örömömet.
not could-I myself-in hold joy-my-ACC
I couldn't contain my joy.

(ACC indicates the accusative case.) It is a remarkable fact that these same metaphors exist in the three languages. After all, English, Chinese, and Hungarian belong to very different language families and represent very different cultures of the world, which presumably did not have much contact with each other when these conceptual metaphors evolved. The question arises, How is it possible for such different languages and cultures to conceptualize happiness metaphorically in such similar ways? Three answers to the question suggest themselves: (1) It has happened by accident; (2) one language borrowed the metaphors from another; and (3) there is some universal motivation for the metaphors to emerge in all three of these cultures.

If it is true, as cognitive linguists claim, that simple or primary metaphors are motivated by universal correlations in bodily experience, we can be pretty sure that it is the third explanation that gives us the answer to the question. (By suggesting this, I do not wish to downplay the role of the second possibility, especially in those cases in which unrelated languages have had close areal contact with each other for a long period. But this kind of resulting similarity in metaphorical conceptualization is a different issue from the one I am discussing here.)

Indeed, when we are joyful, we tend to be up, move around, be active, jump up and down, rather than down, inactive, and static. And when we are joyful, our eyes are bright and we smile. Also, light and brightness are more conducive than darkness to feeling joyful. These are undoubtedly universal experiences, and they are likely to produce universal (or near-universal) simple or primary metaphors. It would be more difficult to call the third metaphor simple or primary. HAPPINESS IS FLUID IN A CONTAINER does not appear to be one, and yet it exists in these three unrelated languages. The reason may be that the major mappings that compose it may be based on universal experiences and metaphorical perceptions: namely, that the emotions are inside our body container; that the emotions are correlated with body fluids, such as the blood; and that control is keeping the substance inside the container. In other words, not only simple or primary metaphors can occur in widely different languages and cultures, but also those complex conceptual metaphors that have mappings based on widely shared experiences and perceptions.

Anger

It seems to me that something similar is going on for the concept of anger in the case of the conceptual metaphor THE ANGRY PERSON IS A PRESSURIZED CONTAINER. This metaphor was first studied by Lakoff and Kövecses in English (Kövecses, 1986; Lakoff, 1987; Lakoff and Kövecses, 1987), and then by a number of researchers in several related and unrelated languages, including Chinese (King, 1989; Yu, 1995, 1998), Japanese (Matsuki, 1995), Hungarian (Bokor, 1997), Wolof (Munro, 1991), Zulu (Taylor and Mbense, 1998), and Polish (Micholajczuk, 1998). To give a flavor of the conceptual metaphor, here are some linguistic metaphors that express it in English:

> You make my blood *boil*.
> *Simmer* down!
> Let him *stew*.
> He *blew his top*.

In what follows in this section, I summarize the main findings of this research, which is discussed in detail elsewhere (Kövecses, 2000a, 2002).

In all of these languages, a CONTAINER metaphor was found and the container was found pressurized, either with or without heat. The correspondences, or mappings, of the PRESSURIZED CONTAINER metaphor for anger include the following:

> the container with some substance or objects → the person who is angry
> the substance or objects in the container → the anger
> the pressure of the substance or objects on the container → the force of the anger on the angry person
> the cause of the pressure → the cause of the anger force
> keeping the substance or objects inside the container → controlling the anger
> the substance or objects going out of the container → the expression of the anger

I argued that these mappings produce a scene or situation for anger in which there is a force inside a person and the force causes the person to act in certain ways that should be suppressed. The 'cause, force, forced

expression' structure remains a mystery and a completely random occurrence without evoking the PRESSURIZED CONTAINER metaphor. Through its detailed mappings, the metaphor provides a coherent structure for the various "angerlike" concepts in the different languages.

The PRESSURIZED CONTAINER metaphor gives rise to a series of metaphorical entailments. In English, these are

> WHEN THE INTENSITY OF ANGER INCREASES, THE FLUID RISES:
> His pent-up anger *welled up* inside him.
> INTENSE ANGER PRODUCES STEAM:
> Billy's just *blowing off steam*.
> INTENSE ANGER PRODUCES PRESSURE ON THE CONTAINER:
> He was *bursting with* anger.
> WHEN ANGER BECOMES TOO INTENSE, THE PERSON EXPLODES:
> When I told him, he just *exploded*.
> WHEN A PERSON EXPLODES, PARTS OF HIM GO UP IN THE AIR:
> I *blew my stack*.
> WHEN A PERSON EXPLODES, WHAT WAS INSIDE HIM COMES OUT:
> His anger finally *came out*.

Many of these entailments are shared by several of the languages that were studied. Hungarian, Japanese, and Chinese have most of them, as the evidence of linguistic expressions makes clear.

This is an extraordinary situation. How can speakers of such diverse languages as Chinese, Hungarian, Zulu (spoken in South Africa), Wolof (spoken in West Africa), and possibly many others around the world, have conceptualized an angerlike experience in such remarkably similar ways? I suggested that, from a cognitive linguistic view, the answer to the question should begin with the study of anger-related metonymies. Many of the languages for which we have data share several important conceptual metonymies, which include the following:

> BODY HEAT STANDS FOR ANGER
> INTERNAL PRESSURE STANDS FOR ANGER
> REDNESS IN THE FACE AND NECK AREA STANDS FOR ANGER

These conceptual metonymies capture people's folk theory of much of the physiological mechanism of anger. English, Hungarian,

Japanese, Zulu, Polish, Wolof, and, to some degree, Chinese as well seem to share the notion of an increase in body heat in anger, and they also talk about it metonymically. The notion of subjective body heat, perhaps together with the idea of the felt warmth of blood, seems to be the cognitive basis for the heat component of the English, Hungarian, Japanese, and Wolof CONTAINER metaphors. The fact that Chinese does not have a large number of metonymies associated with body heat may be responsible for the Chinese CONTAINER metaphor's *not* involving a *hot* fluid or gas.

Internal pressure is present in English, Chinese, Japanese, Hungarian, Polish, and Zulu. We do not have data for internal pressure in Tahitian and Wolof. The physiological response "redness in the face and neck area" can be taken to be the result of both body heat and internal pressure. This response seems to characterize English, Chinese, Japanese, Hungarian, Polish, and Zulu. The Wolof word *boy* 'to be red hot (of charcoal)' also means 'to be really angry.'

My proposal here was that conceptualized physiological characteristics (i.e., the conceptual metonymies) provide the cognitive motivation for people to conceptualize the angry person metaphorically as a PRESSURIZED CONTAINER (Kövecses, 2000). The conceptual metonymies make this particular metaphorical conceptualization natural for people. If conceptualized physiological responses include an increase in internal pressure as a major response in a given culture, people in this culture find the use of the PRESSURIZED CONTAINER metaphor natural.

Paul Ekman, R. W. Levenson, and their colleagues (Ekman, Levenson, and Friesen, 1983; Levenson, Carstensen, Friesen, and Ekman, 1991; Levenson, Ekman, and Friesen, 1990) provide ample evidence that anger is indeed associated with objectively measurable bodily changes such as increase in skin temperature, blood pressure, pulse rate, and respiration, and that other emotions, such as fear and sadness, are associated with a different set of physiological reactions. These studies were conducted with American subjects only. However, Levenson and his colleagues extended their research cross-culturally and found that emotion-specific autonomic nervous system (ANS) activity was the same in Americans and the Minangkabau of West Sumatra (Levenson, Ekman, Heider, and Friesen, 1992). For example, skin temperature and pulse rate rose in anger in both American and

Minangkabau subjects. These findings give us reason to believe that the actual physiological process might be universal. The universality of actual physiological mechanisms might be seen as leading to the similarities (though not equivalence) in conceptualized physiological reactions (i.e., the conceptual metonymies), which might then lead to the similarity (though again not equivalence) in the metaphorical conceptualization of anger and its counterparts (i.e., the PRESSURIZED CONTAINER metaphor).

Without the constraining effect of embodiment, it is difficult to see how such a surprisingly uniform category (of a variety of PRESSURIZED CONTAINER metaphors) could have emerged for the conceptualization of anger and its counterparts in very different languages and cultures. But these physiological changes in anger may overlap with physiological changes in other emotions. This is why happiness can also have the PRESSURIZED CONTAINER metaphor (as indicated by examples such as "*bursting* with joy"), although without the strong heat component that characterizes anger in English-speaking subjects. Thus, a more general conceptual metaphor that could account for such cases would be A PERSON IN AN INTENSE EMOTIONAL STATE IS A PRESSURIZED CONTAINER. The main meaning focus of the metaphor is 'difficulty in controlling a process,' which in turn derives from the mapping 'difficulty in controlling a(n emotional) process → difficulty in keeping a substance in a pressurized container.' It is this mapping that characterizes the PRESSURIZED CONTAINER metaphor in its various applications to emotions other than anger and in languages other than English. For example, Palmer, Bennett, and Stacey (1999) point out that the metaphor is applied to the emotion concepts of shame and grief in Tagalog.

In offering this kind of physiologically based explanation, I am aware that in many cases the "same" bodily phenomenon may be interpreted differently in different cultures and that activities of the body (and the body itself) are often "construed" differentially in terms of local cultural knowledge (see, for example, Csordas, 1994; Gibbs, 1999; Kimmel, in press). In my terminology, I would say of such cases that the physically same bodily activity can receive different meaning foci in two different cultures (or subcultures). And yet, it seems to me reasonable to suggest that the kinds of bodily experiences that form the basis of many conceptual metaphors (such as the PRESSURIZED

CONTAINER metaphor for anger and some other intense emotions) can and do exist independently of any cultural interpretation (be it either conscious or unconscious). They are products of the kinds of physical bodies that we have. However, this is not to say that these products of the body cannot be shaped by local cultural knowledge.

THE EVENT STRUCTURE METAPHOR

Let us now look at what is called the Event Structure metaphor in the cognitive linguistic literature (Lakoff, 1990, 1993; Lakoff and Johnson, 1999). In this metaphor, different aspects of events, such as state, change, cause, action, and purpose, are comprehended via a small set of physical concepts: location (bounded region), force, and movement. What makes this metaphor particularly interesting for our purposes in this chapter is that it seems very different from both the happiness and anger metaphors discussed previously, in that at first glance the Event Structure metaphor seems much less likely to be grounded in the kind of physiological experience than happiness or anger is. Indeed, we can ask how this metaphor is grounded in bodily experience. The following are the conceptual metaphors, each with an English linguistic example, that make up the Event Structure metaphor complex:

The EVENT STRUCTURE metaphor

STATES ARE LOCATIONS: They are *in* love.

CHANGES ARE MOVEMENTS: He *went* crazy.

CAUSES ARE FORCES: The hit *sent* the crowd into a frenzy.

ACTION IS SELF-PROPELLED MOTION: We've taken the first s*tep*.

PURPOSES ARE DESTINATIONS: He finally *reached* his goals.

MEANS ARE PATHS: She went from fat to thin *through* an intensive exercise program.

DIFFICULTIES ARE IMPEDIMENTS: Let's try *to get around* this problem.

EXTERNAL EVENTS ARE LARGE, MOVING OBJECTS: The *flow* of history . . .

EXPECTED PROGRESS IS A TRAVEL SCHEDULE: We're *behind schedule* on this project.

LONG-TERM, PURPOSEFUL ACTIVITIES ARE JOURNEYS: You should *move on* with your life.

Before we turn to the issue of what motivates these metaphorical mappings of the Event Structure metaphor, let us see whether the metaphor exists at all in languages other than English. Ning Yu (1998) investigated the possibility of the existence of the English Event Structure metaphor in Chinese. He read the leading Chinese daily newspaper and made note of the cases in which he found something like the preceding metaphors in English. He discovered that the entire system works for Chinese as well! In his book (Yu, 1998), he richly documents the Chinese version of the Event Structure metaphor. Now I just want to take some of the examples from his 1998 book and some additional examples he offered me more recently (personal communication, March 15, 2003). These examples abundantly illustrate that the Event Structure metaphor does exist in Chinese.

STATES ARE LOCATIONS

Guo-you	qiye	chuyu	lianghao	zhuangtai.
state-owned	enterprises	be-located-in	fine	state

'The state-owned enterprises are in a fine state.'

CHANGE IS MOTION FROM ONE LOCATION TO ANOTHER

Gai	xiangmu	qidong	le.
this	project	get-into-motion	PRT

'This project got into motion (i.e., got started).'

Gai	xiangmu	jin-ru	yunxing.
this	project	enter-into	motion/operation

'This project entered into motion (i.e., got started).'

Jichu	gongye	jianshe	bu	ru	jia	jing.
basic	industries	construction	step	into	good	state

'The construction of basic industries stepped into a good state.'

CAUSES ARE FORCES (CONTROLLING MOVEMENT TO or FROM LOCATIONS)

Zhexie	zhizhu	chanye	de		xingcheng	dai-dong	le	zhengti
these	prop	industries	MOD		formation	bring-move	PRT	overall

jingji		de	fazhan.
Economy		MOD	development

'The formation of these prop industries brought into motion (i.e., gave impetus to) the development of the overall economy.'

ACTIONS ARE SELF-PROPELLED MOVEMENTS

Zhongguo	jiakuai	le	xiaomie	pinkun	de	bufa.
China	quicken	PRT	wipe-out	poverty	MOD	steps

'China quickened steps toward wiping out poverty.'

PURPOSES ARE DESTINATIONS (DESIRED LOCATIONS)

Zhongguo	zheng	chaozhe	jianli	xin	tizhi,	shixian	xiandaihua	de
China	PRT	toward	build	new	system	realize	modernization	MOD

mubiao	qianjin.
goal	advance

'China is advancing toward the goal of building up a new system and realizing modernization.'

MEANS ARE PATHS TO DESTINATIONS

Tongzhou	kaifa	xin	jishu	chuang	xin	lu.
Tongzhou	open-up	new	technology	break	new	road

'Tongzhou opened up new technology to break a new path.'

DIFFICULTIES ARE IMPEDIMENTS TO MOTION

Women	yao	paichu	Xianggang	pingwen	guodu	daolu
we	should	remove	Hong Kong	smooth	transition	road

shang	de	renhe	zhang'ai.
on	MOD	any	obstacles

'We should remove any obstacles on the road of Hong Kong's smooth transition.'

EXPECTED PROGRESS IS A TRAVEL SCHEDULE (A SCHEDULE IS A VIRTUAL TRAVELER, WHO REACHES PREARRANGED DESTINATIONS AT PREARRANGED TIMES)

Yinjin	guowai	zhili	shi	gai	sheng	jin	yong	ba-nian
import	foreign	intelligence	make	this	province	only	use	eight-year

shijian	zou-wan	le	changgui	xuyao	si-shi	nian	cai
time	finish-walking	PRT	convention	need	forty	year	then

neng	zou-wan	de	lu.
can	finish-walking	MOD	way

'Importing foreign intelligence enables this province to use only eight years to finish walking over the way that conventionally requires forty years' walking.'

EXTERNAL EVENTS ARE LARGE MOVING OBJECTS

Gaige	gei	Zhongguo	nongcun	dai-lai	le	ju	bian.
reform	to	China	countryside	bring-come	PRT	huge	change

'The reform brought tremendous change to the countryside in China.'

LONG-TERM, PURPOSEFUL ACTIVITIES ARE JOURNEYS

Wo	yizhi	guanzhu	zhe	tade	yishu	bulü.	Zai	qi	manchang
I	always	watch	PRT	his	artistic	steps	PRT	his	very-long

de	yishu	shengya	zhong,	quzhe,	kanke	shen	duo,
MOD	artistic	career	in	zigzags	bumps	very	many

dan	ta	yong-wang-zhi-qian,	pi-jing-zhan-ji,
but	he	march-forward-bravely	chop-thorns-cut-brambles

paichu	chongchong	luzhang,	zou	chu	yitiao
remove	one-after-another	roadblocks	walk	out	one

ziji	de	dute	de	yishu	daolu.
self	MOD	unique	MOD	artistic	path

'I was always following his artistic steps closely. In his very long artistic career, there were so many zigzags and bumps, but he marched forward bravely, chopping thorns and cutting brambles, removing roadblocks one after another, and he walked out with a unique artistic path of his own.'

This is quite a remarkable match between English and Chinese. After all, the Chinese and English are radically different languages and cultures. It seems unlikely that the Event Structure metaphor was first "invented" in English and then somehow "imported" large-scale to Chinese. The Event Structure metaphor appears to have developed independently in many unrelated languages around the world in which there was a need to talk about the various aspects of events. A third language completely unrelated to either English or Chinese, Hungarian, bears out the same claim. Linguistic evidence suggests that all the constitutive submappings of Event Structure can be found in Hungarian as well. All this suggests that the Event Structure metaphor probably exists around

the world and that it must have developed independently everywhere. But why? What is it about this metaphor complex that led so naturally to its emergence in a varied set of languages and cultures?

The answer seems to be that the submappings of this metaphor complex are all simple or primary metaphors that are motivated independently of each other. For example, states of objects obtain at a particular location; movement leads to change of location; forces often affect objects in visible ways; if we want to achieve a purpose, we often have to move to particular destinations; sometimes we have to make choices among the paths that lead to destinations to achieve our goals. These correlations in bodily experience provide independent motivation for each of these submappings, and they jointly motivate the existence of the Event Structure metaphor. Given these correlations, it would not be surprising to find that the metaphor complex exists in many other languages and that it is a potentially universal conceptual metaphor.

<div align="center">TIME</div>

It is a well-known fact that people around the world conceptualize time in terms of space (Alverson, 1994). This is perhaps one of the least controversial cases of universality in metaphorical conceptualization. Why is time viewed in such a way in so many cultures of the world? In order to see the answer that cognitive linguistics provides, we have to take a closer look at this metaphor and examine some of the details involved.

People in many cultures conceptualize time both as something static and as something dynamic. The static conceptualization of time often involves the categorization of time into the past, present, and future. And when we think of time in dynamic terms, we conceive of it as "passing"; that is, we talk about the passage of time. Both of these conceptualizations are inevitably and inherently metaphorical.

The TIME ORIENTATION Metaphor

Let us begin with the static view of time. Lakoff and Johnson (1999: 140) suggest that in English the future is understood as being in front

of us, the present as being by us, and the past as being behind us. In other words, we seem to have a conceptual metaphor that has the following mappings:

the location of the observer	→	the present
the space in front of the observer	→	the future
the space behind the observer	→	the past

Lakoff and Johnson call this set of mappings the TIME ORIENTATION metaphor. The metaphor gives rise to metaphorical language that we use to talk about the future, present, and past. Here are some examples of this language in English:

That's all *behind* us now. Let's put that *in back of* us. We're looking *ahead* to the future. He has a great future *in front of* him. (Lakoff and Johnson, 1999: 140)

Lakoff and Johnson mention that the same metaphorical time orientation can be found in many languages, including, for instance, the language of the Puri Indians, as discussed by Henry David Thoreau in his *Walden*. It can be added that most of the example sentences given for English also easily translate into Hungarian:

Ez már mind mögöttünk van.
This already all behind-us is
That's all behind us now.

Előre nézünk a jövőbe.
Ahead look-we the future-into
We're looking ahead to the future.

Nagy jövő áll előtte.
Great future stands front-his
He has a great future ahead of him.

We find the same conceptualization of past, present, and future in Chinese as well (Yu, 1998: 92–95). For example:

Guoqu (passed/gone by) "past"
Yi-wang (PRT-gone) "past"
Quian-chen (previous/behind-dust/trace) "past"

Xian-shi (present/existing/on hand-time) "now; at present"
Mu-qian (eye-front) "at present, at the moment"
Mu-xia (eye-below) "now; at present; at the moment"
Yan-xia (eye-below) "at the moment; at present; now)
Jiao-xia (foot-under) "at present; now"

Jiang-lai (will-come) "future"
Qian-tu (front/ahead-road) "future; prospect"
Qian-jing (front/ahead-scene/view) "future; prospect; vista"

All of this shows that this must be a fairly common way of conceptualizing time in the world's languages. To see the motivation for this apparently very widespread time orientation metaphor (with the future in front and the past behind us), we have to turn to the conceptualization of time as something dynamic.

The MOVING TIME Metaphor

When we think of time as something dynamic, we talk about the "passage" of time in some form. In this conceptualization, time is viewed as something moving. This yields the MOVING TIME metaphor, which has the following mapping:

objects	→ times
the motion of objects past the observer	→ the passage of time

This simple mapping can combine with the TIME ORIENTATION metaphor, discussed previously. Consider the following examples by Lakoff and Johnson (1999: 143):

The time will *come* when there are no more typewriters. The time has long since *gone* when you could mail a letter for three cents. The time for action has *arrived*. The deadline is *approaching*. The time to start thinking about irreversible environmental decay is *here*. Thanksgiving is *coming up on* us. The summer just *zoomed by*. Time *is flying by*. The time for end-of-summer sales *has passed*.

These metaphorical linguistic expressions are based on the joint mapping of the TIME ORIENTATION and MOVING TIME metaphors. The MOVING TIME metaphor further specifies our understanding of the passage of time. Given the source domain of objects moving in a line past an

observer from front to back, we get an understanding of time with only one present, the times moving in the same direction, and times facing in their direction of motion. This knowledge arises from the following mapping:

there is only one observer	→ there is only one present time
the objects all move in the same direction	→ times move in the same direction
moving objects face in the direction of motion	→ times face in their direction of motion

Thus, future times are facing the observer in this metaphor. This shows up in linguistic examples, such as "I can see the *face* of things to come," "I can't *face* the future," and "Let's meet the future *head-on*."

The MOVING TIME metaphor is based on the notion of horizontal motion (yielding the metaphor TIME IS HORIZONTAL), but, as we saw in the previous chapter, time can also be viewed as vertical motion (TIME IS VERTICAL) in some languages, including Chinese. The version of the metaphor that is based on *horizontal* motion appears to be more common in the world's languages.

Again, many of the metaphorical linguistic expressions can be readily translated into Hungarian. For example, we get

Elérkezett a cselekvés ideje.
Arrive-past the action time-its
The time for action has arrived.

Közeleg a határidő.
Approaches the deadline
The deadline is approaching.

Itt az ideje, hogy hazamenjünk.
Here the time-its that home-go-we
It's time to go home.

As Ning Yu voluminously demonstrates, Chinese also has the MOVING OBJECT metaphor. Let us take just one of his many examples (Yu, 1998: 114):

Xianzai, xin de 'Taipeng-Yang Shiji' zhengzai xiang women zou lai. Now, new MOD 'Pacific-Ocean Century' PRT toward us walk

come "Now, the new 'Century of the Pacific' is walking toward us."

The MOVING TIME metaphor has a variant, in which it is not objects that correspond to times, but a flow of substance. In this case, we talk about the "*flow* of time." A major use and focus of the metaphor is on the duration of time, an aspect that the other variant does not allow us to focus on. Thus, the time-as-substance metaphor has as one of its mappings: amount of substance → duration of time. The "flowing substance" metaphor commonly appears in works of literature in the form of a river. The river, in these cases, is taken to be a symbol of time.

There is a potentially universal cognitive process underlying the shift from conceptualizing time as composed of independent, separate objects to conceptualizing it as a mass entity, a flowing substance. The cognitive process that in all probability provides the motivation for the shift in conceptualization involves the way we see separate but similar objects close to each other from a distance. When viewed from a distance, these objects appear to be a solid mass in the shape of a line. This is called "multiple-to-mass" image-schema transformation (see Lakoff, 1987). In other words, given the possibly universal MOVING TIME conceptual metaphor, a possibly universal cognitive process can and will produce variants on it.

The MOVING OBSERVER Metaphor

Another major way to conceptualize time metaphorically is the MOVING OBSERVER metaphor. The mapping that constitutes it is as follows:

locations on observer's path	→	times
the motions of the observer	→	the passage of time
the distance moved by the observer	→	the amount of time passed

What the MOVING OBSERVER and the MOVING TIME metaphors share is that, in both, the passage of time is conceptualized as motion: motion by time (in relation to a stationary observer) and motion by the observer (in relation to stationary time).

Again, this metaphor often combines with the TIME ORIENTATION metaphor. Here is a selection of examples from Lakoff and Johnson (1999: 146) to demonstrate the MOVING OBSERVER metaphor:

> There's going to be trouble *down the road*. His visit to Russia *extended over* many years. We're *coming up on* Christmas. I'll be there *in* a minute. He'll have his degree *within* two years. We've *reached* June already.

As with the MOVING TIME metaphor, many of the examples can be translated into Hungarian by making use of the literal counterpart of the English phrases or a phrase that is very close in meaning to the English one:

> Baj lesz a végén.
> Trouble will-be the end-of-at [the road]
> There's going to be trouble down the road.

> Két éven belül megszerzi a fokozatát.
> Two year-on within obtain the degree-ACC
> He'll have his degree within 2 years.

> Már júniushoz értünk/érkeztünk.
> Already June reach-ed-we
> We've reached June already.

Similarly, the MOVING OBSERVER metaphor can also be found in Chinese. Consider the following example by Ning Yu (1998: 118):

> Tamen gaobie le yinchen de zuotian, zou xiang guanghui de mingtian. They bid-farewell PRT gloomy MOD yesterday, walk toward bright MOD tomorrow "They have left the gloomy yesterday and are walking toward the bright tomorrow."

In this example, as in the MOVING OBSERVER metaphor in general, the future is in front of the observer, the past is behind him or her, and the passage of time is the observer's motion along a path oriented in the direction of motion.

Thus, the (PASSAGE OF) TIME IS MOTION metaphor appears to be another good candidate for a universal conceptual metaphor. In addition to English, Hungarian, and Chinese, it exists in Hopi, a North

American Indian language (see Malotki, 1983). Let us just take two examples, as cited by Lakoff and Johnson (1999: 150–151):

> Pu' hapi a-w pitsi-w-iw-ta
> Now EMPH 'REF'-to arrive-STAT-IMPERF-(temp. adv.)
> "Now the [appropriate time] for it has arrived."

This appears to be an example of the MOVING TIME metaphor.

> Nuutungk talong-va-ni-qa-t a-qw hayingw-na-ya
> Last daylight-REALZ-FUT-REL-ACC it-to(EX)
>   approach-CAUSE-PL
> "They approached the last day."

The latter example is a case of the MOVING OBSERVER metaphor, in which the observer is moving along a path of locations toward a specific location.

Now we are in a position to ask the inevitable question: Why is it that the passage of time is conceptualized as motion in languages so distant from each other? The best available answer, following Lakoff and Johnson (1999), would be something like the following: Time and motion are literally correlated in basic ways. Motion takes place in time. What we encounter in the future is ahead of us (TIME ORIENTATION); what we encounter in the future is moving toward us (MOVING TIME); and what we encounter in the future is what we are moving toward (MOVING OBSERVER). For example, I am moving toward an object that I *am going to* bump into a minute later. These are universal experiences in which our notion of time is closely correlated with motion. The literal correlation joins time as a domain and motion as a domain in a single literal conceptual frame, or schema, the TIME-MOTION frame. Given that literal frame, elements of the two frames can stand metonymically for each other within the single unified frame. This can show up in the form of linguistic metonymies. For example, in English one can say, "I slept for *fifty miles* while she drove" (DISTANCE FOR TIME-DURATION) and "San Francisco is *half an hour* from Berkeley" (TIME-DURATION FOR DISTANCE). The unified literal frame can then be viewed as the experiential basis of the metaphor TIME IS MOTION. This account would be in the spirit of some recent attempts to derive metaphor from metonymy, that is, to regard metonymy as a necessary step in the emergence of

conceptual metaphor (see, for example, Barcelona, 2000; Radden, 2000; Kövecses, 2002).

<div align="center">

INNER LIFE
</div>

The concept of the self was dealt with systematically in a cognitive linguistic framework by Lakoff and Johnson (1999). I rely heavily on their work in what follows. Lakoff and Johnson examined most of the common expressions speakers of English use in talking about the self and arrived at a system of conceptualization underlying these expressions in which one or several selves are opposed to what they call the *subject*, the aspect of the person with experiencing consciousness monitoring the world. This is also where reason, will, and judgment reside in a person. And this is the locus of a person's essence, that is, of the qualities that make a person what he or she is. The self, on the other hand, is the aspect of the person corresponding to the person's body, emotions, actions, and so on. Obviously, a person is a unitary entity, a whole, so the imposition on this unitary entity of a (minimally) bifurcated structure (i.e., subject vs. self, or selves) is a metaphoric act by us as conceptualizers. In other words, we divide up the person, who is a whole, in order to be able to understand how that whole works.

Lakoff and Johnson (1999) note that the subject is always understood metaphorically as a person. The self, or selves, on the other hand, are understood as either a person, or an object, or a location. If we want to get a clear picture about how the subject and self (or selves) are conceptualized, we should examine the relationship between the two and look at the several metaphors that people make use of in conceptualizing that relationship. Lakoff and Johnson identify five different relationships between subject and self, and, accordingly, they distinguish five distinct metaphors for the self in English:

The PHYSICAL-OBJECT SELF metaphor
The LOCATIONAL SELF metaphor
The SOCIAL SELF metaphor
The MULTIPLE SELVES metaphor
The ESSENTIAL SELF metaphor

I briefly characterize each of these in terms of their "main meaning focus" and provide some linguistic examples for them. As I explained in chapter 1, the main meaning focus of a source domain is the predetermined conceptual material that it conventionally serves to impart to the range of target domains to which it applies.

The PHYSICAL-OBJECT SELF Metaphor

In the first kind of relationship, the self is conceptualized as an object. The main meaning focus of the metaphor is on the issue of controlling the self. (Indentation indicates that we have a hierarchy of metaphors here, in which the indented conceptual metaphors are special cases or versions of the ones with respect to which they are indented.)

SELF-CONTROL IS OBJECT CONTROL

SELF-CONTROL IS THE FORCED MOVEMENT OF AN OBJECT

    BODY CONTROL IS THE FORCED MOVEMENT OF AN OBJECT (I *dragged* myself out of bed. The yogi *bent* his body into a pretzel.)

    CAUSING THE SELF TO ACT IS THE FORCED MOVEMENT OF AN OBJECT (You're *pushing* yourself too hard. It would take a bulldozer to *get him going* on this job.)

    SELF-CONTROL IS OBJECT POSSESSION (She *lost* herself in dancing. He *let* himself *go*. I was *seized by* anxiety. He was *in the grip of* fear.)

    TAKING CONTROL OF ANOTHER'S SELF IS TAKING ANOTHER'S POSSESSION (He's *possessed*.)

In all of these cases, the control of the self is conceptualized as the control of a physical object (either as the forced movement or as the possession of the object).

The LOCATIONAL SELF Metaphor

The next metaphorical relationship also addresses the issue of control, but here control is viewed as the self's being in its normal location. The notion of the "self's being in its normal location" has several distinct versions: (1) the self as container has the

subject in it; (2) the self is on the ground; and (3) the self is a whole.

SELF-CONTROL IS BEING IN ONE'S NORMAL LOCATION
    THE SELF AS CONTAINER (I was *beside* myself. He's *out to lunch*. Are you *out of* your mind?)
    SELF-CONTROL IS BEING ON THE GROUND (He's *got his feet on the ground*. The *ground fell out from under* me. I'm *on cloud nine*. Her smile sent me *soaring*.)
    ATTENTIONAL SELF-CONTROL IS HAVING THE SELF TOGETHER (*Pull* yourself *together*. She hasn't *got it together*.)
    TAKING AN OBJECTIVE STANDPOINT IS LOOKING AT THE SELF FROM OUTSIDE (You need to *step outside* yourself. You should *take a good look at* yourself.)

The metaphor TAKING AN OBJECTIVE STANDPOINT IS LOOKING AT THE SELF FROM OUTSIDE is a special version of the ATTENTIONAL SELF metaphor. Lakoff and Johnson call it the OBJECTIVE STANDPOINT metaphor, as it reveals a view of the self to itself "from outside."

The SOCIAL SELF Metaphor

The main meaning focus of this metaphor is the evaluation of the relationship between subject and self. This can assume a variety of forms, including a relationship of adversaries, a parent–child relationship, and a relationship between friends. These are all various social relationships in terms of which the subject–self relationship can be evaluated.

AN EVALUATIVE SUBJECT–SELF RELATIONSHIP IS AN EVALUATIVE SOCIAL RELATIONSHIP
    SUBJECT AND SELF AS ADVERSARIES (He's *at war with* himself over whom to marry. He's *struggling with* himself over whether to go to church. He's *struggling with* his emotions. She's her own worst *enemy*.)
    SUBJECT AND SELF AS PARENT AND CHILD (She likes to *pamper* herself. I think I'll *reward* myself with an ice cream cone. I think you *coddle* yourself a bit too much; you need to *give* yourself some more *discipline*.)

SUBJECT AND SELF AS FRIENDS (I think I'll just *hang out with* myself tonight. I need to be a better *friend to* myself.)

SUBJECT AND SELF AS INTERLOCUTORS (I *debate* things with myself all the time. I *convinced* myself to stay at home.)

SUBJECT AS CARETAKER OF SELF (I *promised* myself a vacation. She *takes good care of* herself.)

SUBJECT AND SELF AS MASTER AND SERVANT (I have to *get myself to* do the laundry. I *told myself* to prepare for the trip well ahead of time.)

SUBJECT AS A PERSON BEING OBLIGATED TO MEET THE STANDARDS OF THE SELF (*Be true to* yourself. I *let myself down*.)

The MULTIPLE SELVES Metaphor

In one version of this metaphor, there are several distinct selves that a person can assume. The focus of the metaphor is on the shifting roles of the self between any of these selves, which are conceptualized as social roles. In the other version, the subject projects itself into another person.

VALUES AS SOCIAL ROLES OF SELVES (I keep *going back and forth* between the scientist and the priest in me.)

SUBJECT PROJECTION metaphor

Advisory projection (If *I were you*, I'd punch him in the nose. You're a cruel person with no conscience; if *I were you*, I'd hate me.)

Empathic projection (If *I were you*, I'd feel awful too. *I feel* your pain.)

As can be seen, the projection of the subject onto another person can be of two kinds. Advisory projection takes place when the communicative intent of the subject is that of advising the other person, whereas empathic projection happens when the communicative intention is to empathize with another person.

The ESSENTIAL SELF Metaphor

A common (expert and lay) theory of categories is that each category is defined by its essential properties. The category of personhood is no exception. A person is viewed as constituted by an essential self – a self that is somehow the most important part of the person. Lakoff

and Johnson identify three different types of essential selves: inner self, external real self, and true self.

> PERSON AS AN ENTITY WITH AN ESSENCE
>> INNER SELF (Her sophistication is a *facade*. He *retreats into his shell* to protect himself.)
>> EXTERNAL REAL SELF (I'*m not myself* today. That *wasn't the real me* yesterday.)
>> TRUE SELF (He *found himself* in writing. She went to India to *look for* her true self.)

The TRUE SELF metaphor assumes the additional conceptualization of one's true self as A HIDDEN AND DESIRABLE OBJECT.

The Structure of the SELF Metaphor System

As can be seen, within this framework Lakoff and Johnson outline a system in which there are at least three levels. On the first and highest level we find the general SUBJECT–SELF metaphor (marked by **1.**); one level down we find five "primary" metaphors (marked by **2.**); finally, on the third level, there are either "complex" metaphors formed out of primary ones (such as CAUSING THE SELF TO ACT IS THE FORCED MOVEMENT OF AN OBJECT) or special cases of the primary metaphors (such as the INNER SELF, EXTERNAL REAL SELF, and TRUE SELF being special cases of the PERSON AS AN ENTITY WITH AN ESSENCE metaphor) (marked by **3.**). Thus, the picture looks like this:

> **1.** SUBJECT–SELF metaphor
>> **2.** SELF-CONTROL IS OBJECT CONTROL
>>> **3.** [Complex metaphors and/or special cases]
>> **2.** SELF-CONTROL IS BEING IN ONE'S NORMAL LOCATION
>>> **3.** [Complex metaphors and/or special cases]
>> **2.** AN EVALUATIVE SUBJECT–SELF RELATIONSHIP IS AN EVALUATIVE SOCIAL RELATIONSHIP
>>> **3.** [Complex metaphors and/or special cases]
>> **2.** SUBJECT PROJECTION metaphor
>>> **3.** [Complex metaphors and/or special cases]
>> **2.** PERSON AS AN ENTITY WITH AN ESSENCE
>>> **3.** [Complex metaphors and/or special cases]

Moreover, Lakoff and Johnson suggest that four of the five primary metaphors have a clear experiential basis that motivates the existence of these metaphors. SELF CONTROL IS OBJECT CONTROL is based on the correlation between manipulating objects and having control over them; SELF CONTROL IS BEING IN ONE'S NORMAL LOCATION is based on the sense of control we have when we are in our normal surroundings; EVALUATIVE SUBJECT–SELF RELATIONSHIPS ARE EVALUATIVE SOCIAL RELATIONSHIPS is based on the many evaluative acts by those around us that we experience from very early on in our lives; and the SUBJECT PROJECTION metaphor is based on our ability to imitate others from earliest childhood. The fifth primary metaphor, the PERSON AS HAVING AN ESSENCE, derives from our folk theory that each person has a unique essence that makes that person different from every other person.

The Japanese and Hungarian SELF System

How universal might this English system for the self be? Is not the system a peculiarity of the Western mind? If we look at some linguistic examples, one can easily be led to believe that what we have here is a unique – a Western – metaphor system of inner life. Linguistic examples such as *hanging out with oneself, being out to lunch, being on cloud nine,* and *pampering oneself* might suggest that the conceptual metaphors that underlie these examples are culture-specific conceptual metaphors. But they are not. As it turns out, the same conceptual metaphors show up in cultures in which one would not expect them. Lakoff and Johnson report that the system can be found in Japanese. Moreover, many of the examples translate readily into Hungarian, and that indicates that the system is not alien to speakers of Hungarian either. In the following I provide examples of the five conceptual metaphors for both Japanese and Hungarian. The Japanese examples are from Lakoff and Johnson (1999: 284–287).

> The PHYSICAL-OBJECT SELF metaphor
>   *Japanese*
>   SELF-CONTROL IS OBJECT POSSESSION
>   Kare-wa dokusyo-ni ware-o wasure-ta.
>   He-TOP reading-LOC self-ACC lose[forget]-PAST
>   Lit.: "He lost self reading."
>   "He lost himself in reading."

Hungarian

BODY CONTROL IS THE FORCED MOVEMENT OF AN OBJECT
Alig tudtam elvonszolni magam a kórházig.
Hardly could carry-with-difficulty myself the hospital-to
I could hardly make it to the hospital.

SELF-CONTROL IS OBJECT POSSESSION
Teljesen eleresztette magát.
Completely let-go-PAST herself
She let it all hang out.

The LOCATIONAL SELF metaphor

Japanese

The SCATTERED SELF metaphor

ATTENTIONAL SELF-CONTROL IS HAVING THE SELF TOGETHER
Kare-wa ki-o hiki-sime-ta.
He-TOP spirit-ACC pull-tighten-PAST
Lit.: "He pulled-and-tightened his spirits."
"He pulled himself together."

The OBJECTIVE STANDPOINT metaphor
Zibun-no kara-kara de-te, zibun-o yoku mitume-ru koto-ga
    taisetu da.
Self-GEN shell-from get out-CONJ self-ACC well stare-PRES
    COMP-NOM important COP
Lit.: "To get out of self's shell and stare at self well is
important."
"It is important to get out of yourself and look at yourself well."

Hungarian

THE SELF AS CONTAINER
Magamon kívül voltam.
Myself-on outside was-I
I was beside myself.

The SCATTERED SELF metaphor
ATTENTIONAL SELF-CONTROL IS HAVING THE SELF TOGETHER
Szedd össze magad!
Pick-IMP together yourself
Pull yourself together!

SELF-CONTROL IS BEING ON THE GROUND
Kicsúszott a talaj a lába alól.
Out-slipped the ground the foot-his from-under
He lost his bearings.

TAKING AN OBJECTIVE STANDPOINT IS LOOKING AT THE SELF FROM
   OUTSIDE
Nézz egy kicsit magadba és meglátod, hogy hibáztál.
Look a little yourself-into and see that made-mistake-you
Take a look at yourself and you'll see that you've made a mis-
   take.

The SOCIAL SELF metaphor
   Japanese
   The SELF AS VICTIM metaphor
   Zibun-o azamuite-wa ikena-i.
   Self-ACC deceive-TOP bad-PRES
   Lit.: "To deceive self is bad."
   "You must not deceive yourself."

   The SELF AS SERVANT metaphor
   Kare-wa hito-ni sinsetuni-suru yooni zibun-ni iikikase-ta.
   He-TOP people-DAT kind-do COMP self-DAT tell-PAST
   "He told himself to be kind to people."

   Hungarian
   The SUBJECT AND SELF AS ADVERSARIES metaphor
   Meg kellett küzdenie saját magával.
   PART had-to struggle-he own self-with
   He had to struggle/fight with himself.

   The SELF AS CHILD metaphor
   Megjutalmazom magam egy pohár sörrel.
   PART-reward-I myself one glass beer-with
   I'll reward myself with a glass of beer.

   The SELF AS SERVANT metaphor
   Rá kell kényszeritenem magam a korai lefekvésre.
   Onto must force-I myself the early going-to-bed
   I must force myself to go to bed early.

The MULTIPLE SELVES metaphor

> *Japanese*
> The VALUES AS SOCIAL ROLES OF SELVES metaphor
> Kono mondai-ni tuite-wa watasi-wa kagakusya-tosite-no zibun-
>   no hooni katamuite-i-ru.
> This problem-LOC about-TOP I-TOP scientist-as-GEN self-GEN
>   toward lean-STAT-PRES
> Lit.: "About this problem, I lean toward (my) self as a scientist."
> "I am inclined to think about this problem as a scientist."
>
> The SUBJECT PROJECTION metaphor
> Boku-ga kimi dat-ta-ra, boku-wa boku-ga iya-ni-naru.
> I(MALE)-NOM you COP-PAST-if I-TOP I-NOM hate-to-be-
>   come
> Lit.: "If I were you, I (would) come to hate me."
> "If I were you, I'd hate me." (YOU's Subject hates I's Self.)
>
> *Hungarian*
> The VALUES AS SOCIAL ROLES OF SELVES metaphor
> A benne levő jó és gonosz között ingadozott.
> The in-him being good and evil between waver/ fluctuate
> He wavered between the good and evil residing in him.
>
> SUBJECT PROJECTION (advisory projection)
> A helyedben nagyon elverném őt.
> The place-your-in very away-beat him
> If I were you, I'd spank him hard.
>
> SUBJECT PROJECTION (empathic projection)
> Én is rosszul érezném magam a helyedben.
> I also badly feel-COND-I myself the place-your-in
> I'd also feel bad in your shoes.

The ESSENTIAL SELF metaphor

> *Japanese*
> The INNER SELF metaphor
> Kare-wa mettani hontoono zibun-o dasa-na-i.
> He-TOP rarely real self-ACC get out-NEG-PRES
> Lit.: "He rarely put out (his) real self."
> "He rarely shows his real self."

The TRUE SELF metaphor

Kare-wa mono-o kaku koto-ni [zibun/hontonoo zibun]-o miid-
    asi-ta.

He-TOP thing-ACC write COMP-LOC [self/true self]-ACC
    find-PAST

"He found [himself/his true self] in writing."

The EXTERNAL SELF metaphor

Boku-wa kyoo-wa zibun-ga zibun de-na-i yoona kigasu-ru.

I(MALE)-TOP today-TOP self-NOM self COP-NEG-PRES as if
    feel-PRES

Lit.: "I feel as if self is not self today."

"I feel as if I am not my normal self today."

Hungarian

INNER SELF:

Nem mutatja ki az igazi énjét.

Not show-she out the real ego-her-ACC

She does not reveal/show her real self.

TRUE SELF:

Keresi az igazi énjét.

Search-he the true ego-his-ACC

He's searching for his true self.

These shared examples suggest that English, Japanese, and
Hungarian talk about and conceptualize the notion of self in surpris-
ingly similar ways. The apparently elusive concept of self seems to
receive similar treatment as a result of some of the potentially shared
basic experiences across three radically different cultures. Although
it would not be appropriate to claim that this treatment of the self is
universal, we can perhaps assume that this way of conceptualizing
it is a good candidate for near-universal status.

WHICH METAPHORS ARE UNIVERSAL, AND WHY?

If we look at many of the *linguistic examples* in this chapter, we have
the impression that they display a great deal of variation across lan-
guages. But we have also found that this is only superficial diversity
and variation. The detailed case studies showed that certain *conceptual*

metaphors are potentially universal or can be near-universal. In particular, these metaphors are "simple" or "primary" metaphors and/or complex metaphors that are based on universal human experiences. Anger is a good example of a case in which we have a conceptual metaphor that is potentially universal but is not simple or primary. This can happen because the complex metaphor that we have called THE ANGRY PERSON IS A PRESSURIZED CONTAINER is so robustly based in universal physiological experience. In addition, as we saw in several of the case studies, the shared metaphors are on a generic level. Thus, conceptual metaphors such as we have found for anger, time, event structure, and the self tend to be potentially universal at a fairly high level of abstraction – the superordinate level. As a next step in our analysis, it will be necessary and instructive to look at the question of whether we find universality when we turn our attention to the *specific instances* of the generic-level metaphors in particular cultures, that is, to the culturally fully embedded conceptual metaphors. This is the topic to which I turn in the next chapter.

PART II

DIMENSIONS OF METAPHOR VARIATION

4

Cross-Cultural Variation

In chapter 3, we saw a number of conceptual metaphors that are good candidates for universal or at least near-universal metaphors. We also took up the issue of what might possibly explain the universal status of the metaphors. It was pointed out, furthermore, that the conceptual metaphors we looked at are most likely to be (near-)universal at a generic level. In the present chapter, I will examine the culturally embedded instantiations of these generic-level metaphors to see whether they maintain their potentially universal status. Put simply, the question is whether culturally embedded specific-level versions of the presumably (near-)universal generic-level metaphors are also likely to be candidates for (near-)universal metaphors. I will show that they are not. In a way, this is an obvious and expected result. We expect conceptual metaphors to vary cross-culturally. This is almost as natural and obvious as the variation of metaphors at the level of metaphorical linguistic expressions. However, the reasons for this variation are not obvious, and I will take up that issue in the chapter on the causes of metaphor variation (see chapter 10).

The variation that conceptual metaphors display at the specific level is not the only kind of variation that can occur. I will discuss several others. One of them is the case in which a culture uses a set of different source domains for a particular target domain, or conversely, a culture uses a particular source domain for the conceptualization of a set of different target domains.

Another situation involves cases in which the set of conceptual metaphors for a particular target domain is roughly the same in two languages/cultures, but one language/culture shows a clear preference for some of the conceptual metaphors that are employed. It seems to me that, at least within the same "sphere of civilization," this kind of variation in conceptual metaphors is very common.

Finally, there may be some conceptual metaphors that appear to be unique to a given language/culture. These require that both the source and the target be unique to the culture.

In the remainder of the chapter, I will take up each of these possibilities.

CONGRUENT METAPHORS

In a previous chapter, we saw that the metaphor THE ANGRY PERSON IS A PRESSURIZED CONTAINER is likely to be near-universal. What is especially important about this conceptual metaphor is that it functions at an extremely general level. The metaphor does not specify many things that *could* be specified. For example, it does not say what kind of container is used, how the pressure arises, whether the container is heated or not, what kind of substance fills the container (liquid, substance, or objects), what consequences the explosion has. The metaphor constitutes a generic schema that is filled out by each culture that has the metaphor. The metaphors that are filled out in congruence with the generic schema are called *congruent metaphors*. When the generic schema is filled out, it receives unique cultural content at a specific level. In other words, a generic-level conceptual metaphor is instantiated in culture-specific ways at a specific level. This is one kind of cross-cultural variation.

Consider the following three special cases: First, Matsuki (1995) observes that all the metaphors for anger in English as analyzed by Lakoff and Kövecses (1987) can also be found in Japanese. At the same time, she also points out that there is a large number of anger-related expressions that group around the Japanese concept of *hara* (literally, 'belly'). This is a culturally significant concept that is unique to Japanese culture, and so the conceptual metaphor ANGER IS (IN THE) HARA is limited to Japanese.

Second, Ning Yu (1998) is the most detailed study of anger in Chinese from a cognitive linguistic point of view. He studied the PRESSURIZED CONTAINER metaphor in great depth and indicates that Chinese uses a version of this metaphor in which the excess *qi* (i.e., energy that flows through the body) that corresponds to anger is not a fluid, as in English, but a gas. The gas is neutral with respect to heat, but it is capable of exerting pressure on the body container. The most remarkable feature of the Chinese anger metaphor is that it employs and is crucially constituted by the concept of *qi* – a concept that is deeply embedded in the long history of Chinese philosophy and medicine.

Third, Zulu shares many conceptual metaphors with English (Taylor and Mbense, 1998). This does not mean, however, that it cannot have metaphors other than the ones we can find in English. One case in point is the Zulu metaphor that involves the heart: ANGER IS (UNDERSTOOD AS BEING) IN THE HEART. When the heart metaphor applies to English, it is primarily associated with love, affection, and the like. In Zulu it applies to anger and patience–impatience, tolerance–intolerance. The heart metaphor conceptualizes anger in Zulu as leading to internal pressure because too much "emotion substance" is crammed into a container of limited capacity. The things that fill it up are other emotions that happen to a person in the wake of daily events. When too many of these happen to a person (i.e., the heart container cannot hold any more), the person becomes extremely angry and typically loses control over his anger.

In all three cases, there are a generic-level metaphor and a specific-level one. The specific-level metaphors are instantiations of the generic-level one in the sense that they exhibit the same general structure. The lower-level instantiations are thus congruent with a higher-level metaphor. Where they differ is in the specific content that they give to the metaphor.

The question arises how these culture-specific conceptual metaphors come about. More precisely, why are the specific details of the source domain incorporated into particular metaphorical conceptualizations? Obviously, we cannot say that these arise because we have certain universal experiences. Universal experience can only be an explanation of the emergence of generic-level metaphors, such as THE ANGRY PERSON IS A PRESSURIZED CONTAINER. The generic schemas are filled out in specific ways in every culture,

and the issue of why and how this is done requires additional explanation. I will return to this issue in a later chapter on the causes of metaphorical variation (see chapter 10), in which I deal with "cultural key concepts" and their role in variation.

<div style="text-align:center">ALTERNATIVE METAPHORS</div>

There are several distinct kinds of alternative conceptualization across languages. In the simplest case of cross-culturally alternative metaphors, we have a source domain in one language that is used for a particular target domain and we have a different source for the same target in another language. An example of this kind of situation is mentioned by Lakoff and Johnson (1980), who discuss how an Iranian student in Berkeley was surprised to hear that the expression "the *solution* of my problems" assumed a different source domain from what he had in mind. When Americans understand the metaphorical meaning of the word *solution*, they think of a crossword puzzle, which has only one solution. However, the Iranian student's interpretation of the phrase was based on another metaphorical image, that of a chemical solution. Thus different images or source domains may be used to conceptualize the same target domain in two languages.

The Range of the Target

There can be differences in the *range* of conceptual metaphors (or, more precisely, the range of source domains) that languages and cultures have available for the conceptualization of particular target domains. This is what commonly happens in the case of emotion concepts as targets.

As we saw, Chinese shares with English all the basic metaphorical source domains for happiness: UP, LIGHT, FLUID IN A CONTAINER. A metaphor that Chinese has, but English does not, is HAPPINESS IS FLOWERS IN THE HEART. According to Ning Yu (1995, 1998), the application of this metaphor reflects "the more introverted character of Chinese." He sees this conceptual metaphor as a contrast to the (American) English metaphor BEING HAPPY IS BEING OFF THE GROUND, which does not exist in Chinese at all and

which reflects the relatively "extroverted" character of speakers of English.

We also saw in the previous chapter that perhaps the predominant conceptualization of the future, present, and past in languages of the world is that the future is "in front," the present is "here," and the past is "behind us." It should be common and maybe the dominant way, but it can also be conceptualized in the opposite way. There seem to be a much smaller number of languages in which the future is conceptualized as being in the back and the past as being in front. Such languages include Aymara (Nunez, Neumann, and Mamani, 1997), Trique, Maori, and Ancient Greek (see Allan, 1995). The possible experiential motivation for this time orientation may be, as Lakoff and Johnson (1999) note, that we can see the result of what we have just done in front of us. We commonly hold the product of what we have just finished in front of us, and thus the "in front" orientation may evolve to represent the past.

As a final illustration, let us take the concept of life as target. Later in the chapter, we will see that life is commonly and primarily conceptualized as STRUGGLE/WAR, PRECIOUS POSSESSION, GAME, JOURNEY, and in many other ways by Americans and Hungarians. However, as work by Elizabeth Riddle (2000) shows, speakers of Hmong, a language spoken mainly in Laos and Thailand, conceptualize it very differently. They view life as a "string" that can be cut and broken. The word meaning 'cut,' *tu*, can also mean 'to give birth,' 'to die,' and 'to kill.' Riddle presents evidence for the existence of the conceptual metaphor not only from language but also from social behavior. Although the Hmong metaphor LIFE IS A STRING resonates as at least vaguely familiar to members of the European cultural sphere who have a similar metaphor in Greek mythology (the three Fates spinning, weaving, and cutting the thread of life), the Hmong metaphor is much more clearly present among speakers of this language and seems to guide much of their linguistic and nonlinguistic behavior.

This kind of alternative conceptualization is very common in conventional conceptual systems. But it is also common in poetry and arts. When a poet or artist of a culture different from our own uses a novel source domain for a target, such as life or love, we may have considerable difficulty understanding the meaning conveyed. But this kind of creativity is not limited to "high" poetry. It can be found in

many folk traditions. Cliff Goddard provides an interesting illustration from Malay culture, in which we find *pantuns*, a short traditional Malay verse (Goddard, 2004). One of these talks about love:

> From whence come the leeches?
> From the swamp to the ricefields.
> From whence comes this love?
> From the eyes down to the heart.

The target domain, love, is conventional, but the source is novel. To understand Malay pantuns, detailed local knowledge is needed. Creativity consists, in part, in finding novel source domains for already existing targets.

The Scope of the Source

The "scope of metaphor" is a notion different from that of the "range of metaphor." The scope of metaphor means the set of target domains to which a particular source domain can apply. Obviously, languages differ in respect to the inclusiveness or exclusiveness of the scope of a source domain. As an example to illustrate this notion and the way it can produce cross-linguistic alternatives in conceptualization, let us take a source domain that seems to be common in at least Western languages – BUILDING, especially in the form of, but not limited to, a HOUSE. Paul Chilton (1996) notes that this source domain is very common in Western languages, such as English, German, French, and Russian. The following are some examples of the most typical target domains to which the source BUILDING can apply in English. The examples are taken from Alice Deignan's *Metaphor Dictionary* (Deignan, 1995):

THEORIES ARE BUILDINGS
Increasingly, scientific knowledge *is constructed* by small numbers of specialized workers.
McCarthy *demolishes* the romantic myth of the Wild West.
She lay back for a few moments contemplating the *ruins* of her idealism and her innocence.
Don't be tempted to skip the first sections of your programme, because they are the *foundations on which* the second half *will be built*.

. . . the advance that *laid the foundations* for modern science.

Our view, he said, is that these claims are entirely *without foundation*.

My faith was *rocked to its foundations*.

The second half of the chapter *builds on* previous discussion of change and differentiation in home ownership.

RELATIONSHIPS ARE BUILDINGS

Since then the two have *built a solid* relationship.

You can help *lay the foundations* for a good relationship between your children by preparing your older child in advance for the new baby.

A CAREER IS A BUILDING

Government grants have enabled a number of the top names in British sport *to build* a successful career.

Her career was *in ruins*.

A COMPANY IS A BUILDING

Ten years ago, he and a partner set up on their own and *built up* a successful fashion company.

ECONOMIC SYSTEMS ARE BUILDINGS

With its economy *in ruins*, it can't afford to involve itself in military action.

There is no painless way to get inflation down. We now have an excellent *foundation on which to build*.

SOCIAL GROUPS ARE BUILDINGS

He's about *to rock the foundations* of the literary establishment with his novel.

By early afternoon queues *were already building up*.

A LIFE IS A BUILDING

Now another young woman's life is *in ruins* after an appalling attack.

Do we find the same conceptual metaphors with BUILDING as source in other languages? To answer this question, in the following I present some data from three unrelated languages – Japanese, Brazilian Portuguese, and Tunisian Arabic. In evaluating the data, one must

bear in mind that the examples are taken from a single speaker of each language, and thus my conclusions can only be tentative at best. This situation points to the need for much more serious research in this area of metaphor variation.

Kazuko Shinohara (personal communication, October 2001) noted that the scope of the source BUILDING coincides with the scope of BUILDING in English. He provided the following examples, which sound natural to native speakers of Japanese:

THEORIES ARE BUILDINGS
kagaku-teki riron-wa genzai shoosuu-no senmonka-ni yotte
    kootiku sare-teiru.
scienti-fic theory-Topic. now a few-Gen. expert-Dat. by construct
    Passive-State
"Today scientific theories are built by a small number of experts."

makkaasii-ga sono sinwa-o uti-kowasi-ta.
McCarthy-Nom. that myth-Acc. hit-break-Past.
"McCarthy demolished the myth."

kanojo-no risooshugi-wa hookai sita.
she-Gen. idealism-Topic ruin Past
"Her idealism got ruined."

teekokushugi hookai-go-no sekai nituite kangaeru.
imperialism ruin-after-Gen. world about think
"(I) think about the world after the ruin/break-down of
    imperialism."

kyookasho-no daiisshoo-o tobasitewa ikemasen. ato-no
    bubun-no
textbook-Gen. chapter 1-Acc. skip must-not. later-Gen. part-Gen.
kiso-to naru mono desu kara.
base/foundation-as become thing be because.
"Don't skip chapter 1 of the textbook, because it will be
    foundations for later parts."

sono riron-wa dodai-kara matigat-teiru.
that theory-Topic base/foundation-from mistake-State
"That theory is wrong from the base throughout.
(That theory is built on wrong foundation.)"

RELATIONSHIPS ARE BUILDINGS

sikkarisita ningen-kankee-o kootiku sitai.
solid human-relationship-Acc. construct want
"We want to build solid relationship."

oya-ko-kankee-no kiso-ga dekite-i-nai.
parent-child-relationship-Gen. base-Nom. made-State-not
"The foundation of parent–child relationship has not been
    made."

futari-no kankee-ga houkai sita.
two-Gen. relation-Nom. ruin Past
"Relationship between the two has been ruined."

yuujoo-ga kuzure-oti-ta.
friendship-Nom. collapse-fall-Past
"(Our/Their, etc.) friendship has collapsed."

A CAREER IS A BUILDING

kyaria-o kizuku
career-Acc. build/construct
"to build a career"

A COMPANY IS A BUILDING

kaisha-no kiban-o yurugasu jiken-ga oki-ta
company-Gen. base-ACC. shake event-Nom. happen-Past
"There occurred an event that shook the foundation of the
    company."

ECONOMIC SYSTEMS ARE BUILDINGS

keezai-no kiban-o yurugasu jiken-ga oki-ta
economy-Gen. base-ACC. shake event-Nom. happen-Past
"There occurred an event that shook the foundation of
    economy."

nihon-no keezai-taisei-ga hookaisuru osore-ga aru.
Japan-Gen. economy-system-Nom. collapse threat-Nom exist
"Japanese economy system is being threatened to collapse/ruin."

keezai-taisei-o tatenaosu hituyoo-ga aru.
economy-system-Acc. rebuild necessity-Nom exist
"We need to rebuild our economy system."

SOCIAL GROUPS ARE BUILDINGS
kono sakkaa-tiimu-wa tatenaosi-ga hituyoo-da.
this soccer-team-Topic rebuilding-Nom. necessary-be
"This soccer team needs rebuilding."

A LIFE IS A BUILDING
jinsee-o tatenaosi-tai.
life-Acc. rebuild-want
"I want to rebuild my life."

ikikata-no kiso-o katameru
way-of-life-Gen. base-Acc. solidify
"to make foundation of life solid"

Maity Siqueira (personal communication, November 2001) also observed that Brazilian Portuguese has the same conceptual metaphors with BUILDING as source as English. Here are some examples of such BUILDING metaphors in Portuguese:

THEORIES/IDEAS/RESEARCH ARE BUILDINGS
Essa teoria suporta minha pesquisa.
This theory supports my research.

Tal ideia entrou em colapso ha muito tempo.
Such idea collapsed a long time ago.

A CAREER IS A BUILDING
Estou construindo minha carreira.
I'm building my career.

RELATIONSHIPS ARE BUILDINGS
Leva-se muito tempo para construir uma relacao.
It takes a lot of time to build a relationship.

O casamento deles esta em ruinas.
Their marriage is falling into ruins.

LIFE IS A BUILDING
Vamos construir um futuro melhor.
Let's build a better future.

This is not a complete set of BUILDING metaphors on the analogy of English; Maity Siqueira (personal communication, November 2001)

has noted that in Portuguese this source domain is used in the same way as it is in English.

I also obtained data concerning this source domain from Zouhair Maalej (personal communication, October 2001), a native speaker of Tunisian Arabic, who suggested that the scope of BUILDING is very similar to that in English, although the match does not seem as neat as in the case of Japanese. Here are his examples:

THEORIES ARE BUILDINGS
illi qaalu ma-3andu Hatta saas
(that said he no has least foundation)
What he said is unfounded.

illi qalu mibni 3al-hwa
(that said he speech built on air)
What he said is unfounded.

According to Maalej RELATIONSHIPS ARE BUILDINGS is not a commonly used metaphor in Tunisian Arabic. He suggests that "there is little talk of relationships." But there is a word *binaa,'* meaning "building" in Arabic, that is used to talk about "taking one's wife for the first time after the wedding in one's intimacy." This is regarded as a form of building. The word also means "living under the same roof."

Other metaphors of building do seem to apply:

A CAREER IS A BUILDING
tabba3 is-siyaasa w-hadd mustaqblu bi-ydiih
"He followed politics, and destroyed his career by his own
   hands."

ECONOMIC SYSTEMS ARE BUILDINGS
iD-Darba za3z3it il-3aalam
The strike rocked/shook the world economies.

il-Harb dammarit il-3iraak
The war destroyed Iraq.

A COMPANY IS A BUILDING
il-ma3mal bnaah huwa w-martu Tuba Tuba
(the factory built he himself and wife his stone stone)
His wife and him built their factory stone by stone.

Maalej could not readily produce an example for the SOCIAL GROUPS ARE BUILDINGS metaphor. However, life in general is also conceptualized as a building, as in English and Japanese:

> A LIFE IS A BUILDING
> bna Hayaatu min jdiid ba3dma Tallaq
> (built life his from new after divorced he)
> He started to build a new life after his divorce.

This is quite a remarkable match, but, as we can see, there are cases in which the source BUILDING does not readily or naturally work for particular target concepts. Moreover, Tunisian Arabic seems to apply the source BUILDING to targets that would not be entirely conventional targets in other languages, for instance, English. In particular, the education of children is commonly conceptualized as building, as in the following example:

> EDUCATING CHILDREN IS BUILDING
> illi tibniih fi 3aam yTiiH fi nhaar
> (What you build in a year may fall in a day)

As Maalej explains, speakers of Arabic use this expression to talk about "what may happen to your children's education when they come under the influence of bad-mannered children in school or in the street." This is not to say that the metaphor does not exist at all in English; it does, as in the slogan "Education: building today for tomorrow" (suggested by an anonymous reviewer). The point is that this way of conceptualizing a child's education or upbringing is much less conventional for everyday purposes in English. In another case imagining something, such as the future of your child, is viewed as building:

> IMAGINING IS BUILDING
> 3addayt n-haar nibni w-nhidd
> (I spent the day building and destroying)

You say this when "talking about imagining the worst in case one's children do not succeed in their education or what happens to them if one dies young, etc." (personal communication, Zouhair Maalej, October 2001). The point of these Tunisian Arabic examples is that

the scope of the metaphorical source domain may vary from language to language; it may vary by both narrowing and extending the scope. And the narrowing and extending of the scope of metaphor in relation to another language (such as English) can occur within the same language (as in Tunisian Arabic).

Large-Scale Alternative Conceptualizations

But the most robust evidence for cross-culturally alternative conceptualizations can be found in the work of Bernd Heine and his associates (Heine, 1995, 1997; Heine, Claudi, and Hünemeyer, 1991). Heine is perhaps the scholar who has done the most and the most systematic research into alternative conceptualization across languages. One of the major areas that Heine studied is that of spatial relations. Although spatial relations often serve as source domains for more abstract concepts (as in MORE IS UP, SAD IS DOWN), they can also function as target domains. This is possible because spatial relations are fairly abstract and, as Heine shows, derive from even more basic human experience. Not surprisingly, the basic human experience that leads to the conceptualization of spatial relations in literally hundreds of languages is the human body itself. The body commonly serves as the source domain of spatial relations. The main spatial reference points that seem to be recognized in most languages include our concepts of ON, UNDER, FRONT, BACK, and IN. In Heine's system (Heine, 1995), ON is typically expressed by such linguistic expressions as *up, above, on*, and *on top of*, and DOWN by *down, below, under*, and *bottom*. For our purposes here, we need not be concerned with the appropriateness of this suggestion. The important point is that the conceptualization of the "spatial reference points" is based on our understanding of the human body. In Figure 4.1 (adapted from Heine, 1995), we can see how abstract spatial relations are conceptualized as various body parts in hundreds of African and Oceanic languages. In addition to the several similarities in the conceptualization of spatial relations across African and Oceanic languages, there are some highly interesting differences. As Heine (1995) remarks, two such differences stand out. One is that UNDER is derived from the "buttocks/anus" body region in Africa, whereas it is derived from "foot/leg" in Oceania. The other difference in conceptualization concerns the spatial relation IN.

FIGURE 4.1. Conceptualizing spatial relations through the body (adapted from Heine, 1995).

It is from the body part "belly/stomach" in Africa, whereas in Oceania no particular body part serves this function. Instead, a number of body parts may be used, such as "tooth," "belly/stomach," "heart," "liver," and "bowels" (Heine, 1995: 127).

Heine and Kuteva (2002) present a huge amount of data for the conceptualization of grammatical concepts in a large number of languages. A student of mine, Bálint Koller, studied the expression of spatial relations in this amazingly rich source of data (Koller, 2003). He concluded that there are three basic schemata that human beings use to conceptualize spatial relations: the "body-only" schema, the "body and environment" schema, and the "extended body" schema. In the body-only schema, it is the human body from which the conceptualization of spatial relations derives. In languages that conform to this pattern, the "head" is used to mean UP, and the "foot/ leg" to mean DOWN. This is basically the schema that underlies the previous two ways of deriving spatial relations as presented by Heine. In the second schema, environmental landmarks are used for the purpose of understanding spatial relations. In languages that are based on this pattern words such as *sky/cloud* mean UP, and words such as

DRAWING A.

earth mean DOWN. In the third, called *extended body schema* by Koller, words primarily used to refer to aspects of the immediate human habitat, such as *home*, *house*, and *roof*, can give rise to words meaning AT, TO, WITH, and UP (Koller, 2003). This situation is represented in the following drawings, taken from Koller (2003). Drawing A corresponds to the body-only schema, Drawing B to the environmental landmark schema, and Drawing C to the extended body schema. All the preceding models make use of the body of a human being in upright position. This anthropomorphic model seems to be the most commonly used basis for the conceptualization of spatial relations in the world's languages. However, there are a small number of languages in which a zoomorphic model is used (Heine, 1995). In these languages, it is the animal body (a horizontally positioned body supported by four legs) that serves as the basis for conceptualizing spatial relations.

All in all, then, it seems that it is very common for languages to display alternative ways of conceptualizing spatial relations. We have seen three such alternatives in this section. In one, differential body parts are used; in another, either the body, environmental landmarks,

UP

down

DOWN

DRAWING B.

or the immediate human environment is made use of; and in a third, the animal body, as opposed to the human body, is the basis of conceptualization. All of these are highly motivated. Spatial relations are conceived in terms of human beings in the center of a humanly interpreted universe. The human being speaking a language uses his or her own body and its relationship to the surrounding natural and cultural environment as a basis to conceptualize spatial relations.

PREFERENTIAL CONCEPTUALIZATION

In many cases, two languages/cultures may have many of the same conceptual metaphors for a given target domain, but speakers of the languages may prefer to use a different set of metaphors for this target. If this is so, we have a gradient between the cases of alternative conceptualization I called the *range of target* and what I am now calling *preferential conceptualization*. Indeed, the example of the Hmong

DRAWING C.

metaphor LIFE IS A STRING discussed earlier seems to fall between the two phenomena: the range of target and preferential conceptualization. I placed it with the "range of target" cases because in my judgment it fits that category better. Here the point is that possibly many of the cases of metaphorical differences across languages do not fit such categories neatly and the categories form a gradient with overlaps along which we can place particular conceptual metaphors.

This seems to be happening when we look at conceptual metaphors that Americans and Hungarians use for the target concept of LIFE. My student Niki Köves made a study of how Americans and Hungarians think about life and which metaphors they use as they report on their thoughts (Köves, 2002). She asked 20 Americans in Hungary and 20 Hungarians to write a one- to two-page essay about life. In her instructions to the subjects, she encouraged them to think about four questions:

- How do you view human life in general?
- What does life mean to you?

- What do you consider to be a successful life?
- What is your view on life based on your personal experiences and thoughts?

It is important to note that the word *metaphor* was mentioned nowhere in the instructions to the participants. They returned their essays to the researcher, who then looked for the metaphors subjects used. As Table 4.1 shows, many of the conceptual metaphors the American and Hungarian subjects used are shared. (The numbering indicates frequency of use of a particular conceptual metaphor.) As the table shows, the source domains of GAME, JOURNEY, COMPROMISE, and WAR are shared. Furthermore, the source of PRECIOUS POSSESSION is very close to that of GIFT, thus potentially increasing the number of shared source domains for the concept of LIFE. This is an especially interesting finding, considering that the most common metaphors on the American side, in descending order, were PRECIOUS POSSESSION, GAME, and JOURNEY, whereas on the Hungarian side they were STRUGGLE/WAR, COMPROMISE, and JOURNEY. Where most Americans were talking about life as being *the most precious commodity, something that we have to cherish and take care of, something precious underestimated* by others; *valuing and admiring* life; a *wonderful, beautiful, and dear thing*, most Hungarians were talking about life as *battles that have to be won*, people *having to fight* throughout life, people *always having to prove and fight, which is exhausting and tiring* most of the time. Where Americans were talking about the *stakes being high* and people having to watch

TABLE 4.1. *Life Metaphors for Hungarians and Americans*

American	Hungarian
1. LIFE IS A PRECIOUS POSSESSION	LIFE IS A STRUGGLE/WAR
2. LIFE IS A GAME	LIFE IS A COMPROMISE
3. LIFE IS A JOURNEY	LIFE IS A JOURNEY
4. LIFE IS A CONTAINER	LIFE IS A GIFT
5. LIFE IS A GAMBLE	LIFE IS A POSSIBILITY
6. LIFE IS A COMPROMISE	LIFE IS A PUZZLE
7. LIFE IS AN EXPERIMENT	LIFE IS A LABYRINTH
8. LIFE IS A TEST	LIFE IS A GAME
9. LIFE IS WAR	LIFE IS FREEDOM
10. LIFE IS PLAY	LIFE IS A CHALLENGE

Source: Kövës, 2002.

what they *risk, in case they lose it*; people sometimes *keeping the rules* and *play*[*ing*] *the right way*; people enjoying and making their life as good as possible *within the limits and rules of this game*, Hungarians were talking about people *having to give up their big dreams, accepting* life as it is given to them, *adjusting to* the possibilities, and the importance of *being not dissatisfied*. Finally, they both used the JOURNEY metaphor, saying on the American side that we *travel through* life, *look back on the road, having to keep moving*, and *striving to reach our destination* in life, and saying on the Hungarian side that life is a *big journey, the roads sometimes being bumpy*, and that in life the *right and best path is not indicated*.

In other words, where Americans talked about a precious possession in connection with life, Hungarians talked about war and struggle, and where Americans viewed life as a game, Hungarians viewed it as a compromise. They both conceptualized life as a journey. Even more importantly, the idea of life's being a precious possession figured first for the 20 Americans, whereas the most similar Hungarian counterpart, life as a gift, ranked only fourth. Furthermore, the American notion of life's being a game, which was second in rank, showed up only in eighth position among the Hungarians. Finally, the Hungarian view of life as a compromise, which was second most important for them, was only sixth among the Americans.

All this goes to show that the participating Americans had preference for the PRECIOUS POSSESSION and GAME source domains, and the participating Hungarians opted for viewing life as a STRUGGLE or WAR and as a COMPROMISE. This is an interesting finding because it provides us with the notion that sometimes cross-cultural variation is only a matter of preferential choice of certain conceptual metaphors, and not a matter of availability or lack of certain source domains.

But is this all that the table tells us? Is it simply a frequency list of the most common source domains of life that Americans and Hungarians use? I believe that it tells us more. It suggests that Americans and Hungarians have *different concepts* of life and that the differences arise as a result of the different preferences in the use of largely overlapping source domains. This claim takes us to one of the important issues I wish to discuss in this book: the nature of the relationship between

metaphors (e.g., LIFE IS WAR, LIFE IS A GAME, LIFE IS A JOURNEY) and concepts as represented by cultural models (e.g., the cultural model of the concept of LIFE). I will return to this issue in a later chapter (see chapter 9).

<center>UNIQUE METAPHORS</center>

A culturally unique conceptual metaphor is one that has *both* a culturally unique source domain and a culturally unique target domain. It is hard to tell how common this pattern is in the world's languages and cultures. I believe that in most cases of conventional conceptual metaphors we have either congruent metaphors, alternative metaphors, or preferentially chosen ones; that is, most cases of variation in conceptual metaphor can be accounted for by recourse to one of the possibilities discussed.

This does not mean, however, that this kind of case does not exist. Take, for example, the metaphorical conceptualization of the escape of slaves from the South to the North in the United States in the first half of the 19th century. It was common for the slaves to think of this as a secret train ride; it was called the Underground Railroad. The ride on the Underground Railroad was the source domain and the secret escape of the slaves from south to north was the target domain. Both the source and the target domain are unique. The target domain is unique to the United States in the first half of the 19th century (there was slavery elsewhere, but the slaves probably did not escape from their masters from south to north). The source domain is also unique, in that it is a novel blend of railroad rides and underground activities in Fauconnier and Turner's (2002) sense (see also chapter 11).

Examples of this kind do not spring readily and naturally to mind. I would think that one reason for this is that most of our source and target domains are deeply entrenched in the conventional conceptual system and we do not easily invent either new sources in terms of which targets are conceptualized or new targets that are the focus of conceptualization by more basic source domains. And it seems even more difficult to create cases in which entirely new concepts (a novel source and a novel target) join together in a metaphorical relationship. Most of the time even poets and other creative thinkers use conventional, that is, "nonunique," target concepts, such as love,

life, and freedom. It may be somewhat more common that the same thinkers use a newly created source domain for a conventional target. This occurs frequently in literature, but it is a case that falls within the "range of target" category, in which the range of source domains for a particular target domain is extended beyond what is conventional for that target.

5

Within-Culture Variation in Metaphor

People everywhere live in a complex society that is structured in a large number of ways. We are members of groups that have more or less social power; in many societies we belong to different ethnic groups; we live in geographical regions that leave their mark on the groups of people inhabiting them; we and many other people pursue similar jobs; we observe certain customs and conventions in particular situations in which we communicate with others; and, of course, we all have our own idiosyncrasies as individual human beings. These divisions of the complexities of social and cultural life are well known to sociologists, anthropologists, and others. They are also well known to sociolinguists who study variation in the use of language. These scholars point out that languages reveal a great deal of variation according to these and other divisions of society. They also tell us that languages vary because the experiences of the people divided by these dimensions of experience vary. So if it is true that metaphors reveal and, in some cases, constitute human experience (see chapter 9), then we should expect metaphors, both of the conceptual and of the linguistic kind, to vary according to these social divisions. Indeed, this is my hypothesis in the present chapter. I will suggest that an obvious place to look for variation in metaphor are the social, cultural, stylistic, individual, and so on, dialects and varieties that have been identified by sociolinguists, linguistic anthropologists, and other researchers of language variation in a social and cultural context. This approach makes it even clearer why

cross-cultural variation discussed in the previous chapter and within-culture variation discussed in the present one are aspects of the same general issue. Both deal with social and cultural divisions that are likely to produce metaphor variation due to people's divergent experiences in social and cultural life.

I will call these various divisions of social and cultural life *dimensions* – either social, cultural, regional, and others, dimensions or, correspondingly, dimensions of metaphor variation. It is important to keep in mind throughout this chapter that my strategy is the following: We know from work in sociology, anthropology, sociolinguistics, and other fields, that languages are not monolithic but have varieties reflecting divergences in human experience. I want to see whether the varieties of language most commonly identified by these researchers reveal any divergences in the use of metaphorical language and thought. I present here evidence that I believe supports the idea that metaphors vary not only cross-culturally but also within cultures.

THE SOCIAL DIMENSION

Social dimensions include the differentiation of society into men and women, young and old, and middle-class and working-class. Do men, the young, or the middle-class use different metaphors than women, the old, or the working-class? At present we do not have the relevant studies from a cognitive linguistic perspective. But we do have some indication that some of these social factors might produce variation in metaphorical conceptualization.

One example of this is the men–women dimension. This dimension seems to be operative in several distinct cases: the way men talk about women, the way women talk about men, the way men *and* women talk about women, the way men *and* women talk about the world in general (i.e., not only about the other). In English-speaking countries (but also in others), it is common for men to use expressions such as *bunny, kitten, bird, chick, cookie, dish, and sweetie pie* in describing women. These metaphorical expressions assume certain conceptual metaphors: WOMEN ARE (SMALL) FURRY ANIMALS (*bunny, kitten*), WOMEN ARE BIRDS (*bird, chick, hen party*), and WOMEN ARE SWEET FOOD (*cookie, dish, sweetie pie*). However, when women talk

about men they do not appear to use these metaphors of men, or they use them in a more limited way. Men are not called *bunnies* or *kittens* by women. Neither are men characterized as *birds* or *chicks*, but they can be thought of as LARGE FURRY ANIMALS, such as bears, instead. And women are more commonly viewed by men as SWEET FOOD than men are by women, although women can also sometimes describe men as FOOD, especially in a sexual context.

Men's and women's metaphors may also differ when they conceptualize other aspects of the world. In two fascinating books, Annette Kolodny (1975, 1984) shows us that American men and women had significantly different metaphorical images of the frontier in the period between 1630 and 1860. Men thought of the frontier as a virgin land to be taken, women, as a garden to be cultivated. On the basis of her careful examination of hundreds of literary and nonliterary documents of the period, Kolodny concludes:

Later, they [the women] eagerly embraced the open and rolling prairies of places like Illinois and Texas as a garden ready-made. Avoiding for a time male assertions of a rediscovered Eden, women claimed the frontiers as a potential sanctuary for an idealized domesticity. Massive exploitation and alteration of the continent do not seem to have been part of women's fantasies. They dreamed, more modestly, of locating a home and a familial human community within a cultivated garden. (Kolodny, 1984: xiii)

In light of the massive abuse of the North American continent today, we may note, together with Kolodny, that one wishes that the metaphor of the frontier that characterized women's writing had had more influence on shaping the policies that have governed or regulated the relationship between people and the environment in the North American continent.

In Japanese culture, women seem to be metaphorically conceptualized in ways in which men are not (Hiraga, 1991). In Japanese it is customary to describe women as commodities; the same conceptualization does not apply to Japanese men. Hiraga (1991: 39–40) provides such examples as the following:

WOMEN ARE A COMMODITY
Ano onna-wa ore-no *mono da*.
That woman-TOP I(M)-GEN thing be –PRST
(That woman is mine.)

but not

> ?? Ano otoka-wa watasi-no *mono yo.*
> That man-TOP I(F)-GEN thing be-PRST
> (That man is mine.)

(The question marks indicate the dubious acceptability of the sentence.) Another example is the following:

> *Ore-no onna-ni* te-o dasu-na.
> I(M)-GEN woman-DAT hand-ACC hold-out-NEG-IMP
> (Don't make an advance to my woman.)

but not

> ?? *Watasi-no otoko-ni* te-o dasa-nai-de.
> I(F) GEN man-DAT hand-ACC hold-out-NEG-IMP(F)
> (Don't make an advance to my man.)

In addition to women's being conceptualized as a commodity in Japanese, they can be more specifically viewed as sales products (Hiraga, 1991: 40):

> Tanoo-wa ano onna-o *kizu mono*-ni si-ta.
> Tanoo-TOP that woman-ACC flaw thing-DAT do-PAST
> (Tanoo made that woman a flawed article.)

(*Note*: Tanoo is a common Japanese name for men.) The same thing, however, cannot be said of men:

> * Hanako-wa ano otoko-o *kizu mono*-ni si-ta
> Hanako-TOP that man-ACC flaw thing-DAT do-PAST
> (Hanako made that man a flawed article.)

(The asterisk indicates the unacceptability of the sentence. *Note:* Hanako is a common Japanese name for women.) In the last pair of examples, the flaw in the product corresponds to the lack of virginity in a person. It is this aspect of people that is treated unequally in the Japanese language and in traditional Japanese society in general.

The general point of these examples is this: A language community may employ differential metaphorical conceptualization along a social division that is relevant in that society. As we saw, the particular

division of members of a society into men and women may be re-
flected in various ways of differentially treating men and women
in metaphorical language and thought. We can perhaps hypothe-
size that the more varied these ways are, the more important or en-
trenched the particular division is. Furthermore, it makes sense to
believe that when a particular metaphorical conceptualization is lin-
guistically obligatory for all the participants of the division (e.g., both
men and women), it is likely to be more deeply entrenched.

<div align="center">THE ETHNIC DIMENSION</div>

Metaphorical conceptualization appears to vary from ethnic group to
ethnic group (and this factor can also possibly combine with various
social factors, such as men–women, working class–middle class). One
would expect that variation along the ethnic dimension should be es-
pecially noticeable in societies with highly segregated ethnic groups.
Another interesting aspect of the ethnic factor is the determination
of whether and how the metaphors that have been created by a par-
ticular ethnic group become integrated into another group, and why.
The answers to these questions could be used as the first steps to a
sociology and sociolinguistics of metaphor in the cognitive linguistic
paradigm.

Different ethnic groups may base their metaphors of a particular
target domain on different but congruent source domains. One ex-
ample of this is the Black American English expression *nitty-gritty*
(meaning 'important') versus the mainstream white expression *bot-
tom line* for the target domain of importance. In both, we have the
conceptual metaphor IMPORTANT IS CENTRAL, but the specific-level
source domains are obviously different.

The ethnic factor may also play an important role in creating
"speaking styles" that are highly metaphorical. One such speaking
style is "playing the dozens" in the Black English Vernacular. The fol-
lowing is a sample from a more extended conversation (taken from
Kochman, 1981: 55):

PRETTY BLACK: "What'chu laughing 'bout Nap, with your funky
   mouth smelling like dog shit."
NAP: "Your mama motherfucker."

PRETTY BLACK: "Your funky mama too."

NAP (strongly): "It takes twelve barrels of water to make a steamboat run; it takes an elephant's dick to make your Grandmammy come; she been elephant fucked, camel fucked and hit side the head with your Grandpappy's nuts."

Playing the dozens is a competitive conversational situation in which the participants attempt to outdo each other. The example demonstrates the social relevance of metaphorical creativity. The success of the participants depends on verbal and conceptual skills in producing metaphorical imagery at the expense of the other. In other words, in this particular speaking style that is characteristic of certain segments of African American youth culture metaphorical creativity is emphasized and is a precondition for success. (I will discuss the general issue of creativity in chapter 11.)

These are some random examples of the interaction between metaphor and ethnic dialects. This interaction deserves and awaits much more serious investigation from a cognitive linguistic perspective than I have given to it here.

THE REGIONAL DIMENSION

It seems that regional varieties of the same language also reveal metaphor variation. Regional varieties can be national or local dialects. One would expect certain differences of metaphorical patterns in both. To the best of my knowledge, there has been no work done on the issue in local varieties. There has been some work done on national varieties.

Parenthetically, let me note that, within the framework I am developing here, metaphor variation in foreign language teaching can be thought of as a special case of regional variation. Metaphor variation may occur when learners of a foreign language rely on their first language and the physical environment in which that language emerged. Thus, I believe that what I call the *regional dimension* (together with many of the other dimensions mentioned in this chapter) plays a principal role in the way learners of a foreign language create metaphors that diverge from the conventional metaphorical patterns used by native speakers. The divergent metaphors used by learners

of foreign languages are just beginning to be studied from a cognitive linguistic point of view (see, for example, Kecskes, 2003; Wolf, 1999; Wolf and Bobda, 2001).

We can observe differences in metaphorical conceptualization in national dialects. This variation has several aspects: The choice of expressions reflecting the same conceptual metaphor might differ; conceptual metaphors might differ for the same target; one national dialect might influence metaphorical conceptualization in another; and so on. For example, Americans use a metaphorical expression for anger that is a low-level specific variant of the general ANGER IS A HOT FLUID IN A CONTAINER (or even more generally, of the metaphor THE ANGRY PERSON IS A PRESSURIZED CONTAINER), *have a cow*, whereas the British use *have kittens*. Both expressions are motivated by the same conceptual metaphor, but the actual linguistic expressions differ.

Furthermore, since its emergence as a national dialect in the 19th century American English seems to have had a greater impact on British English in terms of metaphorical conceptualization than British English on American English (see Kövecses, 2000c). There are a large number of metaphorical expressions used in British English that originated in American English. The English spoken in Britain was carried to North America by the settlers. The frequently observed "freshness" and imaginative "vigor" of American English have been noted by many authors. Among several others, Baugh and Cable (1983) provide a useful comment:

He [the American] is perhaps at his best when inventing simple homely words like *apple butter, sidewalk*, and *lightning rod, spelling bee* and *crazy quilt, low-down*, and *know-nothing*, or when striking off a terse metaphor like *log rolling, wire pulling, to have an ax to grind, to be on the fence*. . . . The American early manifested the gift, which he continues to show, of the imaginative, slightly humorous phrase. To it we owe *to bark up the wrong tree, to face the music, fly off the handle, go on the warpath, bury the hatchet, come out at the little end of the horn, saw wood*, and many more, with the breath of the country and sometimes of the frontier about them. In this way, the American began his contributions to the English language. (p. 365)

Many of these and other metaphorical expressions in American English owe their existence to the new landscape the settlers encountered, the many new activities they engaged in, and the frontier experience in general.

Another case in point are Dutch and its derivative language Afrikaans, spoken in some parts of South Africa. René Dirven (1994) analyzes and describes this situation in his book *Metaphor and Nation*. Dirven examined Afrikaans newspapers and collected the common metaphors in them. He wanted to see to what extent these metaphors are shared by Dutch. His study is a systematic comparison of common stock Dutch and new, Afrikaans metaphors. In the description of "nature" metaphors, he points out that the shared metaphors include images of water, light and shadow, lightning, earthquake, sand, stars, wind, and clouds and that "this is a picture of the typical natural setting of the Low Countries or any other more northern European country" (p. 70). A curious feature of Dutch nature metaphors is that they almost completely never are based on animals. In contrast to this relatively calm and serene natural atmosphere he finds metaphors in new, Afrikaans Dutch that are based both on animals of various kinds and forceful images of nature. Dirven (1994) writes:

Afrikaans not only seems to have developed many more expressions based on the domain of nature, but the new metaphors also depict a totally different scenery; this may contain mountains, heights and flattened or levelled-off rises or it may be a flat or hilly landscape, used as grazing or farming land (= veld); there are no permanent clouds or shadows, but the "clouds bulge heavily downwards"; all sorts of familiar animals provide the stereotypical images for human behaviour or appearances. (p. 73)

In sum, as these examples show, the physical environment in which dialects or varieties of a language are spoken seems to have an impact on metaphor variation. Clearly, geographic region is an additional dimension of variation in metaphorical language and thought. The cognitive linguistic view of metaphor would greatly benefit from large-scale and systematic investigations in this area.

THE STYLE DIMENSION

By *style* I mean linguistic variation according to the communicative setting, subject matter, medium, audience, and other factors. It is an open question whether metaphors are used differentially along these dimensions or factors. Some examples seem to suggest that some,

or maybe most, of the factors can be regarded as dimensions along which metaphors vary.

Let us take subject matter or topic as our first illustration of the point. Jean Aitchison (1987) made an observation that might be relevant here. She noted that it commonly occurs that in newspaper articles and headlines about (American) football games the names of the teams may inspire the selection of particular metaphors for defeat and victory. Here are some examples from Aitchison (1987: 143): "Cougars *drown* Beavers," "Cowboys *corral* Buffaloes," "Air Force *torpedoes* the Navy," "Clemson *cooks* Rice." These are headlines from American newspapers describing American football games. Metaphors used in these sentences are selected on the basis of the names of football teams. Because beavers live in water, defeat can be metaphorically viewed as drowning; because cowboys corral cattle, the opponent can be corralled; because navy ships can be torpedoed, the opponent can be torpedoed, too; and because rice can be cooked, the same process can be used to describe the defeat of the opponent. The metaphors in the sentences indicate that the target domain of defeat can be variously expressed as drowning, corralling, and so forth; the choice depends on the meaning of the sentences' constituents (or, loosely, the subject matter or topic).

As a second illustration, let us take audience-related variation in language. Given this dimension, we can have formal, neutral (colloquial), informal, and slang usage. Do metaphors vary with the level of formality? In general, it can be suggested that slang in all languages is highly metaphorical – more metaphorical than the level that we call neutral or colloquial style. Let us see what this claim means in detail. In English (and in many other languages), the domain of anger is conceptualized as A HOT FLUID, FIRE, INSANITY, BURDEN, VICIOUS ANIMAL, and so on. In American slang, there are several expressions describing anger that cannot easily and straightforwardly be assigned to any of these. Two such expressions are *be flexed* and *be bent out of shape*. These expressions appear to reflect a metaphorical conceptualization of anger along the lines of the metaphor ANGER IS PHYSICAL TENSION IN AN OBJECT that is primarily found in American slang. In other words, there is a conceptual metaphor here that chiefly characterizes slang, rather than neutral standard American usage.

Next consider two conceptual metaphors used in standard English for the concept of happiness: HAPPY IS LIGHT/BRIGHT and HAPPINESS IS BEING OFF THE GROUND. Both of these are highly conventionalized metaphors and are reflected in stylistically neutral contexts by a large number of well-entrenched expressions. Examples for the former include "*bright* future" and "*brighten* up." Now in American slang we can also hear expressions such as "I'm still *sunny side up*" and its opposite, "He's *over-easy* now," in which *sunny side up* means 'happy face up' and *over-easy* means 'face down, passed out, not happy.' Examples for the standard or neutral use of the HAPPINESS IS BEING OFF THE GROUND metaphor include "They're *on top of the world*" and "When I saw him, he was *walking on air*." In American slang, however, we can also have "He's *sportin' the gravity boots*," "She heard the news and just *went into orbit*," and "Man, I think I'm *levitating*." In these cases, the conceptual metaphors remain the same, but the slang expressions reflect exaggerated elaborations of the conceptual metaphors.

It seems to me that the other factors of style would also reveal many interesting peculiarities of metaphorical language and thought. This area also deserves detailed further investigation.

THE SUBCULTURAL DIMENSION

Subcultures often define themselves in contradistinction to mainstream culture, and, often, they can in part be defined by the metaphors they use. And sometimes the self-definition of a subculture involves the unique metaphorical conceptualization of important concepts on which the separateness of the subculture is based. There are many different subcultures in every complex society, including religious, artistic, scientific, and gender-based subcultures.

Religious Groups

Some of the most obvious subcultures consist of closely knit religious groups. The tight cohesion of the group often assumes the acceptance of core values and key ideas that are based on particular conceptual metaphors. Let us briefly examine one of these groups as described by the American anthropologist Victor Balaban (1999).

In mainstream American society people are taken to be "agents with coherent intentions" (Balaban, 1999: 130). If they behave in ways that do not suggest this notion of agency, they are regarded as mentally and emotionally unstable. The notion that a person must exhibit agency with coherent intentions in his behavior leads to an understanding of mental illness: People who lack agency with coherent intentions are mentally unstable or deranged. Now some religious subcultures in American society work under the communicative pressure of reducing their agency by reason of being members of the subculture. However, if they do that, they are branded by mainstream society as being mentally unstable.

One such group are the people who regularly attend a Marian apparition site. These pilgrims give accounts of miraculous signs that they have experienced. At their meetings, they tell each other about the divine events that happened to them, the miraculous visions and thoughts they had, and so forth. They give accounts of knowledge that originates outside their selves; they do not function as agents in the thoughts that they experienced. The knowledge that they possess is from an outside agent. But they have to face a problem here: A lack of coherent agency indicates that a person is mentally unstable in mainstream American society. For this reason, the pilgrims to the Marian apparition site must conform to two contradictory pressures. In the words of Balaban (1999): "The pilgrims in Conyers need to assert that their thoughts or feelings come from an outside agent, but at the same time make clear the speaker's control over his/her own mind" (p. 130). How can this dilemma be resolved? The pilgrims have to use language that simultaneously presents them as nonvolitional speakers (to maintain the view of the divine nature of their experiences) and as reliable sources of authentic knowledge (to maintain the view that they are not unstable). What specific linguistic devices can accomplish this complicated task? Balaban suggests the hypothesis that a very important device that they use for this purpose is nonvisual metaphors for knowledge.

Perhaps the most common metaphor for knowledge among mainstream Americans, and, as we know, for many other cultures (Sweetser, 1990, in press), is KNOWING IS SEEING (as in "I *see* what you mean" and "This much is *crystal clear*"). Seeing is a perceptual domain. Other perceptual domains include taste, touch, hearing, and

smelling. Why is knowledge predominantly understood as seeing? It is because seeing is "associated with more certain and direct knowledge, while other senses are more associated with indirect and inferred knowledge" (Balaban, 1999: 132). For example, hearing is mainly related to understanding language and influencing people (as in, "I *hear* you") and touch to having emotional experience (as in "I was *touched*"). These verbs emphasize less intellectual ways of knowledge than seeing does. However, other anthropologists inform us that in some languages and cultures hearing may be the principal metaphor for understanding cognition, as in some Australian languages (see Evans and Wilkins, 1998). The vision metaphor produces an intellectual kind of knowledge that arises from the active and focused functioning of the visual system. The active agent that is presupposed by this metaphor would be, as Balaban suggests, inappropriate for the pilgrims, who attempt to portray themselves as passive but reliable sources of their divine knowledge. Within the category of nonvisual metaphor Balaban also included what he called biological (nonperceptual) metaphors (as in, "I knew it *in my heart*"), nonbiological metaphors (as in "The *doors in my mind opened*"), and an unspecified group (as in "I could *tell* things were changing"). Balaban's hypothesis is, then, that the pilgrims will use more nonvisual than visual metaphors in the accounts of their divine knowledge, thereby satisfying contradictory demands of both their own group and those of the larger mainstream culture.

To test this hypothesis, Balaban collected 191 narratives from pilgrims in Conyers, Georgia, and from the Apparition-list. Four categories of narratives were distinguished: (1) face-to-face religious narratives, (2) face-to-face secular narratives, (3) unelicited online religious narratives, and (4) elicited online religious narratives. The metaphors were then analyzed in four types of narratives.

The overall result of the study was that pilgrims in Conyers used substantially more nonvisual than visual metaphors, thus confirming the initial hypothesis offered by Balaban. This finding, although not conclusive, shows that pilgrims may employ more nonvisual than visual metaphor in order to meet two different cultural pressures: (a) to present themselves as people who have undergone a major religious transformation in the capacity of nonvolitional and passive persons, but (b) to suggest that they nevertheless have reliable and

authentic religious knowledge that distinguishes them from people outside the group.

More generally, the study shows how the use of metaphors by subcultures may depend on sometimes contradictory pressures that influence a social group from the outside.

Literature

We can also think of the literary establishment as a subculture that produces metaphors – both conceptual and linguistic. A major suggestion of the cognitive linguistic view of metaphor is that many of the metaphors produced in literary works come about as a result of a limited set of conceptual processes. Lakoff and Turner (1989) identify the most important of these processes in the realm of poetry, such as extension, elaboration, questioning, and the combining of conventional everyday metaphors. The large-scale application of these processes is one of the ways in which poetic texts can be distinguished from ordinary, nonpoetic texts. This is not to say, however, that poetic, and more generally, literary, texts are not also characterized by unique metaphors. They obviously are. For example, many image-based metaphors, called "one-shot image metaphors," are of this type (Lakoff and Turner, 1989). In later sections of the chapter, I will discuss metaphor variation in literature further.

The literature on the specificity of metaphor in literary texts is voluminous, and summarizing it here would be impossible. However, the reader interested in this complex question should turn to the excellent recent survey by Steen and Gibbs (in press). Indeed, Steen and Gibbs challenge many of the accepted dogmas concerning the issue of metaphor in literature. They put their challenge in the form of a series of questions at the end of their article (Steen and Gibbs, in press). It is worth quoting their conclusions in full:

- What is special about metaphor in literature?
  Does metaphor in literature exhibit special forms, meanings, or uses, in terms of frequencies, distributions, or even as single but prominent occurrences in specific texts?
  Does it exhibit ordinary forms, meanings, or uses, but in a relatively extreme density?
- What is not special, but general about metaphor in literature?

Which linguistic and conceptual structures of metaphor in literature may be explained by more general patterns of language use and cognition?

- Are the special and the general properties of metaphor in literature handled in special ways by language users dealing with literature?
  Do writers and readers employ specifically literary processing strategies or operations when encountering metaphor in literature? Do language users in other roles, such as performers, actors, editors, and reviewers, do so?
- What is the variation of metaphor *within* literature?
  What is the variation of metaphor between genres (novel, poem, play), periods (realism, modernism, postmodernism), countries, and so on?

At the moment, none of these questions can be given a definitive answer. We believe that the various traditions of research discussed in this paper all need to co-operate to produce new findings in this exciting field of research.

Psychotherapeutic Discourse

In at least a loose sense, we can regard people who have the same physical, mental, or emotional problem as constituting a subculture. This could be justified on the grounds that, in comparison to a large portion of society, these people have some unique experiences by virtue of the problems they share.

The concept of sadness is a key concept in psychotherapy because of its "close relative" in clinical and analytic practice – depression. Metaphors for sadness were identified by George Lakoff and Mark Johnson (1980) and Antonio Barcelona (1986). These include SAD IS DARK, SAD IS HEAVY, and SAD IS DOWN. Given these conventional metaphors for sadness, we can ask whether all of them are equally common and important in therapeutic discourse, or whether one or some of them stand out in importance.

This issue was taken up by Linda McMullen and John Conway (2002), who studied interviews with 21 patients who were previously diagnosed as having depression. On the basis of their study, they found four conceptual metaphors for depression: DEPRESSION IS DARKNESS ("It's really like a *black cloud*"), DEPRESSION IS WEIGHT ("I felt just so – so *heavy*"), DEPRESSION IS CAPTOR ("I want to *break out of* this"), and DEPRESSION IS DESCENT ("I just was *down*"). As we can see, three of these overlap with the conventional metaphorical source domains for sadness identified by Lakoff, Johnson, and Barcelona in

English on the basis of ordinary language use: DEPRESSION IS DARK-
NESS corresponds to SADNESS IS DARK, DEPRESSION IS WEIGHT to SAD-
NESS IS A BURDEN, and DEPRESSION IS DESCENT to SADNESS IS DOWN.
I suspect that Lakoff, Johnson, and Barcelona did not identify the
CAPTOR metaphor because most people do not normally talk about
being trapped by, wanting to be free of, or wanting to break out of sad-
ness, although these are ways of talking and thinking about depres-
sion in a clinical context. The study by McMullan and Conway lends
support to the claim that most of the conceptual metaphors that are
used in ordinary language also occur in the language of therapeutic
discourse.

But, to return to the original question, are all the metaphors equally
significant in this kind of discourse? McMullen and Conway's (2002)
study clearly shows that they are not. They found that 90% of the
metaphorical expressions related to depression were instances of the
conceptual metaphor DEPRESSION IS DESCENT. This was the metaphor
patients used most extensively to conceptualize their condition. Why
should this be the case? McMullen and Conway argue that it is be-
cause the metaphorical conceptualization of depression as a place
that is down resonates readily with certain themes in Western cul-
tures. Whereas happiness is conceptualized as UP together with such
notions as power, high status, morality, rationality, and health (see
Lakoff and Johnson, 1980), sadness and depression are viewed in op-
position to these highly valued states in an extremely negative light,
together with lack of power, inferior social position, being immoral,
and being sick. Because depression is evaluated in this way, the de-
pressed person can easily be considered a "failure" in all these ways.

Although I am in agreement with this argument, I wish to sug-
gest that the "popularity" or "success" of the metaphorical source
domain of DESCENT or DOWN for depression is also due to another
factor: namely, that it enables depressed patients to make coherent a
large number of their experiences related to the illness. As McMullen
and Conway themselves note, the metaphor of DESCENT gives rise to
a number of metaphorical entailments. These include the ideas that
once we start the slip (or fall) into the downward place (that is, de-
pression), stopping the process is not easy; that whereas it is easy
to slip (or fall) into a downward place, it is very difficult to climb
back out of it; that once we are in it, other things might "crumble on

top of us," too; that once we are in it, we become "unreachable" to others. These are the experiences that are made coherent by a single metaphorical source domain, that of DESCENT or DOWN. Alternatively, and in the spirit of the founder of linguistic relativity Benjamin Lee Whorf (1956), it could also be suggested that the source domain creates the possibility for these experiences. Be this as it may, my point here is that in addition to the ready social acceptance of the metaphor the cognitive potential of the source domain is such that it can organize (and can perhaps create) a number of experiences shared by depressed patients, and this is what accounts in part for the heavy use of the metaphor in therapeutic discourse.

In sum, a variety of subcultures can be characterized by the conceptual metaphors they use. In the section we have looked at some of these, but, of course, there are many more. For example, there is the scientific community, which can be divided according to which metaphors particular groups use within the community. A good example of this are the set of metaphors used for the mind by what is called the *Chomskyan tradition* and a different set of metaphors used by other groups studying the mind, such as cognitive linguists (see, for example, Kertész, 2004). Sometimes subcultures or groups within subcultures use qualitatively different metaphors that distinguish them from other subcultures or groups or the mainstream culture. In some other cases, the metaphors may be only quantitatively specific and demonstrate preferential modes of conceptualization.

THE DIACHRONIC DIMENSION

Eve Sweetser (1990) showed that the conceptualization of mental processes is necessarily couched in metaphor and that many of the metaphors we have today have been with us for thousands of years. The main metaphor is MIND-AS-BODY; several more specific metaphors reveal the details of this for particular aspects of the mind, such as KNOWING/UNDERSTANDING. She presented data that show that the concept of KNOWING and/or UNDERSTANDING was and still largely is conceptualized as SEEING (e.g., "I *see* the point") in many languages. Sweetser's study concentrates on Indo-European languages, but languages in other language families also seem to corroborate

her generic-level metaphor THE MIND IS THE BODY. However, in these languages other more specific metaphors may play a larger role than seeing for understanding what understanding is (such as KNOWING IS HEARING in some Australian languages; see, for example, Evans and Wilkins, 1998).

Does this mean that the mind and mental processes have always been conceptualized in the same way at least within a single language or cultural sphere? Not at all. Notice that the SEEING metaphor is one of our most down-to-earth and everyday metaphors for knowledge and understanding in the Western world. When it comes to "expert" or scientific theories of the mind and its operations, recent experts and scientists of old alike have often gone "beyond" such mundane metaphors as SEEING. They have often proposed more "elevated" metaphors, and their metaphors have often changed.

For this reason the subculture of science and its various subgroups provide an interesting example of how metaphorical source domains change over time. This is one of the most obvious cases of metaphor variation. Plato used the metaphor of a charioteer and two steeds. In this metaphor, the charioteer corresponds to reason and the two steeds to passions and appetites. Descartes thought of the person in terms of early automaton models. But later the mind and person were also conceptualized as clocks and all kinds of machines. Freud built an elaborate hydraulic model, which served and still serves as the basis of psychoanalytic theory (see Kövecses, 1990). Today the dominant metaphor is that of the computer, in which the functioning of the human mind is imagined on the analogy of the computer. There is an extensive literature on this history. Lakoff and Johnson (1999) provide a systematic (though partial) survey of the evolution of these metaphors from the viewpoint of their "experientialist" philosophy.

But we should not believe, in light of what was said previously, that everyday conceptualization is unchanging, whereas scientific conceptualization is changing over time. Work by Caroline Gevaert (2001a, 2001b) demonstrates that the conceptualization of anger changed considerably from the Old English to the Middle English period. On the basis of a variety of corpora, she showed that heat-related words account for only 1.59% of all the words describing anger before 850. The number of heat-related words for anger

dramatically increases in the period between 850 and 950. Then the number of these words decreases between 950 and 1050 to 6.22%, to 1.71% by around 1200, to 0.27% by around 1300. After 1300 the number starts growing again, and after 1400 it becomes dominant in texts that describe anger. As was mentioned in chapter 1 and as a number of recent publications indicate (see, e.g., Kövecses, 1986; Lakoff, 1987; Lakoff and Kövecses, 1987), heat-related words account for a large portion of all the expressions that are used to talk about anger in present-day English.

What do Gevaert's findings tell us then? They indicate that the conceptualization of anger in terms of heat is not a constant feature of the concept of anger in English but that it can, and does, fluctuate in the course of the development of English. This is an extremely important finding because it bears directly on the issue of universality of metaphorical conceptualization across time. If the conceptualization of anger in terms of heat is a mechanical or automatic consequence of our real physiological processes in anger, this fluctuation should not occur. It cannot be the case that people's physiological characteristics change in anger every 100 or 200 years or so. How can we account for this fluctuation, then? Does our theory provide an answer that is consistent both with the cognitive linguistic view of embodiment and with the obvious changes in conceptualization through time? I will return to this issue in chapter 10, in which I discuss the main causes of variation in metaphorical conceptualization.

THE DEVELOPMENTAL DIMENSION

The developmental dimension also relates to the dimension of age – a sociocultural factor mentioned earlier in connection with the social dimension. The most systematic attempt to show how metaphors emerge in children from a cognitive linguistic view is that of Christopher Johnson (1997). Johnson distinguishes three stages in the emergence of patterns of metaphorical thought. One often cited example of this development is the way the verb *see* in its literal sense evolves to mean 'to know, understand' in a metaphorical sense. The most interesting part of Johnson's theory is the second stage of the emergence of metaphorical thought. When a very young child says something like "I want to see what's in the box," he or she uses a sense of *see*

in which both the literal sense and the later metaphorical sense are "conflated." This conflation occurs after the strictly literal stage and before the strictly and fully metaphorical stage. In the sentence, *see* means *both* that 'I literally want to see what's inside' and that 'and as a result, I want to know what's inside.' The full-blown metaphorical sense of *see*, which is 'to know, understand,' follows the stage of conflation. It remains to be seen to what extent such findings can be generalized to other cases of metaphor.

My interpretation of this development would be that, at least in the case of "primary metaphors" such as KNOWING IS SEEING, the literal stage is followed by a metonymic stage that leads to full-blown metaphorical uses. In the present example, the conceptual metonymy would be ACTION FOR RESULT, in which seeing results in knowing. This interpretation would be consistent with attempts to see metaphors emerging from metonymic thought (see, for example, Barcelona, 2000; Radden, 2000).

In more recent work, Seyda Özcaliskan (in press) shows that age is closely correlated with metaphor comprehension. She studied the acquisition of two time-related metaphors mentioned in chapter 3: TIME IS A MOVING FIGURE and TIME IS LOCATION in English and Turkish. She found that children at the age of 3 years did not really understand the metaphorical expressions based on these metaphors, at 4 years their understanding improved considerably, and at the age of 5 years they provided valid justifications for the use of time metaphors in 40% of the cases in both languages. She also pointed out that the onset of metaphor comprehension can be placed at the age of 4 years and that the full-fledged conceptual use of these metaphors (e.g., reasoning in terms of the metaphor, differentiation of conventional and unconventional time expressions) begins at age 5 years.

THE INDIVIDUAL DIMENSION

It is a fairly common observation that the metaphor usage of key cultural figures, such as presidents and media stars, as well as that of writers and poets can differ markedly from one person to another. An illustration of this point in *Time* magazine lists some of the metaphors that the anchorman Dan Rather of CBS used in his 2001 election

coverage. Here are some examples of his metaphors (*Time*, November 20, 2001):

> The presidential campaign is
> " . . . still hotter than a Laredo parking lot."

> Bush

> "has run through Dixie like a big wheel through a cotton field."
> " . . . will be madder than a rained-on rooster . . . "
> " . . . is sweeping through the South like a tornado through a trailer park."

We can assume that, among the star journalists and anchormen, these metaphors are fairly specific to Rather's metaphorical repertoire. The images that are used seem to reflect Rather's southern upbringing. I do not know whether other reporters who also are from the South use or would use exactly the same metaphors to describe the election campaign. The fact that the metaphors were noted and commented on by the magazine shows that there is something unique or peculiar about them and that they are likely to characterize a particular person.

The creative use of metaphor has a great deal to do with individual variation in metaphor. Individuals often have experiences that do not conform to conventional patterns captured by conventional conceptual metaphors. A part of the creative genius lies in the ability to extend the range of particular target domains. One target domain that figures importantly in poetry is that of "life." We saw a number of conventional source domains for this target, including WAR, PRECIOUS POSSESSION, and JOURNEY, in the previous chapter. However, poets and artists often create novel source domains in their various understandings of the concept. A nice example of this is Emily Dickinson's version of a life metaphor: "My life has stood – A Loaded Gun/In Corners." This is a novel source domain that extends the range of the target domain of life.

But it would be a mistake to believe that it is only a select few, a talented and creative elite, whose language and thought exhibit individual variation in the use of metaphor. The phenomenon can be observed in perfectly "ordinary" people as well. As a first example, consider the case of one of my former colleagues at an American university who had acquired some reputation for expressing much

of what he had to say in metaphors relating to ships and the navy. He described various activities of university life and administrative projects with metaphorical expressions such as the following (personal communication, Mike Casey, January 2001), which are his actual definitions of the expressions:

> When we anticipate problems with one of our initiatives, we "stand by for heavy weather."
> When we complain about a lack of strategic vision, we need a "star to steer by."
> When we arrive in the middle of a discussion or debate, we "come in on the mid-watch."
> When we drop a program, we "bail out" or "abandon ship."
> When we commit wholeheartedly to a project, we order "full-speed ahead."

As can be seen, some of the metaphorical expressions are more or less unique to a person's individual style. However, some of the others that he had employed are commonly used and well understood by most native speakers of English. What seems to be truly unique to his overall metaphor usage is the heavy concentration of metaphors relating to ships and the navy. In all probability, the reason for this is that he had been an officer in the navy for more than a decade.

Let us take another "everyday" example of the ways metaphors vary among individuals. In a course I have taught on the language of emotion in the United States, I asked my students to write a personal account of what love is or means for them. I was interested to find out whether and to what degree individual people use unique metaphors to conceptualize their love experiences. One of my students wrote this:

For me I guess I'd say that love is like a wagon. We both have responsibility for pulling it along. When things are good, we can jump on the wagon and ride down the hill. When things are tough, we each have to grab on to the tongue and work together to get it up the next hill. All our stuff is in the wagon, bumping around together. Once in a while one can get up on top and ride, but not for too long.

It is clear that this is the conventional JOURNEY metaphor for love with several individual modifications. One is that the vehicle that

corresponds to the relationship in the conventional metaphor is replaced by a wagon, a very untypical vehicle that is not capable of self-propelled motion. Second, in this individual variant of the metaphor it is the lovers who have to make the vehicle move when they are facing difficulties. Third, the metaphor reflects a rather pessimistic view of love that is not characterized by effortless and happy progress most of the time. Thus the metaphor used by this person follows the general outline of the well-entrenched LOVE IS A JOURNEY metaphor but deviates from it in ways that suggest a pessimistic outlook on love.

Interestingly, the same woman also provided an account of her partner's view of love: "P. has used the analogy of pulling a calf to describe our partnership, like giving birth in a way to this thing that is the relationship, but it is both of us out in the barn helping a cow deliver her calf. I have thought that that was a rich description also." As one can tell, this is a highly unconventional metaphor for love. In it, the calf that the cow gives birth to is the relationship. However, at a basic image-schematic level the man's and the woman's love metaphors may not be very different. In both, a great deal of joint effort is required to get the relationship moving along: pulling the wagon uphill and pulling the calf out of the cow are image-schematically very similar. Given this, it is perhaps not accidental that the woman described the relationship as a happy one. We can surmise that this deep image-schematic similarity is part of the reason.

It seems to me that psychotherapy and psychoanalysis are some of the richest areas for the creation of individual metaphors. As I understand it, one of the key ideas of psychoanalysis is that life history (and especially early childhood experiences) has a profound influence on our mental and emotional health. In a similar vein, some analysts suggest that significant earlier life experiences can function as source domains for significant later life experiences (see, e.g., Borbely, 1998). Because these experiences differ from person to person, we get a large number of, in our terms, unconventional source domains to conceptualize ourselves and our mental and emotional conditions. If this is true, we can regard a large part of the therapeutic and analytic interview as an attempt to recover a source domain (i.e., a coherent knowledge structure that makes sense of a problem), together with its appropriate target domain (the problem itself).

However, this is not to claim that in therapeutic and analytic discourse these individually unique conceptual metaphors that are based on particular life experiences dominate the conventional ones we find at a more general social level (many of which have been uncovered by cognitive linguists). Which type of metaphor – the unique individual or the conventional ones – is more pervasive and more important in therapeutic and analytic discourse is an open empirical question. We do not have (and I feel that at this stage of research cannot have) any statistical evidence to allow us to decide this issue. What we know is that both types are used, and sometimes people use novel extensions of conventional metaphors in the course of therapy. One example of the latter possibility is mentioned by McMullen and Conway (1996). They quote a patient as saying the following: "I felt like I was a stick of dynamite with a fuse about a quarter of an inch long" (McMullen and Conway, 1996, p. 67). What this sentence is based on is the completely conventional conceptual metaphor THE ANGRY PERSON IS A PRESSURIZED CONTAINER, of which the metaphor ANGER IS A HOT FLUID IN A CONTAINER is a version. In the example, the patient created several novel metaphorical entailments to conceptualize his or her condition. First, he or she used as a self-characterization a stick of dynamite, an extremely dangerous explosive that can cause severe injury to others, and second, he or she is on a quarter-inch-long fuse, which presents emotional outbursts as sudden, unpredictable, and dangerous.

Closely related to the use of individual metaphors in a therapeutic context are those cases in which people create novel metaphors as a result of unique and traumatic life experiences. The metaphors that are created under these circumstances need not be consciously formed. An interesting example of this was called to my attention by Helene Knox (personal communication, August 2003) in an issue of the magazine *A & U* (March 2003). The photographic artist Frank Jump photographs old painted mural advertisements in New York City. He has acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS), but he has exceeded his expected life span. His life and his art are intimately connected metaphorically. The metaphor could be expressed as follows: SURVIVING AIDS DESPITE PREDICTIONS TO THE CONTRARY IS FOR THE OLD MURAL ADVERTISEMENTS TO SURVIVE THEIR EXPECTED "LIFE SPAN." At first, Jump was not consciously

aware that he works within the frame of a metaphor. In his own words:

> In the beginning, I didn't make the connection between the subject matter and my own sero-positivity. I was asked to be part of the Day Without Art exhibition a few years ago and didn't think I was worthy – other artists' work was much more HIV-specific. . . . But my mentor said, "Don't you see the connection? You're documenting something that was never intended to live this long. *You* never intended to live this long." (p. 27; italics in the original)

The mentor made the metaphor conscious for the artist. I believe something similar is happening in many cases of psychotherapy.

BREAKING DOWN THE BOUNDARIES OF DIMENSIONS

Metaphor variation as I have presented it so far in the chapter operates along clearly delineated dimensions, such as the social, regional, and subcultural ones. However, the dimensions along which metaphors vary merge in most cases, exemplifying variation along several dimensions all at the same time. A beautiful illustration of this can be found in Elena Semino and Kate Swindlehurst's analysis of Ken Kesey's novel *One Flew over the Cuckoo's Nest*. A major character and the narrator of the story is an Indian called Bromden. As Semino and Swindlehurst (1996) note, Bromden has a peculiar view of the world in which he sees it as a whole as a huge machine room: THE WORLD IS A MACHINE ROOM. In addition, the smaller world of the hospital where the patients are treated is a machine room: THE HOSPITAL IS A MACHINE ROOM. In this world, almost everything functions as a machine:

THE STAFF ARE ROBOTS
TREATMENT IS THE REPAIR OR INSTALLATION OF MECHANICAL PARTS
THE CHIEF OFFICIAL OF THE HOSPITAL WARD IS A MACHINE

The "MACHINE" metaphor is not unfamiliar to us. We use it all the time when we think and talk about all kinds of "abstract complex systems" (see Kövecses, 1995a, 2002): We talk about "the *machinery* of democracy," "the *workings* of the mind," "*setting the wheels* of the economy *in motion*," "*throwing a monkey wrench in the works*," and countless other

examples. These are all highly conventionalized expressions making use of the source domain of machines. The main meaning focus of these and other linguistic expressions is the effective functioning of abstract complex systems, such as political systems, the mind, and the economy. In other words, we typically use the metaphor of machine when we are concerned with the issue of whether or not the system works properly (e.g., *grease the wheels, working like clockwork, well-functioning, throw a monkey wrench in the works, the wheels are turning now*).

However, Bromden does not use the metaphor this way. He goes way beyond this conventional pattern of metaphorical thought and, as Semino and Swindlehurst show, sees more or less everything in mechanical terms. Some examples might give a flavor of this "over-generalized" application of the machine metaphor by Bromden:

I creep along the floor quiet as dust in my canvas shoes, but they got special sensitive equipment detects my fear and they all look up, all three at once, eyes glittering out of the black faces like the hard glitter of radio tubes out of the back of an old radio. Hum of black machinery, humming hate and death and other hospital secrets.

Her nostrils flare open, and every breath she draws she gets bigger. . . . She works the hinges in her elbows and fingers. I hear a small squeak. She starts moving, and I get back against the wall, and when she rumbles past she's already big as a truck, trailing that wicker bag in her exhaust like a semi behind a Jimmy Diesel. (examples from Semino and Swindlehurst, 1996: 150–152)

These and numerous other examples indicate meanings far beyond the conventional use of the machine metaphor.

The analysis by Semino and Swindlehurst gives us an idea of how the boundaries of particular dimensions of metaphor variation can often be and are in fact broken down. Specifically, we can observe that Bromden is an individual with very specific experiences of the world around him, which give his metaphors individual status. Second, we should also notice the creativity and uniqueness of his metaphors, which give them a literary flavor. Third, the metaphors used by Bromden also reveal the mind of a mentally disturbed person, who has a distorted vision of the world. Fourth, the heavy reliance on machinery in Bromden's thoughts may also be a product of a certain

age and place: highly industrialized Western society after the Second World War, with a great deal of use of and fascination for machines. In other words, accounting for Bromden's metaphor usage requires us to pay equal attention to divergent dimensions at the same time, including the individual, stylistic, subcultural, diachronic, and regional. Taking all this into account, we can see how the dimensions of metaphor variation can jointly influence the metaphors we actually use in particular situations.

ASPECTS OF METAPHOR INVOLVED
IN VARIATION

6

How Components of Conceptual Metaphor Are Involved in Variation

As we saw in chapter 1, the cognitive linguistic view of metaphors consists of several components. For convenience, here they are again:

1. Source domain
2. Target domain
3. Experiential basis
4. Neural structures corresponding to (1) and (2) in the brain
5. Relationships between the source and the target
6. Metaphorical linguistic expressions
7. Mappings
8. Entailments
9. Blends
10. Nonlinguistic realizations
11. Cultural models

We can conceive of these components as *aspects* of metaphor.

In previous chapters, we have already seen how some of these aspects are involved in metaphor variation. I dealt with the experiential basis of metaphor in chapters 2 and 3, and with the relationship of source and target in chapter 4, where I discussed the notions of range of target and scope of source. I will say more about the experiential basis of metaphor in later chapters (especially in chapter 10) and will treat the other two issues (i.e., range of target, scope of source) only briefly here. Moreover, some of the aspects of metaphor are such

robust parts of the issue of variation that they require treatment in separate chapters. For this reason, I will discuss the linguistic expression of metaphor (in chapter 7), the nonlinguistic realization of metaphor (in chapter 8), cultural models (in chapter 9), and conceptual integration (or blending) (in chapter 11) in separate chapters.

At this point, the question for us is: Which of these aspects are involved in metaphor variation, and how? The answer is simple: all of them. The main goal of the present chapter is to demonstrate by means of a few examples how the various aspects of metaphor participate in variation. In particular, I will discuss the following components:

Source and target
The relationship between source and target
Mappings
Entailments
Blending

As mentioned the other components either have been discussed in earlier chapters or are discussed in later ones.

<div align="center">SOURCE AND TARGET</div>

Source and target domains can be involved in metaphor variation in an interesting way. This is because source and target concepts may be conceptualized in multiple ways. The different construals of a source and/or target may then lead to multiple versions of a conceptual metaphor that look the same at first glance.

<div align="center">**Source**</div>

Let us begin with source domains. Consider the case of the SOCIETY IS A FAMILY metaphor (to be discussed further in chapters 8 and 12). This appears to be a fairly straightforward conceptual metaphor. But problems arise when we ask precisely what kind of family is made use of here. As George Lakoff (1996) showed, there are several distinct versions of the concept of family in American culture. Some people use the "strict father" model of the family; others seem to have a "nurturant" family model in mind. Lakoff convincingly argues that the particular conception of the family that people hold has

far-reaching consequences for their thinking about social and political issues. One's notion of society depends on whether the person believes in a family in which there is a major authority figure who runs the family on the basis of the principles of reward or punishment or, alternatively, in a family in which the family functions on the basis of helping, caring for, and empathizing with each other. Lakoff demonstrates that the particular construal of the family influences the way one thinks about a variety of social issues, such as college loans, abortion, and the role of the government in society. In other words, some source domains may have clearly distinct construals, and these differences in the way we think about the source may be responsible for creating alternative conceptual metaphors. Importantly, this can happen in cases, such as the source domain of family, in which the source is a seemingly straightforward and unproblematic concept. We have an apparently single source domain, but the source has two construals. As a result, the distinct construals yield in fact two conceptual metaphors for the same target. This is a case of within-culture variation.

Different construals of the same source domain may also lead to cross-linguistic metaphor variation. Given a particular source, this source may be construed differently in two languages. A case in point is the source domain of motion in space in English and Turkish, as analyzed by Seyda Özcaliskan (2003, in press). Özcaliskan showed that English primarily encodes manner into its verbs of motion (e.g., *walk, run, march*), whereas Turkish motion verbs in general lack this information concerning motion. Turkish primarily encodes direction into many of its motion verbs (e.g., verbs corresponding to English *fall, come, spread, descend*). This difference in the construal of motion events leads speakers of the two languages to comprehend target domains by means of a shared source domain that, for them, has two versions: the manner-centered one (for English) and the neutral or direction-centered one (for Turkish). In this case, the shared source is at a high level of abstraction, whereas the cross-linguistic differences are found at a specific level of conceptual organization. Moreover, as Özcaliskan notes, this built-in difference in the kinds of information that the source domain encodes may predispose the speakers of the two languages to attend to slightly different aspects of not only the source but also the target domain.

Specificity and Congruence of the Source

Given a shared generic-level metaphor, two languages or varieties may have different source domains to conceptualize a target. For example, both English and Chinese have the same generic-level metaphor for politics: POLITICS IS SPORT. However, whereas in American English the specific source domain is typically AMERICAN FOOTBALL or BASEBALL, in Chinese it is typically TABLE TENNIS, VOLLEYBALL, or SOCCER (Yu, 1998). The same kind of variation can be found between varieties of the same language. We noted that in American slang the HAPPY IS BRIGHT metaphor can be specified as FRIED EGGS, as in the expression *sunny side up* or its opposite, *over easy*. In such cases, a generic source concept is specified differentially but in a way congruent with the generic source at lower levels. Two languages or varieties can pick different but congruent specific-level concepts of the same source domain.

This phenomenon occurs on a large scale. Let us take some further examples that have anger as a target domain. Consider all the specific-level manifestations of the generic-level PRESSURIZED CONTAINER metaphor for anger. In American English, the dangerous PRESSUR-IZED CONTAINER is specified as A HOT FLUID IN A CONTAINER at a lower level of conceptual organization, and at a still lower level it can be further specified as a VOLCANO, a FUSE, an EXPLOSIVE, a COW GIV-ING BIRTH, and so on. These latter, highly specific source domains are likely to be much more language-specific than either the HOT FLUID metaphor or the PRESSURIZED CONTAINER metaphor, which is a potentially universal conceptual metaphor. In another case, Hungarian shares with English the conceptual metaphors THE BODY IS A CON-TAINER FOR THE EMOTIONS and ANGER IS FIRE. The body and the fire inside it are commonly elaborated in Hungarian as a PIPE, in which there is a burning substance inside a container. This conceptual elaboration seems to be unique to Hungarian. Hungarians also tend to use the more specific container of the HEAD (with the brain inside) for the general BODY CONTAINER in English in talking about anger, and a number of Hungarian expressions indicate the ways anger can affect the head and the brain (Bokor, 1997). Linguistic expressions in English do not seem to emphasize the HEAD (or brain) as the container of anger to the same degree (except for the single expression

to lose one's head). However, as an anonymous reviewer suggested to me, this might be somewhat misleading evidence because in other modes of expression, such as cartoons, Americans also privilege the head as the major container of anger.

In general, it seems that different languages and varieties use different but congruent source domains at lower levels of conceptual organization, whereas at higher levels the source domains are more likely to be cross-culturally shared.

Target

The target domain can also be conceptualized differently in two languages, and this can result in different metaphors. Work by Michelle Emanatian (1995) shows that English and Chagga, an African language spoken in Tanzania, share certain metaphors of sexuality and sexual desire, such as SEXUAL DESIRE IS EATING, ANIMAL BEHAVIOR, and HEAT. However, the Chagga conceptualize, or frame, the target domain of sexual desire differently than speakers of English frame it. Unlike speakers of English, who conceptualize both male and female lust, the Chagga talk only about the sexual desire of males. Thus, although the two sets of speakers share some of their conceptual metaphors for the same target domain, the differential conceptualization of this target domain results in subtle but important differences in the mappings that constitute the metaphors. I will return to some of the details involved in this example in chapter 10.

In sum, we have seen in this section how differential framings of either the source or the target domains (or both) can produce different conceptual metaphors. We can conceive of such differences in framing as changes in the main meaning focus of the "same" source or target domain. The shift in meaning focus can occur both cross-culturally and within-culture. In either case, it may be a cause of variation in conceptual metaphor.

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SOURCE AND TARGET

I have distinguished two distinct types of relationship between the source and the target domains: the range of target and the scope of source (see chapter 4). In this chapter, I simply mention some of

the same examples and discuss some additional ones for the two relationships.

Range of Target

A language or a variety of it can have a certain target domain that is conventionally associated with a set of source domains. I call this set of source domains the *range of the target*. Two languages or varieties may have different ranges of source domains for a given target domain. We have seen a large number of examples for this kind of variation – both across languages and within the same language (see chapters 4 and 5). As an additional example, we can again consider Emanatian's (1995) work on the Chagga of Africa. On the basis of her description of Chagga sexual language, it seems that the Chagga would be surprised to hear that people in the West conceptualize sexual desire as INSANITY and the lustful person as a FUNCTIONING MACHINE (see Lakoff, 1987). In contrast, most Westerners would probably find it strange that, at least traditionally, the Japanese view women as COMMODITIES and women who are no longer virgins are conceptualized as FLAWED ARTICLES.

As for cases of within-culture variation in the range of metaphor targets, we saw that the ANGRY PERSON IS A TENSE PHYSICAL OBJECT metaphor chiefly characterizes speakers of American slang. And we found in chapter 5 that different individuals may have (at least superficially) different and unique conceptual metaphors for their concept of love. As a further example, we saw that the concept of sadness is conceptualized predominantly as DARK, DOWN, and HEAVY in English and possibly in the languages of all Western mainstream cultures. However, the psychotherapeutic counterpart of this concept – depression – is also understood in terms of the source domain of CAPTOR (see chapter 5). Thus, individuals and subcultures may also differ in the range of the source domains that they employ in the comprehension of abstract domains of experience.

Scope of Source

As we just saw, the range of metaphor involves cases in which a given target domain is associated with different sets of source domains in two or more languages or varieties. By contrast, the scope of metaphor

involves cases in which a given source domain is associated with different sets of targets in two or more languages or varieties. The main example for this source–target relation is the concept of BUILDING as a source domain that was discussed in terms of cross-cultural variation (see chapter 4). I pointed out on the basis of evidence from native speakers of a number of languages that the scope of this metaphorical source is pretty much the same in English and Japanese, whereas it differs from both in Tunisian Arabic. Tunisian Arabic has additional targets for BUILDING, and it does not apply to some of the targets that English and Japanese have.

<div align="center">MAPPINGS</div>

The mappings of the same metaphor may be different across any two languages or varieties. One of the best studied metaphors with a highly stable set of mappings is LIFE IS A JOURNEY (Lakoff, 1990; 1993). The JOURNEY metaphor for life surfaces in a large number of metaphorical linguistic expressions in English, including the following:

LIFE IS A JOURNEY
He's *without direction* in life.
I'm *where I want to be* in life.
I'm *at a crossroads* in my life.
She'll *go places* in life.
He's never let anyone *get in his way*.
She's *gone through* a lot in life.

These metaphorical expressions are based on the mappings that follow:

travelers → people leading a life
motion along the way → leading a life
destination(s) of the journey → purpose(s) of life
obstacles along the way → difficulties in life
different paths to one's destination(s) → different means of
   achieving one's purpose(s)
distance covered along the way → progress made in life
locations along the way → stages in life
guides along the way → helpers or counselors in life

This is a metaphor that has the potential to structure the life of many people, especially in the Western world. The set of mappings that characterize the metaphor are highly conventional, and that means that people who live by the metaphor think of life in terms of a traveler's moving along a path with different locations, trying to reach a destination (or several destinations) along the way, and assessing his or her progress in terms of the distance covered relative to a destination (or destinations). There might be obstacles–difficulties along the way, but people might also be helped by guides–helpers as they try to reach their goals.

Though these mappings as spelled out are widely shared in the Western world, they are not universal across all languages and varieties of languages. One example that can demonstrate this point is provided by Olaf Jakel's (2002) analysis of the LIFE IS A JOURNEY metaphor in an English version of the Old Testament. Let us go over some representative examples of the metaphor in Jakel's study.

As Jakel points out, the journey in the Old Testament is a moral journey. Let us take one example from Jakel's analysis that illustrates this:

> You must *follow exactly the path* that the Lord your God has commanded you.

The example is based on the mapping LEADING A MORAL LIFE IS MAKING A JOURNEY ON GOD'S WAY. Moral digression is conceptualized in this metaphor as deviation from the path established by God:

> For I have *kept the ways of the Lord*, and have not wickedly *departed from* my God.

The mapping that underlies examples of this kind is SINNING IS DEVIATING FROM GOD'S WAY.

One important feature of the path in the source domain is that it is straight:

> To the faithful *his ways are straight*, but full of pitfalls for the wicked.

In the target this corresponds to God's way, the only moral way, yielding the mapping GOD'S WAY IS A STRAIGHT PATH. People receive

instructions or guidance during the journey, and those who listen are on the path to eternal life:

> Whoever heeds instruction is *on the path to life*, but one who rejects a rebuke *goes astray*.

The two mappings on which the sentence is based are HELP OR COUNSELING FOR PEOPLE TO LIVE A GOOD LIFE IS GUIDANCE DURING THE JOURNEY and GOD'S WAY LEADS TO ETERNAL LIFE. Evil ways, on the other hand, are not straight; they are crooked:

> But those who *turn aside to their own crooked ways the Lord will lead away* with evildoers.

Thus, we have the mapping EVIL WAYS ARE CROOKED. Moreover, a further mapping is EVIL WAYS LEAD TO DEATH.

> Sometimes there is *a way* that seems to be right, but in the end it is *the way to death*.

The travelers in this journey can be the righteous and the wicked, that is, morally good or bad people. The righteous keep a straight path:

> Keep *straight the path of your feet*, and all your ways will be sure.
> Do not *swerve to the right or to the left*; *turn your foot away from* evil.

The wicked, on the other hand, do not follow God's way, hence the mapping THE WICKED WANDER OFF GOD'S WAY:

> But my people . . . *have stumbled in their ways, in the ancient roads, and have gone into bypaths, not the highway*.

The righteous get support from their guide, who leads them.

> He [God] *will be our guide forever*.
> He *leads me in right paths*.

The last couple of examples are based on the metaphorical mappings GOD IS THE GUIDE and GOD LEADS THE RIGHTEOUS.

As Jakel (2002) observed, many of the mappings that underlie the biblical text have their counterparts in the widely used worldly version of the metaphor. Thus both the worldly and the biblical versions have the following mappings:

travelers → people leading a life
motion along the way → leading a life
obstacles along the way → difficulties in life
guides along the way → helpers or counselors in life

However, as Jakel points out, several of them do not seem to be present, or play only a minor role, in the biblical version. These include the following:

destination(s) of the journey → purpose(s) of life
different paths to one's destination(s) → different means of
   achieving one's purpose(s)
distance covered along the way → progress made in life
locations along the way → stages in life

In other words, in the biblical version there are no intermediate destinations associated with successive legs of the journey corresponding to one's intermediate purposes at different stages of one's life. There is only one final goal – which is eternal life. There are no different paths to reach destinations corresponding to different ways of achieving one's purposes. There is only a single straight path, a single moral way, which is God's way. And there is no mention that the distance covered during the journey corresponds to the progress made in life. There is only one long extended effort to follow God's way at all times.

Thus we have two different sets of mapping for the same conceptual metaphor, LIFE IS A JOURNEY. The differences in mapping characterize two different segments of Western culture: a profane mainstream culture and a religious subculture (or the other way around). In addition, Jakel (1996: 18) notes that there is also a third set of mappings that characterizes another religious subculture and the language of this subculture – the New Testament. A major distinguishing characteristic of this mode of thinking about life is that, in it, the guide of the journey of life also becomes the way itself:

[Jesus speaks] "And you know *the way to the place where I am going."* Thomas said to him, "Lord, we do not know where you are going. How can we know the way?" Jesus said to him, "*I am the way*, and the truth, and the life. *No one comes to the Father except through me."*

Here the guide and the path are combined into a single entity, Jesus, who embodies both.

To complicate matters further, it is not the case that the different sets of mappings neatly distinguish among all segments of the Judeo-Christian world. Orsolya Izsó (personal communication, June 2000) informs me that the worldly version of the LIFE IS A JOURNEY metaphor is very much accepted in its entirety by the Mormons, who also accept the New Testament version of it as well.

In sum, what I have tried to demonstrate here, using work by Jakel, is that mappings are flexible aspects of metaphor in the cognitive linguistic view. Mappings characterizing particular conceptual metaphors can change through time and can vary from culture to culture, and from subculture to subculture.

ENTAILMENTS

Two languages or varieties can have the same conceptual metaphor, but the source domain in one language or variety may give rise to a set of entailments different from those in the other. The following are some examples for this process taken from a comparison of metaphors for anger in English and Zulu. The analysis of the Zulu metaphors is based on Taylor and Mbense's (1998) work on Zulu anger.

Both English and Zulu have FIRE as a source domain for anger, but speakers of Zulu make use of inferences concerning the metaphor in a way in which speakers of English do not. In Zulu one can *extinguish* somebody's anger by pouring water on him or her. This possible metaphorical entailment is not picked up by the English FIRE metaphor in the form of conventionalized linguistic expressions. Notice, however, that the metaphorical entailment is perfectly applicable to enthusiasm in English, as when someone is said to be a *wet blanket* at a party. Passion can also be comprehended via a similar entailment in English, as when speakers of English say, "She *doused* his passion" (example suggested by an anonymous reviewer). In other words, the entailment of the FIRE source domain that applies to anger in Zulu does not apply to anger in English but does apply to enthusiasm and passion.

The cultural, or cognitive, model of anger has desire (to harm) as a component in both English and Zulu. This can be found as a

submapping of the ANGER IS A WILD ANIMAL metaphor: DESIRE IS HUNGER. This submetaphor appears to exist in Zulu as well, but it seems to have unique entailments for speakers of Zulu. We can interpret Taylor and Mbense's (1998) description of Zulu anger in such a way as to suggest that in Zulu an angry person's appetite can be so voracious that he or she eats food that is not even prepared or does not even separate edible from inedible food. This aspect of the metaphor is obviously missing from English, at least as judged by the English conventionalized linguistic expressions.

In both English and Zulu, anger can be comprehended as A NATURAL FORCE. But speakers of Zulu go much further in making use of the entailment potential of this metaphor than speakers of English. In Zulu one can say of an angry person that *the sky became dark with thunderclouds, the sky* (= lightning) *almost singed us*, or *why did he blow a gale?* These entailments do not exist in English in conventionalized form, but speakers of English may well understand them given the shared conceptual metaphor.

In general, source domains can potentially lead to a number of metaphorical entailments. Given a shared source domain, this metaphorical entailment potential seems to be utilized differentially in different languages and cultures.

BLENDING

An interesting case of metaphor variation is the process of blending, or conceptual integration (see Fauconnier and Turner, 2002). Blending is a process that makes use of but also goes beyond conceptual metaphors, in that it can account for cases in which people imaginatively construct elements that cannot be found in either the source or the target domain. Blends vary in their degree of conventionality, but often they occur in creative individual uses of language and thought. Several such usages can be found in the works of writers. For the purposes of illustration I provide one example here. A more detailed treatment of blending, or conceptual integration, is given in chapter 11.

Szilvia Csábi (2001) analyzed Puritan literature in early 17th century America. She found a pervasive metaphor in many works of this literary tradition: THE SETTLEMENT OF AMERICA BY THE PURITANS IS

THE EXODUS OF THE JEWS FROM EGYPT TO CANAAN. This overarching conceptual metaphor helps explain much of the language and character of Puritan literature. It consists of the following mappings:

the Exodus → the settlement of America by the Puritans
the Jews → the Puritans
Egypt → England
Canaan → America
native inhabitants of Canaan → the North American Indians

Here we have the source domain (the biblical Exodus) and the target domain (the Puritan settlement) conceptually connected in the fashion spelled out in the mappings. The mappings make sense of a great deal of the literary phrases in Puritan literature, but they do not account for everything that is mentioned in these texts. Csábi (2001) takes the following text from Cotton Mather's work *Nehemias Americanus* (The American Nehemiah).

But whilst [John Winthrop] thus did, as our New English Nehemiah, the part of a ruler in managing the public affairs of our American Jerusalem, when there were Tobijahs and Sanballats enough to vex him, . . . he made himself still an exacter parallel unto that governor of Israel, by doing the part of a neighbor among the distressed people of the new plantation. (quoted in Csábi, 2001: 203)

In this case, John Winthrop in the target domain does not simply correspond to Nehemiah in the source domain. In the text, the Jewish leader Nehemiah and John Winthrop are not merely each other's counterparts, as conceptual metaphor analysis would have it. In other words, there cannot be a direct projection from the source to the target. This is linguistically indicated by the noun phrase *New English Nehemiah*. On the one hand, the *New English Nehemiah* did not exist in the source domain of the Bible, in which there were no *New English* people, and, on the other, it cannot have existed in 17th-century New England, where there were no real *Nehemiahs*. The phrase can only be made sense of if we assume the existence of a conceptual blend, a new frame in which Nehemiah from the source is combined with John Winthrop in the target, yielding the newly emergent entity of the *New English Nehemiah* in Cotton Mather's writing.

METAPHOR VARIATION: WHERE ARE WE NOW?

The theory of conceptual metaphor consists of at least 11 components. Of these 11, I examined in this chapter how 6 are involved in the process of metaphor variation: source domain, target domain, relationship between the source and target, mappings, entailments, and blends. We have seen that the source and target domains can actually produce variation in metaphor, and the others can be affected by it.

In general, I wish to suggest that all 11 components are involved in the process – in basically two different ways: either as producers of variation or as components affected by it. As we saw in this chapter and in chapters 1, 2, and 3, the experiential basis, the (different framings of the) source and target domains, and blending seem to *produce* metaphor variation, whereas the other components (such as mappings and entailments) seem to be *affected* by it. The other "affected" components include linguistic metaphors and nonlinguistic realizations of conceptual metaphors.

The role of cultural models in metaphor variation cannot be fitted easily into this framework; it can be seen as either producing or being affected by variation. The choice, it seems to me, depends on the way we see the relationship between conceptual metaphors and cultural models. Because this is another crucially important topic in any discussion of the relationship between metaphor and culture, I will deal with it separately in chapter 9.

7

Conceptual Metaphors and Their Linguistic Expression in Different Languages

My general concern in this chapter is with the regularities of the ways conceptual metaphors are expressed linguistically in different languages. Is the linguistic expression of shared conceptual metaphors also the same, or, alternatively, different from language to language? Several studies have revealed both differences and similarities in the linguistic expression of conceptual metaphors. *In exactly what ways* does the linguistic expression of shared conceptual metaphors differ or is it similar across languages, and, even more importantly, in exactly what ways *can* it differ or be similar, and why? (For previous work on this issue, see, for example, Barcelona, 2001; Charteris-Black, 2002; Deignan, Gabrys, and Solska, 1997; Kövecses, 2001; Kövecses and Szabó, 1996; and Pontoretto, 1994). The work that I describe here is intended to be a contribution to the further clarification of this general question.

More specifically, four issues are investigated in some detail: (1) how particular *figurative meanings* are expressed by means of one or several conceptual metaphors in different languages; (2) whether abstract meaning *can be expressed literally* at all; (3) what the subtle details of the differences in the linguistic expression of the *same conceptual metaphor* are; and (4) how particular *cultural contexts* in which conceptual metaphors are embedded influence the linguistic expression of these metaphors. The four issues are considered in separate sections.

In considering these issues I mainly analyze two conceptual metaphors that exist in both English and Hungarian: TIME IS MONEY

(or, more generally, VALUABLE RESOURCE) and LOVE IS A JOURNEY (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980). TIME IS MONEY is discussed in connection with the first issue, and LOVE IS A JOURNEY is used in connection with the fourth. I use both to deal with the second. And a variety of different metaphorical examples are discussed in studying the third question the chapter addresses.

THE EXPRESSION OF THE SAME FIGURATIVE MEANING

It is a well-known fact that metaphorical expressions can be translated from one language into another in several ways. This creates a problem for the investigation of the question mentioned. How do we determine what the "equivalent" of a particular metaphorical expression is in another language? For this reason, it was necessary to arrive at the most acceptable translation equivalents of the 16 English metaphorical linguistic expressions of the TIME IS MONEY (VALUABLE RESOURCE) metaphor as first described in Lakoff and Johnson (1980). Students in two of my seminars (20 students altogether) translated the expressions into Hungarian, and then we discussed all the cases in which there was disagreement among us concerning the translations. In the course of the discussion, we tried to arrive at translation equivalents that were acceptable to all of us or at least to the majority. Thus, the translations to follow represent this majority opinion of 20 native speakers of Hungarian, who also have a fluent command of English.

When we study similarities and differences in the metaphorical expression of a conceptual metaphor, we need to take into account a number of factors or parameters, including the literal meaning of the expressions used, the figurative meaning to be expressed, and the conceptual metaphor (or, in some cases, metaphors) on the basis of which figurative meanings are expressed. As a fourth parameter, there is also a linguistic form that is used, but this is necessarily (or at least almost always) different in the case of two different languages. Thus, the comments that follow that explain the differences in linguistic expression between English and Hungarian make use of the notions of literal meaning, figurative meaning, and conceptual metaphor. I am aware that all of these are problematic and debated concepts, but for the purposes of this chapter I assume their standard usage in the cognitive linguistic literature.

Given that we will use these notions and given that in this section we keep the same figurative meaning constant, we can expect different patterns that characterize the differences, such as different literal meanings' giving rise to the same figurative meaning, the same conceptual metaphor's giving rise to the same figurative meaning, or different conceptual metaphors' giving rise to the same conceptual meaning. For the sake of completeness, however, when I indicate the patterns that characterize the differences, I will also include linguistic form as the fourth parameter. Each example is characterized by one or several patterns in which I indicate whether the form is the same or different (in this case, it is always different); whether the literal meaning is the same or different; whether the figurative meaning is the same or different (this remains the same throughout in this section); and whether the conceptual metaphor is the same or different. Thus, I work with the following distinctions formulated as questions:

1. Is the word form in question the *same* or *different* in the two languages?
2. Is the literal meaning of that word form the *same* or *different* in the two languages?
3. Is the figurative meaning of that word form the *same* or *different* in the two languages?
4. Is the conceptual metaphor underlying the word with that particular literal and figurative meaning the *same* or *different* in the two languages?

If we compare the linguistic expression of a particular conceptual metaphor in two languages, various kinds of possibilities, or, as I will call them, *patterns*, suggest themselves. I will determine the patterns on the basis of the translations we arrived at as a group.

Let us now see the expression of the TIME IS MONEY metaphor in English and Hungarian and the particular patterns that the translation of the English examples into Hungarian suggests:
(The following grammatical abbreviations are used: PERS = person, POSS = possessive, ACC = accusative, PART = verbal particle, INST = instrumental, CONJ = conjunction, DAT = dative, INF = infinitive, IMP = imperative, LOC = locative, COND = conditional, PURP = purpose.)

TIME IS MONEY

(1) You're *wasting* my time.

(a) Pazarlod/pocsékolod az időmet.

Waste-2nd PERS the time-POSS-ACC

The Hungarian sentence is a straightforward translation of the English one. The word form that literally means the same as *waste, pocsékol*, is used in Hungarian, together with the word form that means 'time,' *idő. Pattern*: different, same, same, same.

(2) This gadget will *save* you hours.

(a) Ezzel a szerkentyűvel sok időt spórolhatsz/takaríthatsz meg.

This-INST the gadget-INST much time-ACC save-can-2nd PERS PART

Again, the Hungarian translation is fairly straightforward, except for the different syntactic constructions used. The word forms that literally mean the same as *save, megspórol* and *megtakarít*, are used in Hungarian. Instead of the word meaning 'hour,' the Hungarian sentence can only make use of the word meaning 'time.' *Pattern*: different, same, same, same.

(3) I don't *have* the time to *give* you.

(a) *Nincs időm, amit neked adhatnék.

No time-POSS that (CONJ-ACC) you-DAT give-can-COND-1st PERS

(b) Nincs időm a számodra.

No time-POSS the you-DAT

(c) Nem tudok rád időt szakítani.

Not can-1st PERS you-LOC time-ACC tear-INF

Although Hungarians can say *Nincs pénzem, amit neked adhatnék* ('I don't have the money to give you'), they cannot say *Nincs időm, amit neked adhatnék* [see (a)]. In Hungarian, one can say both *Nincs időm* ('I don't have time') and *Adok neked időt* 'I'll give you time,' but not the two clauses combined (*Nincs időm, amit neked adok* 'I don't have time to give you'). In expressing the meaning that characterizes the English sentence, Hungarians resort to the sentence *Nincs időm a számodra* ('I don't have the time for you') [see (b)], which consists of fairly hidden linguistic metaphors based on the TIME-AS-A-VALUABLE

COMMODITY metaphor ('no-be my-time the for-you'). But the same idea can also be expressed by a metaphorically much more explicit phrase that is based on a different metaphor: *Nem tudok időt szakítani rád* ('I cannot tear off time for you') [see (c)]. The conceptual metaphor underlying this Hungarian metaphorical expression is similar to TIME IS A SOLID MASS or OBJECT, a mass or object from which one can tear off a piece. *Patterns*: different, different, same, same [for (b)], or, alternatively, different, different, same, different [for (c)].

(4) How do you *spend* your time these days?
(a) *Hogyan költöd az idődet mostanában?
What-LOC spend-2nd PERS the time-POSS-ACC present-in
(b) Mivel/hogy(an) töltöd az idődet mostanában?
What-INST/how fill-2nd PERS the time-POSS-ACC present-in

The Hungarian literal equivalent of *spend*, *költ*, cannot be used in reference to time [see (a)]. The Hungarian equivalent of the English metaphorical expression, which is *tölt* (literally, *fill*), is based on a different conceptual metaphor: TIME IS A CONTAINER. The time container is filled with actions; hence, ACTIONS ARE SUBSTANCES THAT GO INTO THE TIME CONTAINER. *Pattern*: different, different, same, different.

(5) That flat tire *cost* me an hour.
(a) A defekt egy órámba került.
The flat tire one hour-POSS-LOC cost-PAST

The English sentence translates into Hungarian without difficulty. The Hungarian word that literally means the same as *cost, kerül*, can be used in the figurative sense. *Pattern*: different, same, same, same.

(6) I've *invested* a lot of time in her.
(a) Sok időt invesztáltam/fektettem/feccöltem abba a nőbe/belé.
Much time-ACC invest-1st PERS that-into (PRON) the woman-
    LOC

The Hungarian word that etymologically derives from the same Latin word as the English word *invest* does is *invesztál*. Thus, to some extent it is both similar to and different from the English one. For this reason, it would be possible to argue both that the Hungarian word is the same word form as the English one and that the Hungarian word form is different from the English form. Other Hungarian words that have

the same figurative meaning and derive from the same TIME IS MONEY metaphor are *befektet* and *feccöl*. Whereas the former is stylistically neutral, the latter is a very informal variant of it. *Pattern*: different, same, same, same.

(7) I don't *have enough* time to *spare* for that.
(a) Nincs vesztegetni való időm (erre).
No waste/lose-INF be-PURP time-POSS (this-LOC/PURP)

(b) Nincs rá fölösleges időm.
No it-LOC/PURP superfluous time-POSS

Although, for syntactic reasons, Hungarian cannot have a straight-forward translation equivalent of (7), it can have a semantically equivalent translation, making use of the verb *veszteget* (roughly, *to waste/lose*) [see (a)]. In addition, Hungarians can also resort to a partly metaphorical, partly apparently literal sentence, as in (b): *Nincs rá fölösleges időm* ('I have no superfluous time for this'). The metaphorical part arises from a translation of 'I don't have,' and the apparently literal part from the translation of *time to spare*. The translation of this latter phrase is literal; that means that an apparently nonmetaphorical word expresses a meaning that is expressed by a metaphorical one in English. *Pattern*: different, different, same, same [for (a)] and different, same, same, same for 'I don't have,' plus different, different, same, [no metaphor] for 'time to spare' [in (b)].

(8) You're *running out of* time.
(a) Kifutsz az időből.
Out-run-2nd-PERS the time-SOURCE

The English sentence translates easily into Hungarian. However, since several monolingual dictionaries do not have the figurative meaning for the verb *kifut* ('out-run,' i.e., *run out*) and only more recent ones provide it, we can assume that this figurative meaning is a relatively recent development in Hungarian. *Pattern*: different, same, same, same.

(9) You need to *budget* your time.
(a) Be kell osztanod az idődet.
Into must budget-2nd PERS the time-2nd PERS-ACC

The Hungarian word that literally means the same as the English verb *budget* can be used in the same figurative meaning. *Pattern*: different, same, same, same.

(10) *Put aside* some time for Ping-Pong.
(a) *Tegyél félre egy kis időt a pingpongra.
Put-2nd PERS-IMP aside one little time-ACC the ping pong-LOC/ PURP
(b) Hagyj egy kis időt a pingpongra.
Leave-2nd PERS-IMP one little time-ACC the ping pong-LOC/ PURP
(c) Szakíts egy kis időt a pingpongra.
Tear-2nd PERS-IMP one little time-ACC the Ping-Pong-LOC/ PURP

The word-for-word translation of the English verb *put aside* into Hungarian is not possible when it refers to time [see (a)]. This situation is similar to that in (3). The verb that can be used is the equivalent of *leave*, which can denote both money and time [see (b)]. As another possibility, Hungarians also use *szakít*, the verb that is an expression of the TIME IS A SOLID MASS or OBJECT conceptual metaphor [see (c)]. Thus we get two patterns. *Patterns*: different, different, same, same [for (b)], or different, different, same, different [for (c)].

(11) Is that *worth your while*?
(a) Megéri ez neked az *idődet?
Be-worth-3rd PERS this you-DAT the time-POSS-ACC
(b) Megéri ez neked a fáradságot/vesződséget?
Be-worth-3rd PERS the effort-ACC/trouble-ACC
(c) Megéri a beléfektetett idődet?
Be-worth-3rd PERS the invested time-POSS-ACC

Hungarian cannot use the verb *megéri*, corresponding to *be worth*, in direct conjunction with the noun *idő*, corresponding to time [see (a)]. However, it can use nominalizations for this purpose. The resulting nominal typically means 'effort,' 'trouble,' and the like [see (b)]. Alternatively, the verb *megéri* can also take the noun *idő* modified by an adjective (e.g., 'your invested time' [as in (c)]. *Pattern*: different,

same, same, same.

(12) Do you *have* much time *left*?
(a) Sok időd maradt még?
Much time-POSS left yet

Hungarian can also make use of the verb *marad*, which has the same literal meaning as the English verb *leave. Pattern*: different, same, same, same.

(13) He's living on *borrowed* time.
(a) *?Kölcsönvett/hitelbe kapott időből él.
Borrowed time-SOURCE live-3rd PERS
(b) Minden nap ajándék számára.
Every day gift him/her-DAT
(c) Kapott egy kis időt ajándékba az élettől.
Receive-3rd PERS-PAST one little time-ACC gift-LOC/PURP the
    life-SOURCE

The Hungarian verb *kölcsönvesz* (*borrow*) does not have the metaphorical application that the English verb *borrow* has [see (a)]. However, a similar figurative meaning can be expressed by words with a different literal meaning that belong to the same metaphor. One of them is *ajándék* (*gift*), as in (b) and (c). *Pattern*: different, different, same, same.

(14) You don't *use your* time *profitably*.
(a) *Nem használod az idődet nyereségesen/kifizetődően.
Not use-2nd PERS the time-POSS-ACC profitably
(b) Nem használod (jól) ki az idődet.
Not use-2nd PERS (well) out the time-POSS-ACC

The Hungarian verb corresponding to the literal meaning of *use, használ*, does not collocate with Hungarian adverbs corresponding to *profitably* [see (a)]. However, without the adverb the same verb together with the particle *ki* (*out*), yielding *kihasznál*, can be used in the same sense as sentence (14). This is especially so when the adverb *jól* (*well*) is added [see (b)]. *Pattern*: different, same, same, same.

(15) I *lost* a lot of time when I got sick.
(a) Sok időt elvesztettem azzal, hogy megbetegedtem.
Much time-ACC lose-PAST-1st it-WITH that (CONJ) PART-sick-
    got-1st PERS

Although in a different syntactic pattern, the Hungarian verb meaning 'to lose something physically,' *elveszít*, can also be used to indicate a loss of time. *Pattern*: different, same, same, same.

(16) *Thank* you *for* your time.
(a) *Köszönöm az idejét.
Thank-1st PERS the time-POSS-ACC
(b) Köszönöm, hogy időt szánt rám.
Thank-1st PERS that (CONJ) time-ACC intend-for-3rd PERS-PAST
(c) Köszönöm, hogy időt szakított rám.
Thank-1st PERS that (CONJ) time-ACC tear-3rd PERS-PAST I-LOC/PURP

In Hungarian it is not sufficient to *thank* (*megköszön*) someone for his or her time [see (a)]. The metaphorical action relating the agent to time needs to be indicated, as in (b) or (c). In (b), the verb indicating the relation literally means 'intend for,' whereas in (c) it means 'tear (off).' The first one assumes the TIME IS MONEY metaphor; the second, the TIME IS AN OBJECT metaphor. However, this does not change the pattern with reference to the verbs *megköszön* and its English equivalent *thank. Pattern*: different, same, same, same.

On the basis of the comparison of the TIME IS MONEY metaphor in English and Hungarian, it seems that the most common case for the expression of the same figurative meaning is the pattern "different, same, same, same," which occurs 11 times. In this pattern, different word forms that are used have the same primary literal meaning, and the shared primary meanings are extended in the same way within the framework of the same conceptual metaphor. Much less frequent was the pattern "different, different, same, same," which occurs 4 times. Here different word forms have different primary literal meanings that are extended metaphorically within the same conceptual metaphor to yield the same figurative meaning. Finally, we found that the somewhat less frequent pattern "different, different, same, different," in which the same figurative meaning is expressed by means of different word forms that have different primary literal meanings within different conceptual metaphors, occurred 3 times. Table 7.1 summarizes these findings: Given this table and the possibilities

TABLE 7.1. *The Expression of the* TIME IS MONEY *Metaphor in English and Hungarian*

	Word form	Literal meaning	Figurative meaning	Conceptual metaphor
Most frequent case	different	same	same	same
Less frequent case	different	different	same	same
Least frequent case	different	different	same	different

it allows, a fourth (though at first glance unlikely) pattern suggests itself: different, different, different, different. This seems to be a highly unlikely option, because, in it, the expression used in the second language does not express the same figurative meaning that the first does – our basic requirement. And yet it does seem to occur. A student of mine, Orsolya Sági, examined the Hungarian translation of Nabokov's *Lolita* from English (Sági, 2002). It turned out that the translator, in addition to the three options in the table, also made abundant use of this fourth possibility – freely using expressions (from other metaphors) that do not have the same figurative meaning that the English ones have. In other words, she found the following seemingly unlikely pattern in translating a figurative meaning from one language into another:

Word form	Literal meaning	Figurative meaning	Conceptual metaphor
different	different	different	different

Here are a couple of examples provided by Sági (2002):

Her . . . eyes had a funny way of traveling all over you. (37)	SEEING IS TRAVELING *SEEING IS TOUCHING*	. . . szemei furcsán tapogattak [=were touching] végig . . . (47)
Precocious **pet**! (49)	THE OBJECT OF DESIRE IS A (DOMESTIC) ANIMAL *THE DESIRABLE PERSON IS A TRAP / LOVE IS A TRAP*	**K**orán érő **kelepce** [=trap]! (64)

TABLE 7.2. *Four Possibilities for Translating the Same Figurative Meaning*

	Word form	Literal meaning	Figurative meaning	Conceptual metaphor
1. Most frequent case	different	same	same	same
2. Less frequent case	different	different	same	same
3. Least frequent case	different	different	same	different
4. Literary works (everyday speech?)	different	different	different	different

It might be argued that the first example is simply a more "literary" version of the same SEEING IS TOUCHING metaphor that the Hungarian translation uses, but the second one clearly demonstrates the possibility of using a different figurative meaning in place of the original (together with alliteration). This situation seems to be common in translations of literary works. How common is it in the translation of everyday language? I do not know, but I would imagine that it is not as rare and unlikely as one would initially believe it is. This gives us the possibilities indicated in Table 7.2. But why should the pattern "different, same, same, same" be the dominant one? It makes sense to suggest that if a culture adopts this typical Western conceptual metaphor, it adopts it wholesale and in a coherent fashion, that is, with all its characteristic elements and structure. The metaphor imposes a coherent outlook on time, an outlook in which time can be wasted, lost, borrowed, spent, given, and so on. In other words, we can metaphorically do all the things with it that we can do with money and valuable resources in general. What this means is that a coherently organized set of terms (and concepts) from the money or valuable resource domain is used to talk (and think) about time.

What we can observe as a result of the comparison between English and Hungarian is that English has a more full-blown and coherent version of the metaphor than Hungarian. Hungarian departs from this full-blown and highly coherent system in two ways: First, it uses words from the money or valuable resource domain whose literal meanings are different from the literal meanings of English words used to express the same figurative meaning. This is the case in which *borrowing time*, as opposed to *minden nap ajándék* ('every day [is a] gift'). Second, Hungarian uses a word that belongs to a

different conceptual metaphor (more precisely, source domain). This is the case in which TIME is understood as a CONTAINER. The different source domain typically involves words whose literal meaning (e.g., Hungarian *tölt* meaning 'fill') is different from the literal meaning of the money-based term (i.e., *spend*) in English that is used for the expression of the shared figurative meaning (i.e., 'use time for a purpose').

Interestingly, according to the *A magyar nyelv történeti – etimológiai szótára* (Etymological Dictionary of the Hungarian Language), Hungarian also had a verb (*költ*) whose literal meaning was 'spend (money)' that was used for 'spending time.' However, this use of *költ* had disappeared at some point several centuries ago and was replaced by *tölt* (*fill*) in this sense. This means that Hungarian had the TIME IS MONEY (VALUABLE RESOURCE) metaphor very early on, but other conceptual metaphors were and remained present in the Hungarian conception of time, including TIME IS A CONTAINER and TIME IS A SOLID MASS/OBJECT. We can possibly conclude from this situation that the force of the MONEY (VALUABLE RESOURCE) source domain is still less entrenched and comprehensive in Hungarian than it is in English, although the MONEY metaphor may be gaining ground in Hungarian (see, e.g., *kifut* in sentence 8).

It is important not to overgeneralize in light of this analysis. We should not forget that we compared only the translation equivalents of expressions in a single conceptual metaphor in English and Hungarian. When other languages and other conceptual metaphors are taken into account, the picture we arrived at may change considerably. One of the things that is likely to change is the relative percentage of the patterns characterizing a conceptual metaphor. As an example of what might happen when we compare languages other than English and Hungarian and conceptual metaphors other than TIME IS MONEY, let us take a look at some anger expressions in Tunisian Arabic as analyzed by the Tunisian linguist Zouhair Maalej (2003):

ma-bqaaš	3and-i	wayn ydur	ir-riiH.
No exist	with me	where circulate	the wind.

There is no more room for air to circulate inside me.
I could barely keep it in anymore.

Talla3-l-i   id-damm   l-raaS-i.

[He] lift-past to me   the blood   to head my.
He lifted blood up to my head.
I was flushed with anger.

Haraq-l-i   muxx-i.
[He] burn-past to me brain my.
He burnt my brain to me.
He caused my blood to burn.

It is probably only Arabic speakers who express these figurative meanings related to anger in the particular ways they do: as wind circulating inside the person, as blood being lifted to one's head, and as someone burning your brain. The meanings can be translated into English, and they sound familiar. However, the actual phrasing in Tunisian Arabic is radically different from what we find in English or Hungarian. This is so despite the fact that shared conceptual metaphors are utilized: ANGER IS PRESSURE INSIDE THE PERSON in the first two examples and ANGER IS HEAT in the third. What this situation suggests is that we have the same figurative meaning expressed by words whose literal meaning differs markedly from that of English or Hungarian words used for the same purpose and that are expressions of the same conceptual metaphors. In other words, we get the pattern "different, different, same, same." If it turns out that this is the dominant pattern for many conceptual metaphors in many languages, then we should not expect the pattern "different, same, same, same" that we found for English and Hungarian for the TIME IS MONEY metaphor to be the most frequent and dominant pattern in the case of other languages and other metaphors. At the very least, however, these findings give us a way to compare metaphorical expressions across different languages systematically and discover the major patterns that characterize them.

THE EXPRESSION OF ABSTRACT MEANING ACROSS LANGUAGES

On closer analysis and on the basis of some of the preceding examples, it could be claimed that there is yet another, a fifth, possibility for

the expression of the same figurative meaning. We mentioned in the discussion of sentence 7 that the meaning of the English phrase *time to spare* can be expressed in an apparently nonmetaphorical way in Hungarian (by means of the word *fölösleges* = 'superfluous'):

(7) I don't *have enough* time to *spare* for that.
(a) Nincs vesztegetni való időm (erre).
[No lose-INF be-PURP time-POSS (this-LOC/PURP)]
(b) Nincs rá fölösleges időm.
[No it-LOC/PURP superfluous time-POSS]

In other words, this possibility suggests that a figurative/metaphorical meaning can be expressed in a literal way. I do not know how common this possibility is in the expression of abstract meaning. It does not seem to be very common in the case of the TIME IS MONEY metaphor, in which most of the English metaphorical expressions have corresponding metaphorical equivalents in Hungarian, but, as we will see, it occurs more frequently in the LOVE IS A JOURNEY metaphor. Thus, we may have five possibilities altogether, as indicated in Table 7.3. But, regardless of frequency of occurrence, the really interesting theoretical question is whether abstract meaning, such as that associated with the phrase *time to spare*, can be expressed literally at all. To put the same question in a different way: Is the Hungarian phrase *fölösleges időm* ('superfluous time-my') in *Nincs rá fölösleges időm* ('I have no superfluous time for that') literal or metaphorical? I

TABLE 7.3. *Five Possibilities to Translate the Same Figurative Meaning from One Language into Another*

	Word form	Literal meaning	Figurative meaning	Conceptual metaphor
1. Most frequent case	different	same	same	same
2. Less frequent case	different	different	same	same
3. Least frequent case	different	different	same	different
4. Literary works (everyday speech?)	different	different	different	different
5. Figurative meaning expressed by literal meaning	different	different	same [by means of literal meaning]	[no metaphor]

have the feeling that it cannot be literal, only metaphorical. We can only think of the meaning of *fölösleges idő* if we think of time as some kind of valuable resource of which we can have enough, much, little, or more than enough. If we have more than enough, we can spare it. This is what the Hungarian expression means. The quantification (*much, little*), valuation (*enough, not enough*), and placement of time on a quantity scale are conceptual activities primarily applied to valuable resources. When we apply them to time, they suggest that we understand time metaphorically as a valuable resource, even though the Hungarian expression *fölösleges idő* ('superfluous time') appears, on the face of it, to be literal, and not metaphorical.

Let us take some additional examples from the LOVE IS A JOURNEY metaphor that I am going to discuss in a later section (the numbering of the following sentences is based on the numbering used in that section):

(5) I don't think this relationship is *going anywhere*.
(a) *Nem hiszem, hogy ez a kapcsolat megy valahova.
[not think-1st PERS that (CONJ) this the relationship go-3rd PERS somewhere.]
(b) Nem hiszem, hogy ez a kapcsolat vezet valahova.
[Not think-1st PERS that (CONJ) this the relationship lead-3rd PERS somewhere]
(c) Nem hiszem, hogy ennek a kapcsolatnak van értelme.
[Not think-1st PERS that (CONJ) this-POSS the relationship-POSS is meaning-POSS]
(13) This relationship is *foundering*.
(a) *Ez a kapcsolat süllyed(dőfélben van).
[This the relationship founder-3rd PERS (ing-PROG)]
(b) Kapcsolatunk megfeneklett.
[Relationship-POSS run-aground-3rd PERS-PAST]
(c) Ez a kapcsolat már nem tart sokáig.
[This the relationship already not last-3rd PERS long]

Sentence 5(b) is a metaphorical counterpart of the English sentence, whereas 5(c) looks like a literal translation of 5. Sentence 13(b) is an approximate metaphorical counterpart of 13, and 13(c) again appears to be a literal translation of the same English sentence. Are sentences 5(c) and 13(c) indeed literal? A possible way to determine an answer

is to ask how we attribute meaning to these sentences. Can we think of the meaning of the phrase *a kapcsolat értelme* (i.e., 'the meaning of a relationship') literally? Or, do we need some conceptual metaphor to fall back on? To say that a relationship has meaning indicates that the relationship has some purpose, use, reason, or the like. I suggest that out of these it is the notion of purpose that is relevant here. When we think of the meaning of 'the meaning of a relationship' as presented in the Hungarian sentence, we think of a goal or purpose associated with love. To think of a love relationship as having a goal or purpose is to think of the relationship as a purposeful activity. It is purposeful activities that have a clear purposive component. This is an act of interpreting the relationship in terms of an ontological metaphor, one in which an (originally passive and "goalless") emotional state is attributed a goal or purpose. The STATE-AS-ACTIVITY ontological metaphor is made manifest by the specific LOVE IS A JOURNEY metaphor. If a journey has no destination, then it has no goal or meaning, given our folk theory of why we make journeys. It would seem that a clearly metaphorical proposition in 5(b) gives rise to, or is the basis of, an apparently linguistically nonmetaphorical proposition in 5(c) that seems to be based on the same conceptual metaphor nevertheless. We might perhaps say that there is a metonymic relationship between the metaphorical expression and the (at least superficially) nonmetaphorical one, in which the nature of the metonymy is some weak causal relationship, an implication or entailment, between the two (something like LACK OF DESTINATION STANDS FOR LACK OF PURPOSE). If this way of thinking about the problem is correct, we can conclude that we have an expression [5(c)] that appears nonmetaphorical on the surface (linguistically) but metaphorical below the surface (conceptually), with the two being metonymically related.

A similar argument can be made with respect to sentence 13(c). In this case we have the Hungarian expression *nem tart sokáig* ('not last long'), which can be viewed as nonmetaphorical at face value. (I say "at face value" because the etymologically prior meaning of *tart* is not 'last' but '(physically) keep,' and so it would be possible to argue for its metaphoric status on etymological grounds.) Notice that this was given as one of the two translation equivalents of the sentence *This relationship is foundering*. The conceptual connection between this sentence and 13(c) can be explained as follows: If a ship founders it

is not likely to stay afloat long. This is an entailment in the JOURNEY domain. Given the JOURNEY metaphor for love, it can apply to love relationships: A nonfunctional love relationship will not last long, where nonfunctionality of the love relationship results in (or entails) the imminent end of the relationship. In other words, in this case as well there is a metonymic relationship between the metaphorical sentence and the superficially nonmetaphorical one.

What happens in cases in which one language simply does not have a metaphorical expression corresponding to a metaphorical expression in another language? How do people arrive at a translation equivalent then? The previous examples do not really indicate anything about this situation because they have both a metaphorical and a superficially nonmetaphorical equivalent. As we saw previously, one possibility for getting around such a situation is for language B to have a metaphorical expression y based on conceptual metaphor Y and language A to have a corresponding expression x based on a *different* conceptual metaphor X. But sometimes not even this solution is available (barring the fourth option: where, especially in literary works, one figurative meaning in one language is simply replaced by another figurative meaning in another language). If, in other words, a metaphorical expression x in language A cannot be translated into another language B by means of a corresponding metaphorical expression y having the same figurative meaning that is based on either the same or different conceptual metaphor, then the problem of how people can find a translation equivalent for x arises. We have precisely this situation in one of the examples of the LOVE IS A JOURNEY metaphor:

(10) We're just *spinning our wheels*.
(a) ?*Csak pörgetjük a kerekeinket.
[Only spin-1st PERS-PL the wheel-PL-POSS-ACC]
(b) Ez (már) csak felesleges erőlködés/kinlódás.
[This (already) only superfluous effort]

My students and I have not been able to find an acceptable and obvious (or explicit) metaphor-based translation equivalent for sentence (10) in Hungarian. The translation that reflected consensus was 10(b). Again, it could be suggested that this is literal; on the face of it, there is nothing metaphorical about the phrase *fölösleges*

erőlködés ('superfluous effort'). However, I wish to claim that it is both metaphoric and metonymic.

It is metaphoric in the same sense in which the expression *fölösleges idő* ('superfluous time') was claimed to be metaphoric. When we apply the word *fölösleges* to actions (i.e., a set of efforts), we are turning actions into SUBSTANCES (cf. ACTIONS ARE SUBSTANCES) and, more specifically, into VALUABLE RESOURCES of which we can have more than enough. Further, it is metaphoric in the sense that the word *erőlködés* ('effort'), which is used primarily for physical actions, makes us conceptualize psychological and emotional phenomena as physical action via the metaphor PSYCHOLOGICAL/EMOTIONAL IS PHYSICAL.

But I also suggest that the finding of an acceptable translation equivalent in this case is again facilitated by metonymy. The meaning of the phrase *fölösleges erőlködés* ('superfluous effort') is metonymic relative to the meaning of sentence 10. It is metonymic because it is entailed by the meaning of sentence 10: Merely spinning the wheels does not make forward motion possible, and so it is unnecessary or superfluous to keep doing it. Hungarian seems to capture the situation by reference to one of the entailments (i.e., the RESULT) of the total situation as described by 10, whereas American English prefers to capture it via the CAUSE (i.e., the mere spinning of the wheels corresponding to psychological and emotional efforts that do not lead to progress in the relationship). Thus, although Hungarian does not seem to have a ready and obviously (or explicitly) metaphoric translation equivalent for sentence 10, speakers of Hungarian are aided in finding a translation equivalent for the American English sentence by conceptual metonymy – by recourse to RESULT FOR CAUSE.

In sum, on the basis of these examples it seems to me that abstract meanings, such as the ones we have looked at, are expressed by figurative means in both English and Hungarian. Within the cognitive linguistic view perhaps a more general case can be made that abstract meanings can only be expressed in figurative ways in any language. As we have seen, in some cases the expression of an abstract meaning in one language happens with the help of (specific- or generic-level) conceptual metaphors (e.g., in the example of *fölösleges idő* 'superfluous time'); in other cases it is based on a combination of metaphoric and metonymic relationships (e.g., in *nem tart sokáig* 'not

TABLE 7.4. *A Summary of Possibilities for the Translation of the Same Figurative Meaning in Different Languages*

	Word form	Literal meaning	Figurative meaning	Conceptual metaphor	(Conceptual metaphor and metonymy)	(Conceptual metonymy)
Possibility 1	different	same	same	same	(s/d)	(s/d)
Possibility 2	different	different	same	same	(s/d)	(s/d)
Possibility 3	different	different	same	different	(s/d)	(s/d)
(Possibility 4	different	different	different	different)	(s/d)	(s/d)
(Possibility 5	different	different	same) [by means of literal meaning]	[no metaphor]	[no metaphor and metonymy]	[no metonymy]

Note: s/d = same or different.

last long' or *fölösleges erőlködés* 'superfluous effort'); and in still others, primarily with the help of metonymies (*nem tart sokáig* 'not last long'). Table 7.4 summarizes these possibilities. (I put parentheses around "Possibilities 4 and 5" and the cases "Conceptual metaphor and metonymy" and "Conceptual metonymy" because these cases did not show up in the comparison of the TIME IS MONEY metaphor in English and Hungarian. Several counterarguments may be made with respect to this conclusion. One obvious counterargument to the analysis could be to say that many of the linguistic expressions that are based on particular conceptual metaphors are actually taken to be literal by speakers. In the preceding analyses, I wanted to indicate this possibility by repeatedly saying that the sentences *appear* to be nonmetaphorical or, more generally, nonfigurative (including metonymic and metaphoric–metonymic). In other words, I do not want to deny that, at least in a superficial way (hence, *apparently*), the expressions are taken to be literal by people. But "literalness" is a folk-theoretical notion that breaks down if we examine it more closely. The examples "fit" and "pick out" an aspect of the world that is metaphorically given (i.e., by virtue of conceptual metaphors – see chapter 9). Given this metaphorically given world, the linguistic expressions do indeed seem to fit this aspect of the world; that is to say, they create a *semblance* of a literal "fit" between words and the world. How do we know that metaphorical understanding plays

any role in the interpretation of such examples? We know this from psycholinguistic experiments of the kind conducted by Ray Gibbs and Lera Boroditsky and their colleagues (see chapter 2 for details). Gibbs and Boroditsky's work challenges the counterargument that is based on the dead metaphor view, namely, that these examples may have been metaphoric once but are not taken to be metaphoric but literal now. This view was proved to be inadequate and wrong. These researchers showed in a variety of experiments that even apparently literal examples produce metaphorical effects induced by the conceptual metaphors (and metonymies) they express.

A second counterargument could be to suggest that the words that correspond to abstract target domains, such as *love* and *time* mentioned earlier, are literal ones. Other seemingly abstract literal words might include *life, emotion, anger, sad, hate, fear, comprehend, theory, memory, morality, politics, argument, know, fail(ure), success, think,* and *might*. The conceptual metaphors in which they participate are well-known ones: LOVE and LIFE IS A JOURNEY, EMOTIONS ARE FORCES, COMPREHENDING/UNDERSTANDING IS GRASPING, KNOWING IS SEEING, THEORIES ARE BUILDINGS, and so forth. But are these target concepts indeed literal? Do they fit an aspect of the world that is itself not metaphorically given? Evidence from historical linguistics suggests that it is not the case. Eve Sweetser (1990) showed that the concepts we take to be obviously literal today, relating to mental phenomena of all kinds, developed historically by means of many of the same conceptual metaphors that are still fully "active" today (such as UNDERSTANDING/COMPREHENSION IS GRASPING and KNOWING IS SEEING). It is also common knowledge that the etymology of the word *emotion* suggests and is based on a major metaphor for emotions today: EMOTIONS ARE INTERNAL FORCES COMING OUT OF A CONTAINER. Finally, work by Gábor Győri (1998) provides evidence that particular emotion words, such as *anger, fear, sad, happy, love*, all derive etymologically from conceptual metaphors and metonymies that we can find at work even today. In these cases, perhaps a very limited version of the dead metaphor view can be maintained (for such words as *life, emotion, understand, theory*, and *anger*), but at the conceptual level the view is clearly untenable. These words themselves (or rather, the concepts corresponding to them) were produced hundreds or thousands of years ago by the same conceptual metaphors and metonymies that

are still being used for the conceptualization of the domains that they name today.

In conclusion, I believe it is possible to suggest that abstract meaning can only be expressed figuratively in any language and at any historical period for the same language. The particular linguistic expressions may be taken literally in the actual process of understanding (but even that is doubtful, as we saw in chapter 2), but their metaphoric and metonymic status is nevertheless revealed at a more unconscious level, as psycholinguistic experiments indicate (see chapter 2). Furthermore, many apparently literal words came about as a result of the same figurative processes of the mind that are still active today, and the concepts named by these words are now target domain concepts in these conceptual metaphors and metonymies.

CROSS-LINGUISTIC DIFFERENCES IN THE EXPRESSION OF THE SAME CONCEPTUAL METAPHOR

If we think of metaphor as a set of systematic mappings between a source and a target concept (i.e., as conceptual), we find many shared conceptual metaphors across different languages and different varieties of the same language. However, the same conceptual metaphors in different languages/varieties commonly display variation in the metaphorical linguistic expressions that are based on the metaphor. In the present section, I offer an overview of the kinds of variation in the linguistic expression of the same conceptual metaphor based mainly on Barcelona's (2001) work and some of my own (Kövecses, 2001; Kövecses and Szabó, 1996). The pedagogical implications of these cross-linguistic comparisons are best worked out by Frank Boers and his colleagues (see, for example, Boers, 2003; Boers, Demecheleer, and Eyckmans, in press).

Degree of Linguistic Elaboration

A shared conceptual metaphor can be elaborated differently in different languages/varieties. Elaboration here means that a given mapping or metaphorical entailment gives rise to a larger or smaller number of linguistic expressions in two languages/varieties. For example, the metaphor ANGER IS A HOT FLUID IN A CONTAINER has, among

others, the following mappings and entailments in English: "pressure inside the container → difficult-to-control anger in the person," "the container exploding → the person losing control over anger," and "when the person–container explodes, parts of him go up in the air." These aspects of the metaphor are highly elaborated in American English but less so in Spanish (Barcelona, 2001). In American English, you can *have a cow, blow a fuse, blow a gasket, flip your lid, blow your top, blow your stack, fly off the handle,* but these expressions do not seem to have equally conventionalized counterparts in Spanish. This is not to say that Spanish has no means of talking about this aspect of anger; rather, the claim is that it has a much less elaborated repertory of conventionalized linguistic expressions to do it. For example, in Spanish one can say *Se volo la olla* 'His kettle (i.e., his head) blew up,' an expression that, according to Barcelona (2001), is not limited to anger.

Elaboration of a particular shared conceptual metaphor can be studied especially well by the methods of corpus linguistics, using large databases of a language (Deignan, 1999). Studies based on such databases suggest that, for example, sailing and gardening are especially productive conceptual domains in English but are less elaborated in other languages (Boers and Demecheleer, 1997 and 2001).

Kinds of Linguistic Expressions

As Barcelona (2001) notes, linguistic metaphorical expressions can have differential grammatical status in different languages/varieties. Particular conceptual metaphors may be realized linguistically as words, multiword phrases, or more complex syntactic constructions; that is, the linguistic instances of a conceptual metaphor may be encoded in a language in these particular ways. We have seen many examples of metaphorically used words in English corresponding to metaphorically used words in Hungarian. But it can also be the case that a metaphorical example that is a word in one language is a multiword phrase in another, and a word or phrase may correspond to a complex syntactic construction. An example of this last possibility occurs in the case of the CONFLICT IS FIRE conceptual metaphor (Kövecses, 2001), in which the English phrase *spark off something* (such as a revolution or war) corresponds to the complex Hungarian

syntactic construction *a szikra, amely kivált valamit* (literally, 'the spark that elicits something').

Degree of Conventionalization

The *degree of conventionalization* is the extent of stylistic marking or nonmarking (that is, stylistic neutrality) particular metaphorical linguistic expressions have (Barcelona, 2001). One of the conceptual metaphors for anger in both English and Spanish is ANGER IS A NATURAL FORCE. One linguistic example of this metaphor in English is "It was a *stormy* meeting." The source domain of NATURAL FORCE can be waves, floods, storms, strong winds, and the like. Barcelona (2001) notes that the corresponding metaphorical expressions are more conventionalized in Spanish than in English, especially where the natural force is metaphorically viewed as a strong wind. In Spanish it is stylistically unmarked – not creative – to use such sentences as the following (Barcelona, 2001: 121):

> *Se arrebato* y nos dio de voces. ('He was blown away [by anger] and started shouting angrily to us,' i.e., 'He was overcome with anger and . . .')
> Le dio una *ventolera* y empezo a insultarnos. (literally, 'A strong wind [of anger] came upon him and he started insulting us.')

The contrary situation can also occur in relation to the same two languages. Given the same conceptual metaphor and the same mapping, one of the expressions may be more conventionalized than the other (Barcelona, 2001: 125):

> Romeo se ha *en*amorado. ('Romeo is in love')
> Romeo *fell in* love with Juliet.

Here we have the same generic-level source domain CONTAINER in the conceptual metaphor LOVE IS A CONTAINER, but the Spanish linguistic expression that is based on the same mapping is less conventional and more creative than the corresponding English one.

Degree of Specificity

A metaphorical expression in one language/variety may differ from a corresponding metaphorical expression in another language/variety

in the degree of its specificity (Barcelona, 2001). Specificity involves a hierarchy of things or events. The word *dollar* is more specific than *money*, which is more specific than *valuable commodity*, which is more specific than *resources*. Similarly, *crawl* is more specific than *move*, which is more specific than *act*. Let us now take the combined metaphor (caused) change of state is (caused) motion into a container in English. (The metaphor is combined because it includes both a change of state is motion and states are locations/bounded regions.) This metaphor can be used both at a generic and at a specific level, as in the following sentences:

His behavior *sent* me *into* a fury.
She *went* crazy.
The news *threw* him *into* a terrible state of anxiety.
He *flew into* a rage.

Throwing and flying in the last two sentences are specific actions, much more specific than sending and going. In Spanish, this level of specificity does not seem to exist for this combined metaphor. If such specific verbs are used in the Spanish translation, the result is not quite acceptable (Barcelona, 2001: 129):

?? La noticia le *lanzo al interior de* un terrible estado de ansiedad.
?? *Volo al interior de* una rabieta.

In Spanish much more general expressions are used to express these meanings:

Su conducta me *puso* furioso ('His behavior made me furious')
Su conducta me *en*furecio. ('His behavior infuriated me')

Scope of Metaphor

The *scope* of a conceptual metaphor refers to the number of target domains to which a particular source domain can apply (see chapter 4; Kövecses, 1995a, 2000b). The term can also be used with respect to linguistic expressions (Barcelona, 2001). The scope of a particular metaphorical linguistic expression is the number of distinct uses of the expression in different metaphorical target domains. The scope of the use of a metaphorical expression may be different in two

languages/varieties. For example, the concept of HEAT applies to a large number of target domains, such as emotions and argument, as well as the event of pressure. An example for the last one is *We kept going just that little bit better than our rivals when the heat was on*. Although heat can take both emotion and argument as its target in Spanish as well, according to Barcelona (2001), pressure is not an appropriate target for heat in Spanish.

Degree of Metaphorical Transparency

Barcelona (2001) uses the term *metaphorical transparency* for those cases in which a metaphorical expression belonging to a conceptual metaphor in one language is more or less transparent than another expression belonging to the same conceptual metaphor in another language. Transparency is measured by asking whether an expression is used in the target domain only or in both the source and target domains. Both English and Spanish have the A DEVIANT COLOR IS A DEVIANT SOUND metaphor. The metaphor is linguistically realized in English by such expressions as *loud, shrill, grate*. All these expressions can be used in both the source and the target, and thus they are highly transparent as metaphors. Consider the expressions *a loud boy* (source) and *a loud color* (target). By contrast, the Spanish word *llamativo* is much less transparent, because it is only used in the target domain (e.g., *un color llamativo*). Nevertheless, speakers are aware of the connection between *llamativo* and the verb *llamar* ('call') from which it derives, and this knowledge provides the word with some degree of transparency (Barcelona, 2001).

CULTURAL–IDEOLOGICAL BACKGROUND

Two languages may share a conceptual metaphor and the conceptual metaphor may be expressed by largely overlapping metaphorical expressions, but the expressions can reveal subtle differences in the cultural–ideological background in which the conceptual metaphor functions. A good case in point is the metaphor LOVE IS A JOURNEY. This conceptual metaphor was introduced by Lakoff and Johnson (1980), who offered a number of American English examples for the

metaphor. The following are examples given by these authors, together with their Hungarian counterparts:

LOVE IS A JOURNEY

(1) Look *how far we've come*.
?Nézd/látod milyen messzire jutottunk.
[Look how far reach-1st PERS PL-PAST]

?Látod milyen messzire jutottunk?
[See how far reach-1st PERS PL-PAST]

(2) We're *at a crossroads*.
Válaszút előtt állunk.
[crossroads before stand-1st PERS PL-PRES

(3) We'll just have to *go our separate ways*.
*Külön utakra kell lépnünk.
[Separate ways-on (LOC) must step-1st PERS PL]
Elválnak útjaink.
[Separate-3rd PERS PL way-POSS-PL]

(4) We can't *turn back now*.
*Nem fordulhatunk vissza.
[Not turn-can-1st PERS PL back]
(Innen) már nincs visszaút.
[(from-here) already no back-way]

(5) I don't think this relationship is *going anywhere*.
Nem hiszem, hogy ez a kapcsolat vezet valahova.
[Not think-1st PERS that (CONJ) this the relationship lead-3rd
   PERS somewhere]
Nem hiszem, hogy ennek a kapcsolatnak van értelme.
[Not think-1st PERS that (CONJ) this-POSS the relationship-
   POSS is meaning]

(6) *Where* are we?
?Hol vagyunk/tartunk most?
[where be/keep-1st PERS now]

(7) We're *stuck*.
*Elakadtunk.
[get-stuck-1st PERS]
Kapcsolatunk elakadt/kátyúba jutott/bedöglött.
[relationship-POSS get-stuck-1st PERS]

(8) It's been a *long, bumpy road*.
Hosszú, rögös út áll mögöttünk.
[long bumpy way stand-3rd PERS behind-1st PERS]

(9) This relationship is a *dead-end street*.
?Ez a kapcsolat zsákutca.
[this the relationship dead-end-street]
Zsákutcába jutottunk.
[dead-end-street reach-1st PERS PL PAST]

(10) We're just *spinning our wheels*.
*Csak pörgetjük a kerekeinket.
[Only spin-1st PERS-PL the wheel-PL-POSS-ACC]
Ez (már) csak felesleges erőlködés/kínlódás.
[This (already) only superfluous effort]

(11) Our marriage is *on the rocks*.
*Házasságunk van sziklákon.
[marriage-POSS is rock-PL-LOC]
Házasságunk zátonyra futott.
[marriage-POSS aground run-3rd PERS PAST]

(12) We've *gotten off the track*.
*Kisiklottunk.
[get-off-track-1st PERS-PAST]
?Kapcsolatunk kisiklott.
[relationship-POSS get-off-track-1st PERS-PAST]
Kapcsolatunk megfeneklett.
[relationship-POSS run-aground-3rd PERS-PAST]

(13) This relationship is *foundering*.
*Ez a kapcsolat süllyed(őfélben van).
[This the relationship founder-3rd PERS (ing-PROG)]
Kapcsolatunk megfeneklett.
[Relationship-POSS run-aground-3rd PERS-PAST]
Ez a kapcsolat már nem tart sokáig.
[This the relationship already not last-3rd PERS long]

As can be observed, most of the American English examples translate into Hungarian in a straightforward way. In most cases in which English has a metaphorical word or expression with a particular literal meaning, Hungarian also has a word or expression with the same

or similar literal meaning. This would suggest that the conceptual metaphor LOVE IS A JOURNEY is expressed linguistically in much the same way in the two languages. Although this is largely true, we can notice subtle differences in the details of linguistic expression. For example, in sentence 1 English uses the verb *come*, whereas Hungarian uses *jut*, meaning something like 'get to a place after experiencing difficulties,' and in sentence 3 we find *we (have to go our separate ways)*, with *we* in subject position, whereas in Hungarian it is *our roads (that separate)*. The question we have to ask is this: Are these differences in detail isolated, accidental, and without any real significance in the study of metaphorical thought in culture, or, on the contrary, are they systematic, motivated, and of significance in the study of this thought? I propose that the latter is the case. I believe that larger cultural themes, or topics, that have the potential to distinguish different cultures manifest themselves and recur in many of the examples.

In several examples the American English sentences foreground active agents and deliberate action of these agents, as opposed to the foregrounding of a passive relationship and relative passivity of the people participating in the love relationship in Hungarian. In sentences 7 and 12, for example, we have a prototypical agent (humans) in English (*we*), whereas the corresponding Hungarian sentences foreground the relationship itself (a less prototypical agent) as a passive entity that undergoes some event (*being stuck* in 7 and *foundering* 12). The difference may be suggestive of a more action-oriented versus a more passivity-oriented attitude to love and to life in general. In addition, in sentence 1, the active verb *come* is used in English, where Hungarian has the verb *jut* (corresponding to *reach*). The Hungarian verb emphasizes the difficult nature of, and hence the effort required in, making progress in the relationship; the English verb, by contrast, downplays any difficulties in the progress.

Other sentences suggest that decisions about relationships are influenced by internal considerations of active agents in English, whereas they seem to be influenced by external conditions in Hungarian. Decisions to act in certain ways are metaphorically understood in terms of choosing to go along one path rather than another. Thus decisions about either staying together in the relationship or moving on with the relationship are conceptualized as choosing (or not choosing) certain paths. In sentence 3, in English two active agents (we)

are making a(n internal mental) decision (probably based on some external factors), whereas in Hungarian it is the fork in the road (an external condition) that is forcing the agents to go their separate ways. We can find something similar in sentence 4, in which English decisions are made internally by the agents, as opposed to Hungarian, in which, again, an external condition (that there is no road going back) is forcing the lovers to make the choice (of not going back). In other words, it seems that in English internal considerations of external conditions cause people in a love relationship to act in certain ways, whereas in Hungarian external conditions directly force the lovers to act in certain ways. Thus, the English LOVE IS A JOURNEY metaphor has agents who are involved in an internal way (mentally, conceptually) in making decisions, unlike the Hungarian metaphor, which has agents who are externally forced to make decisions about their relationship. In general, perhaps all this can be related to a more fatalistic attitude to life in the case of Hungarians.

Sentence 10 suggests a further difference in culturally entrenched outlook on love relationships. In the English version, two active agents are trying to move the relationship ahead (by spinning wheels) despite the impossibility of the task (spinning wheels do not move the car forward). The wheels are spinning but there is no motion forward. Spinning the wheels is an action intended to move the relationship (the car) forward. In other words, the agents are making a continued and concerted effort to achieve progress. Thus, in addition to goal-orientedness, this suggests optimism, determination, and perseverance in achieving one's goals. By contrast, the corresponding Hungarian sentence explicitly states what is only implied by the English one: namely, that superfluous effort and energy are spent on something that does not work. Hungarian, thus, attaches much less importance to the necessity of achieving one's goal, and it expresses resignation and a tendency to give in to forces that are beyond one's control. This difference might be related to a distinction between a more success-oriented and a less success-oriented attitude to difficult situations in life.

A final difference concerns the naturalness with which the people in the relationship evaluate "from the outside," as it were, the progress they have made. Sentences 1 and 6 constitute such objective evaluations. Whereas these English sentences can easily be translated

into Hungarian word for word, all the Hungarians I have asked were of the opinion that the corresponding Hungarian sentences are not really used in everyday conversations in a natural way. In other words, it seems that Hungarians make explicit their evaluations of their love relationships with less ease than do those Americans whose language is characterized by sentences such as 1 and 6. This kind of self-evaluation may be related to an observation that was called to my attention by Josephine Tudor, a native speaker of British English (personal communication, November 2002), who observed that British speakers of English would primarily use the metaphorical expressions belonging to the LOVE IS A JOURNEY metaphor of other people, rather than of themselves. Furthermore, on occasions when they do use the expressions of themselves, they tend to qualify them with all kinds of hedges, such as *rather, a bit*, or *don't you think*. Thus, the American explicitness concerning one's success or difficulties in love relationships reflects a degree of extroversion that is not found in many other cultures, including the Hungarian and British cultures.

As these differences in the subtler details of linguistic expression show, two languages or varieties may have the same conceptual metaphor, but the linguistic expression of the conceptual metaphor may be influenced or shaped by differences in cultural–ideological traits and assumptions characterizing different cultures. Subtle linguistic differences point to certain cultural–ideological traits that appear to be deeply entrenched and widespread in American and Hungarian culture. The LOVE IS A JOURNEY metaphor is a conceptual metaphor that is highly motivated cognitively. It consists of "primary metaphors" that are based on universal human experiences (e.g., Grady, 1997a, 1997b), such as PURPOSES ARE DESTINATIONS. But the metaphor is not only cognitively but also culturally motivated. As characteristics of cultures change, so can the metaphor and its linguistic expression. In it, the cognitive and the cultural are fused into a single conceptual complex. In this sense, what we call conceptual metaphors are just as much cultural entities as they are cognitive ones.

HOW DO OUR FOUR QUESTIONS GET ANSWERED?

In this chapter, I have tried to deal in some detail with four specific issues concerning the linguistic expression of conceptual metaphors:

(1) how particular *figurative meanings* are expressed by means of one or several conceptual metaphors in different languages; (2) whether abstract meaning can be expressed *literally* at all; (3) what the subtle details of the differences in the linguistic expression of the *same conceptual metaphor* are; and (4) how particular *cultural contexts* in which conceptual metaphors are embedded influence the linguistic expression of these metaphors.

As regards the first issue, it seems that the most common case for the expression of a particular figurative meaning is the pattern "different, same, same, same," at least given the TIME IS MONEY metaphor in English and Hungarian. Less frequent patterns include "different, different, same, same," and "different, different, same, different." In this last case, the same figurative meaning is expressed by means of different word forms that have different primary literal meanings within different conceptual metaphors. There were also a fourth and a fifth possibility. In the fifth, we found that an abstract meaning in one language can be expressed in an apparently literal way in another.

In responding to the second question, I argued that this fifth possibility does not really exist, because the literal expression of abstract meaning is only apparent. I found that abstract meanings, at least in the cases we looked at, are expressed by figurative means in both English and Hungarian. This situation gives us the hypothesis that abstract meanings can be expressed only in nonfigurative ways in any language. In the cases we dealt with in the chapter the expression of abstract meaning in one language takes place with the help of generic-level conceptual metaphors, and in other cases it is based on a combination of metaphoric and metonymic relationships.

In answer to our third question, we found that there are many subtle ways in which the expression of the same conceptual metaphor differs from language to language. These ways include differences in the degree of elaboration, conventionalization, specificity of the metaphor, and scope of the metaphor.

In discussing the relationship between the linguistic expression of conceptual metaphors and the cultural context in which they are embedded, I concluded that two languages (or varieties of the same language) may have the same conceptual metaphor, but the linguistic expression of the conceptual metaphor may be influenced or shaped by differences in cultural–ideological traits and assumptions

characterizing the different cultures. This suggests that (both conceptual and linguistic) metaphors may be not only cognitively but also culturally motivated. In metaphors and their linguistic expression, the cognitive and the cultural are fused into a single conceptual complex. What we have been calling *conceptual metaphors* are just as much cultural as they are cognitive entities (or, more exactly, processes).

8

Metaphor in Social–Physical Reality

As we have noted throughout, metaphor is primarily conceptual in nature and as a conceptual phenomenon is capable of organizing our thought. In chapter 7, we saw how conceptual metaphors can be expressed linguistically, that is, by means of metaphorical linguistic expressions. In this chapter, I will turn to another aspect of conceptual metaphors, namely, their ability to be realized in social–cultural practice and institutions, as well as in modalities other than language. This ability gives the study of metaphor a preeminent role in the study of cultures – concerning both their universal and their particular aspects. I will single out one culture – American culture – for the demonstration of this point.

how can conceptual metaphors be realized in social practice?

There are several possible ways for metaphors to be realized in other than linguistic ways. (These nonlinguistic realizations of metaphors would be called "instituted models" by the anthropologist Bradd Shore, 1996.) If we take a conceptual metaphor to be a pairing of domains A (target) and B (source), such that "A is B," then the realization can occur in at least the following ways:

1. The source domain, B, can turn into social–physical reality;
2. The entailments of the source domain, B, can turn into social–physical reality;

3. The target domain, A, can actually become the source domain, B, and, at the same time, turn into social–physical reality.

When I say that a conceptual domain "turns into" social–physical reality, I simply mean that the conceptual domain occurs not only as a concept or as a word but also as a more or less tangible thing or process in our social and cultural practice (i.e., as a social and physical object, institution, action, activity, event, state, relationship, and the like). In this sense, we can legitimately say that metaphors can be "made real" (Krzeszowski, 2002).

The first case – in which the source domain converts into physical reality – is extremely common in culture. We find it when metaphorical idioms are "enacted"; when a source domain is visually represented (e.g., in dance, painting, sculpture, gestures, cartoons); when people actually act out a source domain (either in real life or on stage, or as a ritual); when the static pattern of a situation or relationship follows the conceptual structure of the source domain; and so on. To take just one example, consider the seating arrangements at a formal meeting. Important people tend to sit more centrally and higher than people who are less important. This follows the metaphorical structure provided by the conceptual metaphors SIGNIFICANT/IMPORTANT IS CENTRAL and SIGNIFICANT/IMPORTANT IS HIGH, together with their opposites LESS SIGNIFICANT/IMPORTANT IS PERIPHERAL and LOWER.

A special case here is gestures. Inspired by work on metaphor in the cognitive linguistic framework, David McNeill (1992), Charles Forceville (1996, 2002), Alan Cienki (1998), Eve Sweetser (1998), Sarah Taub (2001), and Phyllis Wilcox (2000) were among the first to study this kind of metaphor realization systematically.

The second case – in which the entailments of the source domain convert into social–physical reality – may be somewhat less common but equally important in the study of cultures. Lakoff provides a pertinent example (message on the Internet, January 29, 1993). He analyzed President George H. W. Bush's Address to the Nation on Drugs. The address was dominated by three conceptual metaphors: DRUGS ARE EVIL SUBSTANCES FLOWING INTO THE COUNTRY, BEING DRUG-DEPENDENT IS HAVING A DISEASE, and DRUG USERS ARE ENEMIES (TO BE FOUGHT AGAINST). These metaphors share some consequences, or

entailments, and do not share others. The entailments may play a role in determining social policy. For example, the "PIPELINE" and "DIS-EASE" metaphors share the consequence that the problem of drugs is not a result of internal social causes. On the "PIPELINE" metaphor, the drug problem originates outside the country. On the "DISEASE" metaphor, it is not a social but a physical issue. Thus, in neither case is it an internal social problem. However, the "DISEASE" and "WAR" metaphors have very different consequences for handling the issue. If taking drugs is a disease, people who have an addiction have to be placed in hospitals and large-scale programs have to be set up for treating them. If, however, people who sell and take drugs are enemies in a war, they have to be fought, for example, by more policemen on the streets in areas of cities where drugs are most commonly used (the inner city ghettos). Given these different entailments, the money for handling the drug problem would have to be spent on hospitals, research, and so forth, in the former case, and on beefing up of the police force, jails, courts, and so on, in the latter. Thus, the two metaphors have distinct social consequences. In our terms, the different entailments of the two conceptual metaphors are realized in different social policies, that is, in differing social realities.

The third case – in which the target actually becomes the source and turns into social–physical reality – can be regarded as the extreme case of conceptual metaphors' becoming real. Tomasz Krzeszowski (2002) discussed the ARGUMENT IS WAR metaphor in this connection. He observed that the argument domain typically goes through a number of stages in the course of its transformation into the source. The stages are characterized by a variety of different linguistic, nonverbal, stylistic, axiological, interactional, discourse, bodily, and other, features. Here are some of the features that characterize the "transition" of the target ARGUMENT to the source of physical fighting (Krzeszowski, 2002: 145–147). I present his results selectively and in a somewhat modified form:

Stage 1: Written argument
 Medium: written
 Register: frozen to formal
 Linguistic sign: axiologically neutral

Forms of address: polite, avoidance of direct forms, use of third
forms

Grammar: impersonal constructions, complex sentences

Nonverbal: no significant use of nonverbal interaction

Stage 2: Oral argument

Medium: mainly oral

Register: formal to frozen

Linguistic sign: axiologically neutral

Forms of address: polite, avoidance of direct forms, use of third
forms

Grammar: fewer complex sentences

Discourse: frequent role change, rules of turn taking mostly ob-
served

Voice: quiet

Nonverbal: polite gestures, stable position of the body (sitting
or standing)

Stage 3: Quarrel

Medium: verbal

Register: casual to intimate

Linguistic signs: axiologically heavily charged, frequent use of
insulting words

Forms of address: direct and impolite

Grammar: short sentences, including exclamations

Discourse: overlaps in speech by participants

Voice: loud

Nonverbal: gestures, gesticulations, movements anticipating
physical attack

Stage 4: Brawl

Medium: verbal

Linguistic signs: emotive language, frequent use of swear
words

Forms of address: very direct and impolite

Grammar: frequent use of single words

Discourse: hardly any coherence, interaction chaotic

Voice: very loud, extreme emphasis

Nonverbal: nonverbal signs that outnumber verbal ones, direct
bodily contact, use of weapons

Stage 5: Fight
  Outside the category of argument, very little verbal component,
    physical fighting

This process of the target's becoming the physical source is described by Krzeszowski on the basis of the Polish national epic *Pan Tadeusz*, in which a legal argument first made in writing becomes actual physical fighting between two groups of people who are claiming ownership of a castle. The features of the process may be specific to this particular epic poem. However, in describing the process in detail Krzeszowski gives us a beautiful example of how a particular metaphorical target domain turns into the physical equivalent of its source.

At this point, we can legitimately ask, What is the larger significance for the study of culture of pointing out that conceptual metaphors can become real in these ways? In the following sections, I will try to address this issue by using American studies as my example.

AMERICAN STUDIES AND COGNITIVE SCIENCE

Ways of studying American culture include Marxist, Freudian, structuralist, poststructuralist, deconstructionist, and postmodernist approaches. In addition, large parts of American culture have been described by means of more or less traditional forms of historical, literary, anthropological, ethnographic, linguistic, philosophical, sociological, and political science analyses. Moreover, at different times interdisciplinarity, multidisciplinarity, ethnic studies, women's studies, gay and lesbian studies, regional studies, and multiculturalism have been emphasized within the field. The various frameworks of study in the many different disciplines make American studies seem a hopelessly disintegrated and fragmented field, and this impression largely accounts for the reason American studies as a field is not regarded by many as a serious and important scientific enterprise.

Is there a way somehow to unify the disparate approaches and methodologies in American studies? I believe there is. Unification of the field can be achieved if we study the human mind that creates and understands American culture – the human mind that creates

and understands such diverse entities and processes as American institutions, American works of art, American ways of life, the Constitution, the anti-ballistic missile (ABM) treaty, poems by American poets, commentators on American society such as Tocqueville, commentaries such as Tocqueville's *Democracy in America*, the Statue of Liberty, conceptions of morality, American family models, the political ideas of liberalism and conservatism, Walt Disney movies, and the emotional life of Americans. Unification can be achieved if we study not these disparate things and processes in isolation by using one of the approaches and methods mentioned but the American mind that produces and conceptualizes the social, cultural, and psychological reality, or realities, that is (or are) constituted by these things and processes. *In other words, what I am suggesting here is a partial return to a relatively old idea that was discarded some time ago and was believed to be discredited for some time in the humanities and social sciences – the existence of the notion of the American mind and the possibility of studying it in a scientific way.* I propose to revive this idea in a new form in light of recent developments in the study of the human mind in general. Perhaps the major objection to the old-fashioned notion of the American mind was this: There is simply no static and monolithic American mind. This was a valid objection. But today we know a lot more about the mind and how to study it systematically than we did 50 years ago. What I want to suggest here is that the American mind that contemporary cognitive science and linguistics reveals is anything but static and monolithic. Rather, it is dynamic, multifaceted, and variable, and it can be studied in a scientific way.

The new science that studies the mind is called *cognitive science*, and it deals with the issue of how the mind evolved, how it works, what it consists of (i.e., what its content is), and what a theory of it might look like. Perhaps the best known figure in the new paradigm of research is Noam Chomsky, who formulated, together with others, his views of language and the mind in terms of the powerful computer metaphor, in which thought and language are viewed as manipulations of abstract symbols (Lakoff and Johnson, 1999). However, it is not the Chomskyan paradigm within cognitive science that I offer for consideration to American studies; instead, it is a "second-generation" cognitive science that seems to me to be the suitable

approach to an integration of various strands of American studies. (On second-generation cognitive science, see Lakoff and Johnson, 1999; Turner, 1991.) This second-generation cognitive science is different from the first-generation in several ways, two of which I mention here: One is that the new cognitive science is an empirical science that attempts to integrate results from cognitive and developmental psychology, neuroscience, linguistics, anthropology, computer science, artificial intelligence, and several other disciplines. In this respect, it is markedly different from the older version, which is primarily deductive, rather than empirical. The second difference is that the new generation of cognitive scientists break away from the mind-as-computer metaphor and see the mind as being embodied, that is, as arising from very basic sensorimotor experiences of the human body. In this view, meaning is not primarily an arbitrary association between signs and things but a process in which humans conceptualize and understand their (physical, social, cultural, psychological) world by making use of their bodily (sensorimotor) experiences.

A basic question of American studies can now be formulated: *What ideas and notions make up the American mind, how does this mind work, and how can we get access to it?* When we ask the first part of the question, we ask about the content of the American mind; when we ask the second part of the question, we ask about the ways Americans create and make sense of their experience; and when we ask the third part of the question, we ask about which method(s) can be used to uncover its content and workings.

How can we study the concepts and conceptual processes that make up the mind? Because the mind is not directly observable, we can only study it through its many reflections and manifestations. One of these, and perhaps the most elaborate and extensive one, is language. By studying language we can get a fairly good idea of how the mind works and what its contents are. The results that arise from language can then be compared with other nonlinguistic reflections of the mind, such as movies, cartoons, works of art, and various social practices. What has been found consistently in studies of the mind is that the main patterns (entities and processes) that emerge from a study of language characterize these other (nonlinguistic) types of manifestations of the mind as well (see chapters 1 and 2; Gibbs, 1994; Lakoff, 1996). In other words, the same conceptual patterns can

be found in most, or all, reflections of the mind. This suggests that language can be taken to be a fairly reliable instrument in identifying general conceptual patterns and that the general conceptual patterns that we find give us a fairly good clue to what is going on in the mind. In what follows in this chapter, I will try to make use of these methodological claims in finding some of the conceptual patterns that characterize and shape the American mind. My focus will be on metaphorical aspects of the American mind.

METAPHORICAL ASPECTS OF AMERICAN CULTURE

How can we apply the cognitive linguistic view of metaphor to the analysis of American culture? I will show that metaphor is far from being a linguistic device only and that it pervades many areas of American culture. I will also suggest that it can give us valuable insight into areas of American culture that have not been previously analyzed by this methodology. (Most of the examples in this section are taken from Lakoff, 1993, and my own work; see Kövecses, 2002.)

Movies

Let me begin with some simple examples of metaphorical conceptual patterns. Films may be structured in their entirety in terms of conceptual metaphors. One metaphor that is particularly well suited for this is the LIFE IS A JOURNEY metaphor. Life is often conceptualized as a journey, as shown by everyday American expressions such as "I am *stuck* in life," "He *carries a heavy baggage*," "She had a *head start* in life," "She'll *go places* in life," and "He *reached* his goals." Several movies depict a person's life as a journey of some kind.

In addition, individual images in a movie may be based on one or several conceptual metaphors. In the Walt Disney movie *Pocahontas*, for example, one scene shows how Pocahontas and Captain John Smith fall in love. The images through which this is conveyed include Pocahontas and John Smith's cascading down a waterfall. This image is a realization of the conceptual metaphor FALLING IN LOVE IS PHYSICAL FALLING. In another Walt Disney production, *The Hunchback of Notre Dame*, the cruel judge of Paris feels uncontrollable sexual desire for the beautiful Gypsy, Esmeralda. In this scene, the entire room

and the palace where the scene takes place are covered in flames. The metaphor that is given visual expression here is SEXUAL DESIRE IS FIRE (e.g., "They were *burning* with desire," "She is his latest *flame*").

Cartoons

American cartoons are another rich source of the nonlinguistic realization of metaphors. In them, conceptual metaphors are often depicted in a "literal" way. An angry man may be drawn in such a way that smoke is billowing out of his ears. This depiction is based on the ANGER IS A HOT FLUID IN A CONTAINER metaphor. Furthermore, given the same conceptual metaphor, in a cartoon an angry person may literally explode or burst open.

The metaphor KNOWING IS SEEING is also often made real in cartoons. A light bulb lighting above a character's head often indicates understanding by the character. The study of how conceptual metaphors are realized nonlinguistically in cartoons deserves a lot more attention than it has received so far. When Charles Forceville (1996, 2002) began to investigate metaphors of anger in French comic books he found that, often, the pictures go beyond the conventional conceptual metaphors and the mappings that constitute them.

Advertisements

Major manifestations of the American mind are advertisements. Part of the selling power of an advertisement depends on how well chosen the conceptual metaphor that the picture and/or the words used in the advertisement attempt to evoke in people is. An appropriately selected metaphor may work wonders in promoting the sale of an item. For example, washing powders are frequently presented as good friends; this is based on the metaphor ITEMS TO SELL ARE PEOPLE, which is a kind of personification. A WASHING POWDER IS A FRIEND metaphor evokes in people the same attitudes and feelings that they connect with their good friends. Sexuality is also often exploited in advertisements. Cars are often shown as one's lover, and the people in the ads or commercials behave toward them as if they really were: They hug them, they kiss them, they whisper to them, and so on.

This is a fascinating area of study, but important questions are still unanswered: For example, what are the most common source and target domains used in advertisements in the United States? A large-scale study of American advertisements along these lines would give us valuable insight into the American "psyche."

Symbols

Symbols in general and cultural symbols in particular may be based on well-entrenched metaphors in a culture. For instance, a common symbol of life is fire. This symbol is a manifestation of the metaphor LIFE IS FIRE, which also appears in mundane linguistic expressions such as *to snuff out* somebody's life. To understand a symbol means in part to be able to see the conceptual metaphors that the symbol can evoke or was created to evoke. Consider, for example, the Statue of Liberty in New York City, as analyzed by Kövecses (1995c). The statue was created to evoke the idea that liberty was achieved in the United States (together with its "accompaniments" – knowledge and justice). This is displayed in the statue by means of several metaphors – metaphors for free action, history, and knowledge. Because ACTION IS SELF-PROPELLED MOVEMENT, free action is UNINHIBITED SELF-PROPELLED MOVEMENT. This arises from the fact that the statue steps forward as broken shackles lie at her feet. Second, a common conception of history is that it is a change from a period of ignorance and oppression to a period of knowledge and freedom. This is based on the metaphor that HISTORICAL CHANGE IS MOVEMENT FROM A STATE OF IGNORANCE TO A STATE OF KNOWLEDGE. What evokes this metaphor is the fact that the statue steps forward with a torch enlightening the world. The torch symbolizes knowledge. Thus, finally, we have the metaphor KNOWING IS SEEING, as exemplified by such everyday linguistic metaphors as "I *see* your point." Given these metaphors, the statue may be regarded as an embodiment of the metaphorical source domains: UNINHIBITED MOVEMENT, MOVEMENT FROM DARK TO LIGHT, and SEEING.

But today the statue simply evokes in most Americans the image of a benevolent and wealthy country (America) that readily helps and accepts people who are in need (the poor immigrants). How can this interpretation be given to it? The reason in part is that Americans (but

also others) have the metaphor A STATE or A COUNTRY IS A PERSON, plus some conventional knowledge about women. The statue represents a woman who is beckoning to the immigrants who are arriving. This is a "mighty" but gentle woman who readily welcomes her children to her home. The poem engraved on the plaque at the entrance to the statue suggests this interpretation:

> Not like the brazen giant of Greek fame,
> With conquering limbs astride from land to land;
> Here at our sea-washed, sunset gates shall stand
> A mighty woman with a torch, whose flame
> Is the imprisoned lightning, and her name
> Mother of Exiles. From her beacon-hand
> Glows world-wide welcome; her mild eyes command
> The air-bridged harbor that twin cities frame.
> "Keep ancient lands, your storied pomp!" cries she
> With silent lips. "Give me your tired, your poor,
> Your huddled masses yearning to breathe free,
> The wretched refuse of your teeming shore.
> Send these, the homeless, tempest-tost to me,
> I lift my lamp beside the golden door!"
>
> (Emma Lazarus, the "New Colossus,"
> November 2, 1883)

It can perhaps be suggested that the shift in the historical context also contributed to the changing interpretation of the statue. Put in still another way, the change in interpretation can be seen as an example of how a symbol's meaning changes as a result of a shift in the main meaning focus of the conceptual metaphors that underlie it.

Interpretation of History

Metaphors also play a role in modern myths. Myths are often used to make sense of historical events. As an example, let us consider two different events in American history (one of which was mentioned in chapter 6) that were conceptualized in terms of the same events in the Bible: The first is the movement of the Jewish people from Egypt to the Promised Land (Csábi, 2001). The metaphor can be stated as follows: THE SETTLEMENT OF NORTH AMERICA BY THE ENGLISH SETTLERS IS THE MOVEMENT OF THE JEWS FROM EGYPT TO THE PROMISED LAND.

The Mormons consciously patterned their settlement of the Salt Lake area on the same source domain. They also used the biblical account of the Jews' flight from Egypt into Israel as the source domain in their attempt to conceptualize their long westward journey.

Finally, I pointed out elsewhere (Kövecses, 1994) that Alexis de Tocqueville analyzes American democracy as a highly defective person, whose defects have to be made up for and counterbalanced by external forces such as the legal system. This view of democracy depends crucially on the acceptance of the conceptual metaphor A STATE IS A PERSON.

Politics and Foreign Policy

As George Lakoff showed in several publications (Lakoff, 1992, 1996), American politics is largely structured by a variety of metaphors: POLITICS IS WAR, POLITICS IS BUSINESS, SOCIETY IS A FAMILY, SOCIETY IS A PERSON, and THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION IS A RACE. For example, given the POLITICS IS WAR metaphor, American society can be seen as composed of armies that correspond to political groups; the leaders of the armies correspond to political leaders; the weapons used by the army are the ideas and policies of the political groups; the objective of the war is some political goal. These metaphors can be widely found in the media and in the speech of politicians. Most importantly, they impose a particular order or pattern on political activities.

Once people conceive of a nation as a person, thinking of neighboring countries as "neighbors" who can be friendly or hostile, strong or weak, and healthy or sick, becomes possible. Strength corresponds here to military strength and health to economic wealth. This metaphor has certain implications for foreign politics. A country can be identified as strong and another as weak. Because strength is associated with men and weakness with women, a militarily strong nation can be seen as "raping" a weak one when it attacks it. This was the conceptual metaphor that was used in the Gulf War in 1990 when Iraq attacked and occupied Kuwait. The attack was interpreted in the United States as a "rape" of Kuwait (Lakoff, 1992). This interpretation provided moral justification for the United States to go to war against Iraq.

Morality

American discourse about morality often involves two foundational conceptual metaphors (Lakoff, 1996): (1) MORALITY IS STRENGTH and (2) MORALITY IS NURTURANCE.

(1)
BEING GOOD IS BEING UPRIGHT
BEING BAD IS BEING LOW
DOING EVIL IS FALLING
EVIL IS A FORCE
MORALITY IS STRENGTH

According to this metaphorical system of morality, evil can act on an *upright* person, who can either *fall* (become bad) or remain upright (remain good). The evil can be either an external or an internal force. External evil may be a dangerous situation that causes fear. Internal evil may be, for example, the seven deadly sins. In either case, a moral person would apply a counterforce in an effort to overcome the force of evil and would be successful in overcoming it. Thus, in this view, moral "strength" is based on the notion of physical strength.

(2)
THE COMMUNITY IS A FAMILY
MORAL AGENTS ARE NURTURING PARENTS
PEOPLE NEEDING HELP ARE CHILDREN NEEDING NURTURANCE
MORAL ACTION IS NURTURANCE

In this second set of metaphors, morality appears to be more of an "other-directed" issue than a "self-directed" issue. Whereas in the "strength" metaphor there is only a single moral agent, in the nurturance version there are two – people who need help and people who have a responsibility to provide that help. As Lakoff (1996) notes, it is not the case that the two metaphors exclude each other in the actual practice of morality in everyday life. They are used together on most occasions, but different people may give different priorities to them. For some people, morality is primarily defined in terms of the MORALITY IS STRENGTH metaphor, whereas for others it is defined mostly in terms of MORALITY IS NURTURANCE.

In Lakoff's account (Lakoff, 1996), the different priorities that people give to the two metaphors may account for two conceptions of American politics – conservatism and liberalism. If one considers the MORALITY IS STRENGTH metaphor more important, this person is likely to be attracted to conservative ideas and ideals in politics. On the other hand, if someone considers the "nurturance" metaphor more important as regards morality, this person is more likely to be a liberal as far as political issues are concerned. Why? The link between one's moral and political views is provided by a metaphor for the concept of nation mentioned: A NATION or SOCIETY IS A FAMILY. Society is conventionally viewed as a family with the state as a parent and citizens as children. The two views of morality that have been briefly outlined imply different conceptions of what a family is (Lakoff, 1996; see also chapter 6). In the "moral strength" metaphor, the family consists of independent and self-reliant individuals and morality is taught and learned primarily through discipline (to resist evil). In the "nurturance" metaphor, the family consists of people who have a moral obligation to help each other. In this view of the family, morality is taught and learned less through discipline than through nurturance. Now the priorities given to the two metaphors have implications for one's political views because the two conceptions of the family and morality influence one's view of the nation as a family. The metaphor-based notion of morality has different consequences for one's political views. Morality and politics fuse: hence the title of Lakoff's book, *Moral Politics*.

Social Practices

Certain social practices may also be based on conceptual metaphors. Consider the use of "grades" in school. In the United States the letter grades A, B, C, D, and E or F are used, but these are merely disguised forms of numbers, either from 1 to a higher number such as 5 or from 5 to 1. This is common practice in many countries throughout the world. The metaphor that seems to underlie the social practice of "grading" is QUALITY IS QUANTITY. According to this metaphor, matters of quality, such as knowledge, skills, understanding, sensitivity, are comprehended through units of quantity, such as numbers. In some cultures, the quantification of qualitative things has reached

huge proportions. For example, in the United States achievements in sport are primarily interpreted through quantification of some kind. This is especially common in baseball, in which statistics of all kinds are used to "measure" achievements. Notice that in this metaphor it is irrelevant whether the numbers increase or decrease. The important point is that issues of quality are conceptualized in terms of quantitative elements.

IS THE AMERICAN MIND STATIC AND MONOLITHIC? THE CASE OF EMOTIONS IN AMERICA

One of the chief objections to the old theoretical notion of the "American mind" was that there is no such thing: There is no unitary, static, and monolithic American mind. The analyses and examples given so far may have reinforced such a static and monolithic understanding of the notion. However, in the present section I want to show that nothing like this interpretation is intended, and that the cognitive linguistic view of the American mind is capable of answering this objection. In particular, I will suggest that the conceptual patterns that characterize the American mind are dynamic, constantly changing patterns and that they often constitute negotiable alternatives for either the creation or the understanding of the American experience. (The following short case studies of emotions are from Kövecses, 2000a.)

Anger

Let us begin with anger and let us ask whether anger was always conceptualized in the United States as it is predominantly conceptualized today, that is, in terms of the HOT FLUID IN A PRESSURIZED CONTAINER metaphor. This is a difficult question for a cognitive linguist to answer, but, fortunately, social historians of American culture come to our rescue. Peter Stearns (1994) offers an excellent history of emotions in America in his book *American Cool*. Stearns's study shows that the conceptualization of anger, and of emotions in general, underwent important changes from the 18th to the 19th century. This is what he writes about the issue:

Prior to the nineteenth century, dominant beliefs, medical and popular alike, attached anger, joy, and sadness to bodily functions. Hearts, for example,

could shake, tremble, expand, grow cold. Because emotions were embodied, they had clear somatic qualities: people were gripped by rage (which could, it was held, stop menstruation), hot blood was the essence of anger, fear had cold sweats. Emotions, in other words, had physical stuff. But during the nineteenth century, historians increasingly realize, the humoral conception of the body, in which fluids and emotions alike, could pulse, gave way to a more mechanistic picture. And in the body-machine emotions were harder to pin down, the symptoms harder to convey. Of course physical symptoms could still be invoked, but now only metaphorically. (Stearns, 1994: 66–67)

I would interpret what Stearns has to say about anger in this passage in the following way: Before the 19th century, the concept of anger was (and emotions in general were) primarily understood metonymically, rather than metaphorically. There was a great deal of emphasis on what actually happens to the body while in intense emotional states, such as hot blood for anger and cold sweats for fear. This emphasis on "embodiment" was replaced by metaphoric thinking about anger in the course of the 19th century; as a result anger was viewed in humoral terms, that is, in terms of the body as a container with fluids in it. This conception is close to, although is still not the same as, the now-dominant HOT FLUID metaphor. In order for this particular metaphor to emerge, certain changes had to occur in the general social and cultural setting. In sum, what we can see here is a gradual shift from metonymic to metaphoric understanding, and, later on, from one metaphoric understanding to another.

Friendship

We have seen how the conceptualization of a given emotion can change through time within a given culture. An even clearer example of the same process can be seen in the case of friendship. In Victorian times what we would identify today as romantic love was a part of the concept of friendship between males. This came through clearly in the contemporary letters and journals that Stearns (1994) studied: "In letters and journals they described themselves as 'fervent lovers' and wrote of their 'deep and burning affection'" (pp. 81–82). In general, the FIRE metaphor characterizes passions, such as romantic love, whereas affection today is more commonly thought of in terms of WARMTH than (the heat of) FIRE. Indeed, in many of the interviews

that my students conducted in the United States, in which people talked about love in relation to friendship, it was always a more subdued, less intense form of love (affection) conceptualized as warmth. This shows that a metaphor that was conventionally associated with male friendship as fire (through love) for the Victorians was dropped and replaced by a metaphorical source domain (warmth) indicating less intensity.

Love

Alternative conceptual metaphors may also be available simultaneously for a given emotion in a culture. This seems to be the case with two very prevalent metaphors of love today: LOVE IS A UNITY and LOVE IS AN ECONOMIC EXCHANGE. Importantly, these are the two metaphors that play a central role in the constitution of two major cultural models of love: "ideal love" and "typical love" (Kövecses, 1988, 1991). The ideal version of love is mainly characterized by the UNITY metaphor, whereas the typical version mainly by the metaphor of ECONOMIC EXCHANGE. The ideal version reflects more traditional ideas about love, and the typical case more recent ones. Stearns (1994) notes in this connection that after the Victorian period "[t]he sexual emphasis also tended, if only implicitly, to highlight the rewards an individual should get from a relationship rather than the higher unity of the relationship itself" (p. 173). Obviously, talk about "higher unity" and "the rewards the individual should get from a relationship" correspond to the UNITY and EXCHANGE metaphors, respectively. In her study of American love in the 1970s, Ann Swidler reaches a similar conclusion (in Bellah, Madsen, Sullivan, Swidler, and Tipton, 1988):

In a *successful exchange* each person is enhanced so that each is more complete, more autonomous, and more self-aware than before. Rather than becoming *part of a whole, a couple, whose meaning is complete only when both are together*, each person becomes stronger; each *gains* the skills he was without and, thus strengthened, is *more "whole."* If we enter love relationships to complete the missing sides of ourselves, then in some sense when the *exchange* is successful we have learned to get along without the capacities the other person had *supplied*. (p. 119) [italics added, ZK]

In the passage, as in the two metaphors, love is viewed in two possible ways: In one, there are two parts and only the unity of the two makes

them a whole. This is the essence of the traditional conception of love, as recognized but not accepted by, for instance, Margaret Fuller as early as 1843 (see Fuller, 1843). The more recent metaphor takes two wholes that are each not as complete as they could be, and in the process of the exchange they both become stronger, complete wholes. In Swidler's words (in Bellah et al., 1988): "The emerging cultural view of love . . . emphasizes exchange. What is valuable about a relationship is 'what one gets out of it'" (p. 119). Apparently, the EXCHANGE metaphor has become a prevalent metaphor in American culture. This does not mean, however, that the UNITY metaphor is completely forgotten. There are many people in the United States who still use the UNITY metaphor as well.

Given these conceptual changes and alternatives in American emotional life, we can ask, Why did the conceptualization of emotions change and why did the alternative conceptualizations come about?

Anger Again

As Peter Stearns (1994) notes in connection with Victorian emotionology, anger was not a permissible emotion in the home, but, for men, it was actually encouraged at the workplace and in the world of politics. Women were supposed to be "anger-free," and men, calm at home, were expected to make good use of their anger for purposes of competition with others and for the sake of certain moral ends. But why did this "channeled anger" give way to the ideal of "anger-free" people or to the ideal of suppression of anger under all circumstances, as presupposed by the now-dominant PRESSURIZED CONTAINER metaphor? Why did anger become a completely negative emotion? There were a variety of specific reasons, as Stearns argues, including the following:

New levels of concern about anger and aggression followed in part from perceptions of heightened crime, including juvenile delinquency, and the results of untrammeled aggression in Nazism and then renewed world war. It was difficult, in this context, to view channeled anger as a safe or even useful emotional motivation. (p. 195)

As a result, the attacks on any form of anger, which started around the 1920s, continued throughout the Depression period and the Second World War, leading to a global rejection of the emotion by the 1960s in mainstream culture. The new metaphoric image that became

prevalent was that of the "pressure cooker waiting to explode," that is, the metaphor that we call ANGER IS A HOT FLUID IN A PRESSURIZED CONTAINER today. This was a fully mechanical metaphor that depicted anger as something completely independent of the rational self, the angry person as incapable of any rational judgment, and the resulting angry behavior as extremely dangerous. The process (that started in the 18th century) of the separation of the emotion from the self and the body, that is, the "mechanization" of anger, was now completed.

Friendship Again

To turn to friendship, we can ask why in addition to the view of friendship in the Victorian period as almost lovelike, there emerged a very different, less intense form of friendship called *friendliness* in American culture? Again, the causes are numerous and we cannot consider all of them. One of them, however, is that there were demands for a "new emotionology" from outside the "private sphere," especially the world of business and large corporations. Again, Stearns (1994) explains:

American language continued to reflect incorporation of a pleasant but non-intense emotionality. "Niceness" became a watchword for sales clerks and others in casual contact. "Have a nice day" struck many foreigners – even neighboring Canadians – as a remarkably insincere phrase. At the same time though, they noted that Americans did seem "nice," an attribute that includes unusual discomfort with emotional outbursts on the part of those raised in different cultures where displays of temper might be more readily accepted. In American culture, "nice" did have a meaning – it connoted a genuine effort to be agreeably disposed but not deeply emotionally involved while expecting pleasant predictability from others. (pp. 292–293)

Furthermore the new emotionology considerably "reduced tolerance to other people's intensity" (p. 244). Although friendship for many Americans is an opportunity to talk out their problems, "intense emotion was also a sign of immaturity, and it could be shunned on that basis" (p. 245).

Love Again

Finally, why did the conception of love change? But even before that happened, why was romantic love so intense in the Victorian period

to begin with? According to Stearns (1994): "Hypertrophied maternal love increased the need for strong adult passion to aid products of emotionally intense upbringing in freeing themselves from maternal ties" (p. 66). In addition, "in intense, spiritualized passion, couples hoped to find some of the same balm to the soul that religion had once, as they dimly perceived, provided. . . . More concluded that true love was itself a religious experience" (p. 69). Now, in the wake of increasingly loosening family ties and the ever weakening importance of religion, the intensity of romantic love also declined. Romantic love ceased to be regarded "as the spiritual merger of two souls into one" (p. 172). Rationality was emphasized in all walks of life, possibly as a result of the influence of business and the rational organization of large corporations. By 1936, marriage manuals stressed the idea of "rational, cooperative arrangements between men and women. Soaring ideals and spirituality were largely absent. . . . Companionship, not emotional intensity, was the goal" (pp. 175–176). And after the 1960s relationships were regarded as "exchange arrangements in which sensible partners would make sure that no great self-sacrifice was involved" (p. 180).

All in all, then, we can see a general shift to less intense and more controlled forms of emotion in the American context. According to Stearns, the overall result was that "[t]wentieth-century culture . . . called for management across the board; no emotion should gain control over one's thought processes" (p. 184). The rational culture of the computer was in place, together with the new and highly valued emotional attitude of staying "cool." What this discussion shows is that metaphorical conceptualization is not monolithic either across time or even at a single point of time within a single culture and that a change in metaphorical conceptualization is not accidental but greatly influenced by the broader cultural context.

INDIVIDUAL VARIATION IN METAPHOR

Do metaphors vary from one American to another? As was observed in chapter 5, metaphors may vary from individual to individual. How does this apply to Americans in particular, and what explains the variation among them? (Some of the discussion and examples in this section follow Kövecses, 2002.)

Consider some of the metaphors that were used by American politicians in the course of their election campaigns in 1996, as pointed out by an American journalist in *Time* magazine. Given the American liking for sports, not surprisingly all the candidates running for office in the 1996 campaign used sports metaphors, that is, conceptualizations of a variety of issues in terms of the source domain of sports. Here are some examples from a 1996 issue of *Time:*

> Bill Clinton:
> "Let's don't *take our eye off the ball*. I ask for your support, not on a partisan basis, but to rebuild the American economy."
> Bob Dole:
> "Everything before has been a *warm-up lap*, a *trial heat.* . . . In San Diego the real race begins."
> Al Gore:
> "[Progress] takes *teamwork.* . . . It's *three yards* and a cloud of dust."
> Jack Kemp:
> "You're the *quarterback* and I'm your *blocker*, and we're *going all the way*."

As I noted, the fact that these politicians used sports metaphors is not particularly surprising. The interesting issue is why it is that they use so many different kinds of this metaphor, as indicated by the examples. We can suggest that the reason for this is that personal history may, and often does, influence the choice of the kinds of metaphors people use. As it turns out, according to *Time*, Clinton has for a long time been an enthusiastic golfer; Dole did track, football, and basketball and was a record holder in Russell, Kansas, in the half-mile; Gore was the captain of his high school football team; Kemp was a professional football player (playing quarterback) with the Los Angeles Chargers and Buffalo Bills. Now if we match these activities with the actual sports metaphors used by the politicians, we find a remarkable fit that indicates a close correlation between personal history and the metaphors used by individuals.

As we saw in chapter 5, the same approach to individual metaphor variation can be applied to authors. For example, Sylvia Plath's metaphors originate in part from the fact that her father was German and that he was an entomologist specializing in bees. Or, take

Hemingway's symbolic system. Hemingway did bullfighting in Spain, was a big game hunter in Africa, and was a deep sea fisherman in Florida. All of these activities became symbolic in his novels and short stories. Actually, in Hemingway's case it may be difficult to be certain whether the life story produces the metaphors, the life story is produced by a certain vision of the symbolic system itself, or the life story and the symbolic system envisioned simultaneously influence each other and jointly emerge.

In a later chapter, I will return to this issue, when I discuss more generally the causes of metaphor variation (see chapter 10).

METAPHOR AT THE HEART OF AMERICAN CULTURE: LIFE AS A SHOW

It can probably be assumed that each culture is characterized by certain central metaphors, or, as Bradd Shore (1996) calls them, "foundational schemas." These are large-scale conceptual metaphors that organize extensive portions of experience in a culture and may involve several more specific metaphors that are more limited in their scope. It seems to me that one such foundational metaphor in American culture is LIFE IS A SHOW or SPECTACLE, or more generally, ENTERTAINMENT. I would consider the POLITICS IS SPORTS metaphor that is so prevalent in America to be a specific instance of this more general foundational metaphor. However, I do not wish to suggest that this metaphor is an American invention. Varieties of the metaphor appear in Greek antiquity and show up in a number of distinct ways throughout the history of Western civilization (Turner, 1991). Perhaps the most famous "popularizer" of the SHOW or PLAY metaphor was Shakespeare, who wrote these lines in 17th-century Europe:

> All the world is a stage,
> And all the men and women merely players.
> They have their exits and their entrances;
> And one man in his time plays many parts.
>   (Shakespeare, *As you like it* 2.7)

As Neil Gabler (1998) points out, at this time public life was a performance in Europe, in which one presented a self that one wanted to be perceived. Social intercourse was role-playing.

The widespread use of the LIFE IS A PLAY metaphor in America in recent times is shown by its high linguistic productivity, that is, by the many metaphorical expressions that are based on it in one way or another. Lakoff and Turner (1989) provide a long list of examples:

LIFE IS A PLAY
It's *curtains* for him.
She's my *leading lady*.
She always wants to be *in the spotlight*.
The kid *stole the show*.
That's not *in the script*.
What's your *part in* this?
You *missed your cue*.
He *blew his line*.
He *saved the show*.
She *brought the house down*.
Clean up your act!
He always *plays the fool*.
That attitude is just a *mask*.
He *turned in a great performance*.
Take a bow!
You deserve a *standing ovation*.
He *plays an important role in the process*.
He only *played a bit part in my life*.
He's *waiting in the wings*.
I'm *improvising*.
It's *showtime*!
You'*re on*!

The metaphor can be found in every facet of American life and popular culture; pop songs are one of the best sources of examples. Elvis Presley sings, "*Act one* was when we met"; Frank Sinatra has the famous line "And now I face the *final curtain*."

The LIFE IS A PLAY metaphor is structured by the following set of mappings:

an actor → a person leading a life
fellow actors → the people with whom he or she interacts
the way the actor acts → the behavior of the person leading a life

the parts → the roles in life
the leading parts → the people who play main roles in one's life
the beginning of the play → birth
the end of the play → death
the script → the story of one's life as it should happen

Probably the most important correspondence between the two domains is the one according to which parts in a play correspond to roles people "play" in life. This seems to be the main meaning focus of the metaphor. As we saw, this is a very old focus of the metaphor, but it became especially important in early 20th-century America. Taking up some ideas from Warren Susman (1984), Neil Gabler explains the shift from a primarily "character-oriented" to a "personality-oriented" culture:

[T]he old Puritan production-oriented culture demanded and honored what he [Warren Susman] called character, which was a function of one's moral fiber. The new consumption-oriented culture, on the other hand, demanded what he called personality which was a function of what one projected to others. It followed that the Puritan culture emphasized values like hard work, integrity and courage. The new culture of personality emphasized charm, fascination and likability. Or as Susman put it, "the social role demanded of all in the new culture of personality was that of a performer. Every American was to become a performing self." (1998: 197)

The chief representative of this type of character was Fitzgerald's Great Gatsby – Jay Gatz, who, as Gabler remarks, was an invention of himself. He was a symbol of 20th-century America. This was a culture of personality in which "playing a role was just as good as being the real person" (Gabler, 1998: 198).

But the PLAY metaphor gradually grew into something much more extensive in 20th-century America. The concept of life was beginning to be understood in terms of many different forms of entertainment, and not just in terms of a theater play, such as shows of all kinds, spectator sports, and spectacles. Indeed, life became entertainment in general in many ways, yielding the highly general metaphor LIFE IS A SHOW or ENTERTAINMENT. The process must have been motivated by the spread and popularity of spectator sports; the invention of filmmaking, radio, and television; and the availability and popularity of mass communication (and several other factors).

Aspects of life began to assume features of entertainment. At first, there was, we could say, only a metonymic – not a metaphoric – connection between the two. Neil Gabler (1998) tells us that even the seemingly mundane activity of shopping was often accompanied by events that chiefly characterize entertainment. In Gabler's words (1998), "[d]epartment stores had elaborate window dressing, musical accompaniment, art shows, theatrical lighting and playlets to enhance the sense that shopping was just another form of entertainment" (1998: 199–200). The metonymy might be stated as ENTERTAINMENT FOR CONSUMPTION. But then the metonymy started to give way to metaphor in which the boundary between entertainment and shopping was lost to the point that the two fused into a full-fledged conceptual metaphor characterizing the megamalls of the 1980s. In this kind of situation celebrities advertised products and by buying something advertised by a celebrity, one became a celebrity as well (Gabler, 1998). In the metaphor of SHOPPING AS A FORM OF ENTERTAINMENT or A SHOW, the ordinary shopper became a celebrity. Moreover, by means of personification, the products themselves, such as Ray Ban sunglasses and Godiva chocolates, also became celebrities – celebrity products (Gabler, 1998).

Other aspects of life were not spared either. Politics as a target domain was also comprehended as a show. And it was done to an extent unmatched by other countries that have similar political institutions. The election campaign is a prime example. In it, the candidates appear as putative stars; the primaries are like open casting calls; the campaign resembles an audition; the election itself is the selection of the lead; the handlers are the drama coaches, scriptwriters, and directors. In this kind of political atmosphere, the goal of politics almost appears to be none other than providing good entertainment (Gabler, 1998). Gabler might overstate his case here, but there can be no doubt that in America POLITICS (and especially the ELECTIONS) IS A SHOW. A (for many) sad punch line of this argument is that, as I am revising this chapter, an(other) actor was elected the governor of California.

An American colleague of mine, renowned to be an excellent teacher (in addition to being an excellent researcher), once told me that he could not imagine teaching a class without at the same time "putting on a show." Not only teaching but also dating and romantic relationships are imbued with the vocabulary and conceptual

patterns of entertainment, especially those of spectator sports. As Lakoff and Johnson (1980) showed, LOVE IS A GAME, in which people sometimes "can't *get to first base,"* but at other times "can *score touchdowns."* Not even the beautiful American landscape escapes being viewed as a form of entertainment, especially as theater. Perhaps the most common adjective to describe the California coastline and the Grand Canyon in National Park publications and descriptions to visitors is the word *dramatic*.

But the domain in which one would least expect the application of the SHOW or ENTERTAINMENT metaphor is that of warfare. It is usually thought of as the most serious activity people can conduct, and yet in America the ENTERTAINMENT metaphor is one of the chief ways of talking and thinking about war. Surprisingly, even those who are in the "business" of making war think about it this way. According to the *San Francisco Chronicle*, "[o]ne member of the Pentagon press corps even referred to it [the war in Iraq] as 'the show last night' during a briefing Saturday" (sec. A14, Editorials, March 24, 2003). Some Americans find this conceptualization unacceptable or offensive. The same journalist has this to say about the use of the SHOW metaphor: "As transfixed as Americans may be to the TV coverage of war in Iraq, flicking as it does from aircraft carriers to tank battalions in real time, this is not entertainment. The soldiers are real, putting their lives on the line" (sec. A14, Editorials, March 24, 2003). A few days later, a reader of the *New York Times* writes this in connection with the coverage of the same war on TV: "Feeding our seemingly unquenchable thirst to get an intimate view, this real-time coverage turns us into voyeurs and war itself into spectacle" (sec. A18, Letters, March 26). Clearly, the SHOW or ENTERTAINMENT metaphor is a large part of the way many Americans talk and think about war, and of the way they debate it.

It seems, then, that Americans have a certain predilection to understand their various experiences in life, including business, politics, education, love and dating, and warfare, in terms of a show, or more generally, entertainment. But this predilection is perhaps most conspicuous in the current fad of reality TV. In reality TV life as a whole becomes entertainment. The target domain becomes one with the source domain. The parts played by actors in the source turn inseparably into the roles people play in life. It seems that, in it, life loses

its goal other than that given to it by a show, which is to entertain people. Life does become a play, a kind of entertainment, and we as spectators watch ourselves living our own lives.

Again, this is not uniquely American (as a matter of fact, I am told, reality TV was invented in the Netherlands). Reality TV is spreading to many countries, and we can think of it as one of the "things" made popular in (and by) America that are exported worldwide. Indeed, to the extent that reality TV and the view of life as entertainment are gaining an audience in the world, the world can be said to be becoming americanized. This is part of American globalization – for some a welcome, for others an unwelcome, development.

My main suggestion in this section was that cultures can be partially constituted by "foundational" metaphors "all the way down" to cultural–physical reality. I believe that the SHOW, or ENTERTAINMENT, metaphor is one such metaphor in American political life – and, I have the feeling, even beyond it.

WHAT DOES THIS MEAN FOR THE STUDY OF AMERICAN CULTURE?

As the short analyses presented show, we can achieve a remarkable degree in the unification of American studies as a discipline. Its unification can be achieved by focusing the discipline on the study of the "old–new" notion of the "American mind." In addition, as far as methodology is concerned, even more unification can be achieved by the metaphor analysis of texts and discourses in American English – the fullest expression of the totality of the American experience. As I noted, this does not mean that only those American conceptual metaphors that occur as linguistic expressions should be "unearthed" and studied: Instead, the suggestion was that American English often provides a reliable clue for discovering the conceptual metaphors Americans use to create and comprehend their experience. Conceptual metaphors are in the mind, and they can sometimes manifest themselves in other than linguistic ways and may not show up in language at all. These metaphors can be approached only through other expressions of the mind (such as symbols, cartoons, movies, objects of art, everyday material objects, physical behavior, institutions). However, most aspects of American culture are described in

(metaphorical) language, and thus we can turn to this language for help in discovering how these aspects are metaphorically structured by the American mind.

Because most of social, moral, psychological, and emotional experience is by necessity metaphorically constituted (as I will argue in chapter 9), students of American culture will find it valuable to study the metaphor system that constitutes and is used to conceptualize the American experience. This metaphor system is huge. In this chapter I offer only glimpses of this system, but certain domains within it are well studied, including politics (Lakoff, 1996), morality, the notion of self, the concept of time, the concept of mind (all by Lakoff and Johnson, 1999), and the emotion domain (Kövecses 1990, 2000a; Stearns, 1994). These studies provide a good sample of American culture but represent only a small fragment of what needs to be done in order to see the full picture and the general structure of the American mind. What we can learn from these and similar studies, though, is what abstract target domains (such as politics, morality, emotion) Americans find important to build and elaborate on in their life and history; what concrete source domains they use to build them; why they use particular sources; how these sources change over time; and what alternative sources they have available at any given point of time. As a minimum, or basis, my ideal of an American studies program would attempt to study systematically all of these issues, and more.

Two serious objections can be made to the approach to American studies that I have outlined so far. One is that the analysis of conceptual metaphors does not exhaust all the issues that concern the various disciplines that deal with American culture. It can be legitimately claimed that although the issue of metaphorical conceptualization is interesting and important, there are many other issues and topics that the various disciplines within American studies should and do address. I have no problem accepting this claim. It is obvious that, for example, American history should deal with events, dates, documents, numbers, people, objects, places; the study of American history would be incomplete without any one of these. But I would also maintain that it is equally necessary to study how any one of these is conceptualized (that is, interpreted, made sense of, evaluated, criticized, etc.). Metaphorical conceptualization exists in two

versions: either as a folk or as an expert theory. Both everyday people (i.e., nonexperts such as the Puritan settlers) and experts (e.g., commentators such as Margaret Fuller or Alexis de Tocqueville) may rely on one or several conceptual metaphors to conceptualize a phenomenon (e.g., in history). In the case of nonexperts, a folk theory of a phenomenon may be defined by metaphor, whereas in the case of experts (e.g., historians) an expert theory may be defined by it. Either type of theorizing relies on metaphor. Therefore, the study of the metaphor system that forms a part of the American mind is a necessary component of the study of American culture.

Another objection to my heavy reliance on metaphorical conceptualization can be the following: The conceptual metaphors that we have seen in this chapter and the American metaphor system in general appear to be fairly similar across many different cultures, and thus what is revealed by this system may not seem specific to American culture and the American mind. For example, the conceptual metaphors A SOCIETY IS A PERSON and POLITICS IS WAR can be found not only in American but in many other cultures, and so are not particularly revealing about the American mind as such. This point is partially true as well. It is true that many of the conceptual metaphors we find in American culture are present in other cultures as well. But it is equally true that many metaphorical source domains are unique to American culture; that many source domains are more prevalent in or characteristic of American culture than of others; that many source domains are elaborated in ways in which they are not in other cultures; that many target domains are unique to American culture; and so forth. Let me take up just one of these possibilities. One of the source domains for politics in many cultures is SPORT, but this source domain is commonly known to be especially prevalent in the conceptualization of American political life. The study of the reasons for this goes beyond metaphor analysis (and leads to social and cultural history, the history of ideas, etc.) and thus complements the approach that I am proposing (see, for example, Kövecses, 2000c).

But the important point that I would like to make here is that the approach I am arguing for allows us to pay attention to both the unique and the cross-culturally shared aspects of the American mind. Thus cognitive science (and cognitive linguistics within it) enables us to connect the American mind with the human mind in general.

Instead of considering this as a flaw or weakness, I take it to be a welcome addition to the theory and practice of American studies.

TOWARD A NEW CULTURAL STUDIES

The demonstration of the study of American culture by means of metaphor analysis in this chapter is an arbitrarily chosen example. My more general claim is that any other culture could be studied by making use of the conceptual tools presented in the chapter and throughout the book. Methodologically, the notions of dimensions of metaphor variation, aspects of metaphor involved in variation, scope of source domain, preferential conceptualization, linguistic and non-linguistic realization of metaphor, and others, could all be put to good use in the study of any culture. There is, furthermore, the issue of causes of metaphor variation, which I will explore in a later chapter (chapter 10). Taken together, all of these can provide us with new ways of studying cultures. On the content side, we could determine with a fairly good degree of precision what metaphorically constituted ideas make up the most important aspects of conceptual systems around the world. By comparing what we find in particular cultures concerning the metaphorical conceptual systems of their members, we would be able to see what they share and where they differ. This way we could fruitfully combine aspects of the mind – the universal and the particular – that have previously been regarded as contradictory in the study of cultures. Such an approach could lay the foundations for a more "formal" study of cultures (see Fernandez, 1991: 9) that is, at the same time, sensitive to both the universal and the nonuniversal experiences of human beings living in those cultures.

9

Metaphors and Cultural Models

In the view of culture with which I have been working in this book, there is a notion that, in addition to conceptual metaphor, plays a crucial role: that of cultural model. Cultural models are important in our attempts to describe and characterize the human conceptual system and, hence, cultures. Psychologists, anthropologists, and linguists have made extensive use of the notion under a variety of different names (see, e.g., Holland and Quinn, 1987; Lakoff, 1987). Cultural models are best conceived of as any coherent organizations of human experience shared by people.

Given the notions of conceptual metaphor and cultural model, it is legitimate to ask, *What is the relationship between the two?* Cultural models exist for both concrete and abstract concepts, as well as for those that fall somewhere between the two extreme ends on the scale of abstraction. Clearly, the issue of the nature of the relationship between cultural model and conceptual metaphor can only arise in the case of cultural models for concepts at or close to the abstract end of the scale. Our concepts for physical objects such as chairs, balls, water, rocks, forks, dogs, and so on, do not require metaphorical understanding (at least in our everyday conceptual system and for ordinary purposes). In fact, some scholars (especially cognitive anthropologists) claim that cultural models exist without prior metaphorical understanding even for abstract concepts; that is, we have a primary literal understanding of them (e.g., Quinn, 1991). Others, however, claim that cultural models for abstract concepts are inherently metaphorical; that is, they are

constituted by metaphor (e.g., Johnson, 1987; Kövecses, 1999; Lakoff and Johnson, 1980; Lakoff and Kövecses, 1987). The present chapter discusses this issue and some related ones; in particular, I consider the following:

- The relationship between central metaphors and cultural models
- The issue of whether metaphor reflects or constitutes cultural models
- The relationship between conceptual metaphors and cultural models in real discourse
- The issue of the ways cultural models emerge

By focusing on these particular issues, I do not wish to suggest that there are no *other* equally important ones concerning the interrelation between metaphor and cultural models. There are several others. One of them is the role that already existing cultural models play in interpreting particular metaphors in a given context. This question is discussed by Alan Cienki (1999) in his study of the way Russian students use certain moral concepts with the help of particular metaphors in a given context. Whereas Cienki's study focuses on how metaphor and cultural context interact in situated discourse, my interest in this chapter is primarily in how metaphors contribute to the content of cultural models and how cultural models with such content can emerge (and then be used in apparently literal ways).

CENTRAL METAPHORS AND CULTURAL MODELS

Lakoff and Kövecses (1987) characterized the naive, or folk, understanding of anger in English as a prototypical cognitive, or cultural, model. They suggested the following model based on linguistic evidence in American English:

1. Offending event
    The wrongdoer offends the self.
    The wrongdoer is at fault.
    The offending event displeases the self.
    The intensity of the offense outweighs the intensity of the retribution (which equals zero at this point), thus creating an imbalance.
    The offense causes anger to exist.

2. Anger
   > Anger exists.
   > The self experiences physiological effects (heat, pressure, agitation).
   > Anger exerts force on the self to attempt an act of retribution.
3. Attempt to control anger
   > The self exerts a counterforce in an attempt to control anger.
4. Loss of control
   > The intensity of anger exceeds the limit.
   > Anger takes control of the self.
   > The self exhibits angry behavior (loss of judgment, aggressive actions).
   > There is damage to the self.
   > There is danger to the target of anger, in this case, the wrongdoer.
5. Retribution
   > The self performs a retributive act against the wrongdoer (this is usually angry behavior).
   > The intensity of retribution balances the intensity of offense.
   > The intensity of anger drops to zero.
   > Anger ceases to exist.

The main idea here is that the metaphors and metonymies associated with anger converge on and constitute the model, and the different metaphors and metonymies map onto different parts of the model.

Native speakers of Hungarian seem to have the same cultural model of anger (*düh*). The *but*-test that Lakoff and Kövecses (1987) used to ascertain the validity of the model for English yields the same results for speakers of Hungarian as it does for speakers of English. For example, the sentence "He was angry, but he didn't lose control" and its Hungarian equivalent sound more natural than the sentence "He was very angry, but he lost control" in both languages. This is because the conjunction *but* is used to counter expectations. In this case, the expectation dictated by the prototypical model would be that once we are very angry (stage 2), we tend to lose control (stage 4). In other words, the applicability of the *but*-test indicates deviation from the prototypical cultural model. Because it indicates the same kinds of deviations in the two languages, it also shows that the underlying

prototypical cultural models have a similar overall structure. (On us-
ing the *but*-test in psycholinguistic experiments concerning anger, see
Gibbs, 1994.)

In the characterization of Japanese *ikari* (= anger) (and, less typi-
cally, also *hara*), Matsuki (1995) notes in connection with the model
found in American English, "The scenario applies to Japanese anger,
although Stage 3 is more elaborate than in English" (p. 145). In the
Japanese conception, the control aspect of *ikari* is more elaborate be-
cause anger first appears in *hara*; then increases to *mune*, and finally to
atama. As Matsuki points out, *hara* is a container (the stomach/bowel
area) and, metonymically (CONTAINER FOR CONTENT), can also be the
emotion itself. *Mune* is the chest and *atama* is the head. If anger reaches
atama, the angry person is unable to control anger.

King (1989) suggests that there are two prototypical cognitive mod-
els operating in Chinese:

1. Offending event
     The wrongdoer offends the self.
     The offending event displeases the self.
     The offense causes an imbalance in the body.
2. Anger
     Anger exists.
     The self experiences physiological effects (heat, pressure,
        agitation).
3. Attempt to control anger
     The self exerts a counterforce in an attempt to control anger.
4. Release of anger
     The self releases anger by exhibiting angry behavior.
5. Restoration of equilibrium
     The amount of discharged anger balances the excess in the
        body.
     The imbalance disappears and equilibrium is restored.

The other model differs from the preceding model in stages 4 and 5:

4. Diversion
     The force of anger is diverted to various parts of the body.
     The self exhibits somatic effects (headaches, stomachaches,
        etc.).

5. Compensating event
> The compensating event pleases the self (this is usually sympathetic behavior directed at the self).
>
> The intensity of compensation balances the intensity of the offense.
>
> The somatic effects of anger disappear.
>
> Anger ceases to exist.

In addition to the several differences, we find several characteristics common to both models. They all seem to be composed of several successive stages and they all seem to have an ontological, a causal, and an expressive aspect. On the basis of the preceding characterizations, the following general structure of the respective emotion concepts (*anger, düh, ikari/hara*, and *nu*) can be identified.

The prototypical cognitive models have an *ontological* part that gives us an idea of the ontological status and nature of anger, that is, the kind of thing/event it is: In all four languages anger, or its counterpart, is a force inside the person that can exert pressure on him or her. The ontological part also includes some physiological processes associated with the respective emotion. It is the ontological part of the model that constitutes the second stage of the cognitive model or scenario as a whole.

The first stage in the model corresponds to the *causal* part. This presents anger and its counterparts as emotion that is caused, or produced, by a certain situation.

Still another part of the model is concerned with the *expressive* component: that is, the ways in which anger, or its counterpart is expressed in the different cultures. The cognitive models tell us that all four cultures conceive of anger as something that is somehow expressed.

Finally, the expressive component is preceded by a *control* component that is manifested as two separate stages of the model: an attempt at controlling expression and a loss of control over expression.

Thus, the resulting five-stage model for the four cultures seems to be the following:

(1) cause → (2) existence of anger or its counterpart (in the form of a force) → (3) attempt at control → (4) loss of control → (5) expression

(Here, the arrow → indicates temporal succession and causal sequence.) Because expression and control are closely linked (i.e., at issue is the control of expression), the two can be conceived of as a single aspect and referred to as the expression part of the model, yielding the following highly schematic model:

cause → existence of emotion (as forceful entity) → expression.

This then seems to be the *basic skeletal structure* that all four cultures share in their folk understanding.

But how can metaphors create such a model? My suggestion is that this happens by means of the set of mappings that characterize conceptual metaphors. Some metaphors play a central role in defining a particular model for a concept. In the case of anger, the central metaphor that "lends" structure to the model of anger in a variety of cultures is that of PRESSURIZED CONTAINER. The particular structure that anger and other emotion concepts share is the 'cause–existence of emotion–expression' schema. This is defined, in large part, by the PRESSURIZED CONTAINER metaphor that is characterized by the following mappings. (Unlike in the previous examples, here the arrow indicates simultaneous activation of elements in the source and the target, but, in a historical perspective, I would claim that the relationship between the simultaneously activated elements was also temporal and causal.)

the container with the substance (fluid or gas) → the person who
  is angry
the heat or pressure of the substance → the intensity of anger
the forceful substance in the container → the anger
trying to keep the forceful substance inside the container → trying
  to control the anger
the substance going out of the container → the involuntary expression of the anger

I believe that these are the mappings that play a constitutive role in the construction of the basic structure of the folk understandings of anger and its counterparts in different cultures. Without these mappings (i.e., imposing the schematic structure of the way the force of a fluid or gas behaves in a container on anger), it is difficult to see how

anger and its counterparts could have acquired the structure they seem to possess: a situation producing a force inside a person, and then the force's causing the person to act in certain ways that should be suppressed. The 'cause–emotion force–involuntary expression' structure remains a mystery and a completely random occurrence without evoking the PRESSURIZED CONTAINER metaphor. Through its detailed mappings, the metaphor provides a coherent structure for the concepts.

In the view presented here, the conceptual metaphors and metonymies contribute actively to the structure and content of the prototypical cultural models. In Zulu, the chief conceptual metaphor that does the job of providing the skeletal structure for anger is a version of the PRESSURIZED CONTAINER metaphor: ANGER IS IN THE HEART (Taylor and Mbense, 1998; Kövecses, 2000a). However, just as in English, additional metaphors focus on particular aspects of this generic structure. In the case of Zulu anger, two metaphors are especially important for the "expression" part of the basic model, which specifies the nature and intensity of angry behavior. Speakers of Zulu elaborate on two metaphors that speakers of English do not or elaborate to a much smaller degree: ANGER (DESIRE) IS HUNGER and ANGER IS A NATURAL FORCE (Taylor and Mbense, 1998). If the metaphor DESIRE IS HUNGER is elaborated as voracious appetite that devours everything indiscriminately and NATURAL FORCE as a force that destroys everything, as is the case in Zulu, then this will probably influence the cultural model of anger, as is indeed the case, according to Taylor and Mbense. Instead of venting their anger on a specific target (in English, the person who offended you), Zulu people appear to respond in a less clearly directed way and behave aggressively toward everyone indiscriminately. This is not to say that English cannot have this response or that Zulu cannot have the directed response; rather, the two languages seem to differ in what they consider the prototypical cultural model for the concept.

The major claim I am making here is this: Systematic links take us from (possibly universal) actual physiological processes of anger through conceptualized metonymy and metaphor to cultural models. In the process, the broader cultural contexts also play a crucial role, in that they fill out the details left open in the schematic basic structure. In other words, I believe that we can offer a satisfactory

explanation of the emergence of cultural models if we take into account the possibly universal experiential basis of most of our abstract concepts, the conceptualization of this experiential basis by means of conceptual metonymies, the conceptual metaphors that often derive from these metonymies, and the broader cultural context. The central conceptual metaphor in the case of anger is the PRESSURIZED CONTAINER metaphor (and the generic FORCE metaphor for the emotions in general; see Kövecses, 2000a), but other domains would be structured by other central or "master" metaphors. We should of course not imagine the process of the emergence of cultural models in sequential steps, progressing from experiential basis to cultural model. A probably more adequate way of thinking about it would be to say that the components I outlined here are all at work at the same time, mutually influencing each other. In the course of this joint evolution, the conceptualized experiential basis (often appearing as conceptual metonymies) and the emerging conceptual metaphor contribute to the basic schematic structure of the cultural model, and the simultaneously present cultural context fleshes out the details of the schema.

DOES METAPHOR REFLECT OR CONSTITUTE CULTURAL MODELS?

The specific issue I will raise in this section is this: Do metaphors indeed constitute abstract concepts (as structured by cultural models) or do they simply reflect them? (Much of the discussion in this section is based on Kövecses, 1999, 2000a.)

To begin, we can ask whether this is a meaningful question at all. For example, according to Ray Gibbs, if we believe that "what is cognitive (and embodied) is inherently cultural," the question disappears (Gibbs, 1999: 156). Although, as is apparent from the conclusion of the previous section, I wholeheartedly agree with the view that cognition is inherently cultural, I do not think that the *need* for us to ask the question disappears under such an assumption. It seems to me that even if we strongly believe in the inherently cultural nature of cognition, we *ought to be able to explain* within the framework of cognitive science and linguistics how such integration between cognition and culture has come about, or emerged, in particular cases of this

integration – for instance, in the case of conceptual metaphors and cultural models. It is with this goal in mind that I attempt to answer the question at the head of the section.

There can be several theoretically possible answers. One can say (1) that abstract concepts emerge literally, without any metaphors constituting them; (2) that abstract concepts emerge literally from basic human (physical–bodily or cultural) preconceptual experiences, still without any metaphors constituting them; (3) that abstract concepts emerge metaphorically, with the help of concrete concepts constituting them; and (4) that abstract concepts emerge metaphorically, with the metaphors having some additional physical–cultural basis. Possibilities (1) and (2) can be regarded as cases of what can be termed the *literal emergence view* and (3) and (4) as cases of what can be termed the *metaphorical emergence view*. These possibilities can be represented diagrammatically as indicated in Figures 9.1 and 9.2. In the remainder of the chapter I examine these four possibilities and ask whether they are equally viable accounts of the relationship between conceptual metaphors and abstract concepts as structured by cultural models.

FIGURE 9.1. Two kinds of literal emergence.

(3)
(4)

FIGURE 9.2. Two kinds of metaphorical emergence.

Ungrounded Literal Emergence

According to the view of Literal Emergence 1, which I henceforth call *Ungrounded Literal Emergence*, we assume that a new abstract concept, or cultural model that structures it, arises as a new configuration of content and structure *independently of* more concrete configurations of content and structure. That is, on this view, meaningful elements for abstract concepts are assembled into a new whole without being derived from well-established and more concrete ones.

Let us take an example of what this process of emergence might involve in the case of an abstract concept. Consider such specific abstract concepts as company, society, government, theory, mind, political system, economy, people, history, human relationships, and language (analyzed in detail in Kövecses, 2002). All these specific concepts can be subsumed under the generic heading of COMPLEX SYSTEMS. The specific concepts represent cases in which we have a variety of parts that interact in complex ways. The concept of COMPLEX SYSTEMS (or ORGANIZATIONS) is an abstract and superordinate one. In talking about the abstract concepts that it subsumes, we use language such as the following: We talk about a society's *ills*, an *ailing* company or economy, *heads* of states, the *heart* of a culture, *building a solid* relationship, *laying the foundations* of modern science, *constructing* scientific knowledge, someone's career's being *in ruins, setting in motion* the legal *machinery*, the *workings* of the mind, *sowing the seeds* of freedom in a country, a *budding* romance, *cultivating* a relationship,

a *blossoming* economy, and a nation, language, or civilization that once *flowered*. These ways of talking about complex systems, or organizations, suggest that we think of them as having the following properties:

They can be in an appropriate or inappropriate condition. (*ills, ailing*)
They have a structure. (*head, heart*)
They can be created. (*build, construct*)
They can be lasting. (*solid, in ruins*)
They can function. (*work[ings], machinery*)
They can develop. (*sow seeds, bud, blossom, flower*)

Unlike the linguistic examples given, we take these properties to be literal, rather than metaphorical. Given each of these properties, we possess a great deal of additional knowledge about abstract systems in general. For example, given the property "they can develop," we have additional detailed knowledge such as the following:

1. You prepare the development of an abstract complex system.
2. You create and start the abstract complex system.
3. The system has initial stages of development.
4. The system goes through a number of stages.
5. The complex system may develop appropriately or inappropriately.
6. You take care of the complex system to ensure its appropriate development.
7. The complex system reaches its best stage in the course of its development.
8. The complex system produces certain benefits.
9. The system begins to decline, and eventually it ceases to exist.

The more detailed knowledge is also taken to be literal, rather than metaphorical. This conceptualization shows up in language in a variety of ways. The language appears to be literal again. Thus, we often talk about companies' developing, the appropriate or inappropriate development of a society, a civilization or theory's reaching its peak and then declining, the benefits that a political or economic system can yield, and so on.

Not all the complex systems mentioned have all these properties associated with them, but many such concepts are associated with most. How did this particular conception of abstract complex systems emerge? We could say that it emerged literally and that these are literal features of the concept. The big question is whether this particular assembly of these assumed literal features has come about independently of a more concrete concept or concepts (such as PLANT, BUILDING). If we say that it has occurred independently, then we have a concept that is pretty much arbitrary in its content and structure; it is "ungrounded" and "unnatural." We have no way of accounting for why this particular content and structure were assembled for what we would now consider the concept of COMPLEX SYSTEMS. (I continue the analysis of the notion of COMPLEX SYSTEMS in the subsection, Internally Grounded Metaphorical Emergence.)

However, this arbitrary but literal assembly of content and structure could be taken to be the basis for the selection of metaphor(s). Thus, on the view of Ungrounded Literal Emergence, it could be suggested that this (partial) preexisting literal cultural model serves as a basis that determines the selection of particular metaphor(s), such as the metaphor COMPLEX SYSTEMS ARE PLANTS. In this view, the literalness of a concept goes together with conceptual "unnaturalness" or "arbitrariness" in the creation of the concept.

In general, on the Ungrounded Literal Emergence account of the relationship between abstract concepts and metaphors, there is no explanation whatsoever why we have the abstract concepts with their particular assembly of content and structure. On this account, abstract concepts are completely arbitrary as to why they have the particular content and structure that they have. But perhaps no one would want to claim that abstract concepts emerge in a completely arbitrary way. As we saw, there seem to be three ways of accounting for the nonarbitrary emergence of abstract concepts. Now I turn to these.

Grounded Literal Emergence

The Literal Emergence 2 view shares with Ungrounded Literal Emergence the idea that metaphors reflect a preexisting literal cultural model but adds to it the notion that the literal cultural models

emerge directly (i.e., without metaphor) from some preconceptual experience. Hence it can be called the Grounded Literal Emergence view. We can conceive of the Grounded Literal Emergence view as an improved version of Ungrounded Literal Emergence in which the obvious weakness of "ungroundedness" characterizing Ungrounded Literal Emergence is remedied. I describe this view in more detail in the discussion of Quinn's work on American marriage.

Marriage. Quinn (1991) suggests that, contrary to the claim made by Lakoff and Kövecses (1987), metaphors simply *reflect* cultural models. In contrast, Lakoff and Kövecses claim that metaphors largely *constitute* the cultural model, or naive understanding, of anger, as based on their study of American English.

Implicit in Quinn's claim that metaphors simply reflect preexisting cultural models are two very important further claims: One is that abstract concepts can be understood in a literal way, and the other is that the core of culture consists of literally understood cultural models (for both concrete and abstract concepts).

The first claim arises from the fact that Quinn's generalization is based on the examination of such abstract concepts as anger and marriage. Quinn suggests that concepts such as marriage are understood literally by people. The concept of marriage is one of several other concepts indicating human relationships. Furthermore, she seems to think that anger, a prototypical emotion concept, can also be literally understood. Both concepts of human relationships and emotions are prime examples of abstract concepts. Indeed, Quinn (1991: 64–65) makes a more general claim about abstract concepts: "While I certainly agree that metaphors play some role in the way we comprehend and draw inferences about abstract concepts, I take issue with the claim that they or the schemas on which they are said to be founded actually constitute the concepts." A little earlier in the article she states, "I will be arguing that metaphors, *far from* constituting understanding, are *ordinarily* selected to fit a preexisting and culturally shared model" (p. 60) [my emphasis].

This is a general claim about the nature of the human conceptual system. My discussion will focus on this particular issue. I will have nothing to say about the second assumption, namely, that the core of culture consists of literally understood cultural models. As regards

this claim, I refer the reader to the work of Bradd Shore (Shore, 1996), who claims, contrary to Quinn, that even the most basic notions of a culture may be metaphorically constituted. Gibbs (1994) provides additional criticism of Quinn's challenge.

On Quinn's view, the American conception of marriage can be characterized by a set of expectations: Marriage is expected to be shared, mutually beneficial, and lasting (p. 67). She points out, furthermore:

that this particular constellation of expectations derives from the mapping of our cultural conception of love onto the institution of marriage and the consequent structuring of marital expectations in terms of the motivational structure of love. Because people want to be with the person they love, they want and expect marriage to be shared; because they want to fulfill the loved person's needs and have their own needs fulfilled by that person, they want and expect marriage to be beneficial to both spouses in the sense of mutually fulfilling; and because they do not want to lose the person they love, but want that person to go on loving them forever, people want and expect their marriages to be lasting. (p. 67)

In this view, marriage takes over several properties of love, which then define it (i.e., marriage). But the question then becomes, Where does the abstract concept of love arise from? Does it emerge literally or metaphorically? Quinn's answer is straightforward. It emerges literally from certain basic experiences, and then these experiences structure marriage. The particular basic experiences that Quinn suggests the American conception of love and marriage derives from involve early infantile experiences of the baby and the first caretaker. Here is the relevant passage:

I speculate that the motivational constellation that is part of our understanding of love and that provides marriage with its structure itself makes sense in psychoanalytic terms. Psychoanalysts since Freud, who characterized adult love as a "re-finding" of infantile love for the first caretaker, have theorized about the relation between the two. My claim is that Americans' distinctive conception of marriage takes the particular shape it does and has the force it does for us because of the cultural model of love mapped onto marriage and, thus, indirectly because of an infantile experience that Americans have shared and that underpins our conception of adult love. (p. 67)

```
┌─────────────────────────┐
│       MARRIAGE          │
│   ┌─────────────────┐   │
│   │      LOVE       │   │
│   └─────────────────┘   │
│                         │
└───────────▲─────────────┘
            │
            │
┌───────────┴─────────────┐
│       INFANTILE         │
│     EXPERIENCES         │
│   BETWEEN BABY AND      │
│   FIRST CARETAKER       │
└─────────────────────────┘
```

FIGURE 9.3. Improved Grounded Literal Emergence.

In other words, the picture that Quinn paints of the emergence of the concept of marriage is subtler than the one depicted in the diagram of Grounded Literal Emergence and can be given as Improved Grounded Literal Emergence (see Figure 9.3). However, for Quinn, the point remains: No metaphor is needed for abstract concepts to emerge. The expectational structure of marriage derives from the motivational structure of love, which in turn derives from the basic infantile experience of the baby and first caretaker.

Quinn then goes on to say that marriage has some additional aspects: "The remainder of the cultural model of marriage reflected in the metaphors for marital compatibility, difficulty, effort, success or failure, and risk, derives from a contradiction that arises inevitably between the expectations of mutual benefit and that of lastingness" (p. 67). She argues further that in voluntary relationships, if one's needs are not fulfilled one is free to leave. However, marriage is special in this respect: It is supposed to last. She adds: "A variety of situations can initiate a felt contradiction between the expectation of marital fulfillment and that of a lasting marriage."

If we characterize the essence of marriage, as Quinn does, as a set of expectations that can be viewed as being literal, Quinn's major claim stands: The core of the concept of marriage is literal; hence metaphors do not play a constitutive role in its understanding. More generally,

abstract concepts such as marriage can exist without metaphors constituting them. This analysis would support the Grounded Literal Emergence view.

However, I believe that the analysis is incomplete and problematic. The problem is that we cannot take the expectational structure of marriage to be literal. Notice that Quinn's claim is that it is the motivational structure of love (i.e., that we want to be with the person we love, we want mutual need fulfillment, and we want love to be lasting) that provides the expectational structure of marriage. What Quinn does not say is how the concept of love itself is structured over and above its motivational structure. We should, therefore, first ask what love is before we discuss its expectational structure. And, ultimately, the question we have to face is whether the structure of the concept of love itself is derivable from the basic infantile experiences that Quinn mentions. Can the concept of love emerge literally from these basic experiences? My answer is that the basic infantile experiences play an important role in the emergence of the concept but are not sufficient for its detailed characterization. The insufficiency arises from the fact that the infantile experiences lack the detailed content and structure that characterize the concept of love in adults. (Details are provided in the subsection, Externally Grounded Metaphorical Emergence.) In other words, the metaphorical source domain has structure and content that are additional to those found in the basic experience. To take another example of a similar situation, the bodily physiological experiences associated with anger cannot be said to define the content and structure of the concept of anger. For that, we need conceptual metaphors (such as ANGER IS A HOT FLUID IN A CONTAINER). With the help of basic experiences alone and without such conceptual metaphors it is difficult to see how abstract concepts can emerge and, in emerging, how they can acquire the detailed content and structure that they have. Nevertheless, the basic experiences do have an important function in this process: Namely, they can be seen as motivating and constraining the conceptual metaphors that can eventually provide the necessary content and structure of abstract concepts. I will claim in a later section that in general abstract concepts can emerge from basic experiences through the mediation of metaphor only.

Internally Grounded Metaphorical Emergence

It will be recalled that in the Internally Grounded Metaphorical Emergence view abstract concepts emerge from concrete ones via conceptual metaphor. Let us now consider how this view (which, for reasons that we will see, I call *Internally Grounded Metaphorical Emergence*) would work for the concept of ABSTRACT COMPLEX SYSTEMS that we briefly looked at in the subsection, Ungrounded Literal Emergence.

The particular metaphor that could be suggested as producing the generic concept of complex abstract systems is COMPLEX ABSTRACT SYSTEMS ARE COMPLEX PHYSICAL OBJECTS (including the HUMAN BODY, BUILDINGS, MACHINES, and PLANTS); in the conception under consideration (i.e., given as the properties 1 to 9 in the subsection on Ungrounded Literal Emergence), the specific source domain would be PLANTS.

The COMPLEX ABSTRACT SYSTEMS ARE PLANTS metaphor is based on a small number of basic, constituent mappings, including the following (taken from Kövecses, 2002):

(a) the plant → the complex system
(b) parts of the plant → parts of the complex system
(c) the biological growth of the plant → the abstract, nonbiological development of the complex system

We can illustrate these mappings with such metaphorical sentences as these:

(a) Please turn to the local *branch* of the organization.
(b) She has *grown* a lot as a scholar lately.

Sentence (1) demonstrates mappings (a) and (b), whereas sentence (2) is a linguistic manifestation of mappings (a) and (c).

In many cases of metaphor we have a great deal of rich knowledge about the elements in the source, and consequently, we can make use of this knowledge in the comprehension of the target. Two such pieces of knowledge are the following: (1) When plants grow, they become physically bigger; and (2) plants are sometimes cut or pruned, processes that result in a smaller size. Now it seems that

speakers of English make use of this additional information based on the PLANT metaphor in understanding certain features of complex abstract systems. We can represent these metaphorical entailments as submetaphors of the metaphor COMPLEX ABSTRACT SYSTEMS ARE PLANTS. In what follows, I take my examples from the *Cobuild English Guides 7: Metaphor*, which is a dictionary of English metaphors compiled by Alice Deignan (1995) for learners of English as a foreign language. The dictionary is based on the *Bank of English*, a huge corpus of everyday English. The entailments are given in capital letters; the appropriate examples are given in italicized lowercase letters:

A COMPLEX ABSTRACT SYSTEM BECOMING LARGER IS A PLANT GROWING BIGGER
  • Only now, 21 years since he established his distinctive women's range, is he *branching out into* men's clothing.

REDUCING COMPLEX ABSTRACT SYSTEMS IS MAKING PLANTS SMALLER (PRUNING, CUTTING)
  • They selectively *pruned* the workforce.
  • Government and educational bureaucracies can and should be *ruthlessly pruned*.

The features of complex abstract systems in question in these cases are (1) complex abstract systems' becoming larger and (2) the reduction of complex abstract systems. Additional rich knowledge concerning plants is utilized to capture these features.

However, most of the metaphorical entailments that derive from the PLANT metaphor in relation to complex abstract systems are related to mapping (c): biological growth in the source corresponding to some abstract development in the target. As will be seen, a huge amount of detailed knowledge is carried over from plants to complex abstract systems relative to this mapping. Here are the ones that stand out on the basis of the *Cobuild Metaphor Dictionary:*

PREPARING THE DEVELOPMENT OF A COMPLEX ABSTRACT SYSTEM IS PREPARING THE GROWING OF A PLANT
  • The work *will prepare the ground for* future development.
  • These two chapters *prepare the ground for* the critical argument that follows.

- Now they have signed agreements that *lay the ground for a huge growth* in trade and cooperation.
- Their positions had not changed but they *had laid the ground for* working together and that was very encouraging.

TO START OR CREATE A COMPLEX ABSTRACT SYSTEM IS TO SOW A PLANT

- A *seed* of doubt *may have been planted in* your minds.
- He had *the skill to plant the seed in* Jennifer's mind that her problem was not so important.
- The emphasis must now be on *sowing the seeds* of such a movement.
- . . . debate that *sowed the seeds* of the welfare state.

THE INITIAL STAGES OF DEVELOPMENT ARE THE BEGINNINGS OF GROWTH

- Typically the *first green shoots* of recovery herald an increase in bankruptcy.
- There would, he added, be no *green shoots* of economic recovery until interest rates came down.
- In this way, problems that can lead to depression and even illness *can be nipped in the bud*.
- They will run a workshop for *budding* authors on how to make, write, and illustrate their own books.
- He is not particularly serious about his *budding* recording career.
- Our *budding* romance was over.
- Another equally outstanding design *was germinating* at Bristol.
- The new phase in the relationship between father and son *had germinated* on the long drive from Toronto.
- The book is an account of *the germination and fruition* of ideas as experienced through a full career.

TO MAINTAIN OR TAKE CARE OF A COMPLEX ABSTRACT SYSTEM IS TO CULTIVATE A PLANT

- He always *cultivated* friendships with the ruling class.
- . . . technical universities that boast well-organized courses and *carefully cultivated* links with industry.

- He may have *cultivated* this image to distinguish himself from his younger brother.
- This will make it more difficult *to weed out* people unsuitable for the profession.
- The police may need to establish ways of *weeding out* lazy and inefficient officers.
- Those in the motor trade who ignore women customers deserve *to be weeded out*.
- The worst material was never shown. It *was weeded out* by the television companies themselves.

THE SUCCESSFUL OR APPROPRIATE DEVELOPMENT OF A COMPLEX ABSTRACT SYSTEM IS THE HEALTHY GROWTH OF A PLANT

- Exports *flourished*, earning Taiwan huge foreign currency reserves.
- His career *is flourishing* again.
- As the king refused to educate the public, ignorance and prejudice *flourished*.
- . . . the ruins of a once *flourishing* civilization.

THE UNSUCCESSFUL OR INAPPROPRIATE DEVELOPMENT OF A COMPLEX ABSTRACT SYSTEM IS THE UNHEALTHY GROWTH OF A PLANT

- The center parties have achieved spectacular by-election results in the past, only to see their support *wither* again in general elections.
- They had been innocent sweethearts at a German university but their romance *withered* when they came back to England.
- I could see her happiness *withering*.
- The changes are likely to cause severe disruption for all the countries as the old system *withers away*.
- The union, which was once the most powerful in the country, *has shriveled* under his leadership.
- The sympathy made something in him *shrivel, shrink away*.
- It was the kind of rain that *shrivels* the hopes of holidaymakers.
- He visibly *wilted* under pressure.
- The look the president gave the reporter made that experienced journalist *wilt* before his eyes.

THE BEST STAGE IN THE PROGRESS OR DEVELOPMENT OF A COMPLEX
ABSTRACT SYSTEM IS THE FLOWERING OF A PLANT

- The relationship *blossomed*. They decided to live together the following year.
- It was not until he joined her for a skiing holiday that their romance *blossomed*.
- She had studied, worked, traveled, and *blossomed* into an attractive intelligent young woman.
- His business *blossomed* when the railway put his establishment within reach of the big city.
- As her career *blossomed*, she kept her personal and professional lives totally separated.
- . . . a *blossoming*, diverse economy.
- Greta is very much enjoying having the baby. She is *blooming*.
- Their friendship *flowered* at a time when he was a widower and perhaps felt lonely in his personal life.
- . . . the nation that had *briefly flowered* after 1918.
- They remembered her as she'd been *in the flower* of their friendship.
- I feel I can still do it even though I am no longer *in the flower* of my youth.
- This was in the seventeenth century, when modern science was *in its first flowering*.

THE BENEFICIAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF A COMPLEX ABSTRACT SYSTEM ARE THE FRUITS OR CROPS OF A PLANT

- Now they've finished, will they sit back and enjoy *the fruit* of their labors?
- American and Japanese firms are better at using *the fruits* of scientific research.
- They enjoy the *fruits* of success and live well.
- . . . the *first fruit* of the union between IBM and Apple.
- Their campaign seems *to be bearing fruit*.
- Sooner or later our common efforts *will bear fruit*.
- Last week their labor *bore fruit* and most achieved good exam results.
- They were eager to continue the long and *fruitful* association.

- She returned home after her *fruitless* efforts to find a job.
- Unfortunately a plan to reprint the play never *came to fruition*.
- You have the capacity *to bring* your ideas *to fruition*.
- Employers *reaped enormous* benefits from cheap foreign labor.
- Reynolds *reaped* the reward for his effort by taking sixth place.
- Cecilia's records *are not yet reaping* huge profits.
- . . . a TV film that's *reaped* a clutch of international awards.
- We have thousands of ideas *to harvest*.
- The *harvesting* of knowledge from space will be one of the great scientific endeavors of the next century.

Now we can see that most of the assumed literal features of the superordinate concept of complex abstract systems as given earlier have their counterparts in the PLANT metaphor:

1. the preparation of the development of a complex abstract system → the preparation of the growth of a plant
2. to create and start a complex abstract system → to sow a plant
3. the initial stages of the development → the beginning of the growth of a plant
4. the best stages in the development → the flowering of the plant
5. the appropriate development of the system → the healthy growth of a plant
6. the inappropriate development of the system → the unhealthy growth of a plant
7. to take care of a system → to cultivate a plant
8. the benefits that the development of the system yields → the fruits or the crops of the plant

Apparently, then, the COMPLEX ABSTRACT SYSTEMS ARE PLANTS metaphor utilizes most of the metaphorical entailment potential associated with the concept of plant. This is knowledge that ordinary

speakers of English (as opposed to experts such as biologists) have about plants. The vast amount of rich knowledge focuses on one basic constituent mapping of the metaphor, the mapping according to which the natural, biological growth of plants corresponds to the (abstract) progress or development of complex abstract systems. This elaborate knowledge about the growth of plants structures much of our knowledge about the "developmental" aspects of complex abstract systems.

Now if we regard abstract concepts, such as abstract complex systems, as arising independently of metaphor (such as COMPLEX ABSTRACT SYSTEMS ARE PLANTS), we have no way of accounting for the content and structure of these abstract concepts; indeed, we are left with no possibility for explanation at all. All we can say is that the abstract concept has emerged out of thin air. By contrast, the metaphor account can provide a detailed and systematic explanation why a certain assembly of content and structure constitutes an abstract concept; the particular assembly of conceptual elements is provided by the source domain of plants.

However, this raises a further issue: We still have no account of what motivates the metaphor itself that in turn motivates the abstract concept. Although the structure and content of an abstract concept are now motivated (by a metaphorical source domain, i.e., PLANTS in COMPLEX SYSTEMS ARE PLANTS), we do not yet have any clear experiential motivation for the metaphor itself (that is, for why the source and the target so naturally go together). This creates a situation that requires some explanation, because all metaphors must have some experiential basis in order to be readily understandable. Is it the case that COMPLEX SYSTEMS ARE PLANTS does not have this? The problem is similar to what Grady (1997a) mentions in connection with the metaphor THEORIES ARE BUILDINGS. He points out that on the surface this metaphor has no experiential basis, but if we recognize the existence of what he calls "primary" metaphors, the experiential basis is obvious. In this case, we would have two primary metaphors that underlie THEORIES ARE BUILDINGS: ORGANIZATION IS PHYSICAL STRUCTURE and PERSISTING IS REMAINING ERECT. These primary metaphors do have a clear experiential basis: Namely, ORGANIZATION IS PHYSICAL STRUCTURE is motivated by the fact that a physical object with

a structure is characterized by logical and causal relations among its parts, and PERSISTING IS REMAINING ERECT is motivated by the fact that many physical objects typically perform their functions in a standing position.

As I have pointed out elsewhere (Kövecses, 1995a, 2002), metaphors such as COMPLEX ABSTRACT SYSTEMS (such as THEORIES) ARE BUILDINGS and COMPLEX ABSTRACT SYSTEMS ARE PLANTS are characterized by central mappings that function as "simple" (or in Grady's terminology, "primary") metaphors. (On the notion of "central mapping," see Kövecses, 2000b, 2002.) In these two cases, they would be ABSTRACT STRUCTURE IS PHYSICAL STRUCTURE (equivalent to Grady's ORGANIZATION IS PHYSICAL STRUCTURE) and ABSTRACT DEVELOPMENT IS PHYSICAL GROWTH. We can say that these simple, or primary, metaphors have *internal motivation*, as opposed to other cases in the literature that can be said to be *externally motivated* (such as the motivation of increased body heat for ANGER IS A HOT FLUID IN A CONTAINER). What this means is that given a physical concept, the concept is characterized by certain abstract properties that are projected into an abstract generic mental space and thereby become target domains (see chapter 11; Fauconnier, 1997; Fauconnier and Turner, 2002). As noted, in the case of ORGANIZATION IS PHYSICAL STRUCTURE the properties projected from concrete to abstract space include logical and causal relations among concrete parts; in the case of ABSTRACT DEVELOPMENT IS PHYSICAL GROWTH they would include some temporal progression from an initial state to a desired final state, as specified in the preceding mapping. The resulting picture for the Internally Grounded Metaphorical Emergence view, Figure 9.4, would thus be somewhat different from the diagram that was given at the beginning of the section. In other words, this is a case of metaphor in which the metaphor is motivated: The motivation is internal to the source domain. These cases are markedly different from the motivation that can be found in many other instances of metaphor in the literature (e.g., ANGER IS HOT FLUID IN A CONTAINER) and that can be said to be externally grounded, or motivated, in the sense that the basic experience that motivates a metaphor lies outside the metaphor's source domain (as body heat lies outside the source concept HOT FLUID IN A CONTAINER, at the same time bearing some resemblance to it).

FIGURE 9.4. Internally Grounded Metaphorical Emergence.

Externally Grounded Metaphorical Emergence

Another instance of an externally motivated metaphor can be found in connection with the concept of marriage. Let us now return to the Improved Grounded Literal Emergence view of the concept of marriage and see what an alternative metaphor-based explanation would be like. We can begin by observing that in her discussion whether Quinn equates the expectational structure of marriage with the concept of marriage itself remains unclear. Nowhere does she describe or define marriage itself in terms of other than its "expectational structure." This leads one to believe that marriage is conceptualized by people in terms of this structure only. But is it? Do not people have an idea of what marriage is independently of and before they have an expectational structure of it? One would think that they do; yet this aspect of the concept of marriage does not show up in her article. Marriage is presented by Quinn as an expectational structure, and all the other aspects of it that she discusses, such as compatibility, difficulty, effort, success and failure, and risk, are given as consequences

of this structure. What, then, does the notion of marriage consist of independently of and before it acquires its particular expectational structure?

First and foremost, marriage is some kind of abstract union between two people. To illustrate this conception, consider some definitions of marriage in a sample of American dictionaries:

marriage 1 the state of being married; relation between husband and wife; married life; wedlock; matrimony **4** any close or intimate union (*Webster's New World Dictionary*, third college edition)

marry 1 a) to join as husband and wife; unite in wedlock **b)** to join (a man) to a woman as her husband, or (a woman) to a man as his wife **vi. 2** to enter into a close or intimate relationship; unite (*Webster's New World Dictionary*, third college edition)

marriage 1 a: the state of being married **b:** the mutual relationship of husband and wife; wedlock; **c:** the institution whereby men and women are joined in a special kind of social and legal dependence for the purpose of founding and maintaining a family (*Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary*)

marry 1 a: to join as husband and wife according to law or custom **2** to unite in close and usu. permanent relation **vi 2** to enter into a close or intimate union (these wines – well) (*Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary*)

marriage 1. a. The state of being husband and wife; wedlock **b**. The legal union of man and woman as husband and wife (*The Heritage Illustrated Dictionary*)

marry 1. a. To become united with in matrimony (*The Heritage Illustrated Dictionary*)

married 1. United in matrimony (*Funk & Wagnalls Standard Dictionary*)

As these definitions show, a major component of the concept of marriage is the (legal, social, emotional, etc.) union of two people. This seems to be a large part of the notion that is independent of and prior to the expectational structure associated with marriage. In other words, the prototypical, or stereotypical, idea of marriage must include the notion that it is an abstract union of various kinds between two people.

As Quinn suggests, the concept of marriage is structured by the mapping of the American cultural conception of love. However, she

finds this only in the expectational structure of marriage. But now we can see additional structure in marriage that derives from love. This is the notion of unity involving two people. As I showed in earlier work (Kövecses, 1988, 1991), the concept of romantic love is, in large measure, understood and structured by the metaphor LOVE IS A UNITY OF TWO COMPLEMENTARY PARTS, as can be found in expressions such as "You *belong to* me and I *belong to* you," "Theirs is *a perfect fit*," "We're *as one*," "She's *my better half*," "They *broke up*," "They're *inseparable*," and "They *match* each other *perfectly*." It is largely the functional unity of two physical parts that serves as the source domain for the abstract target concept of marriage. But more generally, our understanding of nonphysical – social, legal, emotional, spiritual, psychological, and so on – unions derives from physical or biological unions. This is a perfectly regular way in which human beings conceptualize and, by conceptualizing, build their nonphysical, abstract world. We have seen the same process at work for the COMPLEX ABSTRACT SYSTEMS metaphor earlier.

In other words, we have the conceptual metaphor NONPHYSICAL (FUNCTIONAL) UNITY IS PHYSICAL (FUNCTIONAL) UNITY. (It is also significant that the etymological root of the words *union* and *unity* is the Latin word *unus*, meaning one.) This is the metaphor that underlies the conception of various social, legal, psychological, sexual, political, emotional, and other "unities" and explains the use of such expressions as "*to join* forces," "the *merging* of bodies," "the *unification* of Europe," "to be *at one with* the world," "a *union* of minds," and "a deep spiritual *union with* God." Obviously, the metaphor also applies to marriage as a nonphysical unity between two people. Some examples from the preceding definitions include "*to join* in marriage," "a marriage *union*," "the legal *union* of man and woman," and "*to be united* in matrimony"; hence the metaphor MARRIAGE IS A PHYSICAL AND/OR BIOLOGICAL FUNCTIONAL UNITY OF TWO PARTS. Not surprisingly, we also find examples of this metaphor in the data that Quinn presents. She names what we call the MARRIAGE IS A PHYSICAL AND/OR BIOLOGICAL FUNCTIONAL UNITY metaphor "two inseparable objects," as in "We knew we were going *to stay together*, and "an unbreakable bond," as in "That just kind of *cements the bond*" (p. 68).

At this point it might be objected that my analysis is largely based on dictionary data and that Americans may not conceptualize marriage according to the UNITY metaphor. We have some evidence that they do. The evidence is both direct and indirect. In 1992 at Rutgers University, New Jersey, in an informal experiment I asked students in an introduction to anthropology course to write down linguistic expressions about marriage. They came up with dozens of phrases and sentences, including "the ultimate *bond*," "She's *my ball and chain*," "They are *a match made in heaven*," "They've *tied the knot*," "She's *my better half*," "They *broke up*," "I can't *function without her*," "They're *getting hitched*," and "They *dissolved their union.*" These are all UNITY metaphors or at least closely related to this metaphor. They suggest that the notion of UNITY is not alien to many Americans when they talk and think about marriage.

The indirect evidence is from a set of interviews concerning romantic love that a student of mine, Ted Sablay, conducted in the summer of 1996 at the University of Nevada, Las Vegas. The interview subjects were seven male and seven female students with roughly the same White middle-class background. What the interviews reveal about romantic love should be taken seriously in dealing with marriage because, as Quinn herself claims, marriage is in many ways structured by our understanding of love. In his report on the project, Ted Sablay found that the most frequent metaphor for love is the unity metaphor for his interview subjects. This gives us some reason to believe that, at least for some Americans, the conception of marriage is still built on the idea of forming a unity with another and that this notion is not just a consequence of an antiquated dictionary definition.

What is the relationship between the idea of MARRIAGE AS NON-PHYSICAL UNITY and the expectational structure of marriage that Quinn describes? We can suggest that the conception of marriage as a unity between two people is the basis, or the foundation, of its expectational structure, namely, that marriage is expected to be shared, beneficial, and lasting. The reason that marriage is expected to be all these things is that it is conceptualized as a unity of a particular kind: the physical unity of two complementary parts, which yields the metaphor MARRIAGE IS THE PHYSICAL AND/OR BIOLOGICAL UNITY OF TWO COMPLEMENTARY PARTS. The details of the UNITY metaphor

for marriage can be given as a set of mappings:

1. the two physical parts   → the married people
2. the physical joining of the → the union of the two people
   parts   in marriage
3. the physical/biological unity → the marriage union
4. the physical fit between the → the compatibility between
   parts   the married people
5. the physical functions of the → the roles the married people
   parts in the unity   play in the relationship
6. the complementariness of → the complementariness of
   the functions of the   the roles of the married
   parts   people
7. the whole physical object → the marriage relationship
   consisting of the parts
8. the function of the whole → the role or purpose of the
   object   marriage relationship

What we have here is a source domain in which there are two parts that fit each other and form a whole, in which the particular functions of the parts complement each other and the parts make up a larger unity that has a function (or functions). This source schema of a physical unity has parts that are additional to the basic experience of baby and first caretaker. Unlike in the infantile experience, here two originally separate parts are joined, or put together; unlike in the infantile experience, there is a preexisting fit between the parts; unlike in the infantile experience, the whole has a function that is larger than, or extends beyond, the functions of the individual parts. What corresponds to these in the target domain of marriage is that two separate people who are compatible join each other in marriage with some life goal(s) in mind. It is this structure that appears in the way many people (in America and possibly elsewhere) think about marriage. But this way of conceptualizing marriage is simply a special case of the larger process whereby nonphysical unities in general are constituted on the analogy of more physical ones. It is important to see that the PHYSICAL UNITY metaphor characterizes not just marriage but many other abstract concepts in which the issue of NONPHYSICAL UNION arises, that is, abstract concepts that have UNION as one of their dimensions, or aspects. This dimension of

NONPHYSICAL UNION emerges from the content and structure of what was called the source domain of PHYSICAL UNITY (OF TWO COMPLEMENTARY PARTS). In this sense, abstract concepts that possess the dimension of NONPHYSICAL UNION can only be metaphorical. This is for the simple reason that this abstract dimension inevitably emerges from the physical source of PHYSICAL UNITY. The application of this simple, constitutive metaphor to marriage is both transparent and important. Its significance lies in the fact that in the concept of marriage NONPHYSICAL UNION is a core dimension. Indeed, it is so fundamental that, as we will see shortly, the expectational structure that Quinn identified derives from it.

In Quinn's view, the basic experiences constitute cultural models (like those of abstract concepts in general and that of the concept of marriage in particular) and the cultural models select the fitting conceptual metaphors. In my view, it is the basic experiences that select the fitting conceptual metaphors and the metaphors constitute the cultural models. As we saw earlier, there are differences between what the basic experiences and what the conceptual metaphors can yield relative to abstract concepts. Basic experiences in themselves could not account for the entire content and structure of the concepts of love and marriage (just as they could not account for the cultural model of anger). The more that is needed is provided by such constitutive metaphors as NONPHYSICAL UNION (IN LOVE AND MARRIAGE) IS PHYSICAL UNITY and ANGER IS A HOT FLUID IN A CONTAINER.

This metaphorically structured understanding of marriage forms a definition of marriage and provides its expectational structure. The definition could be given as follows:

Marriage is a union of two people who are compatible with each other. The two people perform different but complementary roles in the relationship. Their union serves a purpose (or purposes) in life.

This is, of course, a generic-level definition, which can be filled out with specific details in individual cases.

The expectational structure of marriage arises from the definition in the following way:

- Because a part by itself is not functional, people want to share their life with another in marriage.
- Because only one or some parts fit another part, people want a compatible partner in marriage.

- Because (to get a functioning whole) a part must perform its designated function, people want to fulfill their designated roles in a marriage relationship.
- Because wholes have a designated function to perform, marriage relationships must be lasting.

As can be seen, this is similar to Quinn's expectational structure, although there are also some differences. One difference is that in my characterization compatibility is a mapping in the UNITY metaphor, whereas in hers it is a consequence that follows from the expectational structure. Another difference is more substantial. It is that I have given the expectational structure of marriage as a consequence of a certain metaphorical understanding of marriage, one that is based on the metaphor NONPHYSICAL UNITY IS PHYSICAL UNITY. It is in this sense that I claimed that the concept of marriage is metaphorically constituted.

In sum, what Quinn calls the expectational structure of marriage results from a certain metaphorical understanding of marriage. Thus, marriage is not a literally conceived abstract concept, although the metaphor that yields the expectational structure is based on certain bodily experiences.

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CONCEPTUAL METAPHORS AND CULTURAL MODELS IN REAL DISCOURSE

I have argued in the previous section that, contrary to Quinn's claim, metaphors constitute cultural models and do not simply reflect them. However, I do not want to suggest that Quinn is entirely wrong in her claims. As a matter of fact, I believe that both Quinn and I are right at the same time. How is this possible? We get a straightforward explanation if we consider the following.

A part of our conceptual system consists of abstract concepts that are metaphorically defined. The definition of abstract concepts by means of metaphor takes place automatically and unconsciously. This is the case when emotions are viewed as forceful entities inside us, when we think of abstract complex systems as growing (= developing), when we define our goals as "goals" (to be reached), and, indeed, when we believe that marriage is some kind of a union. We take these metaphorical "definitions" as givens that are literal.

My point is to show that they are not. There are many concepts like these that are defined or constituted by conceptual metaphors. And they are so constituted unconsciously and without any cognitive effort. I believe that this kind of definition of abstract concepts takes place at what I call the *supraindividual* level of conceptualization (see Kövecses, 2002, chapter 17). It is the supraindividual level in the sense that it consists of a static and highly conventionalized system of mappings between physical source and abstract target domains. Because of the automatic and unconscious nature of the mappings, we tend to think of these abstract concepts as literal and believe, as Quinn does, that the literal models of the concepts "select" the appropriate metaphors.

However, having said this, I also believe that Quinn makes a valid point. When we actually use these metaphorically constituted concepts in *real* discourse, it is often the case that we choose metaphorical expressions that are *not constitutive* of our understanding of the target concept in question in discourse but that are *based on* an already existing metaphorical understanding of a model of a target domain. In other words, I would agree that the way discourse understanding and production work often creates situations in which metaphorical expressions arise from a prior understanding of the target as a (metaphorically constituted but literally taken) cultural model.

As an illustration of this situation, let us consider Chilton and Lakoff's (1995) work on the application of the BUILDING metaphor to the political domain, in particular, Gorbachev's metaphor of the COMMON EUROPEAN HOUSE, that is, EUROPE IS A COMMON HOUSE (see chapter 10 for details). As we saw in the discussion of the Internally Grounded Metaphorical Emergence view, there exists the general metaphor ABSTRACT COMPLEX SYSTEMS ARE BUILDINGS (Kövecses, 2000b, 2002). This metaphor has several mappings that can be given as submetaphors within the general metaphor; specifically:

THE CREATION OF ABSTRACT STRUCTURE IS BUILDING
ABSTRACT STRUCTURE IS PHYSICAL STRUCTURE (OF THE BUILDING)
ABSTRACT LASTINGNESS IS THE STABILITY OF THE PHYSICAL STRUC-
    TURE (TO STAND)

According to the standard cognitive linguistic view of metaphor, the source domain of BUILDING and the target domain of, in this case,

POLITICAL STRUCTURE are characterized by these mappings (see, e.g., Kövecses, 1995a, 2000b, 2002; Grady, 1997a, 1997b). My claim, in line with the preceding argument, would be that the abstract target concept of POLITICAL STRUCTURE is constituted by these mappings. That is to say, the notion of political structure (as in the discussion of the unification of European countries into a single political entity) is in part defined by the metaphor ABSTRACT COMPLEX SYSTEMS ARE BUILDINGS. And, indeed, we find numerous examples that are based on these mappings in the discourse on the integration of Europe in the 1990s, as analyzed by Andreas Mussolff (2001). Here are some examples from his work:

We want a Europe that's not just an elevated free trade area, but the construction of a house of Europe as laid down in the Maastrich treaty. (*The Guardian*, July 6, 1994)

The common currency is the weight-bearing pillar of the European house. (*The Guardian*, June 3, 1997)

The first example is based on the submetaphor THE CREATION OF ABSTRACT STRUCTURE IS BUILDING; the second is based on both ABSTRACT STRUCTURE IS PHYSICAL STRUCTURE (OF THE BUILDING) (pillar) and ABSTRACT LASTINGNESS IS THE STABILITY OF THE PHYSICAL STRUCTURE (TO STAND) (weight-bearing). These examples show that political structure is thought about in terms of the BUILDING metaphor and, more importantly, that certain aspects of this abstract entity (and of many additional ones), such as construction, structure, and strength, are inevitably constituted by metaphor. (Notice the unavoidably metaphorical character of the words *construction, structure, strength* in relation to political structure.)

But in the course of the debate about the unification of Europe at the time many expressions other than those that fit and are based on these submetaphors were used in the press (Mussolff, 2001). Mussolff provides a huge number of metaphorical expressions that were not supposed to be used (according to this view of metaphor), but they were nonetheless. There was talk about the roof, the occupants, the apartments, and even caretakers and fire escapes. If the BUILDING metaphor is limited to these predetermined aspects of the target domain, then speakers should not talk about any of these things in

connection with political structure. But they do. Let us see some of Mussolff's (2001) examples:

We are delighted that Germany's unification takes place under the European roof. (Documentation by the Federal Press and Information Office, Bonn)

At the moment, the German occupants of the first floor apartment in the "European house" seem to think that foreigners from outside the continent should be content with living in the rubbish bin. (*Die Zeit*, January 10, 1992)

What does he [Chancellor Kohl] need this house for, after so many years as Chancellor? – Well, it's obvious, he wants to become the caretaker. (*Die Zeit*, May 16, 1997)

[the European house is] a building without fire-escapes: no escape if it goes wrong. (*The Guardian*, May 2, 1998)

[it is a] burning building with no exits. (*The Times*, May 20, 1998)

Given these examples of metaphor usage, it seems that metaphors can do more than just automatically and unconsciously constitute certain aspects of target domains in a static conceptual system (i.e., at the supraindividual level). Once we have a source domain that conventionally constitutes a target, we can use any component of this source that fits elements of the target. Notice that there is a reversal here. In a dynamic discourse situation the activated target domain in the discourse can indeed select components of the source that fit a particular target idea or purpose. For example, if one has a negative view of the unification of Europe and has problems with, say, the difficulty of leaving the union in case it does not work out for a particular country, then the speaker can talk about a "*building without fire escapes*" – a part of the source that is obviously outside the conventionally used aspects of the source but that fits the target. (This account of metaphorical expressions in real discourse that should not occur but that do is similar to that offered by Grady, Oakley, and Coulson, 1999. The difference, though, is that whereas the present account makes use of conceptual metaphor theory, their explanation makes use of the theory of conceptual integration, or blending. On blending, see chapter 11; Faucconier and Turner, 2002.)

Interestingly, Lynne Cameron and Graham Low discovered a similar process that they call metaphor "attraction" (Cameron and Low,

in press). In it, a particular "base" metaphor (as they term it) can attract different metaphors that just "happen to be on the same topic." When this happens, real discourse tends to display a high density of metaphorical expressions: That is, metaphorical expressions based on the same source domain form clusters in the text.

In other words, the preceding examples demonstrate that in real discourse target domains can, indeed, select the metaphors, albeit in a limited fashion. The selection of metaphors is limited because they are from a source that is already constitutive of the target. However, the rich target domain knowledge may select metaphors that are not conventionally used for the automatic and unconscious understanding of this target.

HOW DO CULTURAL MODELS EMERGE?

The attempt to answer the question whether metaphors constitute or simply reflect cultural models requires an answer to the question of how abstract concepts emerge. We have considered several possibilities for the emergence of abstract concepts: (1) Ungrounded Literal Emergence, (2) Improved Grounded Literal Emergence from some basic experience, (3) Internally Grounded Metaphorical Emergence, and (4) Externally Grounded Metaphorical Emergence. I have argued that Ungrounded Literal Emergence is not a viable way of thinking about the emergence of abstract concepts because it provides no account whatsoever of why abstract concepts have the particular content and structure that they have. I have also argued against Improved Grounded Literal Emergence, a view that maintains that abstract concepts emerge directly – that is, without the mediation of metaphor – from basic human experience. In particular, I pointed out that Quinn's analysis of American marriage leaves out of consideration a large and significant portion of this concept – the part that is metaphorically conceived and from which the expectational structure of marriage derives. The notion of marriage, on my analysis, is partially based on and constituted by the generic metaphor NONPHYSICAL UNITY IS PHYSICAL UNITY. Given this metaphor, we can naturally account for why marriage has the expectational structure that it has, as well as for the fact that the same metaphor applies to many domains that are seemingly unrelated to marriage or love.

I suggested in this chapter that a number of abstract concepts can only emerge metaphorically: via either Internally Grounded Metaphorical Emergence or Externally Grounded Metaphorical Emergence. Conceiving of their emergence in this way, we can offer a systematic and integrated account of not only such specific concepts as anger, love, and marriage but also of abstract concepts in general. However, I also argued that in real discourse target domains can indeed select metaphors that are not a part of the conventional application of the source to the target.

Actually, the view that cultural models that characterize abstract concepts in scientific theories can only emerge from metaphors or blends is a commonplace in the philosophy of science. A number of philosophers and cognitive linguists have repeatedly pointed out that scientific theorizing would be impossible without "constitutive" metaphor (see, e.g., Boyd, 1993; Kuhn, 1993). This is simply the way in which we create an understanding of much of the world for ourselves. There is no reason to believe that cognition somehow works in reverse order in the conceptualization of everyday reality. To believe so leads to theories of cultural models that cannot fully account for the detailed specific content and structure of many abstract concepts.

CAUSES OF METAPHOR VARIATION

10

Causes of Variation in Metaphor

What causes our metaphors to vary along the dimensions and in the aspects that were discussed in the previous chapters? I suggest that the causes can be grouped into two large classes: differential experience and differential cognitive preferences or styles. In other words, the suggestion is that, on the one hand, many of our metaphors vary because our experiences as human beings also vary. And, on the other hand, our metaphors vary because the cognitive preferences and styles we put to use for the creation of abstract thought also vary. First, I examine some of the factors or causes that produce differential experience, and then I look at some of the cognitive processes that people employ differentially when they speak and think figuratively.

Two important caveats must be mentioned in connection with these claims. One is that the lists of factors and cognitive processes that produce variation in metaphor are not meant to be exhaustive. There is no doubt that both lists could and should be expanded for a more complete account of the potential causes of metaphor variation. The other caveat is that the factors that I take to produce differential experience (and hence different metaphors) and the differential cognitive processes that produce different metaphors are not separable from each other but work jointly. That is, differential experience is produced by means of cognitive processes, and differential cognitive processes that produce different metaphors always operate on some experiential content. I lay out the two large classes of factors or causes separately only for the sake of a clearer presentation.

There are several distinct causes that produce differential experience and hence different metaphors, including awareness of context, differential memory, differential concerns and interests, and their various subcases.

Awareness of Context

We are attuned to the world in which we live most of the time. This means that we unconsciously monitor and pick out certain details of the world, including, of course, ourselves as part of it. This world consists, for us, of ourselves (our body), the physical environment, the physical and social aspects of the settings in which we act, and the broader cultural context. These are also aspects of the world that may have an influence on the ways the metaphors we use often vary along the dimension and in the form that I have specified so far in this book. Since all of these aspects of the world can vary in many ways, the metaphors we use can vary in many ways.

Physical Environment. There are differences in the physical environment in which people live, and because people are (mostly unconsciously) attuned to these differences, the metaphors that people speaking different languages and varieties of languages use also vary. By physical environment I mean the particular geography, landscape, fauna and flora, dwellings, other people, and so forth, that speakers of a language or variety interact with on a habitual basis. A good test case of this suggestion is a situation in which a language that was developed by speakers living in a certain kind of natural and physical environment is moved by some of its speakers to a new and very different natural and physical environment. If this happens, we should expect to find differences between the metaphorical conceptualization of the speakers of the original language and that of the people who speak the "transplanted" version of the same language. In the chapter on the dimensions of variation, we saw two examples of this situation. Both Dutch and English are languages that were moved to a new and very different physical environment, South Africa and North America, respectively, and they developed a unique metaphorical language patterned after the new environment.

Even more obvious cases of the physical environment's alteration of metaphorical conceptualization are situations in which spatial conceptualization varies according to the degree of contact between humans and animals (see chapter 4). In societies where people and animals live in close contact with each other there is a greater likelihood that spatial relations will be conceptualized in terms of the animal body. However, this example also reminds us that, often, the discussion of the influence of the natural and physical environment on metaphorical conceptualization cannot be easily separated from the discussion of social structure and its role in creating differential metaphors across languages.

Social Context. Not only the physical but also the social environment can exert an influence on the kinds of metaphors we have in a language or variety. Social issues that may have some influence on metaphorical conceptualization include power relations and social pressure.

POWER RELATIONS. The impact of social context on metaphorical thought is especially clear in the case of power relations in a given society. The differential use of metaphors about women and men (by women and men) in Japanese society served as a telling example in this connection (see chapter 5). In general, we can claim that the different distribution of power in societies results in differential uses of metaphor by the participants of those power relations.

SOCIAL PRESSURE. As noted in chapter 5, the anthropologist Victor Balaban studied the metaphors pilgrims used at a Marian apparition site. The main finding of his study was that pilgrims in Conyer used substantially more nonvisual than visual metaphors. He suggests that this happens in order for the group to meet two different cultural pressures: to present themselves as people who (1) have undergone a major religious transformation in the capacity of nonvolitional and passive persons, but (2) nevertheless have reliable and authentic religious knowledge that distinguishes them from people outside the group. More generally, the study shows how the use of metaphors by subcultures may depend on sometimes contradictory social pressures that influence the group.

Cultural Context. By *cultural context* I simply mean the broader context that a culture or subculture provides for the understanding of any of its concepts, including all the (sub)culturally unique and salient concepts and values that characterize particular (sub)cultures – together with the governing principles of a given culture or subculture. The governing principles and key concepts have special importance in (metaphorical) conceptualization because they permeate several general domains of experience for a culture or cultural group.

To demonstrate the effect of these differences on metaphor, let us first consider in some detail the near-universal PRESSURIZED CONTAINER metaphor for anger in a variety of cultures. We saw in chapter 3 that at a generic level, this metaphor is very similar across many cultures. However, as was pointed out in chapter 4, at a specific level we can notice important differences in the metaphor across certain cultures. How do the differences arise?

Geeraerts and Grondelaers (1995) note that in the Euro-American tradition (including in Hungary), it is the classical–medieval notion of the *four humors* from which the Euro-American conceptualization of anger (as well as that of emotion in general) derived. (We may also note that the Hungarian concept of *düh* is from the same source.) But they also note that the application of the humoral doctrine is not limited to anger or the emotions. The humoral view maintains that the four fluids (phlegm, black bile, yellow bile, and blood) regulate the vital processes of the human body. They were also believed to determine personality types (such as sanguine and melancholy) and account for a number of medical problems, together with cures for them (such as bloodletting). Obviously, then, the use of the humoral view as a form of cultural explanation extends far beyond anger and the emotions. In addition to being an account of emotional phenomena, it was an explanation of a variety of issues in physiology, psychology, and medicine. In other words, the humoral view was a key component of the classical–medieval cultural context and it exerted a major impact on the emergence of the European conception of anger as a fluid in a pressurized container.

In Japan, as Matsuki (1995) tells us, there seems to exist a culturally distinct set of concepts that is built around the concept of *hara* (meaning both the belly/stomach area and anger). Truth, real intentions, and the real self (called *honne*) constitute the content of *hara*. The term

honne is contrasted with *tatemae*, or one's social face. Thus when a Japanese person keeps anger (*ikari*) under control, he or she is hiding his or her private, truthful, innermost self and displaying a social face that is called for in the situation by accepted standards of behavior. The notion of *hara* greatly influenced the Japanese conception of anger over the ages.

King (1989) and Yu (1995, 1998) suggest that the Chinese concept of *nu* (corresponding to anger) is bound up with the notion of *qi*, that is, the energy that flows through the body. *Qi* in turn is embedded in not only the psychological (i.e., emotional) but also the philosophical and medical discourse of Chinese culture and civilization. The notion and the workings of *qi* are predicated on the belief that the human body is a homeostatic organism, the belief on which traditional Chinese medicine is based. And the conception of the body as a homeostatic organism seems to derive from the more general philosophical view that the universe operates with two complementary forces, *yin* and *yang*, which must be in balance to maintain the harmony of the universe. Similarly, when *qi* rises in the body, there is anger (*nu*), and when it subsides and there is balance again, harmony and emotional calm result. Without the concept of "QI," it would be difficult to imagine the view of anger in Chinese culture. (Actually, as Ning Yu (2003) tells us, *qi* plays a crucial role in many other emotion concepts in Chinese, including the concept of courage.)

Thus the four emotion concepts, *anger* in English, *düh* in Hungarian (the two representing European culture), *ikari* in Japanese, and *nu* in Chinese, are in part explained in the respective cultures by the culture-specific concepts of the *four humors*, *hara*, and *qi*. What accounts for the distinctiveness of the culture-specific concepts is the fact that, as we have just seen, those concepts that are evoked to explain the emotion concepts are embedded in very different systems of cultural concepts and propositions. It appears then that the broader cultural contexts that operate with culture-specific key concepts account for many of the specific-level differences among the four emotion concepts and the PRESSURIZED CONTAINER metaphor.

The example of the PRESSURIZED CONTAINER metaphor for anger demonstrates how culturally unique key concepts fill out generic-level schemata in the creation of cross-culturally differential metaphors. We can expect such differences in key concepts

to bring about differences not only in the production but also in the understanding of metaphors by speakers of languages that are associated with differential core values. Jeanette Littlemore (2003) shows that when speakers have conflicting core values (such as individualism–collectivism), they are likely to misunderstand each other's metaphors that are based on those values.

But perfectly everyday concepts may also have an important role in distinguishing people's habitual metaphorical thought across cultures or subcultures. For example, Frank Boers and Murielle Demecheleer (1997, 2001) suggested that the concepts of HAT and SHIP are more productive of metaphorical idioms in English than in French. And conversely, the concepts of SLEEVE and FOOD are more productive of metaphorical idioms in French than in English. They argue that this occurs because the former two concepts are relatively more salient for speakers of (British) English, and the latter two are relatively more salient for speakers of French.

To investigate the relevance of the differential salience of concepts across cultures to foreign language teaching, Boers and Demecheleer ran an informal experiment with 78 French-speaking respondents. They wanted to find out whether French-speaking students were more likely to infer the meaning of English idioms involving the concepts of SLEEVE and FOOD, as opposed to English idioms involving the concepts of HAT and SHIP, correctly. Their predictions proved correct in both cases. The French-speaking students could more easily guess the meaning of unknown English idioms involving SLEEVE and FOOD than that of those involving the concepts of HAT and SHIP. This way, they also provided evidence for the reality of differential salience of concepts across cultures.

Given these and a great many other examples, we can suggest that both everyday concepts and the key or defining concepts of a culture have a great deal of influence on metaphorical conceptualization – especially at lower, more specific levels of thought. The relationship and the interaction between metaphors and the culture-specific key concepts may be quite complex, as, for example, Ning Yu's (2003) study of the Chinese concept of courage indicates.

Communicative Situation. Awareness of the changing aspects of the communicative situation can also influence the metaphors people

produce. Several such aspects were implicitly evoked and relied on in the previous chapters (and probably there are additional ones that play a role). Metaphorical source domains for particular targets may arise from what I call the *pressure of coherence*. This means that speakers try (and tend) to be coherent with various aspects of the communicative situation in the process of creating metaphorical ideas. The communicative situation has to be understood as minimally comprising the audience, the medium, the topic, and the setting. All of these may play a role in creating metaphors that may not exist in the most conventionalized, the standard, variety of a language or in the creation of differential uses of metaphors in communicative situations that are characterized by different purposes and affective relationships between author and audience (Cameron and Low, in press).

We saw in chapter 5 some examples of the factor of audience, and the growing literature on sign languages and gestures also seems to indicate that the visual medium may have, in addition to the many shared metaphors with the auditory medium, certain metaphors that are specific to it (see, for example, Wilcox, 2000). In this chapter, I focus on two of the components of the communicative situation: topic and physical setting.

TOPIC. Take, for instance, the sentences described by Jean Aitchison mentioned in the chapter on the dimensions of metaphor variation (see chapter 5): "Cougars *drown* Beavers," "Cowboys *corral* Buffaloes," "Air Force *torpedoes* the Navy," and "Clemson *cooks* Rice" (Aitchison, 1987: 143). These headlines from articles describing American football games exemplify the case in which the author of the headline can create a metaphor for defeat in sports on the basis of certain properties of the characters that participate in the "story." Because, for example, cowboys are in the business of corralling animals, the author is in a position to create a metaphor for defeat based on this property of cowboys.

As another example, consider a headline from *The Wall Street Journal Europe* (January 6, 2003): "The Americanization of Japan's Car Industry Shifts into Higher Gear." What we have here is the PROGRESS IS MOTION FORWARD metaphor from Event Structure (see chapter 3). The specific target domain is the progress of the Japanese car industry. Because the topic is the car industry, use of the motion of a car,

and not of some other entity capable of motion, makes sense in the metaphor. It seems to me that the pressure of coherence is at work here as well.

The phenomenon is not limited to headlines. Consider the following portion of a newspaper article from a Hungarian newspaper and its rough English translation:

Levelet írt Sepp Blatter a Nemzetközi Labdarúgó Szövetség (FIFA) svájci elnöke az ázsiai szövetség (AFC) vezetőinek, melyben elfogadhatatlannak minősítette a kontinens küldötteinek három héttel ezelőtti kivonulását a FIFA–kongresszusáról, ugyanakkor megígérte, hogy megpróbál segíteni az AFC gondjainak megoldásában – jelentette kedden a dpa német hírügynökség.

Nagyon elkeserített az Önök viselkedése a Los Angeles-i kongresszusunkon. Önöknek, mint a labdarúgáshoz értő szakembereknek tudniuk kellett volna, hogy az a csapat soha nem nyeri meg a mérkőzést, amelyik a lefújás előtt levonul a pályáról – áll a levélben. (*Zalai Hirlap* [The Chronicle of Zala County], July 28, 1999, p. 14)

Sepp Blatter, the Swiss president of the International Football Federation (FIFA), wrote a letter to the leaders of the Asian Football Association (AFC), in which he deemed unacceptable the behavior of the association's delegates three weeks ago when they left the FIFA Congress prematurely. On the other hand, he promised that he would try to help solve the problems with which AFC is struggling – the German news agency dpa reported.

I was bitterly disappointed by your behavior at our Congress held in Los Angeles. You, as experts on football, should have known that the team that leaves the field before the game is called off by the referee can never win the game – states the letter. (my translation, ZK)

Here, the target domain is the politics of international football (or soccer), which is conceptualized as the real game of football (soccer). The delegates leaving the FIFA meeting ahead of time correspond to the football (soccer) players who leave the playing field before the referee calls off the game. The pressure of coherence causes or enables the president of FIFA, Sepp Blatter, to choose the football (soccer) game metaphor because the topic of the meeting is football (soccer) itself.

The pressure of coherence seems to be pervasive in journalism in general. The Hungarian daily *Magyar Nemzet* (Hungarian Nation) carried an article some years ago about some of the political leaders

of neighboring countries who were at the time antagonistic to Hungary. One of them, the Slovak then-president, Meciar, had been a boxer. This gave a Hungarian journalist a chance to use the following metaphor, which is based on this particular property of the former Slovak president:

A pozsonyi exbokszolóra akkor viszünk be atlanti pontot érő ütést, ha az ilyen helyzetekben megszokott nyugati módra "öklözünk": megvető távolságot tartva. A kolozsvári pankrátorral pedig közös ringbe sem szabad lépni. (*Hungarian Nation*, September 13, 1997)

We deal a blow worth an Atlantic point to the ex-boxer of Bratislava if we box in a Western style as customary in these circumstances: keeping an aloof distance. As far as the prize wrestler of Cluj-Napoca is concerned, we should not even enter the same ring with him. (my translation, ZK)

What we have in all of these cases is that a certain aspect or property of either the source or the target domain forms the basis for building the respective source or the respective target domain. In the example of "Cowboys *corral* Buffaloes," the generic-level meaning of *corralling*, that is, 'controlling,' is used to express the target domain of defeat, whereas in the last example of *keeping an aloof distance* (from Meciar), it is the property of one of the characters in the target domain that helps select the source domain for the target of confrontational international politics – boxing.

PHYSICAL SETTING. Physical setting as a potential cause of, or factor in, metaphor variation was studied by Frank Boers (1999), who started out from the following general hypothesis: People make more extensive use of a source domain when that particular source domain becomes more salient for them under certain circumstances. In other words, certain changes in the circumstances of the communicative situation may make people more aware of a particular source domain, and this may result in an increased use of the source domain in metaphorical conceptualization. The specific hypothesis was that the source domain of HEALTH is especially productive of linguistic expressions in the winter because this is the time when, at least in countries of the Northern Hemisphere, people are more aware of their body through the more frequent occurrence of illnesses (such as colds, influenza, pneumonia, bronchitis) at this time of the year. The particular target domain that was selected for the study was ECONOMY. Thus,

according to the hypothesis, we can expect an increase in the relative salience of the ECONOMY IS HEALTH metaphor in the winter period. The salience of the HEALTH domain was measured in terms of the frequency of health-related metaphorical expressions for economy.

In order to test the hypothesis, Boers counted all the metaphorical expressions that are related to economics and that are based on the HEALTH domain in the editorials of all issues of the English weekly magazine *The Economist* over a period of 10 years. The study resulted in a sample of more than one million words. Here is a selection of the metaphorical expressions that he identified: "*healthy* companies," "*sickly* firms," "economic *remedy*," "*symptoms* of a corporate *disease*," "a financial *injection*," "*arthritic* markets," and "economic *recovery*." The heavy presence of such and similar expressions shows that economy is commonly talked and thought about in terms of bodily health. The question for the researcher was whether there was any fluctuation in the frequency of use of the HEALTH metaphor from season to season. Boers found that the frequency of the metaphor was highest between the months of December and March. The same result was found systematically for the 10 years under investigation. During this period, the frequency of health-related metaphors for economy increased and stayed higher in the winter, confirming the hypothesis. When the HEALTH domain becomes more salient for people, they make more extensive use of it than when it is less salient.

It could be objected that the more extensive use of the HEALTH metaphor was not necessarily due to a change in weather conditions, but to a general increase of metaphorical activity in the winter. Thus, it could be said that maybe all the other source domains for the economy (such as WARFARE and RACE), for some unknown reason, become more prominent at this time of the year. Boers checked this possibility also. He reexamined a part of the data for the other major metaphorical source domains in order to see whether their use also fluctuates according to seasonal changes. He found no such fluctuation. The use of the other source domains remained relatively stable over the seasons. In other words, these source domains, unlike the HEALTH domain, do not seem to be susceptible to fluctuation as a result of certain changes in the physical setting of communication (i.e., a setting in which bodily health becomes more salient). This is not to suggest,

however, that the use of these source domains for economics never fluctuates. It may under different communicative circumstances, but the relevant studies have not yet been done.

Differential Memory: The Role of History

What I call *memory* here is history – the major or minor events that occurred in the past of a society/culture, group, or individual. I call this *memory* because the society, group, or individual "remembers" these events through its collective unconscious (in the case of societies or social groups) – embodied in language. The memory of the events is coded into the language. Because of the past-oriented nature of the language, many of the metaphors we use may reveal a certain time lag between our experiences of the world today and the experiences of the source domain in the past. (On this, see, e.g., Deignan, 2003). It is more or less a commonplace that the history of culture plays a major role in the use of metaphorical language, and that the metaphors we use today may not reflect current understandings about our culture. It is our job as metaphor researchers in the future to find out in which cases this is true and in which ones it is not or is only partially true.

Social History. Why do Hungarians tend to use the metaphors they do for life, and why do Americans tend to use different ones? This issue was discussed in chapter 4, in which I described a small-scale survey by Niki Köves (2002). Her survey showed that Hungarians primarily use the LIFE IS WAR and LIFE IS A COMPROMISE metaphors, whereas the Americans most commonly employ the LIFE IS A PRE-CIOUS POSSESSION and LIFE IS A GAME metaphors. The issue obviously is related to the peculiarities of Hungarian and American history. Hungarians have been in wars throughout their more than 1,000-year history as a nation and state and had to struggle for their survival, wedged between powerful German-speaking and Slavic nations. Given this history, not surprisingly for many Hungarians life is more of a struggle, and less of a game. To point this out is, of course, trivial as far as history is concerned, but it is not trivial to the study of the emergence of a particular metaphorical conceptual system.

The invention of various tools for communication throughout the ages is another good example of how social history provides

metaphorical source domains for the understanding of the mind. So-cial history also explains, for example, why many of the metaphors Americans use today reflect past experiences in American social and cultural history. The westward expansion, frontier experiences, In-dian and colonial contacts with the English-speaking settlers, and so on, all played a role in giving rise to many metaphors speak-ers of American English use today. And this is also why the highly metaphorical language of emotions has been changing through the centuries in America, as Stearns's (1994) work so clearly indicates. For example, it was changes in social history in the United States that caused more and more Americans to begin to move away from the traditional UNITY metaphor to the now more common EXCHANGE metaphor in the conceptualization of their love experiences.

However, the changes in metaphorical language and thought do not mean that the new ways of thinking and talking about a target domain completely replace older ways of thinking and talking. The two can coexist – at least for a while – in most cases.

Personal History. Personal history plays a similar role. As we saw in the discussion of individual variation (see chapter 5), a person's his-tory may have lasting effects on the way this person selects his or her source domains. Dan Rather's southern upbringing (see chapter 5), a university professor's long career in the navy (see chapter 5), the particular sports that American presidential candidates played in their youth (see chapter 8), and many other cases of individual metaphor usage can all be explained naturally if we take into account life histories.

The explanation applies equally to fictitious characters, such as characters in literary works. As a matter of fact, when this happens, these are very important cases that show that authors unconsciously create their characters' metaphorical "behavior." The fact that au-thors do this is evidence that this is a common factor in metaphorical thought. Consider once more the narrator of the story in Ken Kesey's *One Flew over the Cuckoo's Nest*, Bromden, one of the key characters in the novel. We saw in chapter 5 that Bromden uses machines and electronic devices as his source domain to interpret the world around him, and that he uses them excessively and even pathologically. Why is this so? Why machines and electronic devices? We can find out

from the novel. This is what Semino and Swindlehurst (1996: 151) say about him:

Over the course of the narrative we discover that Bromden spent a year studying electronics at college and then joined the Army as an electrician's assistant during World War II. Thus, while he has great familiarity with electronic and mechanical objects, he is also afraid of machines because he associates them with the war and in particular with the air raid in Germany that precipitated his current mental disturbances.

In other words, the story of one's life may be a key factor in explaining individual variation in metaphorical conceptualization.

We can even take this argument one step further and suggest that the unique metaphor-based symbolic system that an author uses may be partially determined by his or her personal life history. We saw examples of this in chapter 8 in the case of some American authors. More generally, the study of the life history of authors can be important because it enables us to see the mechanisms by virtue of which authors and people in general go beyond the conventionalized *linguistic* metaphors "imposed" on them by their language or dialect. It can also reveal how we can and do transcend the *conventional conceptual* metaphors made available to us by our conceptual systems.

Differential Concerns and Interests

The differential concerns and interests that societies, groups, or individuals may have also seem to have an impact on the kinds of metaphors people use. This factor may not always be easily distinguished from the history of a society, group, or individual discussed previously. Aspects of events that happened in the past may remain with us, and we may remain intensely concerned with them in our present life. This is what we find in the previous section, in which both Bromden's past and his present concerns predispose him to the heavy use of machine-related metaphors. However, there are also many cases in which intense present concerns and interests can be separated from the vestiges of past events in our mind. In the discussion of this factor, similar to differential memory, it is useful to distinguish more general social (societal or group) concerns and interests from individual personal concerns and interests.

Social Concerns and Interests. Certain social groups are commonly characterized by a particular interest that is of immediate concern to them. This is often the case with religious groups or groups of people who have a particular illness, hobby, or the like. In chapter 5, we found that people who had episodes of depression share metaphors of depression such as DEPRESSION IS DARKNESS ("It's really like a *black cloud"*), DEPRESSION IS WEIGHT ("I felt just so – so *heavy"*), and DEPRESSION IS DESCENT ("I just was *down"*) and that, more importantly for the present purpose, they also share at least one conceptual metaphor that people without the illness do not have: DEPRESSION IS CAPTOR ("I want to *break out of* this"). Why do people who have depression have the CAPTOR metaphor? Why do not non-depressed (i.e., only sad) people talk about sadness as CAPTOR? Most people do not normally talk about being trapped by, wanting to be free of, or wanting to break out of sadness, which are ways of talking and thinking about depression in a clinical context. It makes sense to say that people who have depression use this language and way of thinking about their situation because it faithfully captures what they experience and feel. Their deep concern is with their unique experiences and feelings that set them apart from people who do not have them. It is this concern that gives them the CAPTOR metaphor for depression.

An entire society may be characterized by certain concerns and interests. Americans, for example, are often said to be given to action, as opposed to passivity. This trait may explain the heavy use of sports and game metaphors by Americans. The claim here is not that only Americans have the game and sports metaphors, but that they have them for a more extensive range of target concepts than other nations. In other words, the reality (or maybe just the myth) of having a trait may give rise to a heavy reliance on a metaphorical source domain that is coherent with the trait.

Personal Concerns and Interests. Personal concerns and interests also often influence the choice of metaphorical source domains. The phenomena of having a "hang-up" or a "one-track mind" clearly belong to this category. If, for example, a person always thinks about sex (i.e., has a kind of "one-track mind"), this person is likely to frame more ideas in terms of sex than a person who does not have

this "mind-set." The phenomenon that "everything reminds him of sex" can be regarded as a pathological obsession – a kind of intense concern with or interest in something.

But conditions do not have to be that extreme. Intense professional interest may also lead a person to think about and express target domains habitually in terms of a source domain that is based on a professional interest. A good way of studying this form of variation is to look at letters in newspapers that are sent in by readers. In Hungarian newspapers the authors of the letters often mention their profession. Consider the following letter by a Hungarian electric engineer concerning the issue of Hungary's new relationship with Europe in the late 1990s (the quoted letter is followed by my more or less literal translation of the original):

Otthon vagyunk, otthon lehetünk Európában. *Szent István* óta bekapcsolódtunk ebbe a szellemi áramkörbe, és változó intenzitással, de azóta benne vagyunk – akkor is, ha különféle erők időnként, hosszabb-rövidebb ideig, megpróbáltak kirángatni belőle. (italics in the original; *Magyar Nemzet* [Hungarian Nation], June 12, 1999, p. 8)

We are, we can be at home in Europe. Since Saint Stephen we have been integrated/connected to this intellectual/spiritual electric circuit, and with varying degrees of intensity, but we have been in it – even though various powers, for more or less time, have tried to yank us out of it. (my translation, ZK)

The target domain is Hungary's new relationship to Europe in the wake of major political changes in the country in the 1990s. The interesting question is what the source domain is. As the passage makes clear, many of the words used reflect the professional interest of the author of the letter: *be integrated/connected, electric circuit, with varying degrees of intensity* are expressions that reveal electricity and electric circuitry as a source domain in the passage. The electrical engineer reasons on the basis of his knowledge of this domain. The concept of electricity and electric circuitry as a source domain is not obvious for this target and is certainly not the only one that could be used. My claim is that it is made available and its use is facilitated by the professional interest of the person who does the thinking about this particular target domain. Teachers, athletes, scientists, and so on, often take their source domains from their fields of activity to characterize

and reason about the various target domains they encounter, talk, and think about.

In chapter 7, I discussed a number of cognitive processes that appear to account for the differential linguistic expression of conceptual metaphors across languages. We can think of these processes as differential cognitive preferences or styles. Such cognitive processes as elaboration, conventionalization, specificity, and transparency can be found at work in all languages and cultures, but, as we saw in chapter 7, the degree to which they apply can vary from language to language. In the present section, I discuss additional cognitive preferences and styles that seem to be responsible for variation in metaphorical thought. (My use of the term *cognitive style* is perhaps not the conventional one here, as compared to the customary usage in cognitive psychology, but this does not in any way affect the argument. On cognitive linguistic work in relation to metaphor understanding using the more customary sense, see Boers and Littlemore, 2000.)

Experiential Focus

It is a fundamental claim of the theory presented here that in many cases human beings share a great deal of bodily experience on the basis of which they can build universal metaphors. The question that inevitably arises is this: Is this universal bodily basis utilized in the same way across languages and cultures or even varieties? In light of the available evidence it seems that the answer is no. The universal bodily basis on which universal metaphors *could* be built is *not* utilized in the same way or to the same extent in different languages and varieties. The notion that I would like to offer to get clear about this issue is that of *differential experiential focus*. What this means is that different peoples may be attuned to different aspects of their bodily functioning in relation to a target domain, or that they can ignore or downplay certain aspects of their bodily functioning as regards the metaphorical conceptualization of a particular target domain.

A case in point is the conceptualization of anger in English and Chinese. As studies of the physiological process of anger across several unrelated cultures show, increases in skin temperature and blood pressure are universal physiological correlates of anger. This accounts for the ANGER IS HEAT metaphor in English and in many other languages. However, King's (1989) and Yu's (1995, 1998) work suggest that the conceptualization of anger in terms of heat is much less prevalent in Chinese than it is in English. In Chinese, the major metaphors of anger seem to be based on pressure, not on pressure *and* heat. This indicates that speakers of Chinese have relied on a different aspect of their physiological characteristics in the metaphorical conceptualization of anger than speakers of English. The major point is that in many cases the universality of experiential basis does not necessarily lead to universally equivalent conceptualization – at least not at the specific level of hot fluids, in the case of anger. (But, as we saw in several chapters (e.g., in chapter 3), at a generic level near-universality does occur. Cf. THE ANGRY PERSON IS A PRESSURIZED CONTAINER metaphor.)

Another example of how different cultures utilize a presumably universal bodily basis in anger is offered by Michelle Rosaldo in her description of Ilongot anger (Rosaldo, 1980). The Ilongot are a former headhunting tribe living in northern Luzon, Philippines. For young Ilongot men, anger, *liget*, is a highly energized state that they need in order to accomplish their headhunting raids successfully. In Rosaldo's words: "The *liget* that Ilongots associate with youthful prowess and, for them, with the universal agitation that makes young men want to kill, takes on reality and significance because it is bound up not in mystery or cosmology, but in three forms of relation central to Ilongot social life" (Rosaldo, 1980: 138). Indeed, Rosaldo glosses the Ilongot term for anger as 'energy/anger.' This suggests that for the Ilongot anger (*liget*) figures as a generalized state of arousal that can sufficiently motivate their actions. They think of their anger also as hot but, most importantly, as an agitated and energized state that makes them want to go out and take heads. Clearly, this is, for us, a surprisingly different way of building on our presumably universal bodily experience in conceptualizing anger.

As a matter of fact, the conceptualization of anger in terms of heat has not always occurred even in English. As was noted in chapter 5, Caroline Gevaert (2001a) found on the basis of a variety of corpora

that heat-related words account for only 1.59% of all the words de-
scribing anger before 850. The number of heat-related words for anger
dramatically increases in the period between 850 and 950. Then the
number of these words decreases between 950 and 1050 to 6.22% and
then to 1.71% by around 1200, and then to 0.27% by around 1300.
After 1300 the number starts growing again, and after 1400 it be-
comes dominant in texts that describe anger. Gevaert provides a table
(Table 10.1) that indicates the linguistic expressions relating to anger
in her corpora. Gevaert (2001a) also provides a chart that shows the
frequency of the anger expressions (Table 10.2), that is, how the ex-
pressions were distributed in the periods under investigation. These
numbers indicate that the conceptualization of anger in terms of heat
is not a permanent and ever-present feature of the concept of anger
in English. How can this fluctuation occur in the conceptualization of
anger over time? Is it because people's physiological characteristics
when they are angry change throughout the ages? Obviously not. I
believe the answer is that universal physiological features provide
only a *potential* basis for metaphorical conceptualization – without
mechanically constraining what the specific metaphors for anger will
be. Heat was a major component in the concept of anger between 850
and 950, and then after a long decline it began to play a key role
again at around 1400 – possibly as a result of the emergence of the
humoral view of emotions in Europe (see Gevaert, 2001a; Geeraerts
and Grondelaers, 1995). We can notice the same kind of fluctuation
in the use of the domain of "SWELL," which I take to be akin to what
we call the "PRESSURE" component in the conceptualization of anger
today. Pressure was a major part of the conceptualization of anger un-
til around 1300, but then it began to decline, only to emerge strongly
again, together with heat, in the form of the HOT FLUID IN A CONTAINER
metaphor centuries later. The point is that we should not expect any of
the *conceptualized* responses associated with anger to remain constant
in conceptualizing anger (and the emotions in general) throughout
the ages.

More generally, what I would like to emphasize here is that uni-
versal embodiment associated with a target domain may consist of
several distinct components, or of distinct aspects. The conceptual
metaphors that emerge may be based on one component, or aspect,
at a certain point of time and on another at another point. Which

TABLE 10.1. *ANGER–Expressions in Old and Middle English Corpus*

Conceptualization (ANGER IS . . .)	Old English Expressions	Middle English Expressions
literal	*irre, wraðe, gram*	*ire, wrathe, grame*
STRONG EMOTION	*Anda*	*anda, mod, nith*
WRONG EMOTION	*(irre)pweorh, weamod*	*weamod, overthwart*
CONTEMPT	*modig, onscunian, unweorp*	*scorn, forthinken, despite, spite, disdain, indignation*
INSANITY	*(ellen)wod, woffian*	*wod, out of mind, rage, frenesy, fury, mad*
FIERCENESS	*unmilts, reðe*	*grim, ege, reh, brath, breth, brem, fell, violence, tempest*
AFFLICTION	*torn, gremian, tirgan, fandian, teona, geswencan, ofsettan, sare, gederian, geangsumian*	*gremen, hearmen, tenen, werien, anger, annoyen, grieven, tarien, offenden, vexen, rubben on the gall*
UNHAPPINESS	*unbliðe, unrot, gealh, sarig*	*sari, wroth, not/ill paid, mispayen, displeasen, not pleased, discontent, miscontent, not content*
HEAT	*hæte, hatheort, hathige, hygewælm, wilm, onælan, gehyrstan, onbærnan, ontendan*	*hot heart, ontenden, heat, chaufen, boilen, fervor, fume, fire, incense, inflame, kindlen, wallen, tendren, brennen*
SWELLING	*þindan, þrutian, abelgan*	*bersten, great heart, belgen, swellen*
BITTERNESS	*biter*	*bitter, egre*
MOTION	*astyrian, drefan, hrædmod, onræs, ahreran*	*stirien, mengen mod, (a)moven, hastif, rese, short*
HUMORAL CONDITION		*gall, melancholy, distemperen*
other	*grimetan, gryllan, sweorcan, hefig*	*grillen, grucchen, irish, heigh, crabbed, unsaught, wrake, wrah, testy, wasp*

Source: Gevaert, 2001a.

one is chosen depends on a variety of factors in the surrounding cultural context. In addition, the conceptual metaphors may be based on one component, or aspect, in one culture, and on another component, or aspect, in another culture. Moreover, there may be cultures in which people clearly have a universal physiological component, and yet the conceptualization of anger or other emotion concepts is

TABLE 10.2. *Quantitative Data for* ANGER*–Expressions in Old and Middle English Corpus*

Conceptualization (ANGER IS . . .)	a. 850	850–950	950–1050	c. 1200	c. 1300	c. 1400	c. 1500
Literal	46.03	55.56	55.59	67.72	54.22	46.64	30.1
	3	3	3	3	3	3	3
STRONG EMOTION	1.59	5.98	0.95	2.57	0.82	0.49	–
	1	1	1	3	1	1	–
WRONG EMOTION	0.79	1.06	2.32	1.14	–	0.16	0.14
	1	2	2	1	–	1	1
CONTEMPT	0.79	1.06	1.26	0.57	0.82	0.99	3.24
	1	3	2	1	3	3	3
INSANITY	0.79	0.21	1.27	2	4.63	2.3	6.19
	1	1	1	2	2	2	5
FIERCENESS	3.96	0.42	0.53	4.01	2.72	1.31	0.7
	2	2	2	5	3	2	4
AFFLICTION	12.7	4.49	13.50	4	11.17	16.28	21.95
	2	7	6	5	6	5	6
UNHAPPINESS	2.38	1.28	0.43	0.29	21.25	23.85	27.7
	2	3	3	1	3	4	8
HEAT	1.58	12.18	6.22	1.71	1.36	2.14	3.64
	2	6	5	6	3	0	7
SWELLING	26.19	10.89	12.87	11.71	0.82	0.33	–
	1	2	2	4	2	1	–
BITTERNESS	1.59	1.50	1.27	1.14	0.54	0.33	–
	1	1	1	1	1	2	–
MOTION	–	4.06	2.85	0.57	0.54	1.15	5.48
	–	4	3	1	1	4	4
HUMORAL CONDITION	–	–	–	–	–	2.47	0.42
	–	–	–	–	–	3	1
Other	1.58	1.28	0.95	2.57	1.08	1.46	0.42
	2	3	3	3	3	7	3
Number of tokens	126	468	948	350	367	608	711

Source: Gevaert, 2001a.

only marginally based on metaphors or metonymies. One such language is Tsou (an Austronesian language spoken in parts of Taiwan), in which the emotions are primarily expressed linguistically through an elaborate prefix system attached to emotion *verbs* (not nouns). But as Shuanfan Huang (2002), the linguist who studied the language, tells us, even in this language there exists the conceptual metaphor ANGER IS EXCESS AIR or FIRE IN A CONTAINER.

As a matter of fact, it also seems possible that universal physical or biological embodiment is entirely ignored in conceptualization. For example, we know of at least one culture in which the angry person is not, or is only to an insignificant degree, viewed as a pressurized container. Cathrine Lutz (1988) tells us that on Ifaluk, a Micronesian atoll, the folk conception of *song*, the counterpart of English anger, can be characterized in the following way:

1. There is a rule or value violation.
2. It is pointed out by someone.
3. This person simultaneously condemns the act.
4. The perpetrator reacts in fear to that anger.
5. The perpetrator amends his or her ways.

This model of *song* does not emerge from the mapping that characterizes the ANGRY PERSON IS A PRESSURIZED CONTAINER metaphor. The model emphasizes the *prosocial, moral, ideological* aspects of anger – as opposed to the antisocial, individualistic, and physical aspects that the PRESSURIZED CONTAINER metaphor emphasizes in Western cultures (Lutz, 1988). That is, although the Ifaluk may well have very similar physiological processes in anger to the English and Chinese, this fact does not necessarily lead them to conceptualize *song* as pressure in a container, corresponding to anger as a destructive force within a person. For the Ifaluk, anger is a much more social business, as their language, thinking, and behavior reveal. Does this mean that *song* is an abstract concept not motivated by bodily experience? Yes, it does, because it is not universal *bodily* experience that motivates it. Its motivation derives from the particular social–cultural practice of the Ifaluk.

Although the examples that show the complex relationship between universal embodiment and metaphorical conceptualization are related to anger, the points I have made should not be believed to apply only to anger or the emotions. Another well-known case that demonstrates the point that there can be multiple motivations for the metaphorical understanding of a target domain is that of time (Lakoff and Johnson, 1999). As was mentioned in the discussion of time in chapter 3, the future can be understood as being in front of us, the present as being by us, and the past as being behind us in a static view of time. This is the TIME ORIENTATION metaphor. What seems

to motivate the existence of this view of time is that time and motion are literally correlated in basic ways. What we will encounter in the future is ahead of us (TIME ORIENTATION); what we will encounter in the future is moving toward us (MOVING TIME); and what we will encounter in the future is what we are moving toward (MOVING OBSERVER). These are universal experiences in which our notion of time is closely correlated with motion. In a smaller number of languages static time can be viewed in a different way, in which the future is back, the present is here, and the past is ahead of us. This is the case in languages such as Aymara (Nunez et al., 1997), Trique, Maori, and Ancient Greek (see Allan, 1995). How is it possible to have two such diametrically opposed views of time, one in which the future is in front and one in which it is in back of us? This should not be possible if there is only a single universal experiential basis for comprehending time. But, as we saw in the case of anger, a target domain can be correlated not with just one but with several equally plausible experiential bases. Time can be correlated not only with motion but also with the results of our actions in time. Thus, another possible experiential motivation for the latter, less prevalent TIME ORIENTATION metaphor may be, as pointed out by Lakoff and Johnson (1999), that we can see the results of what we have just done in front of us. In this way, the result of what we have done, that is, the past, is in front of us, and this, in turn, renders the future as something behind us. In other words, speakers of different languages may focus on different components or aspects of the experiential basis associated with time and thus conceptualize time, and other abstract domains in general, in several different but equally motivated ways.

Viewpoint Preference

The different metaphors cultures use may be determined by a culture's simply "choosing" between equally well motivated ways of looking at things. This is what I call *viewpoint preference*. Take, for example, a tree, and an observer looking at the tree. Trees do not have inherent fronts, but when you observe the tree, you can attribute a front to the tree. There seem to be two ways of doing this. In one, people take the side of the tree that is facing them to be the front. This

is an *ego-opposed* perspective. In the other, people take the front of the tree to be on the other side, farther away from them. This is an *ego-aligned* perspective. The ego-opposed and the ego-aligned ways are different ways of metaphorically conceiving of the situation. Given these two possible ways of assigning a front to a tree, cultures prefer one or the other.

Now consider the sentence "There's a rock in front of the tree." The meaning of the sentence depends on whether we have an "ego-opposed" or "ego-aligned" perspective. In certain cultures (e.g., English), the sentence means that there is a rock between the observer and the tree (ego-opposed perspective), in others (e.g., Hausa) it means that the rock is on the far side of the tree, which is away from the observer. Thus, viewpoint preference determines the particular metaphorical outlook on situations involving inanimate things that do not inherently have certain properties.

Prototypes and Framing

In chapter 6, we saw several cases of a particular source domain that was conceptualized differentially either within a language/culture or across languages/cultures. The notion of family or that of motion can be conceptualized in different ways across subcultures or cultures. When we employ the different versions of these concepts in metaphorical thought, we get different conceptual metaphors that often have significantly different entailments. In other words, source concepts may have several versions, influencing the conceptual metaphors that are based on them. There are at least two ways in which source concepts and the resulting conceptual metaphors may cause differences in metaphorical conceptualization: differential prototypes and differential framing. Let us begin with the more obvious case – prototypes.

Prototype. In different cultures the prototypes of things that are each other's counterparts may differ considerably. When these differing counterpart notions are used as source domains, the resulting conceptual metaphors also differ. As an example, let us consider a conceptual metaphor in which the notion of HOUSE functions as

the source domain, as this is used in different cultures. Paul Chilton and George Lakoff (1995) suggest that the notion of a typical building or house can be different for communities of speakers speaking different languages and living in different cultures. In the United States and much of the Western world, the typical house is a free-standing boxlike structure on its own fenced land with a family living in it. However, the typical Russian house (*dom*) is a large apartment house with several units with families of tenants living in them. Chilton and Lakoff claim that this may lead to differential entailments of the HOUSE metaphor in which two cultures conceive of counterparts of HOUSE in such divergent ways. A case in point is the last Soviet leader Gorbachev's metaphor: A COMMON EUROPEAN HOUSE. Gorbachev's metaphor was viewed with suspicion by several Western states, including the United States. The Russian interpretation of the metaphor emphasized common responsibilities and a common structure (with a plurality of independent living units). The Western idea of a house emphasizes a single unit, no internal separations, no common structure, and walls around the house. The entailments of the two conceptions differ. In the Russian view, "the occupants of a communal house are concerned with the security of the whole tenement block; Europeans are in the same block, therefore, they should not threaten to destroy the whole structure with nuclear weapons" (Chilton and Lakoff, 1995: 54). In other words, in the Russian view Russia and the rest of Europe belong to the same international community, the common European house, thus excluding the United States. This entailment was perceived as a threat to the National Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO's) deployment policy.

There is of course a straightforward reason why the two prototypes and thus the entailments differ. It is that people live in different kinds of buildings in the two parts of the world. The difference plays a role in what they consider to be a typical house. Thus the prototypical concepts that we use in conceptual metaphors are based on our experiences in the culture in which we live.

Framing. In English the concept of sexual desire, or lust, is conceptualized as heat (of fire). This gives rise to such conventionalized expressions as the following:

She's *burning with* desire.
I've got the *hots* for her.
He's *on fire* for her.

The linguistic examples of the LUST IS HEAT metaphor are based on the following mappings:

The thing that is hot (from fire) → the lustful person
The heat → the lust
The degree of the heat → the intensity of the lustful feeling

These are the main mappings that characterize the metaphor as it is used in English. In the metaphor, both the lust of the lustful person and that of the person who is lusted after can be viewed as *hot*. The degree of the heat indicates the intensity of the sexual desire of either person.

In contrast, in Chagga, an African language spoken in Tanzania, the LUST IS HEAT metaphor is understood differently (Emanatian, 1995). Consider the following examples taken from Emanatian:

nkeóka
"She roasts."

Nékeha
"She burns."

Náworé mrike
"She has warmth."

As can be seen, all three examples are about women. The meaning of the expressions is given by Emanatian as 'She is sexually desirable.' Overall, this contrasts markedly with English, in which a similar expression would mean something like 'She has intense feelings of lust' (although the word *hot* can mean both 'lustful' and 'desirable'). The next Chagga example does not indicate intense sexual desire, as a corresponding English expression would, but again sexually desirable qualities:

Náworé 'úshangu lo móro
"She has a 'heaven' of fire."
She has desirable sexual attributes (skills, natural endowments, interests).

The lack of these qualities is expressed by the notion of coldness:

> Kyamúya rikó lilya
> "She's cold."
> She lacks desirable sexual attributes.

> Nékechólólia
> "She's cold."
> She lacks desirable sexual attributes.

A man may know that a woman is sexually exciting in a less direct way, "by seeing smoke."

> Ngí'wóni mtsu
> "I see smoke."
> I can tell she's sexually exciting.

What is particularly interesting about these examples is that the SEX IS HEAT metaphor, though it employs the same source domain as the corresponding English metaphor, provides a differential perspective on sexuality in comparison to English: The target domain to which it applies is slightly changed *and* the source domain is employed differently in Chagga than in English. In other words, the domain of sexuality is framed differentially in the two languages although the same source domain is employed. To see the exact details of this, here are the mappings of the Chagga SEX IS HEAT metaphor:

> the thing/substance burning → the woman with the desirable sexual qualities
> warmth or heat of the thing/substance → desirable sexual qualities of a person
> the person who observes the burning thing → the man who finds a woman sexually desirable

Emanatian (1995) shows that, in general, although both male and female sexual desire is conceptualized by speakers of English, this is not the case in Chagga; here it is only the male desire that is part of the target domain. However, when Chagga men conceptualize sexual desire, desire does not involve heat. Thus, we find that differences in the English and Chagga mappings for roughly corresponding metaphors (SEXUAL DESIRE IS HEAT and SEX IS HEAT) result from differential framings in both the source and the target domain.

In conclusion, we saw that either reality (as in the case of the prototypical house) or framing (as in the example of the SEX IS HEAT metaphor) can provide differential meaning focus for the concepts we use in metaphorical conceptualization. This seems to enhance greatly the possibility for our metaphors to vary.

Metaphor Versus Metonymy Preference

Is there variation between metaphoric and metonymic conceptualization? Do languages or varieties prefer one to the other? Several studies indicate that, relative to a domain (such as anger), there can be a preference in different languages for either of these figurative processes (cf. Maalej, 2003; Taylor and Mbense, 1998; Yu, 1998; unpublished ms.). And even a single language/culture may shift from metonymic preference to a metaphoric one in the course of time in conceptualizing a domain (e.g., anger in the United States, as we saw in chapter 8).

The most detailed and systematic investigation along these lines is a study by Jonathan Charteris-Black (2003). He examined in great detail how and for what purpose three concepts – mouth, tongue, and lip – are figuratively utilized in English and Malay and found similarities in metaphorical conceptualization. For example, in both languages, the same underlying conceptual metaphor (e.g., MANNER IS TASTE) accounts for expressions such as *honey-tongued* and *lidah manis* ('tongue sweet'), and in both languages such expressions are used for the discourse function of evaluating (especially negatively) what a person says. However, he also found that the figurative expressions involving the three concepts tended to be metonymic in English and metaphoric in Malay. In English, more than half of the expressions were metonyms, whereas in Malay the vast majority of them showed evidence of metaphor (often in combination with metonymy). For example, whereas metonymic expressions such as *tight-lipped* abound in English, such expressions are much less frequent in Malay.

Charteris-Black raises the important question of why this should be the case. Why does English tend toward a more metonymic and Malay toward a more metaphoric mode of thought in figuratively making use of the three concepts? He offers the following explanation, which I present in a somewhat simplified form here: In Malay culture it is extremely important to save the hearer's face when a

negative evaluation of people's action (in this case, speech action) is communicated. A more metaphoric mode of thought, and hence linguistic expression, can communicate the speaker's negative evaluation to the hearer in a more covert and less direct manner, thus saving the hearer's face. This results in a more euphemistic style in Malay. A more metonymic way of thinking (characteristic of English in this case), however, reveals a less hidden, more overt way of presenting negative evaluations. The result is a relatively direct way of expressing negative evaluation in English. That is to say, the cultural acceptability versus unacceptability of directness in making negative evaluations accounts for the more metonymic character of English and the more metaphoric character of Malay in the domain of speech.

In sum, a particular domain may undergo differential figurative conceptualization in two languages or varieties: a more metonymic and a more metaphoric one. This suggests differential cognitive styles in conceptualization. Which one is used in connection with a particular domain may be an arbitrary choice or a historical coincidence in some cases but may also depend, at least in part, on the more general values and conventions of the larger culture.

FURTHER CAUSES OF METAPHOR VARIATION?

As was indicated at the beginning of the chapter, I do not claim to have dealt with the full inventory of causes that lead to variation in metaphor. The particular causes that I have been concerned with in the chapter were arrived at by an examination of a number of varied examples that were available to me from either the relevant cognitive linguistic literature or my own research. Needless to say, both the literature on metaphor and the number of examples waiting to be explored in the different languages and cultures are vastly greater than what I have been able to survey and generalize.

As far as the category of cognitive processes as causes are concerned, I believe that there is a crucially important kind of process that has not been discussed in this chapter – it is creativity. This is such an obvious and pervasive cause of variation that it deserves a separate chapter to itself.

Creativity

Metaphor and Blending

Human beings are endowed with the amazing ability of creativity. Creativity can take a variety of forms; of these, this book is concerned with what can be called *figurative creativity*. This primarily includes three basic cognitive operations: metaphor, metonymy, and blending (or conceptual integration). In this chapter, I am concerned with metaphor and blending as creative mental processes that can account for a great deal of variation in the use of figurative conceptualization. In other words, I take the creativity of the metaphoric process, as well as that of blending, to be additional causes of the innumerable divergences that we find in figurative thought in the world's languages and cultures as well as within particular languages and cultures. My major goal, then, is to characterize some of the ways in which metaphoric thought and conceptual integration are creative processes of the mind that can produce a wide range of divergences across and inside languages and cultures, together with the constraints that may also apply to them.

METAPHORICAL CREATIVITY

If metaphors are based on embodiment, that is, correlations between abstract and physical (or subjective and sensorimotor) domains of experience and we share much of this embodiment, why are our metaphors (across cultures, groups, and individuals) not at least roughly the same? I have tried to provide an answer to this

question in the previous chapter, and I continue to do so in the present one.

The question was raised in Lakoff and Turner's (1989) book *More Than Cool Reason* in relation to literary works. They asked, How are poets creative in the use of their metaphors? An important part of the answer, according to Lakoff and Turner, is that people in a culture, including poets, share most of conceptual metaphors. They demonstrated that ordinary people and authors such as Shakespeare and Dickinson have most of their metaphors in common. As an illustration, let us take a look at the poem of a 17th-century American poet, Anne Bradstreet, entitled "To My Dear and Loving Husband."

> If ever two were one, then surely we.
> If man were loved by wife, then thee;
> If ever wife was happy in a man,
> Compare with me, ye women, if you can.
> I prize thy love more than whole mines of gold
> Or all the riches that the East doth hold.
> My love is such that rivers cannot quench,
> Nor ought but love from thee, give recompense.
> Thy love is such I can no way repay.
> The heavens reward thee manifold, I pray.
> Then while we live, in love let's so persevere
> That when we live no more, we may live ever.

The linguistic expressions in the poem strike us as novel and original, and yet they are easily understandable. One of the reasons for this is that the poem is based on familiar, conventional metaphors of the conceptual kind: LOVE IS A UNITY (as in "She is my *better half*" and "We're *inseparable*"), LOVE IS AN ECONOMIC EXCHANGE (as in "I'm *putting more* into this than you are"), LOVE IS A NUTRIENT: FOOD or DRINK (as in "I'm *sustained* by love"), or LOVE IS FIRE (as in "Betty was my old *flame*"), the last one depending on our interpretation of the word *quench* in the poem. It is an example of either LOVE IS A NUTRIENT (FOOD/DRINK) or of LOVE IS FIRE. All of these conceptual metaphors are made use of in the poem:

> If ever two were one, then surely we. – LOVE IS A UNITY
> Thy love is such I can no way repay. – LOVE IS AN ECONOMIC EXCHANGE
> My love is such that rivers cannot quench, – LOVE IS A NUTRIENT/FIRE

But if the "most creative" users employ the same metaphors that ordinary people do, how can they be considered creative? Lakoff and Turner suggest four ways in which this is possible: extension, elaboration, questioning, and combining.

Let us begin with elaboration to illustrate the point. Given a conventional conceptual metaphor, a poet can elaborate on an existing element of the source domain in an unusual way, thereby achieving a novel linguistic expression that is based on this everyday conceptual metaphor. A good example of this is provided by Adrienne Rich's "The Phenomenology of Anger," first analyzed by Gibbs (1994):

> Fantasies of murder: not enough:
> to kill is to cut off from pain.
> but the killer goes on hurting
> Not enough. When I dream of meeting
> the enemy, this is my dream:
> white acetylene
> ripples from my body
> effortlessly released
> perfectly trained
> on the true enemy
> raking his body down to the thread
> of existence
> burning away his lie
> leaving him in a new
> world; a changed
> man.

The poem is based on one of the most conventional conceptual metaphors for anger – ANGER IS A HOT FLUID IN A CONTAINER. But the metaphorical creativity of the poet can turn the conventional image into a novel one. The hot fluid is elaborated as acetylene and the passive event of explosion is replaced by directing the dangerous substance of acetylene at the target of anger. This is an example of how a conventional conceptual metaphor is given new form by the creative process of elaboration.

Consider now combining. Combining is a process that results in complex conceptual metaphors. Let us take again the metaphor ANGER IS A HOT FLUID IN A CONTAINER. This is a metaphor that consists of a number of more basic conceptual metaphors, including THE

BODY IS A CONTAINER FOR THE EMOTIONS, EMOTIONS ARE SUBSTANCES, and INTENSITY (IN EMOTION) IS HEAT (Kövecses, 1986, 1990, 2000a). Clearly, these basic metaphors go into the making of other complex metaphors both within the domain of emotions and outside it.

This phenomenon is very common and the process is highly productive. Particular ways of putting metaphors together may yield new metaphors that are culture-specific at a basic and specific level of conceptual organization. As another illustration, take the following two, originally unrelated metaphors: PURPOSEFUL ACTION IS SELF-PROPELLED MOTION and HIGH STATUS IS UP. The former is from the Event Structure metaphor and may well be universal, whereas the latter is an orientational metaphor that is most likely to be found in languages and cultures that have a certain kind of social structure and organization. The two metaphors can combine "naturally" in English and other European languages, resulting in the metaphor A CAREER IS AN UPWARD JOURNEY (as in "*climbing* the social *ladder*"). This particular compound metaphor is much less likely to be universal than either of the basic metaphors from which it derives.

But we should not believe that these creative cognitive processes are used only by poets. As we have seen throughout, all the processes that Lakoff and Turner mention are also commonly used by many ordinary people – perhaps with the exception of questioning, which seems to be more often employed by poets and other creative writers who think reflectively about our metaphorical worldviews.

Actually, it is likely that in addition to the creative processes mentioned by Lakoff and Turner, there are more. One good candidate seems to be what I would call *negation*, or *canceling*. In negation, or canceling, a certain metaphorical way of conceptualizing a target is canceled and replaced by an opposite metaphorical image. The negation need not be implicit. Cristina Soriano (2003, unpublished ms.) isolated an interesting new conceptual metaphor for anger: ANGER IS A WEAPON. She found examples such as the following:

ANGER IS A WEAPON
Every woman has a well-stocked *arsenal* of anger potentially useful against those oppressions.
So who or what were the *targets* of his wrath?
Anger can bash its owner as bad as whomever it is *aimed at*.

With nowhere else to *direct* that anger, I *focused* it on the most
  readily available *target* – myself.

They are the strange swamp warriors, living for combat, for scraps
  and intrigue, for a *focus to* their rage.

What we have here is a shooting frame with a person with a gun
deliberately directing it at another person in order to hurt or kill that
person. We saw a similar case by Adrienne Rich, in that the passive
and involuntary event of explosion was replaced by direction of the
flow of the dangerous substance from the container. The WEAPON
metaphor goes beyond this. It uses anger as an instrument designed
to hurt someone in a calculated way. Thus, the metaphor reconceptu-
alizes an aspect of the cultural model of anger by means of which it
completely undermines and negates the spontaneous, "natural," and
involuntary response that is associated with the prototype of anger
(see chapter 9).

As was noted in the previous chapter, creativity in metaphorical
thought may result from the unique experiences of a society, group,
or individual. A unique experience may alter deeply entrenched con-
ventional metaphors, such as LOVE IS JOURNEY, and result in novel
ones. Let us take again the description of a love metaphor in chapter 5,
provided by an American student of mine:

> For me I guess I'd say that love is like a wagon. We both have
> responsibility for pulling it along. When things are good, we can
> jump on the wagon and ride down the hill. When things are
> tough, we each have to grab on to the tongue and work together
> to get it up the next hill. All our stuff is in the wagon, bumping
> around together. Once in a while one can get up on top and ride,
> but not for too long.

What is most noteworthy about this description for the present pur-
poses is that the metaphor reflects the pessimistic view of love of
the person who created it. In a follow-up interview, she told me
about the major difficulties she had had with her previous relation-
ships. The metaphor she created on the basis of the conventional
JOURNEY metaphor clearly indicates this. In her case, the creative new
metaphor arises from her life history. As mentioned in chapter 5, her
current partner used an even more creative metaphor. In her own

words: "P. has used the analogy of pulling a calf to describe our part-nership, like giving birth in a way to this thing that is the relationship, but it is both of us out in the barn helping a cow deliver her calf. I have thought that that was a rich description also." The main factor in the creation of this novel metaphor was the fact that he is a farmer – often doing the job that the metaphor relies on. In the terms of the previous chapter, this is a case in which individual concern and interest lead to a novel metaphor.

Can Metaphorical Thought Be Completely "Free"?

In the cases discussed so far, I have dealt with examples that are based on embodiment and cultural experience – either jointly or singly. Despite the enormous potential that these factors involve in creat-ing new metaphors, they involve a certain degree of constraint on what can be created. The novel metaphors must be in line with ei-ther embodiment or cultural experience. For this reason, creativity in metaphor is least constrained when embodiment and cultural experi-ence are minimized in creating new metaphors. In this case, the new metaphors are produced predominantly by human imaginative cog-nitive processes – and only to a much lesser extent by embodiment and social–cultural experience.

When this happens, human beings are free to improvise. Let us first consider a case in which improvisation may be somewhat con-strained. It can be constrained, for example, by certain aspects of the communicative situation, as I pointed out in the previous chap-ter. Consider the following example from the *San Francisco Chronicle* (sec. A15, April 5, 2003):

> Last fall, in a radio interview with a San Diego radio station and later on CNN's *Larry King Live*, [the singer Harry] Belafonte likened Secretary of State Colin Powell to a plantation hand who moves into the master's house, in this case the White House, and only supports policies that will please his master, President Bush.

We have a great deal of knowledge about each element of the com-municative situation, and all of these pieces of knowledge can be put to use in creating new metaphors. In the example, one of the things that Belafonte knows about Powell is that Powell is an African

American. Because African Americans were slaves, Belafonte can easily set up the metaphor, or more exactly, metaphorical analogy. We can assume that this feature shared by Powell and the slaves helps trigger the particular analogy. In other words, a feature (being an African American) that is shared by an element of the target (in this case, Powell) and an element of the source (the slaves) helps the speaker arrive at an extensive set of analogical relationships between source and target.

But there need not be such constraints on our cognitive processes to create novel metaphors. It need not be the case that the target and the would-be source share such a feature. Analogies studied by scholars such as Dedre Gentner, Keith Holyoak, Paul Thagard, Sam Glucksberg, and Boaz Keysar (e.g., Gentner, 1983; Glucksberg, 1993; Holyoak and Thagard, 1996) and their colleagues are often of this kind. In them, the target and the source are characterized by similar structural relations – without any shared features of the communicative situation that might trigger the recognition of the shared relations (such as in the case discussed).

The phenomenon of analogy is a crucial part of our metaphorical creativity. We can find source domains for any target if we recognize that two domains share generic-level structure (see, e.g., Lakoff and Turner, 1989). For example, we can find shared generic-level structure in such domains as HUMAN LIFE TIME and the LIFE CYCLE OF PLANTS. This structure would include, for example, "living organisms have a period of their existence when they are most active" (whatever this means either for people or for plants) and "living organisms decline after this period." This case is of course a highly conventional metaphor: THE HUMAN LIFETIME IS THE LIFE CYCLE OF A PLANT. But the same kind of cognitive process accounts for any number of similar metaphors. Take, for instance, the metaphor used by Harry Belafonte. We would not need any explicit triggers to say of an especially servile secretary of state or minister that he or she is a slave, thus evoking the GOVERNMENT IS A PLANTATION metaphor in which the president or prime minister is the master and the secretaries of state or ministers are the slaves. This is because we have the ability to recognize shared generic-level structure such as "inferiors are servile to superiors in order to please them" in distinct domains. I take it that the GOVERNMENT IS A PLANTATION metaphor is a fairly unconventional one and

an example of how metaphorical creativity can be based on generic-level structure.

An interesting variation on this type of metaphorical creativity is what we can find in metaphors such as LIFE IS A POSSIBILITY or LIFE IS A COMPROMISE, mentioned in chapter 4. The first feature to note about such metaphors is that the source domains are as abstract as the target domain itself. This characteristic makes these metaphors different from the ones that are most commonly dealt with in cognitive linguistic studies of metaphor. Are they metaphors at all? I believe they are. In such cases the abstract source domains can be thought of as generic-level structures (in generic spaces) of the kind we saw in the previous paragraph; for example, for the concept of possibility it would be something like "*x* offers good things for people." Now this generic-level structure can be instantiated in several more specific ways, such as a gift that can offer various possibilities to do things for people. In any case, the abstract nature of the source makes these metaphors somewhat marginal instances of metaphor and we are less willing to see any kind of resemblance between such a source and target than when the source domain is more concrete or specific, such as gifts or a box of chocolate (made famous by Forrest Gump: LIFE IS LIKE A BOX OF CHOCOLATES). Although we would have no trouble agreeing with the suggestion that life resembles a gift or a box of chocolate, this would be much more difficult for the suggestion that life is *like* (or resembles) a possibility or a compromise.

But what is recognized as shared between two domains need not be something as abstract as generic-level structure. It can be similarities of all kinds, most importantly, actual or perceived shared features. The literature on metaphor abounds in examples. Image metaphors of the kind described by Lakoff and Turner (1989) are based on shared features of source and target, for instance, the shared shape of a woman's waist and that of an hourglass. And the metaphor " She's a regular *fish*" would be a case in which there is some real or perceived similarity shared by a person and a fish, namely, that they both swim well. The point here is that the recognition of (real or perceived) shared features between any two domains can create an infinitely large number of novel metaphors.

In conclusion, we can think of embodiment and similarity as different kinds of constraint on the creation of metaphor. Embodiment seems to be a stronger kind of constraint, in that it works automatically and unconsciously. This is why primary metaphors based on correlations in experience often do not strike us as metaphorical in nature at all. The similarity constraint works mostly on the material of cultural experience, as discussed in the examples and in the previous chapter. However, we can look at the recognition of similarity not only as a constraint but also as a creative act. Human beings vary in their ability to see similarity, and thus we can think of this ability as an aspect of creativity. To see similarity where there is no objective similarity and to see similarity where there is no culturally imposed perceived similarity are true acts of creation. This requires individual sensitivity that all do not possess to the same degree. When metaphors are used this way, we are engaging in creative acts of producing figurative meaning.

CREATIVITY THROUGH BLENDING

We can account for a huge number of examples of metaphorical creativity by means of the metaphorical cognitive processes we have seen. But the human cognitive potential goes beyond the processes discussed so far. In particular, in many cases of what look like "innocent" metaphorical expressions, metaphor analysis along the cognitive linguistic lines runs into difficulty.

Consider a well-known example:

This surgeon is a butcher.

What this sentence says is that we have a surgeon who is not very good at his job. Obviously, in the intended sense we are not literally identifying the surgeon with a butcher. So the sentence must express a figurative meaning. Let us now apply the "standard" cognitive linguistic analysis of metaphor to it. This means that we set up two domains: the word *surgeon* evokes the SURGERY domain, and the word *butcher* evokes the domain of BUTCHERY. Given these domains, we can set up the metaphor: SURGERY IS BUTCHERY. Then, we can work out the mappings between the two. It would be something along the

following lines:

The butcher → the surgeon
The tool used: cleaver → the tool used: the scalpel
The animal (carcass) → the human being
Commodity → the patient
Abattoir → operating room
The goal of severing meat → the goal of healing
The means of butchery → the means of surgery

Although this is no doubt a valid analysis so far as it goes, it runs into a major difficulty: The analysis misses the main idea that the sentence is used to express: namely, that the surgeon is incompetent. In other words, there is no natural correspondence between the two domains that would capture this meaning. It would not really do to say that the butcher's incompetence corresponds to the surgeon's incompetence. This is not a good solution because butchers as such are not inherently or typically incompetent at their job. There is nothing about butchers that makes them inherently incompetent. But, then, if it is not legitimate to set up such a mapping between the incompetence of butchers and the incompetence of surgeons, how can we account for the fact that the sentence says that the surgeon is incompetent?

The theory of conceptual integration, or blending, offers a solution (Fauconnier and Turner, 2002). We can spell it out as follows:

- There are two input spaces: butchery and surgery. There is a set of mappings that characterize the relationship between the two.
- There is a generic space in which a person in a job role applies a sharp tool to a body for a purpose. The two input spaces share this structure.
- There is also a blended space. The blend inherits some structure from both the source input and the target input. It inherits from the target the surgeon, the patient, some tool, the operating room, and the goal of healing. From the source input, it inherits the role of the butcher and the means of butchery.
- Thus, in the blend there is a surgeon in the role of a butcher who uses a tool and the means of butchery for the purpose of healing a patient. This leads to the interpretation that the surgeon is incompetent. A surgeon cannot do a good job in trying to heal

Blend

FIGURE 11.1. "The surgeon is a butcher" blend.

a human patient by using the means of butchery. A surgeon who does this can only do an ineffective, nonprofessional job and is thus incompetent.

A simplified diagram taken from Grady and associates (1999) might make all of this clearer (see Figure 11.1). The diagram shows that the means of butchery is projected to the blended space from the BUTCHERY input and the goal of surgery (healing) is projected to the blended space from the SURGERY input. The clash between the means of butchery and the goal of surgery will have in that space the result that the surgeon/butcher cannot do a decent job in achieving the goal of surgery, that is, healing. For this reason, the blend gives rise to the idea of the surgeon's incompetence.

In conclusion, we can say that with the help of blending theory we can account for examples such as "This surgeon is a butcher" that

would be very difficult to explain by using standard metaphor theory alone.

However, this is not the main point of the present discussion. What is really significant is that blending is an additional and all-important cognitive process that greatly enhances the potential for creative thought.

Types of Conceptual Integration

The conceptual integration of the kind that is prompted by the sentence "This surgeon is a butcher" is a highly sophisticated one. In it, both of the input spaces contribute to the creation of the blend. In other cases of conceptual integration, we have less complex (but not less important) cognitive processes at work in creating blends. We can imagine the various kinds of blends along a gradient of how many and what type of cognitive processes participate in producing blends. The example of the surgeon and the butcher is fairly complex and is at one end of the gradient. There are also fairly simple and transparent ways of producing blends, with many in-between cases. Along the gradient of "blend production" there are certain locations in which we find characteristically different ways of blending that we can think of as the prototypes of conceptual integration. We can single out four such locations along the continuum: simplex networks, mirror networks, single-scope networks, and double-scope networks (Fauconnier and Turner, 2002). These four different types of network represent increasingly complex systems of cognitive operations with which blends are created.

Simplex Networks. In simplex networks it is hardly noticeable that there are several mental spaces and cognitive processes at work. Take kinship terms as an example: *father of, mother of, son of, daughter of*, and so on. All of these are organized into the frame of the family. It is the notion of the family that underlies kinship terms. It thus provides one of the mental spaces, or frames, in the network. The words in the frame have open slots waiting to be filled by certain elements: X is the father of Y, W is the daughter of Z, and so on. The elements that participate in this space, that is, the elements that fill out the open slots, are particular individuals (such as Paul and Sally). So we can say that the other input space in the network is a set of individual

people who do not form a frame (although they are in the same space). The people in this unframed space are connected by the values that are provided by the family domain. This means that the network has two input spaces: family and individual people.

But there is also a generic space with two kinds of people: man and woman. All the family members are either male or female.

And finally, we also have a blended space in which the two input spaces join together: Paul is the father of Sally, Sally is the mother of Sue, and so on.

In other words, we have a category system (kinship terms) that consists of a set of roles, and we have a list of individuals (Paul, Sally, etc.) who fit one or several roles (kinship terms, categories) as defined in the system. When individuals fit one of the roles, we have a blended space with that role and individual combined. We get Paul as the father of Sally, Sally as the daughter of Paul, Sally as the mother of Sue, and so on.

Such simplex networks are commonly based on frames (with various roles defined in them) and elements (or values) that fit the roles of the frames. The frames and the sets of elements (that fit the roles) are input spaces. There is also a set of mappings between the two inputs: The role of father corresponds to the individual Paul, the role of daughter corresponds to the individual Sally, and so on. Figure 11.2 illustrates the network of spaces involved. (All the rest of the diagrams in this chapter were made available to me by Mark Turner, personal communication, May 2003.) What happens in the creation of this blend is something conceptually simple: The roles in the frame are filled out by individual elements in the other input space. This is an automatic and unconscious process. This is why we do not notice that we have a blend in which two input spaces are joined. And this is also the reason why simplex networks are taken to be compositional and truth-functional. Unlike in the example of "This surgeon is a butcher," there is no new emergent structure in the blend. We get straightforward combinations of roles and elements that we have in the two input spaces. And if it is true in the world that Paul is the father of Sally, then the combination of the role and the value as depicted by the sentence "Paul is the father of Sally" is also taken to be true. That is, the blend is taken to be true. This explains why compositional and truth-functional semantics mainly

FIGURE 11.2. Simplex network: One input contains a frame with roles but no values. The other input contains unframed elements. The inputs are matched by a Frame-to-values connection (from Fauconnier and Turner, 2002).

deals with such integration networks. However, the other blends we see in the remainder of the chapter are not of this simple type.

Mirror Networks. In mirror networks, there is a single organizing frame that structures all the frames: the inputs, the generic space, and the blend. This organizing frame need not be exactly the same in every space, but there must be enough similarity. There are many cases like this. For example, suppose that you have a favorite basketball team now and suppose that there is an all-time all-star basketball team that is selected from the best players of the past 100 years of basketball. Imagine now that your favorite team is playing a game against the all-time all-star team. If you can imagine this, you are running a blend in your head that is based on a mirror network.

Another case is the riddle of the Buddhist monk. It goes like this: A Buddhist monk starts at dawn to walk up to the top of a mountain. He gets there in the evening. He spends the night at the top of the mountain meditating. He starts walking down the mountain at dawn the following day and gets back in the evening. He takes the same path on both journeys. The question is, Is there a place on the path that the monk occupies at the same hour of the day on the two separate journeys?

Let us consider what conceptual work figuring out the riddle might involve. People who find the "correct" solution often reason this way: Instead of imagining the monk going up one day and then separately imagining him going down on another day, let us imagine the same monk going up and going down on the same day. That is, the monk would start the walk up one day and his counterpart would start the walk down the same day at the same time. Because they both take the same path, they meet at some location. This location indicates the hour when they meet (because place is correlated with time). For most people this is a good solution. The argument here is that this reasoning is based on conceptual integration involving mirror networks. Let us now try to lay out the process in which we can arrive at the solution by conceptual blending.

Clearly, we have two inputs spaces: one for the journey up and one for the journey down. These are structured in the same way, except that the monk walks uphill in one space and downhill in the other and the days of the journey are different.

There is also a generic space. The generic space contains all the information that the input spaces share. There are a moving individual, a path going from the foot to the top of the mountain, a day of travel, and an unspecified direction of movement. This information about the input spaces and the shared generic space can be given in the diagram in Figure 11.3. And crucially, there is a blended space. The blended space has the two monks walking in opposite directions along the same path on the same day. This is emergent structure, because there is only one monk walking in both of the input spaces. What we find in this blend is one slope with one path and the same day, but we also find that instead of one monk walking (as in both of the inputs) there are two monks walking. This can be given as in Figure 11.4. Given these projections into the blend, we can imagine how the (by-now) two monks walk along the same path in opposite

FIGURE 11.3. The "Buddhist monk" network: generic space.

FIGURE 11.4. The "Buddhist monk" network: blended space.

FIGURE 11.5. The "Buddhist monk" network: emergent structure in the blend.

directions on the same day and meet each other at some location. As we "run" the blend, we see a perfectly familiar situation of two people walking toward each other and meeting. The point of meeting along the path is represented in the blended space in Figure 11.5. Here the two monks meet (or more precisely, the monk meets himself). This is a familiar frame that emerges as new structure from the inputs, which have only one person walking. The location (and the time) of meeting is then projected back to the input spaces. The location (and time) projected back into the inputs offers the solution to the original question. Whatever location and time are projected back are the place and time where and when the monk is on the two different journeys. By unconsciously creating a blend with a familiar frame of two people meeting at a particular time and place, we come up with a natural solution to the riddle.

The more general point is this: Conceptual integration can involve spaces that are structured by the same frame. Mirror networks also involve mappings between the various spaces. Projecting elements

and relations into the blend, we get a frame in the blend that is new relative to the frames in the input spaces. This is another form of creative thought, and it does not involve metaphor. Creativity does not necessarily require metaphorical thinking.

Single-Scope Networks. As we have seen so far in the section, the previous two types of conceptual integration – simplex networks and mirror network – are not metaphor-based conceptual integrative processes. But the kind of conceptual blending I am about to discuss here involves, on this view, many of the standard examples of conceptual metaphor. In the theory of conceptual integration, conceptual metaphor is one type.

The label *single-scope network* originates in the notion that the network has a blended space whose structure derives from one of the input spaces. The two input spaces correspond to source and target in the "standard" metaphor view. In the theory of blending, it is the source domain (one of the inputs) that largely structures the blend. As an example of this, consider a sentence such as "Murdoch knocks out Iacocca." This sentence is based on the metaphor BUSINESS IS BOX-ING. The example and the metaphor can be thought of as a case of blending in the following way.

There are two input spaces (boxing and business), a generic space, and a blended space. There are systematic correspondences between the elements of the source input and those of the target input:

Boxer 1 → Murdoch
Boxer 2 → Iacocca
Knocking someone out → defeating someone (in business)

Because both boxing and business are forms of competition in which two people or organizations compete with each other, the generic space contains the skeletal information "competition between competitors."

Finally, in the blend we have the frame of boxing in which Murdoch knocks out Iacocca in the business world. The important observation here is that the blend has the frame of one of the input spaces (here, boxing) in which certain roles of that frame are filled out by elements of the other input space (here, business). Murdoch and Iacocca are

FIGURE 11.6. The "boxing CEOs" network.

from the target input, and the action of knocking someone out is from the source. What makes the understanding of the sentence possible is the set of conventional correspondences between source and target: the boxers corresponding to businessmen and the act of knocking someone out to defeating someone in the business world. Figure 11.6 has all this information. The source domains of conceptual metaphors impose their structure on the blended space. By means of filling out, or instantiating, the roles in the source frame by elements in the target frame, we get a blend that is both old and new with respect to the inputs. Its newness derives from the fact that individuals in the target (e.g., Murdoch and Iacocca) participate in the "old" boxing frame as boxers. This is a general phenomenon in the case of single-scope

integration networks and an additional way of producing novel figurative thought.

Double-Scope and Multiple-Scope Networks. In *double-scope networks*, the target domain plays an equally important role in contributing to the frame structure of the blend. Selective parts of both the source and target domains make up the emergent frame structure of the blend. We can illustrate this with an example that we have seen throughout this book: ANGER IS A HOT FLUID IN A CONTAINER. Take the following sentence:

> God, he was so mad I could see the smoke coming out of his ears.

This is a novel elaboration of the metaphor ANGER IS A HOT FLUID IN A CONTAINER. In it, an element of the source is blended with an element of the target. There are no ears in the source and there is no smoke in the target, but in the blend both are present at the same time as *smoke coming out of his ears*. A frame is created with smoke and ears in it that is novel with respect to both the source frame and the target frame.

What happens here is that an angry person's head with its ears becomes the container in the source, and the smoke (steam) in the source is seen as going out of the ears (and not through the orifices of the container). This is a true conceptual fusion of certain elements of both source and target in the blend. The blend goes beyond simply instantiating existing frame roles in the source with participants in the target frame, as we saw in the case of single-scope networks.

Given the new emergent structure, the blend can be developed further. One can say, for example:

> God, was he ever mad. I could see the smoke coming out of his ears – I thought his hat would catch fire!

To understand this sentence, we need the "smoke coming out of one's ears" frame, plus knowledge based on the process in which intensity is conceptualized in the network. A submapping of the ANGER IS HEAT metaphor is INTENSITY OF EMOTION IS DEGREE OF HEAT. One of the entailments of this metaphor is that a high degree of heat may cause fire (corresponding to "intense anger may cause a dangerous social situation"). But how does "hat" get into the blend? The fact that it does shows the almost infinite creativity of blends: We can develop

them further and further, bringing about new conceptualizations that depend on old ones, as well as the application of systematic cognitive processes. In this particular case, the "hat" emerges as we run the previous blend with the "smoke coming out of one's ears." The head container with the ears metonymically evokes the hat, which is typically worn on the head. As a result of the entailment of the INTENSITY IS HEAT metaphor ("high degree of heat may cause fire"), the hat can be seen as catching fire. This would indicate an overall increase in the intensity in the person's anger.

But many networks have not just two but many input spaces. One of the celebrated examples of such a multiple-scope network is the Grim Reaper – the symbol of death. This network contains multiple input spaces: the harvest domain, the domain of human death, the domain of killing, and the domain of causal tautology. A crucial part of the network is the metaphor A HUMAN LIFETIME IS THE LIFE CYCLE OF A PLANT, or, more specifically, DEATH IS HARVESTING. The metaphor involves the input domains of death and harvesting. In this metaphor, the plant that is cut down by a reaper corresponds to the person who dies. Here are the correspondences in detail:

Reaper → death in general
The grain (plant) → the person who dies
Being cut down → the event of dying
Reaping → causing death

Can this set of mappings by themselves explain the Grim Reaper as the symbol of death? There are two major problems with these mappings that require us to assume that there are two additional input spaces involved in understanding what the Grim Reaper is.

One is that according to the mappings it is "death in general" that causes death. This is an obvious tautology. The tautology is a general one that can be called *Empty Causes.* In it, the cause is the same as the result: Death causes death. This is a general process that shows up everywhere: It is cold because of the cold, we see "blueness" as a result of something's being blue, and so forth. Thus, Empty Cause is another input space in the network.

The other problem is that in the blend the Grim Reaper "kills" a person, an act that does not follow from the mappings, in which only

Blend: Death the Grim Reaper

FIGURE 11.7. The "Grim Reaper" network.

the agricultural activity of reaping is performed. Thus, we need a fourth space; namely, that of a killer, who intentionally kills a specific human being.

Again, the network can be represented by a diagram (see Figure 11.7). If we blend the death as Empty Cause with the killer, we get death as a killer who causes human beings to die. This is a case of personification. This personified death as a killer is further blended with the harvesting space. When this happens, death is integrated with the Reaper and the action of killing with reaping, the victim with the

grain, and the instrument used by the killer with the scythe that is used by the reaper. There are other possible sequences to arrive at the same blended entity, but the result would be the same: the Grim Reaper.

Now we can see why an account of the Grim Reaper along the lines of conceptual integration is necessary and why metaphor analysis in itself would be insufficient. The Grim Reaper of the blend has authority over human beings and no one has authority over him. There is only a single and definite Grim Reaper. He is also eternal; he is not replaced by other Grim Reapers. The Grim Reaper kills a specific person and does not kill indiscriminately. And the Grim Reaper is grim because death is grim for us. The Grim Reaper is different from real mortal reapers, and this is what makes him a blended entity – and not an entity simply projected from the harvesting domain onto human death.

Furthermore, we also get an account of why the particular words that make up the expression "Death, the Grim Reaper" are used. Specifically, death is taken from the domain of death as one of the input spaces. The word *the* is used because there is a single definite Grim Reaper; the word *grim* is used because the emotion that we feel in connection with death makes the reaper grim as well (via the metonymy RESULT FOR CAUSE); and the Grim Reaper is a reaper because there are reapers in the HARVESTING input corresponding to killers and death in the other inputs.

There are additional aspects of the Grim Reaper on which the analysis did not touch. For example, no mention was made of the Grim Reaper's cowl or of the fact the the Grim Reaper is a skeleton. In order to deal with these aspects of the complex concept of the Grim Reaper, additional spaces or extensions of already existing spaces are required. Take, for example, the fact that the Grim Reaper is a skeleton. The skeleton is the result of the long process of the "story" of dying. To begin, there are the stage of being about to die, then expiring, the burial, the decay of the body, and finally the skeleton itself. We find in this long chain two kinds of compression: a temporal and a causal one. The skeleton is the final stage in a long temporal and causal process. The actual "embodiment" of the Grim Reaper as a skeleton compresses the temporal and causal process into its last stage: the skeleton. Accordingly, death is seen as a skeleton that compresses the

temporal and causal story into a "timeless" and "causeless" part-for-whole structure. A part of the story (the last stage of death) and a part of the dead person (the remaining skeleton) come to symbolize death itself.

In sum, then, creativity is most obvious in double- and multiple-scope networks. Such networks can produce blends that did not exist before. This is creativity in an absolute sense. Other forms of creativity involve cases in which there is a frame in the blend that is novel with respect to the inputs. Such cases would not be creative in an absolute sense because the frame in the blend is typically a well-recognized frame in the culture (e.g., the boxing frame). A third form of creativity in blending involves compression, as we just saw in the case of the Grim Reaper. Finally, we can have creativity when there is projection back to the input spaces from the blend. We saw this in the case of the Buddhist monk example.

DIFFERENTIAL APPLICATION OF UNIVERSAL CREATIVE PROCESSES

As we have seen in this chapter, blending and metaphor are, together with others, basic cognitive operations of the mind. They can produce enormous variety in human thought. Cases such as love as pulling a wagon, Powell as a plantation hand, smoke (anger) issuing out of one's ears, the Grim Reaper, and the Buddhist monk are just some of the literally infinite number of creative examples that I have discussed in some detail in this chapter. Although these examples are produced by universal cognitive processes, the products of the processes show variation. The Grim Reaper can only exist in a civilization that has Christianity as the dominant religious belief. The kind of anger described by the phrase "smoke coming out of one's ears" can only occur in cultures that place a great deal of emphasis on heat in conceptualizing anger. Which of these cultures actually produce such extended forms of conceptualizing anger seems to be a matter of cultural conventions. The universal cognitive processes of using metaphor and blending in creative ways are available to all speakers in all cultures, but they are not put to use to the same degree.

12

Culture, Coherence, Conflict

This book has discussed many of the complex relations and interactions between metaphor and culture. Rather than summarize all of these here, in this final chapter I proceed as follows: First, I briefly call attention to some of the relationships that I feel I have not emphasized enough but are clearly crucial in examining the role of metaphor in culture. Furthermore, I try to describe the relationship between metaphors, on the one hand, and embodiment, context, and cognitive preference, on the other. I suggest that the relationship is ideally that of coherence, but it may be just as important to take note of the possible conflicts between metaphor and the three systems in characterizing cultures. Finally in this chapter, I offer some thoughts concerning the issue of universality and variation in metaphor, as these emerge from the analysis of the data I have examined.

METAPHOR AND CULTURE

Let me begin with identifying some of the ways in which the study of metaphor and that of culture are intimately connected. I place them at the fore here because not all of them have received sufficient attention in the preceding chapters and yet they are important for a theory of (the relationship between) metaphor and culture.

First, if we think of culture as, in the main, a set of shared understandings of the world, the question of the role of figurative

understanding in culture immediately arises. Because our under-standing of the world includes both concrete and abstract objects and events, naturally figurative thought should play some role in the case of *abstract* objects and events. In several influential trends of con-temporary cognitive science and linguistics, abstract thought is taken to be based on concrete domains of experience, of which the human body has a distinguished status. This was also the argument I made in chapter 9, in which I argued that cultural models for abstract do-mains (i.e., our shared understandings of abstract objects and events) are, and can only be, metaphorically constituted.

Second, conceptual metaphors are often expressed in language – a major component of culture. Thus, language may be a chief indicator of conceptual metaphors. But it can also be more: It can produce certain Whorfian effects, as work by Lera Boroditsky (2001) shows. Speaking a language and knowing its conceptual metaphors may influence the way we think about abstract concepts such as time (see chapter 2).

Third, conceptual metaphors may be realized in cultural practice, including institutions, behavior, symbols, and artifacts. We have seen a number of examples for some of these possibilities in chapter 8. Thus, conceptual metaphors often have a strong physical–material existence in a given culture. Cultures may vary in terms of which metaphors are realized in practice or in the degree to which particular metaphors are realized.

Fourth, when conceptual metaphors are expressed in the form of metaphorical linguistic expressions in discourse, they may serve cul-turally distinct social–cultural functions, as we saw in the discussion of Malay metaphors in chapter 10.

Fifth, the *conventional* metaphorical system of a culture preserves and lends stability to a particular culture. This is possible because cultures can be viewed, in part, as shared metaphorical understand-ings of the world and because conventional metaphorical language and metaphorically constituted physical reality have relative time stability.

Sixth, given that cultures can be thought of as sets of shared under-standings, *creativity* in figurative thought (including metaphor and conceptual integration) can provide cultures with the potential of change and new experience (see chapter 11).

In this book, and especially in the previous two chapters, I have isolated three large systems that, I believe, play an important role in an account of the universality and variation of metaphors. The systems are bodily experience (embodiment), social–cultural experience (context), and cognitive preferences and styles. My goal in the present section is briefly to characterize three distinct types of coherence as they obtain between metaphors and the three systems: in particular, coherence across embodiment and metaphors, coherence across social–cultural experience and metaphors, and coherence across cognitive processes and metaphors.

Metaphor and Embodiment

The human body, including its physiological, structural, motor, perceptual, and so on, makeup, is essentially universal (which is not to say that interpretations of the body and its workings or even many actual physical activities of the body are universal, as anthropologists have taught us). This universal body is the basis of many conceptual metaphors. The metaphors that emerge from it are potentially universal as well. The notion that meaning in general (not only metaphorical meaning) derives from embodied experience is the key idea of experientialist philosophy and hence that of cognitive science based on this philosophy. In it, universal meaning emerges from universal bodily experience. Given such experiences, metaphors that are based on them have a good chance of being universal. We have seen a number of such potentially universal metaphors: HAPPINESS IS UP, THE ANGRY PERSON IS A PRESSURIZED CONTAINER, TIME IS MOTION, various kinds of Event Structure metaphors such as PURPOSES ARE DESTINATIONS and DIFFICULTIES ARE OBSTACLES. In all of these cases, the metaphors are coherent with certain physical aspects of the human body.

Metaphor and Social–Cultural Experience

The human body does not function in isolation; rather, it functions in a variety of contexts. As we have seen throughout, these contexts shape our metaphors.

First, the environment, the social–cultural context, and the communicative situation of groups of people or individuals provide these groups and individuals with experiences that are specific to them. In addition to the body, the metaphors we produce are influenced by all of these specific experiences.

Second, our metaphors are also created by a certain history: either a history of the contexts (environment, society–culture, communicative situation) or the history of an individual. The histories of contexts and individuals vary across time, and these variations in history produce variation in metaphors.

Third, the kinds of metaphors we have also depend on the diverse concerns and interests that govern our life. Our concerns and interests may be general, that is, "built into" the culture, or personal. Both influence significantly the metaphors we employ to understand the world around us.

The general term that we can use to capture these different yet closely integrated experiences is *social–cultural experience*.

Metaphor and Cognition

Metaphors may also be the function of the kinds of cognitive systems we have. I have identified several *cognitive preferences or styles* in cognitive systems that are capable of producing differential uses of metaphor, including conceptual integration (blending), experiential focus, viewpoint preference, framing, prototype, metaphor versus metonymy preference, elaboration, conventionalization, specificity, and transparency. These various cognitive processes are universal, but their applications are not. Cultures and subcultures may use them preferentially and to different degrees. The metaphors that characterize groups and individuals are coherent with the cognitive preferences and styles of these groups and individuals.

The Role of Embodiment in Metaphor Revisited

One of the most important cognitive processes listed for the experientialist view of metaphor, as well as the thesis of embodiment, is *differential experiential focus*. This process has significant implications for the way we think about the relationship between metaphor and

embodiment. We observed that there is coherence between metaphor and embodiment, in that the kinds of metaphors we have fit the kinds of bodily experiences we have.

However, we should not imagine this as a *strong causal relation* between embodiment and metaphors. The particular human embodiment we bring to bear on the creation of metaphors does not mechanically and automatically lead to the emergence of universal conceptual metaphors. The human bodily basis that we use for conceptualizing abstract concepts often consists of several components and multiple aspects. Any of these components and aspects may provide bodily motivation for conceptual metaphors.

Moreover, the components or aspects that are "selected" for the "creation" of metaphors may vary over time (see previous chapter). These are cases of what I call *differential experiential focus*.

Finally, the bodily basis may also be entirely ignored when human beings conceptualize abstractions, as was shown, for example, by Lutz's (1988) study of Ifaluk anger. Thus the notion of differential experiential focus explains the flexibility and diversity with which languages and cultures make use of the body in metaphorical conceptualization.

An Example of How the Three Systems Work Together

All three systems can be jointly at work in the creation of particular metaphors and thus display a high degree of overall coherence. Let us take the ANGER IS A HOT FLUID IN A CONTAINER metaphor in English. First, as I have pointed out throughout the book, this metaphor is coherent with the bodily experience of anger. Second, it is also coherent with a particular system of social–cultural experience. Its coherence derives from the fact that this metaphorical conceptualization of anger is a social–cultural product deriving from the humoral view of emotions in medieval Europe, and even earlier in Greek antiquity. Finally, it is coherent with a particular cognitive system – one that has a preferential experiential focus on the components of both heat and pressure, rather than just heat or just pressure. An example of the choice of heat only in the metaphorical conceptualization of anger would be a language that has heat-related expressions (e.g., *hothead*) but no HOT FLUID IN A CONTAINER metaphors, whereas an example of

pressure only would be a language in which pressure far outweighs heat in the conceptualization of anger. A language that comes fairly close to this latter situation is Chinese, as we saw in chapters 3 and 10. The general point is that this metaphor is at the intersection of the three coherently interacting systems that were identified as playing a key role in metaphor variation.

<div align="center">CONFLICT</div>

Although the notion of coherence as developed so far explains the existence of many conceptual metaphors in the languages and cultures of the world, it does not explain the existence of many others. In particular, given the notion of embodiment and its role in the "production" of metaphors, we should not expect to find conceptual metaphors that contradict embodiment. As we saw in the previous section, it is fine to have metaphors that are based on different components or aspects of embodiment, and it is even fine to ignore embodiment altogether, but there should be no metaphors that contradict embodiment. But there seem to exist such cases of metaphors.

A Case of Apparent Conflict

As a first example, take the concept of anger again. Much of the motivation for metaphorically conceptualizing anger as a HOT FLUID IN A CONTAINER arises from the physiological response of increase in body heat that people experience when they are in a state of intense anger. However, we can also talk about *cold anger* to refer to a particular kind of anger, say, when the angry person is meditating, in a self-controlled way, on a retribution that far outweighs the offense. This kind of conceptualization of anger should not exist because it violates the embodiment of anger that involves body heat. But it does exist and it is necessary to account for it. In this case, I believe that the explanation is fairly straightforward. The notion of cold anger is based on conceptualizing a part of anger (retribution) as a rational act by the angry person. It is this rational, as opposed to emotional, decision that is conceptualized as being "cold." It is the RATIONAL IS COLD metaphor that applies to a part of the cultural model of anger. In

other words, I would claim that in this case the conflict in metaphorical conceptualization is more apparent than real.

"Cognition over Embodiment" Override

Consider now a similar situation in the conceptualization of fear. Fear is commonly conceptualized as being "cold" – rather than warm or hot – in English and many other languages and cultures. This explains the many expressions of fear in, for example, English that are related to cold, such as "get *cold* feet," "make one's blood *run cold*," "be *frozen* in one's tracks," and "*cold* shivers running down one's spine." This gives us the metonymy-based conceptual metaphor FEAR IS COLD. However, we also get linguistic expressions of fear that are based on heat. One example of this was mentioned in chapter 2: "Our fears are *fueled by* acts of terrorism." The word *fuel* in this sentence suggests heat, and it is based on the generic simple metaphor INTENSITY IS HEAT. Because the conceptualization of fear is conventionally based on "cold," not "heat," the example contradicts both the conventional conceptualization and the physiological embodiment of fear. This is a problem for the experientialist (or cognitive linguistic) view of metaphor, which requires that no metaphors can contradict the embodiment of concepts.

Heat is not a part of our folk theory of physiological effects associated with fear, although it is a part of the folk theory of anger. Neither does an increase in body heat seem to be an effect in expert theories of physiological effects of fear, unlike an increase in body heat in anger (as shown by Ekman et al., 1983). What's going on here then? Does metaphorical thought conflict with embodiment, thus contradicting one of the major claims of the cognitive linguistic view of (metaphorical) understanding? I believe this is exactly what is happening. But I do not think that this conflict creates a major difficulty for the experientialist view of the embodiment of metaphors. All that needs to be done is to make a slight change in the strong version of the theory. I suggest that we conceive of the simple but highly generic metaphors that are based on tight correlations in experience (such as INTENSITY IS HEAT) as powerful conceptual devices that can override local embodiment in other parts of the conceptual system (in FEAR IS COLD). In other words, once we have a highly

entrenched and generic simple metaphor such as INTENSITY IS HEAT, this metaphor can be applied even to cases in which the metaphor does not fit local embodiment (as in the case of FEAR IS COLD). I do not know how common similar cases of "embodiment override" are, but I guess they are common enough that they call for some explanation within the theory of embodiment of meaning. The notion of simple, generic, correlation-based metaphors that are powerful enough to override local embodiment would be my best shot at solving the issue.

"Social–Cultural Experience" Override

A conceptual metaphor consists, among other things, of a set of mappings between a source and a target domain. There seem to be many cases of conceptual metaphors that exist in several cultures and that share some of their mappings but *not others*. Why do not shared metaphors based on the same kind of embodiment have the same mappings in two cultures or subcultures?

Let us take a somewhat contrived example to try to explain how this is possible. Consider the SOCIETY IS A FAMILY metaphor that we saw in chapters 6 and 8. The metaphor exists in several cultures including the United States and France, as well as several subcultures including those of American conservatives and liberals. As Lakoff (1996) notes, the metaphor exists in two versions in many European and North American cultures: In one, it is based on the "strict father" model of the family and in the other, it is based on the "nurturant family" model.

The experiential motivation for this metaphor arises from at least two factors: (1) The SOCIETY IS A FAMILY metaphor is a special case of the more general metaphor SOCIAL RELATIONS ARE FAMILY RELATIONS. This is based on the fact that families make up larger social units, including society as a whole. (2) The issues surrounding the family form an important part of general social–political issues. Thus the metaphor can be considered explicitly "embodied" in the sense that we all have physical, bodily experiences of various kinds (experiencing particular emotions, being physically punished, being cared for, etc.) concerning our family, and we bring to bear these

experiences on our social–political views (see also chapters 6 and 8; Lakoff, 1996).

Two of the major mappings of the metaphor can be given as follows:

family relations → social/political relations
family issues → social/political issues

Because the president stands metonymically for the society or the nation, his family issues may become a political issue. For example, if the president commits marital infidelity, this may become a political issue, given the SOCIETY IS A FAMILY metaphor and the PRESIDENT FOR SOCIETY metonymy. This is what actually happened to President Clinton because of his sexual relationship with Monika Lewinsky. He was impeached. Now in France it was common knowledge that the former president, François Mitterrand, had a mistress for years. Given the same metaphor and metonymy in the French conceptual system, how come marital infidelity never became a political issue in France? I believe that the answer is that another part of the conceptual system can override some of the mappings of the SOCIETY IS A FAMILY metaphor. If there is a culture, such as France, in which sexual freedom (of even family members) is an important value, then the metaphorical connection "family issue → political issue" is not made (i.e., activated) because it would be inconsistent with the part of the conceptual system that maintains that sexual freedom is important. In other words, a part of the broader cultural context (in this case, the value of sexual freedom in France) can override the particular mappings that a culture sets up between the FAMILY source and the SOCIETY target. (It must be noticed that this argument only works if we assume that there exist "strict father" families in France as well, as described in chapters 6 and 8, in which the embodied experiences of family members match those found in strict father families in the United States. It is reasonable to suppose that this is in fact the case.)

And the same applies to different subcultures, such as American conservatives and liberals. In the view of most conservatives, President Clinton was rightly impeached, whereas in the view of most liberals, the impeachment was not right and necessary. Thus, a highly

motivated metaphor in one culture or subculture may be at variance with the "same" metaphor in another culture or subculture in which connections between source and target it observes.

More generally, we can perhaps conclude (despite the admittedly contrived nature of the example used for illustration) that a well-embodied metaphor may make use of differential mappings (even within the same culture) because of the influence of the broader cultural context. Thus, we can get cases in which social–cultural experience overrides embodiment.

As a final note on this section on "conflict" among the systems, I am aware that, in a way, the term *override* may be unfortunate in the present context (Michael Kimmel, personal communication). The talk about "overrides" may seem to suggest some kind of temporal and causal progression from a "universal base" to a "cultural overlay" and an ontologically "most basic" part from which other things emerge, or develop. I do not intend any such interpretation. I do not claim that there is first a universally embodied shared metaphor that gives rise to different versions of the same metaphor in different cultures, just as I do not claim that the three systems that interact in metaphorical conceptualization can be meaningfully separated from each other for other than heuristic purposes (see chapter 10). As I have argued elsewhere (Kövecses, 2000a) and in chapter 10, I view the emergence of metaphors as being simultaneously shaped by both embodiment and culture (and most likely also by communicative context). I simply use "override" as a convenient way of talking about certain "incoherences" and "conflicts" among the heuristically postulated systems. In reality, all that we see is the differences in metaphorical conceptualization across and within cultures. Thus the term *override* should be taken as representing a convenient fiction to talk about such differences as we move from culture to culture, from subculture to subculture, and so forth.

UNIVERSALITY AND VARIATION IN METAPHOR: THE OVERALL PICTURE

My goal in this book is to offer a view of metaphor that can deal successfully both with the fact that some metaphors are potentially universal and the fact that some metaphors vary cross-culturally

and within culture. The view that I arrived at can be reduced to and described by the following general and somewhat schematic propositions:

a. Metaphor is inevitably *conceptual, linguistic, neural–bodily, and social–cultural* – all at the same time.

b. The *dimensions* along which metaphors vary reflect differential experiences.

c. Metaphors have a variety of *aspects* that are all involved in metaphor variation.

d. The *causes* on which universality and variation in metaphor depend include embodiment (i.e., the neural–bodily basis), social–cultural experience (context), and cognitive processes (cognitive preferences and styles).

e. Therefore, metaphors and embodiment, metaphors and social experiences, and metaphors and cognitive processes are *coherent* with each other.

f. Some metaphors are coherent with *all three of these causes*, some others *with only one or two causes*. There is no metaphor that is not coherent *with at least one type of cause*.

g. *Universal embodiment* can lead to potentially *universal metaphors*.

h. Embodiment can have several *distinct components*, and there can be *multiple aspects* of embodiment. These differential components and aspects can lead to *alternative (and often congruent) metaphors*.

i. Embodiment itself can be of two kinds: In one, metaphorical conceptualization is based on purely *physical* experience (such as increase in blood pressure); in the other it is based on experience that is *just as much cultural as it is physical* (such as early childhood experiences in a family).

j. The *cognitive processes* that human beings use are *universal*, but their *applications are not*.

k. *Differential social–cultural experiences and differential cognitive processes* can lead to *variation in metaphors*.

l. Universal embodiment *can be overridden* by either social–cultural context (experiences) or cognitive processes (cognitive preferences).

m. It is simplistic to suggest that *universal aspects of the body necessarily lead to universal conceptualization*, and it is equally simplistic to suggest that *variation in culture excludes the possibility of universal conceptualization*.

n. Cognitive science and linguistics must explicitly and systematically embrace the study of both embodiment *and* cultural systems in their pursuit of human cognition. It is not possible to study the mind in a serious way without the study of culture. *The mind is equally the product of culture and embodiment, or, even more precisely, the three are likely to have evolved together in mutual interaction with each other*.

These propositions only make sense against the background of the wealth of data and the specific analyses that I have presented in this book. But the amount of data and the analyses I have offered in these pages are just a tiny portion of what lies "out there" waiting to be collected, analyzed, and, indeed, examined from cognitive linguistic and other perspectives. The issue of universality and variation in metaphor in the world's languages and cultures and within individual languages and cultures is perhaps one of the most complex and challenging problems in the study of metaphor and in the understanding of cultures. In a real sense, this book can only be a very modest beginning in handling a probably never-ending task and challenge. If it is that, I have achieved my goal.

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