The notion of subjectivity explored here concerns expression of self and the representation of a speaker's perspective or point of view in discourse. Subjectivisation involves the structures and strategies where languages evolve in the linguistic realisation of subjectivity and the relevant processes of linguistic evolution themselves. This volume reflects the growing attention in linguistics and related disciplines commanded by the centrality of the speaker in language. An international team of contributors offers a series of studies on grammatical, diachronic, and literary aspects of subjectivity and subjectivisation, from a variety of perspectives including literary stylistics, historical linguistics, formal semantics, and discourse analysis. The essays look at the role of the perspective of locutionary agents, their expression of affect and modality in linguistic expressions and discourse, and the effects of these phenomena on the formal shape of discourse.

This volume demonstrates how deeply embedded in linguistic expression subjectivity is, and how central to human discourse.

Subjectivity and subjectivisation

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Linguistic perspectives

Edited by

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1 Subjectivity and subjectivisation: an introduction

Edward Finegan

> It is in the instance of discourse in which *I* designates the speaker that the speaker proclaims himself as the 'subject'. And so it is literally true that the basis of subjectivity is in the exercise of language . . .
>
> Language is so organized that it permits each speaker to *appropriate to himself* an entire language by designating himself as *I*.
>
> Benveniste (1971:226)

Among linguists and other professional students of language, the word *subject* and its derivative *subjectivity* tend to evoke a grammatical association: subject as distinct from direct object, for example. In some contexts, *subjectivity* contrasts with *objectivity* in suggesting something 'soft', unverifiable, even suspicious. The essays in this book do treat subjectivity, and they are centrally linguistic in their focus, but they do not address *subject* as a grammatical relation. Nor do they address objective versus subjective modes of inquiry – in linguistics or elsewhere. Rather, broadly speaking, the *subjectivity* explored here concerns expression of self and the representation of a speaker's (or, more generally, a locutionary agent's) perspective or point of view in discourse – what has been called a speaker's imprint. In turn, *subjectivisation* (or *subjectification*) refers to the structures and strategies that languages evolve in the linguistic realisation of subjectivity or to the relevant processes of linguistic evolution themselves.

As used here, then, *subjectivity* has an array of meanings, neither so old nor so well studied as grammatical subjecthood, but central to emerging views of discourse – to the intersection of language structure and language use in the expression of self. Subjectivity concerns the involvement of a locutionary agent in a discourse, and the effect of that involvement on the formal shape of discourse – in other words, on the linguistic expression of self. As Julia Kristeva (1989:11) has written about subjectivity and subjectivisation:

> Discourse implies first the participation of the subject in his language through his *speech, as an individual.* Using the anonymous structure of *la langue*, the subject forms and transforms himself in the discourse he communicates to the

other. *La langue*, common to all, becomes in discourse the vehicle of a *unique* message. The message belongs to the particular structure of a given subject who imprints a specific seal upon the required structure of *la langue*. Without being aware of it, the subject thus makes his mark on *la langue*.

The discourse sense of *subjectivity* is not now paramount in linguistic analysis, and has never been, in part because structural and formal linguistics more typically focus on language as the expression of *objective* propositions, on occasion displaying a curious indisposition even to recognize the self in discourse. As Lyons (1982:103) has noted, 'Modern Anglo-American linguistics . . . has been dominated by the intellectualist prejudice that language is, essentially, if not solely, an instrument for the expression of propositional thought'.

Still, the subjectivity of discourse – subjectivity in what may be regarded as its more humanistic sense – is not new to linguistics, although at the present time we are witnessing a renaissance of interest in the topic as a critical facet of language: language not strictly as form nor as the expression of propositional thought, language not as autonomous structure nor as representing logical propositions, but language as an expression – an incarnation, even – of perceiving, feeling, *speaking subjects*. Included in a revivified humanistic linguistics, as some are calling it (Becker 1988; Tannen 1988; Maynard 1993), is analysis of the expression of self and the representation of point of view and perspective, whether of a speaking subject or a narrated one, in other than propositional form.

It is this humanistic subjectivity that is the focus of the essays in the volume at hand, the proceedings of a conference at St Catharine's College, Cambridge, where a group of researchers interested especially in the grammatical, diachronic, and literary aspects of subjectivity gathered in May 1992. Particularly influential on the approaches taken here are the views of subjectivity adumbrated by John Lyons, who gave the opening remarks at the conference, by Elizabeth Closs Traugott, whose contribution appears in this volume, and by Ronald W. Langacker. The views of Lyons, Traugott, and Langacker are addressed within several of the essays that follow, making superfluous anything more than some prefatory comments here.

Besides the discussion in his influential volumes on semantics (1977), Lyons has written a valuable essay on subjectivity. Its title, 'Deixis and subjectivity: *Loquor, ergo sum?*', is intended to suggest 'a deliberate antithesis to Cartesian and neo-Cartesian intellectualism in linguistics' (1982:105). In the essay, Lyons characterises subjectivity as 'the way in which natural languages, in their structure and their normal manner of operation, provide for the locutionary agent's expression of himself and

of his attitudes and beliefs' (102), and he underscores the fact that a speaker's expression of self in an utterance cannot be reduced 'to the assertion of a set of propositions' (104). Using Lyons' characterisation of subjectivity, Elizabeth Traugott (1989) has taken a diachronic perspective, coupling subjectivity and grammaticalisation, and her views are refined in her contribution to this volume (to which I return in the discussion of individual contributions below). Langacker's analysis of subjectivity, discussed briefly a little later and extensively in the contributions by Carey and Kemmer, needs little elaboration here. He takes a synchronic approach within the framework of cognitive grammar, equating meaning with conceptualisation (1985:109).

Within the essays that follow, contributors unpack a score of subjective expression types, in English and several other languages. As the essays demonstrate, the representation and expression of subjectivity is variegated. To mark subjectivity, some languages exploit morphology, which is perhaps the marking most readily tracked; other languages mark subjectivity in a variety of more subtle ways, ranging from intonation to word order. The prevalence in Japanese of explicit morphological markers probably accounts for an early awareness of subjectivity among scholars of that language. As Maynard (1993:4) describes the situation:

> when speaking Japanese, one simply cannot avoid expressing one's personal attitude toward the content of information and toward the addressee. Such a personal voice echoes so prominently in Japanese communication that often . . . rather than information-sharing, it is subtextual emotion-sharing that forms the heart of communication.

In many other languages, including English, subjectivity is marked in ways sufficiently subtle to be easily overlooked, and sufficiently complex to prove challenging to explicate. As Langacker (1990:34) has observed, subjectivity is a notion not only of 'subtlety' but of 'near ineffability'. Exploration of subjectivity in Japanese, a matter of interest among traditional Japanese scholars for two centuries, continued through the 1970s and 1980s among formal and functional grammarians, while in English it remained underexplored.

While not a new notion, then, subjectivity nevertheless remains unfamiliar and is not an ordinary working construct in the linguist's analytic toolbox. Emblematic of its neglect is the fact that subjectivity is not assigned an entry of its own in the *International Encyclopedia of Linguistics* (Bright 1992), though it is discussed under 'literary pragmatics', an arena in which its pedigree in western scholarship is well established. In fact, in western languages, subjectivity has received its

most intense scrutiny in literary expression, where free indirect style is a striking manifestation of narrated subjectivity that has been studied since the turn of the century. Far from being limited to literary contexts, however, subjectivity in English and all other languages is an all-encompassing phenomenon, as in Japanese. Indeed, as Benveniste (1971:226) has observed, 'A language without the expression of person cannot be imagined'.

If it seems obvious that speakers and other locutionary agents must take a perspective on anything they express, and inevitable that the perspective will shape expression, it is not obvious just how perspective influences expression, nor how interpreters construe subjective meanings accurately. Certainly it is not known to what extent cultural (or biological) factors influence subjective expression, nor in what ways the forms of subjective expression may be universal. Moreover, if subjectivity is not well understood in its synchronic operation, it is still less clear how languages evolve mechanisms for the expression of self in non-propositional form, and how such forms come to be grammaticalised.

Three main arenas have been the focus of recent studies of subjectivity and subjectification:

(1) a locutionary agent's *perspective* as shaping linguistic expression;

(2) a locutionary agent's expression of *affect* towards the propositions contained in utterances;

(3) a locutionary agent's expression of the *modality* or epistemic status of the propositions contained in utterances.

As to *perspective*, Langacker (1985, 1990, 1993a, 1993b) has written extensively about its role in the structures of both grammar and semantics. In a series of thought-provoking discussions, he has peeled back the subjective layers in which the most ordinary expressions are enmeshed, including those that have been subjectivised in their evolution from lexical to grammatical elements, such as with the future sense of *go* (*I'm going to study*) and the perfect sense of *have* (*He has finished*). He has also considered the subjective and objective construal of participants, labelling as more objective any expression that represents the observing speaker, as in *Vanessa was sitting across the table from me* (with overt reference to the ground *from me*) and as more subjective any expression like *Vanessa was sitting across the table*, where the ground remains implicit (Langacker 1990). Another example underscores the role of perspective, where 'spatial motion on the part of an objectively construed participant is replaced by subjective motion (mental scanning) on

the part of the conceptualizer', as in the contrast between *The hiker ran up the hill* and *The highway runs from the valley floor to the mountain ridge*. Langacker (1990:19) points out that, as in the sentence about the highway, numerous verbs have undergone a process of subjectification, such that the only movement represented in the verb is the subjective path traced mentally by the conceptualiser.

As to *affect*, 'language has a heart' is the memorable aphorism by which Ochs and Schieffelin (1989) capture the fact that language users can and typically do express affect toward their articulated propositions. This heartiness in language is not a new observation, and the distinction between the emotive functions of language and its referential and conative functions has been highlighted by Bühler (1934), Jakobson (1960), Halliday (1975), Lyons (1977), and others. Synthesising these earlier views, Ochs and Schieffelin (1989:9) observe that:

> languages are responsive to the fundamental need of speakers to convey and assess feelings, moods, dispositions and attitudes. This need is as critical and as human as that of describing events. Interlocutors need to know not only what predication a speaker is making [but also] the affective orientation the speaker is presenting with regard to that particular predication.

As with other aspects of subjectivity, affect finds expression in lexicon and various levels of grammar (as well as in gesture and paralinguistic phenomena, of course); discussion of many of these can be found in Ochs and Shieffelin (1989) and Besnier (1990).

As to *modality*, it is perhaps the most thoroughly explored aspect of subjectivity, especially as expressed in verbs and, more recently, adverbs. Taking a simple adverbial example, consider the utterances below:

(a) It's obvious to me that at sea level water boils at 100 degrees centigrade.

(b) Obviously, at sea level water boils at 100 degrees centigrade.

Utterance (a) expresses two propositions: (1) something is obvious to the speaker; and (2) what is obvious is that at sea level water boils at 100 degrees centigrade. Utterance (b) makes no reference to a speaker, but expresses the same proposition about the temperature at which water boils. In addition, though, in utterance (b) the modal adverb *obviously* expresses the speaker's judgement as to the epistemic status of the proposition. Thus, one function of adverbs is to represent speaker point of view as to the epistemic status of an expressed proposition (see Biber and Finegan 1988, 1989). Besides such modal adverbs, languages have many devices for expressing the epistemic status of a proposition. The

importance of this fact in the exploration of subjectivity can be inferred from an observation by Lyons (1982:113) that 'the balance of evidence would seem to be in favour of the thesis that, whereas subjective modality . . . is universal in natural languages, objective modality is not'.

Following a period in which the humanistic and cognitive faces of linguistics remained largely in the wings, current interest has now drawn subjectivity into the limelight. There is intense investigation of the role of subjectivity in human interaction, and an emerging view of discourse as an instrument not solely, perhaps not centrally, designed for communicating ready-made content, but as an *expression* of self and, in part, its *creation*. Emphasising the dichotomy between form and meaning during the early part of this century, Leonard Bloomfield attempted to exclude meaning from linguistics. As the century comes to a close, linguists of diverse interests and a wide range of methodologies view meaning as pivotal in the analysis of language, and subjectivity plays an important role in their analyses of how meaning is created and construed.

For example, conversation analysts have investigated subjectivity in several arenas, among them scientific discourse. In analysing the way physicists at an American university frame their discourse in workaday interactions with one another, Ochs et al. (in press) explore ways in which referential practices organise 'subjective involvement' in the worlds of the laboratory. Using the first-person pronoun *I* to refer simultaneously to themselves and to the physical entities discussed in the laboratory meetings, the physicists produced syntactically cohesive but semantically disjunctive expressions such as *I am in the domain state*. According to the researchers, such expressions serve to 'draw the attention of interlocutors to events taking place simultaneously in more than one world and to different identities within each of these worlds'.

In the last decade or so, the expression of subjectivity in literary discourse has been addressed anew by scholars well versed in linguistic analysis. Banfield (1982) and Ehrlich (1990) have helped bring subjectivity, especially as manifested in represented speech and thought, to the attention of linguists. In the literary representation of free indirect style, subjectivity is more patent than in other styles because 'two different subjects of consciousness, the speaker and some other person' need to be invoked (Lyons 1982:120). According to Brinton (this volume), free indirect style 'enables an author to overcome the limitations of one narrator and hence one point of view per text by portraying different characters' subjective impressions from their point of view, at the same time maintaining the third person and past tense of narration'. The

importance of subjectivity in literary works is well represented in the present volume.

In other arenas, too, linguists have been exploring subjectivity. In a valuable paper treating 'lexicalization patterns', Talmy (1985) examines the expression of several categories bearing subjective meaning, among them valence/voice, attitude, mood, path, hedging, factivity/evidence, and figure and ground (see also Talmy 1978). Elsewhere, Kuroda (1972, 1973) describes the correlation between stories in Japanese and certain grammatical features, finding in the use of the reflexive *zibun* and of certain sensation words that Japanese style (that is, its grammar) reflects the epistemological, as well as literary, differences between reportive and non-reportive stories. Kuno (1987, Kuno and Kaburaki 1977), too, has examined subjectivity in Japanese, as have Nakayama (1991), Yoshida (1991), and, in book-length studies, Maynard (1993) and Iwasaki (1993). Following two centuries of explorations in the Japanese *kokugogaku* tradition (see Maynard 1993), researchers are now exploring subjectivity in other Asian languages, including Mandarin (Zubin et al. 1990) and Korean (Chun and Zubin 1990; Zubin et al. 1990), as well as other non-western languages: Samoan (Ochs 1986), Nukulaelae Tuvaluan (Besnier 1989), Zinacanteco Tzotzil (Haviland 1989), and more (see Chafe and Nichols 1986). The present volume adds to the understanding of subjectivity in languages such as English, German, Icelandic, and Dutch.

The first contribution following this introduction is Rudi Keller's closely argued discussion of 'The epistemic *weil*'. Keller demonstrates that the use of main-clause word order in German *weil* clauses is a grammaticalised reflection of a change of meaning. The epistemic *weil*, but not the factual *weil*, is marked by the occurrence of the verb in second, rather than clause-final, position. Keller argues that the utilisation of this position for an epistemic function is 'caused by the semantic change from factual to epistemic *weil*'. Thus, in the examples below, (b) is not, as some would claim, a simpler and more colloquial version of (a), but an utterance with a different meaning, as marked by the position of the verb.

(a) Er ist nach Hause gegangen, weil er Kopfweh
he has home gone because he headache
hatte. (factual)
had

(b) Er ist nach Hause gegangen, weil er hatte Kopfweh. (epistemic)

By reporting a state of affairs, sentence (a), with its factual *weil*, addresses the question, 'Why is that the case?'; by contrast, the epistemic sentence

(b) offers an argument and thereby addresses the question, 'On what basis do you know?' Within their respective *weil* clauses the speaker of the factual sentence talks about a headache, the speaker of the epistemic sentence about knowledge of the headache. According to Keller, the epistemic reading 'demands' certain relationships between what is presupposed and what is stated and, consequently, a paratactic rather than a hypotactic word order. Keller views the epistemic *weil* as 'a metaphorical application of the factual *weil*' that is about to lexicalise, and he shows how the semantification or pragmatic strengthening of a metaphor often involves subjectification. Taking issue with an analysis of metaphoricisation as having to do with human cognition, Keller attributes it instead to the very technique of using signs to invite inferences by 'associative concluding'. When an associative conclusion is recurrent enough, 'regularity will be interpreted as a rule', and what formerly had to be derived by pragmatic inference becomes lexicalised in the metaphor. On the basis of five identified advantages, Keller predicts a change to epistemic *weil*, accompanied by the word order change.

In 'Subjectification in grammaticalisation', Elizabeth Traugott also discusses diachronic patterns. She extends her previous analyses, concentrating on the intersection between grammaticalisation and subjectification. Regarding subjectification as a pragmatic-semantic process whereby meanings become increasingly based in speakers' beliefs about, or attitudes towards, what they are discussing, she illustrates how certain expressions that initially articulate concrete, lexical, and objective meanings have come – through repeated use in local syntactic contexts – to serve abstract, pragmatic, interpersonal, speaker-based functions. Grammaticalisation, by contrast, is the process whereby lexical items or phrases come to be 'reanalyzed as having syntactic and morphological functions'. For example, the grammaticalisation of *be going to* relies on pragmatic reanalysis that entails the experiencer of an abstract sense of motion being identified with the speaking subject, thus realigning and strengthening speaker perspective. In her contribution, Traugott treats a range of features: the modals *must* and *will*, temporal and concessive *while*, the scalar particle *even*, stance adverbs such as *actually* and *generally*, the Black English Vernacular feature *come* V-*ing*, and the discourse particles *I think* and *let alone*. She identifies five dimensions along which subjectification develops, including propositional and discourse function, objective and subjective meaning, and non-epistemic and epistemic modality. Modifying an earlier claim (Traugott 1989) concerning unidirectionality from propositional to textual to expressive meanings, she proposes a more general principle

whereby propositional material evolves in discourse situations to meet the purposes of 'creating text and indicating attitudes'. These processes of subjectification follow from a cognitive need for speakers to increase the informativeness of what they say, and a social need 'to be polite and offer options for interpretation, and for hearers to interpret more than they hear'.

In a chapter touching on literary language, but much broader in its application, Suzanne Kemmer unravels several strands of the complex meanings and pragmatic functions of English *-self*, describing its principal conventionalised senses and exploring how several related uses underlie a formal similarity. Like several other contributors, she invokes both Langacker's and Traugott's senses of 'subjectivity' in her analysis. With reflexive *-self*, a same-clause co-referential noun phrase is expressed, as in *Stan admired himself*. Emphatic *-self* serves to mark an unexpected referent, as in *Even the emperor himself couldn't accomplish that*. Most closely related to subjectivity is the viewpoint *-self*, as in *Picture the boyish version of himself that Richard Selzer offers up in his memoir*. Here, the antecedent of the reflexive is embedded in the relative clause that follows it. With some instances of the viewpoint *-self*, an embedded clause represents thoughts or words of an antecedent from the antecedent's perspective, as in *John told Mary that there was a picture of himself in the paper*. In such a logophoric use, a 'direct discourse perspective' prevails, and the antecedent must be a 'subject of consciousness'. Kemmer concludes that the viewpoint *-self* 'subtly instructs the hearer what point of view to take; the effect conveyed is a sense of the speaker's empathy with the character, the feeling of being in the character's shoes or seeing from the character's eyes'.

In 'Subjectification and the development of the English perfect', Kathleen Carey thoughtfully compares Traugott's and Langacker's conceptions of subjectivity and identifies points of convergence and divergence by applying their underlying assumptions to stages in the grammaticalisation of the English perfect. Drawing on literary data from earlier periods of the language, Carey examines the path of grammaticalisation represented by the paradigm Resultative → Perfect → 'Hot News' perfect. She shows how the shift from Resultative → Perfect would constitute subjectification both for Traugott and Langacker. She finds that their perspectives converge in their conception of the process underlying subjectification, arguing specifically that 'conversational implicature plays a crucial role in instigating semantic change'. She concludes this from the fact that, for Traugott, 'meanings become more speaker-based because, in their drive toward expressivity,

speakers will conversationally implicate meanings that are not linguistically encoded'. And, for Langacker, she finds that subjectification involves the shift of the locus of relevance away from the linguistically coded, objectively construed subject, to the speech situation which is not itself linguistically coded, and which is then the site of implicature. Carey concludes that the two complementary models highlight different facets of the same process.

In 'Subjectification, syntax, and communication', Arie Verhagen demonstrates the value of integrating syntactic, semantic, and discourse perspectives in linguistic analysis. He examines the objective and subjective meanings of the Dutch verbs *beloven* 'promise', *dreigen* 'threaten', and *weigeren* 'refuse'. In their subjective senses, these verbs are juxtaposed with the verb in the complement clause, thus forming a cluster of the subjective verb and the non-finite verb, as in (a) below. In contrast, an objective meaning is realised by a word order with an intervening noun phrase object, as in (b). Thus, the subjective reading of (a) contrasts with the objective reading of (b):

(a) omdat het debat spannend beloofde to worden (subjective)
because the debate exciting promised to become
'because the debate promised to become exciting'

(b) toen hij beloofde de grondwet te zullen
when he promised the constitution to shall
vergedigen (objective)
defend
'when he promised to defend the constitution'

Teasing apart the syntactic complications involved with each of his verbs, and invoking arguments from semantics and discourse analysis, Verhagen demonstrates the value of combining all three levels in analysing the subtleties of subjectification.

Dieter Stein explores the interplay between the history of word order inversions and their emotive and subjective functions in English, focussing on what twentieth-century linguists view as a natural tendency for what comes first to mind to be first expressed. Inversions are viewed as having emotional and expressive functions, and Stein traces the rise of such functions in English. In his wide-ranging contribution, he discusses an array of subjective expression types, concentrating on left-shifted adverbials, as in *Never did I hear about cabalism*, and on certain presentative structures, as with *In came Chomsky*. As the likely reason for such front-shifted inversions bearing an affective meaning, Stein cites their 'inherent proclivity towards cognitive saliency'. Illus-

trating how, from time to time, particular inversion structures have come and (it would seem) gone, he documents that certain options re-emerged, now functioning to express emotion and affect. Like Adamson (this volume), Stein relates his findings in part to intellectual and cultural developments in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century England.

While most contributions to this volume explore subjectivity in non-literary language, three focus principally on its literary expression. In the first of these, Susan Wright examines the historical development of subjectivity, describing how the progressive contributes to the marking of 'experiential syntax'. She focusses on the 'changing consciousness' about the expression of subjectivity in an effort to uncover when and how 'an interpretation of (self-conscious) subjectivity' becomes attached to 'a bundle of features that may appear irregularly, inconsistently, even . . . randomly'. Noting that 'powerful and active . . . resources for the expression of subjectivity in natural discourse [may exist] long before particular ones are selected as features with a *potential* for subjective expression in literary discourse', she subtly explores the relationship between the literary use of the progressive to foreground characters' subjectivities and its earlier use in everyday conversation. As with other features conventionalised in a specific function or sense, Wright surmises that subjective uses of the progressive were being pragmatically inferenced from non-aspectual progressives as early as the seventeenth century, as in this example from a letter by Dorothy Osborne: 'I am combing and curling and kissing this Lock all day, and dreaming ont all night.' A thorough examination of sixteen prose comedies by Wycherley, Congreve, Centlivre, and especially Behn leads Wright to conclude that there is indeed a lag between the pragmatically inferenced subjectivity of the conversational progressive and 'its systematic construction as literary style'.

In another contribution examining subjectivity in literary texts, Laurel Brinton analyses the strategic deployment of English reflexive pronouns lacking an overt antecedent (a feature also examined in Kemmer's contribution). Such reflexives generally lack an antecedent within their own clause and sometimes within their own sentence, though not within the context of their discourse. Brinton demonstrates how such reflexives represent the consciousness of *narrated* characters from their own point of view, as in this instance from James' *The Ambassadors*: 'It was indeed as if they were gathered for a performance, the performance of "Europe" by his confederate and *himself*.' In free indirect discourse, Brinton finds non-anaphoric reflexive pronouns neither grammatically aberrant nor stylistically idiosyncratic, but,

rather, occurring optionally in the same environments that support simple pronouns. Neither locally bound nor always c-commanded by their antecedents, they are nevertheless 'somewhat constrained syntactically'. The antecedents of such reflexives are not new or unknown, and can be identified in the immediate discourse context. Brinton compares the non-anaphoric reflexives of English with those found in a number of European languages, particularly Icelandic, and with the logophoric pronouns characteristic of some West African languages. Relating her analysis to Kuno's notion of empathy, whereby a speaker identifies with a person or thing that 'participates in the event or state that he describes in a sentence' (Kuno 1987:206), Brinton shows that non-anaphoric reflexives represent a character's point of view, a consciousness, often, that the narrator 'cannot presume to know'. Despite their rarity, Brinton deems non-anaphoric reflexives a 'significant marker' of free indirect style, and her essay offers a comprehensive analysis of them.

Sylvia Adamson closes the volume with an unusual and bold contribution. In it she traces the origins of English empathetic narrative to the culture of Puritanism with its narratives of experiential memory. Examining several Early Modern English works, from Bunyan's *Grace Abounding* and *Pilgrim's Progress* to Hakluyt's *Principal Navigations*, Adamson quantifies the distribution of past-tense verbs with referentially cotemporal adverbs, distinguishing between 'now' and 'then' variants. In so doing she establishes a link between the rise of empathetic style and a 'narrative genre explicitly devoted to the representation of experiential memory'. She finds in the Puritan narratives that 'the gap between narrating and narrated selves takes on an ideological force: the narrated self is not only past but other'. For writers attempting to narrate this experiential memory, the challenge is 'to recreate the past in all its experiential vividness, the more so since the objective coordinates of time, place and circumstance . . . provide simply the context for the significant events, which are subjective'. Adamson identifies the narrative of consciousness as an essential condition for the rise of empathetic narrative as a stylistic option. In *Grace Abounding* she finds 'stylisation', a discourse equivalent to the process of grammaticalisation. It should not surprise us, Adamson gently coaxes, 'if empathetic narrative made its historical début within this narrative genre as the technical means of realising its aims – to report on consciousness in the mode of experiential memory'. Far from causing surprise, Adamson moulds a plausible link between the historical emergence of empathetic narrative and the rise of the Puritan conversion narratives as a genre. Her analysis leads her to hypothesise a process of

de-subjectivisation, which partly contravenes the accepted path of grammaticalisation discussed elsewhere in the volume.

In the essays that follow, then, the contributors explore diverse facets of subjectivity. Some do so synchronically, others diachronically. Taken together, the contributions treat quite a few features in several languages. Some focus on the language of ordinary life, others on the language of literature. Variously, they appeal to syntax, semantics, and discourse for their explanations, and on occasion to cultural phenomena beyond the customary reach of scientific inquiry. Some contributors grapple with competing views of subjectivity, others forge new handles on the topic. In all, the contributions constitute a welcome addition to the body of inquiry into subjectivity, and most readers will discover in these pages much that challenges their previous thinking about the topic.

I headed this introduction with an observation from Benveniste; it is appropriate to conclude with another: 'Language is marked so deeply by the expression of subjectivity that one might ask if it could still function and be called language if it were constructed otherwise' (Benveniste 1971:225). The essays in this volume demonstrate how deeply embedded in linguistic expression subjectivity is, and how central to human discourse. If, as Benveniste suggests, a language without subjectivity cannot be imagined, it follows that a linguistics without subjectivity ought to be an oxymoron. This volume illustrates the pervasive nature of subjectivity in discourse and helps keep the oxymoron at bay.

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2 The epistemic *weil*

Rudi Keller

1 In present-day colloquial German, one is more likely to hear the utterances in (ii) than the formal, 'correct' one in (i):

(i) Er ist nach Hause gegangen, weil er Kopfweh hatte.

(ii) Er ist nach Hause gegangen, weil er hatte Kopfweh.

The word *weil* is changing from a hypotactic to a paratactic conjunction, with considerable syntactic consequences.[1] The change of word order involved in this shift not only draws considerable attention to itself; it also tends to be misunderstood and often criticised. At first glance, the preference for utterance (ii) over (i) seems to be indicative of nothing more than the laziness characteristic of spoken language – main clause order instead of the more 'complicated' subordinate clause order – just another piece of evidence for the decay of morals and language observed everywhere. This is the typical opinion of speakers who look critically at their own and other people's use of language.

There are two things to notice about the theory of language decay: firstly, it is always only other people's language that is in decay. The view 'Oh, how rotten my language is compared with my grandmother's' does not seem to be very common among people who believe that languages are in continuous decay. Secondly, nobody has yet managed to come up with an example of a decayed language, even though the theory of decay is at least two thousand years old. Of course, the change involving *weil* is not a case of decay, but the very opposite: an addition to the intellectual vocabulary. For it is a case of subjectification, or, more precisely, of epistemification.

I aim to show what the change consists of, and then to explain it. To do the latter, however, it is necessary to outline what an explanatorily adequate theory of language change should be.[2] This chapter has three parts: one metatheoretical, one descriptive, and one explanatory. In the first, metatheoretical part, I will show what an explanatorily adequate theory of linguistic change must look like in order to avoid falling foul of

Roger Lass' judgement (1980:ix): '[to] reduce either to taxonomic or descriptive schemata [. . .] or to rather desperate and logically flawed pseudoarguments'. In the second, descriptive section, I shall demonstrate that the change of word order in the clause after *weil* is motivated by a change of meaning. I will show that pairs of sentences like (i) and (ii) are not synonymous; they are not even logically equivalent. Finally, I shall argue that the hint that such changes are instances of metaphoricisation, subjectification, and possibly pragmatic strengthening is correct and completely free of explanatory force; *metaphoricisation*, *subjectification*, etc. are names of mysteries, but not their solution. So 'subjectification' is the name of a descriptive generalisation of different kinds of semantic changes which need explanation.

2 Let us look briefly at the metatheoretical aspect of change.[3] Since the beginning of the nineteenth century, linguists have argued about the question of whether language change should be explained with reference to causality or finality, or, indeed, whether it can be explained at all. I will call these three positions the causalistic, the finalistic, and the nihilistic. They have one feature in common; they are all incorrect. The classic arguments in their favour are as follows:

(a) The causalistic view. Either no reasons are given, in which case we have a very loose concept of 'cause', or the arguments are *ex negativo*: language change is not intentionally made by men; it is independent of men. Therefore it has to be explained in terms of causes.

(b) The finalistic view. The common argument for this position is that language does not exist independently of its speakers and that its change is brought about exclusively by intentional communicative actions.

(c) The nihilistic view. This view, most strongly stressed by Roger Lass (1980), is backed up by the argument that since sociocultural processes are not deterministic, they are not predictable, and as a consequence, are not explainable.

There is, however, some truth in all three arguments. It is true that the evolution of language is not deterministic, it is true that language change is normally not made intentionally, and it is true that language change is always the result of intentional human actions. But the conclusions drawn from these views are wrong. Language change is indeed explainable in the strict sense of *explanation*, but the explanation is neither purely causalistic nor purely finalistic. The thesis that an explanation

has to be either one or the other (*tertium non datur*) is due to the prison of dichotomies.[4] There is a third mode of explanation which corresponds to the fact that a so-called natural language is neither natural nor artificial, but, to echo Steven Spielberg, a phenomenon of the third kind. It is, as Adam Ferguson (1767:187) put it, 'the result of human action, but not the execution of any human design'. A simple example of such a phenomenon, where its mode of explanation can easily be made obvious as well, is the beaten path across the lawn on a university campus. Its emergence is expectable, depending on the meteorological and cultural situation, but it is not predictable in the strict sense of the word as it applies to the indeterminacy of human actions. The path is not intentionally made by men, but it is undoubtedly the result of human actions. No one would think of the emergence of the trail as unexplainable, according to the free will of men, and no one would attempt to explain it exclusively in terms of a causalistic or finalistic position. The explanation is immediate and plausible: if people want to walk from A to B and take a short-cut across the lawn, since grass diminishes by law if frequently trodden on, a beaten path necessarily comes into existence.

Robert Nozick, using a metaphor borrowed from Adam Smith, calls this kind of genetic explanation an invisible-hand explanation.[5] What I would like to point out is that a so-called natural language is neither natural nor artificial, but is of a spontaneous order. It is the unintended necessary result of intentional human actions. The form of an invisible-hand explanation can be diagrammed as follows:



Individuals act under certain (cultural, environmental, linguistic) frame conditions: the so-called ecological conditions. If parallel choices are made because of the similarity of human predispositions (the known principles of human nature, as the eighteenth-century Scottish philosophers put it), and because of the similarity of ecological conditions, then communicative effects are triggered which generate the *explanandum* with necessity.

So finding the adequate *explanans* to a given *explanandum* can be achieved by firstly, eliciting the cultural and linguistic frame conditions, among others, secondly, formulating comprehensible maxims of actions that can be assumed to apply for the acting individuals, and thirdly, demonstrating that acting recurrently by the maxims assumed under the conditions reconstructed must necessarily and cogently lead to the *explanandum*. Put succinctly then, the explanatory force is a function of

(1) the validity of the frame conditions,

(2) the plausibility of the assumed maxims of actions, and

(3) the cogency of the *explanandum* to follow from (1) and (2).

This model makes it possible to judge the value of theoretical concepts like subjectification or semantic bleaching by finding its typographical place within the model. It thus also becomes obvious that the question of the necessity of language change needs more specification.[6] The necessity of a circumstance can be stated only with regard to certain premisses, which necessitate. The greater the distance between the necessitating premisses and circumstances taken as necessary, the more interesting the statement of necessity.

Two examples make this clear. As a matter of fact, German speakers avoided the word *englisch* with the meaning 'angelic' during the second half of the nineteenth century. As a result, it disappeared from German. Its dying out is a necessary consequence of its avoidance. But it is not necessary with regard to its being homonymous with *englisch* in the sense of 'english', because avoidance in the case of homonymy is not necessary behaviour. To state that the disappearance of the word was necessary because it was avoided is perfectly correct, but the statement is, to a large extent, trivial.

A statement like the following would be much more interesting: verbal politeness necessarily causes change in the vocabulary of politeness, because being polite implies doing something exceptional, among other things. And it would be even more elucidating if one could show that groups of people develop systems of verbal politeness of necessity, on account of the principles of human nature for instance. In other words, the more general and unspecific the premisses are with regard to which the necessity of a change is stated, the more interesting, risky, and clarifying the theory will be.

3 Let us come back down to earth now and begin the descriptive part of the chapter. In spoken German sentences like (ii) occur more often than sentences like (i):

(i) Er ist nach Hause gegangen, weil er Kopfweh hatte.

(ii) Er ist nach Hause gegangen, weil er hatte Kopfweh.

In German grammars, *weil* with main-clause order, as in (ii) is either completely disregarded or mentioned as a colloquial anomaly, as anacoluthia. Gaumann (1983) concludes that main-clause order after *weil* is not a mistake in performance, but is actually part of the speaker's competence. The tendency to drop the inversion, so Gaumann says, is part of the general trend towards more 'economy' and simplicity. In cases where both types of construction are possible, we have functional variants with the same semantic value. In cases where only main-clause order is acceptable, the *weil*-clause has a meta-communicative function, namely, to mark illocutionary force.

Even if Gaumann's findings are comprehensible individually, there is no inherent relation between them. What has 'economy' to do with the illocution-marking function? Why can this function only be stated with *weil*-clauses where the verb cannot be placed at the end? I would like to offer some suggestions as to how the individual observations, which are partly correct, can be connected. The point is that *weil* with main-clause order is a metaphoric expression which is about to lexicalise. It seems to designate an epistemic relation on the basis of similarity with some relation in the 'real world'. One can conclude epistemic *weil* from factual *weil*. The factual *weil*-clause (normally) answers the question 'why is that the case?', whereas the epistemic *weil*-clause (normally) answers the question 'how come you know?'. The change in word order is a consequence of a change in meaning.

Let us consider a sentence containing a classic, ordinary *weil*-clause:

(i) Er ist nach Hause gegangen, weil er Kopfweh hatte.

We can investigate a certain semantic aspect of this sentence through presuppositional analysis.[7] What is stated, and what is presupposed? The presuppositions of a sentence are those propositions that are mutual knowledge,[8] and these are unaffected by negating the sentence. Let us test the effects of negation. The negative of (i) is

(i′) Er ist nicht nach Hause gegangen, weil er Kopfweh hatte.

The sentence in (i″) is equivalent to (i′):

(i″) Es ist nicht der Fall, daß er nach Hause gegangen ist, weil er Kopfweh hatte.

There are two readings of (i′) and (i″) respectively:

(a) 'He has gone home, and he had a headache, but that was not why he went home.'

(b) 'He has not gone home, and he had a headache, and that was why he didn't go home.'

In reading (a), the negative affects the *weil*-relation ('The headache was not the reason for his going home'), whereas in (b) only the antecedent is affected ('the headache was the reason for his not going home'). We can thus conclude that depending on how we read sentence (i), it is possible to presuppose either of the propositions of the antecedent and the embedded sentence. In this case, the causal (*weil*) relation is stated. Alternatively, the antecedent is stated while the causal relation and the proposition of the *weil*-clause are presupposed. In any case, sentence (i) does not state that someone had a headache, but it does carry the presupposition of a headache.

Consider the negation of the alternative (ii) sentence, with main-clause order:

(ii) Er ist nach Hause gegangen, weil er hatte Kopfweh.

(ii′) Er ist nicht nach Hause gegangen, weil er hatte Kopfweh.

The following expresses the negative more clearly:

(ii″) Es ist nicht der Fall, daß er nach Hause gegangen ist, weil er hatte Kopfweh.

The first thing to note is that there is only one reading (reading (a) for (i′), namely 'having a headache was not why he went home' being excluded). What is negated in (ii′) and (ii″) is his going home, whereas the *weil*-clause is not negated in either sentence. This might lead one to think the proposition in the *weil*-clause and the causal relation to be presupposed as well, but, since the domain of the negative does not include the *weil*-clause at all, it cannot be the case. Notice that (i′) has the form

(i′) ¬ [he has gone home, because he had a headache],

whereas (ii′) has the form

(ii′) ¬ [he has gone home], because he had a headache.

Supporting evidence is provided by putting the sentences under a different operator:

(iii) Ich vermute, daß er nach Hause gegangen ist, weil er Kopfweh hatte.

(iv) Ich vermute, daß er nach Hause gegangen ist, weil er hatte Kopfweh.

In (iii), the supposition refers to the whole sentence; in (iv) it refers to the antecedent only, and the *weil*-clause remains unaffected. The proposition of the *weil*-clause is not part of the supposition, but is, instead, its reason. If the *weil*-clause is beyond the reach of the negative of (ii), it cannot be presupposed either. Consequently, the proposition of the *weil*-clause in (ii) is stated.

As a result, the two sentences (i) and (ii) are not logically equivalent, for in (i) the proposition of the embedded sentence is presupposed, whereas in (ii) the entire *weil*-clause is stated. However, the varying relations of presuppositions account for only part of the story. There is yet another semantic difference to consider – the metaphorical nature of the epistemic *weil*. Let us look at sentences which resist alternative types of construction:

(v) Er ist nach Hause gegangen, weil ich sehe seinen Mantel nicht mehr an der Garderobe.

If we compare (v) to our classic *weil*-sentence,

(i) Er ist nach Hause gegangen, weil er Kopfweh hatte.

it is clear that while (i) can be paraphrased roughly by (I):

(I) His having a headache was the reason for his going home,

the sentence in (v) cannot be paraphrased by

(V) My not seeing his coat on the hat-stand anymore was the reason for his going home.

In other words, the *weil*-clause in (i) gives the reason for his going home, while the *weil*-clause in (v) gives the reason for my concluding that he has gone home. Because the *weil*-clause in (v) answers the question 'how come you know?', this *weil* is 'epistemic', whereas the *weil* in (i) is 'factual'.

Let us return to sentences in which both factual and epistemic uses of *weil* are possible, and see whether this thesis can be generalised. Compare the sentences in (vi) and (vii):

(vi) Er wird nach Hause gegangen sein, weil er Kopfweh hatte.

(vii) Er wird nach Hause gegangen sein, weil er hatte Kopfweh.

Again, the differing logical structures of the two sentences, as well as the contrasting semantic roles of the *weil*-clause, are evident. The scope of the assumption in (vi) covers the whole sentence, while in (vii) it

includes the antecedent only. In (vi) the *weil*-clause contains the reason presumed for going home, whereas the *weil*-clause in (vii) gives the reason for the assumption. So once again, the factual *weil* gives the reason for some state of the world, the epistemic *weil* gives a reason for an epistemic state. What about our original sentences in the light of this analysis?

(i) Er ist nach Hause gegangen, weil er Kopfweh hatte.

(ii) Er ist nach Hause gegangen, weil er hatte Kopfweh.

The *weil*-clause in (i) gives the reason for going home. In (ii), however, the speaker offers his argument for the event stated in the antecedent, as if saying, 'He has gone home, and I know why, and am going to tell you: he had a headache.' So the *weil*-clause in (ii) bears epistemic significance since the speaker talks about his knowledge of the headache, whereas in (i) the speaker talks about the fact of a headache. The utterance of (ii) amounts to offering an argument while (i) only describes a state of affairs. This is why the speaker may remain distanced from the reason given in (i), but the speaker in (ii) would be unable to keep his distance from his argument:

(i°) Er ist nach Hause gegangen, weil er Kopfweh hatte. (Aber ich glaube nicht, daß dies wirklich der Grund war.)

(ii°) *Er ist nach Hause gegangen, weil er hatte Kopfweh. (Aber ich glaube nicht, daß dies wirklich der Grund war.)

The reason for the difference is that one cannot offer an argument and keep one's distance from it at the same time. If this analysis is correct, it is a step in the right direction. As the sentences left and right of *weil* are on the same logical level, epistemic *weil* is not constructed with subordinate word order.

Let us look at another type of *weil*-sentence. The examples discussed so far give a reason for a conclusion, but not for the choice of an illocutionary act. Sentences which do this are cases where the proposition is a function of any illocutionary force part from stating:

Warning: Beiß da lieber nicht hinein! Weil das ist unheimlich scharf.

Order: Mach die Tür zu, weil wir haben hier geheizt.

Promise: Bis spätestens übermorgen haben sie ihr Geld. Weil ich will endlich wieder in Ruhe schlafen können.

Threat: Sieh bloß zu, daß das beim nächsten mal klappt. Weil ich kann das nicht mehr mit ansehen.

Question: Hast du noch etwas zu trinken? Weil ich hab' unheimlich Durst.

In sentences like these, the function of *weil* might be considered to be illocutionary instead of epistemic, but, if we look more closely, it seems unnecessary to extract a third function for *weil*. The reason is that the difference in meaning between the sentences above resides not in the meaning of *weil*, but in the contrast between illocutionary acts. More precisely, what differs is the role that truth-value plays in assertive acts on the one hand, and in other illocutionary acts on the other. As Frege has remarked, three features of a statement are important: firstly the 'thought' ('der Gedanke'), which in our terms is the proposition; secondly the 'judgement' ('das Urteil'), that is, the acknowledgement of the thought as true or false; and thirdly the 'statement' ('die Behauptung'), which is the announcement of the judgement. 'If we acknowledge a thought as true internally, we judge; if we announce such acknowledgement, we state', wrote Frege (1971:54; my translation). In general, we are more concerned with judgement than announcement when stating, and so we refer the *weil*-clause with an assertive antecedent primarily to the judgement in Fregeian terms, and less to the act of announcement.[9] This means that the *weil*-clause does not primarily give the reason for the act of announcing the proposition, but an acknowledgement of the truth-value, that is, the truth-claim attached to the proposition. Therefore the *weil*-clause answers the question 'how come you know this?' and not 'why do you state this?' In non-assertive speech-acts, there is no equivalent to what Frege called 'judgement'. We have only equivalents to what Frege called 'thought' and 'statement': these are the proposition and illocutionary force respectively. That is why, in everyday language we take the questions 'why do you want to know?' and 'why do you ask?' to be equivalent,[10] whereas the questions 'why do you believe this?' and 'why do you state this?' need different answers.

Consequently the difference between epistemic *weil* and so-called illocutionary *weil* is based on the difference between assertive and non-assertive speech-acts, and not on different functions of *weil*. This means that we have only to distinguish two types of *weil*: the factual and the epistemic. When using factual *weil*, the embedded sentence is always presupposed and, depending on how we read it, the antecedent may also be presupposed or it may be stated. With epistemic *weil*, the proposition of the *weil*-clause is always stated, and the proposition of the antecedent has an independent illocutionary function. This illocutionary function is normally assertive, but may be non-assertive.

To conclude this descriptive section then:[11] The shift from subordinate to main-clause order in *weil*-clauses is not due merely to large-scale sloppiness parading as simplicity, but is the consequence of a semantic change from factual to epistemic meaning. The epistemic reading demands that the proposition of the *weil*-clause is not presupposed, but stated, and consequently it demands that word order is not hypotactic, but paratactic.

The processes involved here are metaphoricisation, epistemification, subjectification, and perhaps others. The value of such characterisations cannot be found in their explanatory power, for they do not have any. They are valuable for drawing out in probably sufficient generality and precision, where there is need for explanation.

4 Now I want to turn to the question of how this case of semantic change and the tendencies it is embedded in can be explained. An explanation can generally be characterised as follows: it must show how the communicating individuals' efforts, which are designed to fulfil their own communicative purposes and not to cause language change, lead or must lead to the structure to be explained, thereby taking into consideration the ecological conditions under which people act.

Let us start with metaphoricisation. Eve Sweetser has remarked correctly that the epistemification of *because* is a case of metaphoricisation. This is also true for German *weil*. But what puzzles Sweetser is the 'unidirectionality of metaphorical mapping' (1990:174). The ways that metaphors emerge can be described as going from the external to the internal, from the concrete to the abstract, from the intuitive to the unintuitive, and so forth. Sweetser thinks that the reason is to be found in human cognition. But explaining linguistic phenomena with reference to human cognition is impermissible as long as we deduce our hypothesis of cognition from our understanding of the linguistic phenomenon. But, quite apart from this methodological objection, I believe there is a simpler explanation, namely, the technique of using signs itself.

Communication is not a problem of transportation; it is much more a problem of how to make the other draw the conclusions you want him to draw. So communication is actually a problem of inference. Notice that we call things *signs* if we use them to draw conclusions from them. To communicate with signs means giving something perceptible to somebody, hoping he will be able to conclude from it, something that is not immediately perceptible. And there are exactly three methods of inference that we practise: causal, associative, and rule-based.

If you recognise spots as a sign of measles, you are using causal

inference, if you recognise the graphic of a crossed out cigarette as a sign of a smoking-ban, you are using the skill of association, and if you recognise 'hello' as a greeting, you are using the knowledge of certain rules. These three basic methods of human communication are the symptomatic, the iconic, and the symbolic. The knack of re-using the symptomatic and iconic methods on the level of symbols results in metonyms and metaphors respectively. The term *metaphor* does not describe a thing so much as a particular method of interpretation. Metaphors are used to communicate something that is not immediately accessible to the listener – something intuitive or abstract – by means of symbols symbolising something that is accessible to speaker and listener equally. For technical reasons, the reverse is impossible: you might interpret the utterance 'I feel like a blooming garden in spring', but the utterance 'My garden looks about how I'm feeling at the moment' presents much more trouble. Consequently, coinage and interpretation of metaphors are achieved by using one basic method of forming signs: association. And the unidirectionality of metaphorical mapping is a consequence of its technique.

Often, used-up metaphors lose their metaphoricity because speakers interpret frequent regularities as rules. If an associative conclusion occurs often enough, regularity of use will be interpreted as a rule of use. The process by which an associative conclusion is replaced by a rule-based conclusion is lexicalisation. But, at the same time, it is a process of the semantification of sense which is originally generated pragmatically. So lexicalisation consists effectively of the emergence of rules, a kind of semantification, and a special case of pragmatic strengthening.[12] Semantification, sometimes called desemanticisation, bleaching, etc., is often combined with a loss of information. The emergence of meaning frequently involves the simultaneous loss of information and bleaching of expressivity, which is partly the reason that new metaphoricisations come into existence as soon as old ones lexicalise.

Epistemic *weil* is a metaphorical application of factual *weil*, and this metaphor is about to lexicalise. It follows that the result of the semantification of a metaphor turns into a case of subjectification if two conditions obtain. The first is that the iconic method must be used to communicate something interior through something exterior, and the second is that the metaphor must occur so frequently that its regularity is read as a rule. This is the case with *weil*.

However, not every case of subjectification is the result of metaphoricisation plus pragmatic strengthening. There are instances of so-called Mandeville's paradox, where striving for objectification at the level of an individual's action can generate subjectification at the level of the

linguistic system.[13] For example, the shift from temporal meaning to causal or adversative meaning seems to be a typical case of Mandeville's paradox. The speaker chooses a more 'reserved' and less obliging variant in a context where the causal or adversative interpretation is obvious for pragmatic reasons. In the long run, such 'over-interpretation' will lead to a semantic change from temporal to causal or adversative meaning, with the result that speakers will have to look for new temporal expressions if they do not want to be obliging. I could not use the sentence 'In der Zeit, in der du in der Sonne lagst, habe ich Geschirr gespült' when talking to my wife if I wanted to stress nothing but simultaneity, even if 'in der Zeit, in der . . .' is absolutely free of adversative meaning. The mechanisms of Mandeville's paradox played a part when Old High German *dia wîle dô* 'at the time that' (via Middle High German *(die) wîle* 'during') became New High German *weil* 'because' (cf. OE *þa hwile þe* 'at the time that' > ME *while* 'during' > pdE *while* 'although'). But, since it was not involved in the change from causal to epistemic *weil*, I will leave the issue of non-intended subjectification according to Mandeville's paradox.

Let us return to epistemic *weil*. As we have seen, speakers today prefer epistemic *weil* with main-clause order to factual *weil*, even if the latter would be perfectly possible and certainly correct. And this raises the question of the advantage to speakers of nearly always choosing one of two possible variants.

One answer that has been ready to hand ever since the days of Jacob Grimm is the economy argument; that is, speakers choose the cheaper option.[14] The argument of greater simplicity might play a role with more complicated *weil*-sentences, but it cannot be decisive. There has to be more to it than this. What are the arguments associated with the profits? The greater the subjectively expected net benefit and the expected utility,[15] the better the justification for a choice, and the stronger the explanation. There are at least five profit arguments for preferring epistemic *weil*:

1. The presupposition argument: if the speaker wants to bring the causing state of affairs to the listener's notice, a sentence that states this circumstance is better than one that presupposes it.
2. The function of compensation: for whatever reasons, the conjunctions *da* and *denn* belong to the literary language. In spoken language today, their function is almost covered by *weil*.[16] The function of *denn* is adopted by epistemic *weil*, as well as the particular word order. This is evident in the following sentences, where both types of *weil* are possible:

(viii) Er ist nach Hause gegangen, da die Geschäfte gleich zumachen, denn er bekommt heute abend Besuch.

(ix) Er ist nach Hause gegangen, weil die Geschäfte gleich zumachen, weil er bekommt heute abend Besuch.

3. The epistemic load: as factual *weil* can 'only' indicate a reason or cause, whereas epistemic *weil* turns a thought into an argument, the epistemic version bears more intellectual 'weight', even if the argumentation is totally trivial. This is demonstrated in the following:

(x) Er hat die Wahl gewonnen, weil er die Mehrheit der Stimmen auf sich vereinen konnte.

(xi) Er hat die Wahl gewonnen, weil er konnte die Mehrheit der Stimmen auf sich vereinen.

4. The undisputability: an epistemic *weil*-sentence cannot easily be disputed because of its epistemic status and the relations of presuppositions. This is made clear by the following three dialogues:

(xii) Er ist nach Hause gegangen, weil er hatte Kopfweh. – Nein, nicht weil er hatte Kopfweh, sondern weil er keine Lust mehr hatte.

(xii′) *Er ist nach Hause gegangen, weil er hatte Kopfweh. – Nein, nicht weil er hatte Kopfweh, sondern weil er hatte keine Lust mehr.

(xii″) *Er ist nach Hause gegangen, weil sein Mantel hängt nicht mehr an der Garderobe. – Nein, nicht weil sein Mantel hängt nicht mehr an der Garderobe, sondern weil sein Auto steht nicht mehr im Hof.

5. The relation of implication: any factual reason can be epistemified, but not vice versa. So speakers can always be sure to play safe by using the epistemic version.

To conclude, the epistemic *weil* has many advantages and is a new contribution to our intellectual vocabulary. Currently, writing speakers estimate the costs of breaking standard word order rules of the literary language to be higher than the benefits gained from using the epistemic version. But that will change because, in the long run, worse choices made only because things have always been like that do not hold out.

NOTES

1 See Traugott (1989) for discussion of the changes affecting English *while*.
2 This has been done in greater detail in Keller (1990) and (1991). (For an account in English, see Keller (1985), (1987) and (1994).)
3 See Keller (1985) etc. for more extended discussion of the question of explainability and ways of explaining language change.

4 See Keller (1994, chapter 3).
5 On the theory of the invisible-hand explanation, see Nozick (1975), Ullmann-Margalit (1978), Vanberg (1984), and Keller (1994).
6 See Traugott (1989:33): 'As is true of all linguistic change, the tendencies characterised are possible and not necessary'.
7 On the relations of presuppositions in sentences containing *weil*-clauses, see Kindermann (1985:67–9).
8 See Keller (1974).
9 Speaking carefully here should indicate that we could think of contexts where the reason does not refer to the judgement, but to its act of announcement.
10 Of course, taken in detail, they are not equivalent. The question 'why do you ask?' can be followed by the answer 'because I want to know', but not vice versa.
11 See Keller (1995) for more descriptive detail.
12 See Traugott and König (1988).
13 On the notion of Mandeville's paradox, see Hayek (1966), and Keller (1995, chapter 2.2).
14 'Die Sprache wächst nach dem natürlichen Gesetze weiser Sparsamkeit' (Grimm 1968, vol. 2:2).
15 See Thorson (1976).
16 For different usages of *weil*, *da*, and *denn*, see Pasch (1983).

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3 Subjectification in grammaticalisation

Elizabeth Closs Traugott

1 Introduction[1]

(1) a. Mary *is going to* visit her agent. (progressive motion verb *go*, purposive *to*)

b. Mary *is going to/gonna* visit her agent. (quasi-auxiliary)

(2) a. *Let us go.* (imperative)

b. *Let's go.* (hortative)

(3) a. Mary read *while* Bill sang. (temporal connective)

b. Mary liked oysters *while* Bill hated them. (concessive connective)

Of each of these pairs, a form or phrase in (b) can be shown to be more subjective in meaning, more grammaticalised, and historically later in development than its cognate in (a). My purpose in this chapter is to further refine the notion of subjectification as it operates in grammatical domains of English such as are illustrated in (1)–(3). I will characterise the different kinds of subjectification that are involved in the development of grammatical markers in several areas of grammar that are syntactically different, but which nevertheless share semantic and pragmatic properties of modalisation, especially modalisation of the epistemic kind (cf. Lyons 1977, Palmer 1986).[2] Finally, I will discuss the implications of the data for hypotheses of unidirectionality of change.

Subjectification has been defined in different ways since the seminal work by Benveniste (1966) on 'sujet d'énoncé' and 'sujet d'énonciation' and by Lyons on subjectification (1977, 1982). As I have used the term, 'subjectification' refers to a pragmatic-semantic process whereby 'meanings become increasingly based in the speaker's subjective belief state/attitude toward the proposition', in other words, towards what the speaker is talking about (Traugott 1989:35). This characterisation of subjectification is very broad. In his important work on subjectivity and subjectification, Langacker has suggested that some instances of

subjectification illustrate a more narrowly defined process, specifically increase in 'the realignment of some relationship from the objective axis to the subjective axis' (Langacker 1990:17). Although overlapping with my concept of subjectification, Langacker's is nevertheless considerably different, and I will point to some of the differences as I proceed.

Subjectification is evidenced in lexical as well as grammatical change. Examples in the lexical domain include the development of illocutionary speech-act verb meanings from locutionary (and ultimately often non-locutionary) meanings, for example: *agree* (originally 'be pleasing, suitable'), *insist* (ultimately from a Latin past participle meaning 'sat on'), *promise* (ultimately from a Latin past participle meaning 'sent forward') (Traugott and Dasher 1987, Traugott 1987). The issues for the intersection of subjectification and grammaticalisation are essentially the same as for lexical change, except that in grammaticalisation the interplay between morphosyntactic and pragmatic/semantic factors leads to more complex trajectories of change than are usual in lexical change.

'Subjectification in grammaticalisation' is, broadly speaking, the development of a grammatically identifiable expression of speaker belief or speaker attitude to what is said. It is a gradient phenomenon, whereby forms and constructions that at first express primarily concrete, lexical, and objective meanings come through repeated use in local syntactic contexts to serve increasingly abstract, pragmatic, interpersonal, and speaker-based functions. 'Grammaticalisation' is the process whereby lexical items or phrases come through frequent use in certain highly constrained local contexts to be reanalysed as having syntactic and morphological functions, and, once grammaticalised, continue to develop new grammatical functions (Hopper and Traugott 1993; see also Lehmann 1985, Heine et al., 1991). As the examples in (1)–(3) indicate, grammaticalised forms may coexist alongside non-grammaticalised ones, sometimes for many centuries, a phenomenon that Hopper (1991) has called 'layering'; indeed, coexistence of older and newer forms and meanings is the norm rather than the exception.

2 Examples of subjectification in English grammaticalisation

Langacker's work focusses primarily on 'subjectivity' as a gradient phenomenon found synchronically (Langacker 1985, 1990). It concerns degrees of grounding in the perspective of the speaker from a cognitive point of view. According to Langacker, all situations are ultimately construed by the speech participants. But some are expressed in a

maximally objective way, in the sense that events and their participants are placed 'on-stage' as the focus of attention, while elements of the 'ground' (the speech event itself, and its participants) are unprofiled, unexpressed, 'off-stage' as audience looking on. Other situations are expressed in a way that aligns some aspect of the event and its participants with the ground, and hence with some part of the viewing scene. A synchronic example of the gradience is:

(4) a. Vanessa jumped across the table.

b. Vanessa is sitting across the table from Veronica.

c. Vanessa is sitting across the table from me.

d. Vanessa is sitting across the table. (Langacker 1990:17–20)

In Langacker's view, the sense of *across* in (4a) is maximally objective in that *across* profiles movement without regard to speaker–hearer position. (4b,c) are more subjective in that *across* represents not concrete motion, but the abstract construal of a conceptualiser (the speaker) tracing a mental path 'in order to locate the trajector *vis-à-vis* the reference point' (ibid.:18). In (4b) the reference-point is not one of the speech participants; in (4c) it is the speaker (1st person). The first person reference is 'objective' in the sense that the third person reference to Vanessa is – the speaker is profiled as a participant in the event; but the subjectivity of the construal is the same as in (4b) (the speaker takes a detached look at herself). (4d) is more subjective than either (4b) or (4c) in that the reference point is identified with the speaker.

As an example of diachronic subjectification, Langacker cites the development of epistemic modals. Thus the well-known change from deontic expressions such as:

(5) a. They must be married. (meaning 'some external force requires them to be married')

to epistemic:

(5) b. They must be married. (meaning 'It is obvious that they are married, I conclude that they are married')

involves a shift from a viewpoint based in persons (or laws) external to the speech participants to one based in those participants. Diachronic studies of the development of the modals in English are extensive (among them Visser 1969–73, Bybee and Pagliuca 1985, 1987, Traugott 1989, Sweetser 1990, Kytö 1991, Denison 1993), and this topic will not be discussed further here.

Other examples of subjectification that Langacker cites include the development of *be going to*. As in the case of *across* in (4a), the motion verb sense of *be going to* in sentences like (1a) is objective and concrete. The speech participants are, of course, represented in that the verb is *go* rather than *come*, but a sentence like (1a) is maximally objective to the extent that a deictic representation of an event can be. By contrast, a sentence like (1b) is subjective: 'the speaker/conceptualizer . . . traces mentally along the path in order to situate the process in relation to a reference point' (ibid.:23). In (1b) the process is that of visiting the agent, and the reference point is the moment of utterance. The degree of subjectification in constructions like (1b) is made particularly clear by examples like:

(1) c. An earthquake is going to destroy that town. (Langacker 1990:23)

The rest of this section is devoted to more detailed analyses of the development of this and other constructions.

2.1 Be going to

The history of *be going to* has recently been explored by Pérez (1990), Danchev and Kytö (1994), and Tabor (1994). It is complicated by the fact that the progressive *be-ing* construction (as opposed to *be-ende*) was still nascent – indeed Denison (1993) argues that it was not really an auxiliary until the end of the eighteenth century. However, for our purpose, which is to focus on the subjectification involved, it may be sufficient to note that the first likely (and much-cited) example is:

(6) a. Thys onhappy sowle . . . *was goyng to* be broughte into helle for the synne and onleful lustys of her body. (1482 Monk of Evesham (*OED go* 47b))

Certainly, (6a) can be understood as an expression of motion in the context of the belief that after death the soul goes on a journey with the purpose of being rewarded or punished for actions in life. But in this example the passive demotes the inference that the subject of *go* is volitional or responsible with respect to the purposive clause. Because the destination of the journey (*hell*) is an adjunct not of *was goyng to*, but of *be broughte*, the directionality of *going* is also demoted, and the inference of imminent future resulting from the purposes of the judges of the dead is promoted (Hopper and Traugott 1993:83). Therefore (6a) is at the very least an example of the kind of context in which the change might have originated.

What we have in (6a) is pragmatic evidence for the potential grammaticalisation of *be going to* to a marker of temporality. In other words, the inference of future from *was goyng to* rather than from *to* alone arises contingently out of conversational implicatures. However, temporality appears to be conventionalised, in other words, semanticised,[3] in examples like (6b) where the motion verb *go* is semantically incompatible with the non-motion *sat upon it* ('deliberated', 'did nothing about it'):

(6) b. The council sat upon it, and *were going to* order a search of all the houses about the town. (before 1680 History of Charles II, II p. 164 (*HDCET*))

The full grammaticalisation of *be going to* is evidenced when the subject and/or the verb is incompatible with purposiveness, for example, with a verb of mental experience (for example, *hear*, *like*), or when the subject is inanimate and cannot be construed as moving. One of the earlier examples of the latter is:

(6) c. It seems as if it *were going to* rain. (1890 Chambers' Journal (*OED go* Vb))

Be going to is often thought of as a tense (or prospective aspect) signalling proximal, near future, but its association with intention and planned, likely eventhood, suggests that it is also modalised even though it has no modal verb in its history. Strong epistemic modalisation is evidenced by such uses as:

(6) d. An accident has been reported on Crockett Boulevard. – That *is going to* be South of Crockett. (Radio traffic report, November 1993)

In this example, *That is going to be* followed a hesitation and pause suggesting the traffic reporter first attempted to verify the location, and then expressed slight lack of certainty about this verification (roughly equivalent to *That would be*).

There are two common accounts of changes such as are illustrated by *be going to* (usually only those meanings exemplified by (6b,c) are considered). One appeals to metaphor: a trajectory through space is mapped onto a trajectory in time (Sweetser 1988, Pérez 1990; and, with reference to the African language Chagga, Emanatian 1992). The other appeals to generalisation: the phrase is extended to more and more environments, and in the process loses some of its meaning (Bybee and Pagliuca 1985, 1987). The metaphor account does not explain why or how the grammaticalisation of *be going to* is constrained to the highly

local environment of an immediately following verb (*I am going to Cambridge* involves the motion verb only). I have proposed elsewhere that an account from metonymy, or association in linguistic context is more explanatory (Traugott and König 1991, Hopper and Traugott 1993: chapter 4), and will not repeat the arguments here. As for the generalisation account, it tells us only about analogical extension. It tells us nothing about the cognitive and communicative effect, or how to interpret the perspective in sentences like those in (6). I propose that in addition to analogical extension and generalisation, there has been pragmatic reanalysis[4] such that the experiencer of an (abstract) sense of motion has been identified with the speaking subject. To this extent, there has been no bleaching, but a realignment, which involves a strengthening of speaker perspective (see section 3 below).

2.2 Let us

I turn now to some examples of subjectification that correlate with change of grammatical status from main verb constructions not merely to auxiliaries (i.e. reduced verbs), but to discourse particles with quasi-adverbial properties. Consider first the development of the so-called hortative *let's* from the imperative *let us*. In (2a) *Let us go*, the understood subject of *let* is *You*, cf. *Let us go, will you*, and the hearer is profiled as separate from the speaker and companions (i.e., exclusive *we*), who are construed as syntactic objects of permission as well as subjects of *go*. In (2b) *Let's go* the perspective is quite different. In (2b) speaker and hearer together (inclusive *we*) are subjects of both *let* and *go*, cf. *Let's go, shall we*. The imperative construction goes back to Old English (OE), and is illustrated in (7a), which is a request to an emperor:

(7) a. Of eorþan we arison. *læt us* on eorþan
From earth we arose. Let us on/in earth
gerestan oþ ðæt god us eft
rest. until that God us afterwards
arære.
raise-up: SUBJUNCTIVE
'We rose from earth. Let us rest on earth until God may raise us (at the Resurrection).' (*c.* 1000 ÆCHom II, 31–2)

In Middle English (ME) the hortative construction came to replace an old subjunctive and an old periphrastic expression *uton* 'let's'. Unambiguous examples of the hortative are provided by (7b,c). In (7b) the hortative occurs with both the old imperative out of which it developed, and the old subjunctive that it replaced:

(7) b. Com doun to-day, and *lat* (IMP) youre bagges stonde . . . What, *lat* (HORT) us heere a messe, and *go* (SUBJ) we dyne.
'Come down today and let your bags stand (leave your bags) . . . Let us hear a mass and let us go dine.' (*c.* 1387 Chaucer CT., Ship's T 1410)

c. Ye shape for to be ouer-ronne, & that I
You prepare for to be over-run, & that I
nel noght soeffre; *lat vs* rather al be ded
not-will not endure; let us rather all be dead
atones than soeffre such a vyleney.
immediately than suffer such a villainy
(*c.* 1400 Thomas Usk, Appeals 28 (*HDCET*))

More recent developments in the history of *let's* show further subjectification. One continues to presuppose a hearer who will participate in the situation, i.e. the construction is still hortative, but the prime function is expression of what might be called the speaker's 'condescending support-style' as in (7e):

(7) d. *Let's* take our pills now, George. (to a child or a person in a retirement home)

Another barely involves the hearer at all, and functions primarily as an indication that the speaker is cognisant of the presence of the hearer and will take a turn, respond, etc., as in:

(7) e. *Let's see* now, what was I going to say?

The last kind of locution is often, in fact, addressed to oneself, and the fixed phrase serves purposes similar to *OK*, *well*, and other discourse markers (see Schiffrin 1987). In other words, *let's see* is becoming a sentence particle serving the textual and metalinguistic function of bracketing a unit of discourse.

2.3 Let alone

Another construction that has similarly lost many of its verbal properties and has become a discourse particle is *let alone*, the subject of Fillmore, Kay, and O'Connor (1988), one of the first papers on construction grammar, which has much in common with the objectives of work on grammaticalisation, but is conceived from a synchronic perspective. Originally an imperative directed at an addressee (*let me/ something alone*), or a participle construction as in (8a), it came by the nineteenth century to express speaker's attitude regarding possible

alternatives on a scale of inclusion, as in (8b). In this sense, it has acquired a metalinguistic, epistemic function of denying the informativeness of the member of the set (whether nominal, adjectival, or verbal) mentioned:

(8) a. I would have that book, therefore, by such [those ignorant of Latin – ECT] *let alone*, and left to the Grammar-school. (1660 Charles Hoole, Teaching School, p. 26 (*HDCET*))

b. We shall have no bed in the house . . . for Charles himself – *let alone* Henry. (1816 Jane Austen Lett. II.263 (*OED let* 18))

(8a) indirectly directs an individual or group to act in a certain way. (8b) still in part indirectly directs an interlocutor to act in a certain way, this time to redirect the linguistic act of construal, but it primarily expresses the speaker's epistemic attitude, or 'strength of commitment to' the part following *let alone* (Fillmore et al.:532).

2.4 I think

Yet another example of a verbal construction coming to acquire discourse particle function is *I think*. This is currently undergoing a change from main-clause status, where the first person is selected from among the set of possible subject arguments of *think*, to a parenthetical construction with greater freedom of position, to a fixed phrase indicating speaker's epistemic attitude. Thompson and Mulac's (1991) study of the use of *I think* in college students' conversations shows that *I think* is used in 53% of the possible contexts in which equivalent interpersonal expressions of epistemic stance such as *I mean*, *I guess*, *you know*, etc. occur, as in:

(9) It's just your point of view you know what you like to do in your spare time *I think*. (Thompson and Mulac 1991:313)

According to the study, 95% of the tokens of such expressions are first person, 4% second person, and 1% third person. The subjectification here involves not only the function of the phrase, but also the overwhelming selection of the first-person subject form (which may eventually become eroded, leaving only a discourse particle, just as *please* is a reduced form of *if you please*).

So far the examples have involved verbs, at least in their origins. Many have involved realignment of the syntactic subject, but in different ways. The most obvious among the examples cited here is the case of *let us* where the covert subject of *let* (*you*) is reinterpreted as *we*.

Another example is *be going to*, where the authority for the belief or evaluative attitude is anchored in the speaker, not the syntactic subject. In the case of *I think*, where the subject is first person, the subject is losing referential (objective) properties, and becoming simply the starting-point of a perspective. In a very broad way, then, the examples of subjectification discussed so far include a process of shift from what Benveniste (1966) called the 'sujet d'énoncé' (subject of the clause/proposition) to 'sujet d'énonciation' (subject of the utterance).

However, by no means all examples of subjectification involve realignment of the syntactic subject, though they do all involve some alignment to speaker's perspective. Especially clear examples are the development of the demonstrative *that* into the article *the* (see Greenberg 1978 for a cross-linguistic typological study of such developments), or of the numeral *one* into the article *a* (see Hopper and Martin 1987 on English, and Givón 1981 for a typological account). The present-day shift from approximative *like* to focusser and ultimately to discourse marker introducing reported speech and thought is a change in progress showing similar characteristics (Romaine and Lange 1991). These changes all involve a shift from relatively objective reference to use as markers of discourse reference, i.e. they acquire a metalinguistic function of creating text and signalling information flow. Since the focus of this chapter is on modalisation, I will not dwell on such developments, but will turn to a couple of examples that do not involve verbs, and have no original NP argument to be realigned. Rather, constructions are recruited to serve metalinguistic and modal functions based in speaker attitude, but without specific relation to a syntactic 'subject'.[5]

2.5 *While*

I turn now to the example that first engaged my interest in correlations between grammaticalisation and subjectification: that of *while*. Historically, virtually all grammatical markers of clause combining can be shown to have developed out of some earlier more 'objective' function. Connectives that mark coordinate and adjunctive clause combining, for example temporals, causals, and conditionals, typically originate in adverbial constructions (see Genetti 1991). They are used in discourse to signal speaker's perspective on the way in which the events talked about relate to each other.

The connective *while* originated in OE in an adverbial phrase translatable as 'at the time that' consisting of the accusative distal demonstrative, the noun *hwile* 'time' in the accusative, and the invariant

subordinator *þe*, a highly explicit coding of simultaneity (often in the sense 'as long as'), for example:

(10) a. þæs mannes sawul is belocen on his
that man's soul is locked in his
lichaman *þa* *hwile* *þe* he
body that: ACC time: ACC SUBORD he
lybbende biþ.
live: PRES-PART is
'Man's soul is locked in his body while/so long as he is alive.'
(*c.* 1000 ÆCHom II)

The subjectification is minimal, and consists only in the assertion by the speaker of the temporal relationship between the events represented in the matrix clause and the temporal clause. The phrasal expression *þa hwile þe* was reduced by late OE to the simple conjunction *(h)wile*. (10b) illustrates the plain connective, (10c) the connective followed by the general subordinator of ME, *that*:

(10) b. Ðæt lastede þa [xix] wintre *wile* Stephne
That lasted those 19 winters while Stephen
was king.
was king. (*c.* 1137 ChronE (Plummer) 1137.36)

c. Hu duden al as he bed, & *while*
They did exactly as he commanded, & while
þt he beoten hire, begunnen . . .
SUBORD they beat her, began . . .
(*c.* 1225, St Juliana 103 (*HDCET*))

The new conjunction is more subjective because, instead of profiling a specific time, it now profiles discourse structure.

A noteworthy development in this connection was that the precise specification of simultaneity signalled by the demonstrative was lost, allowing for other conversational inferences to play a part. One such inference is that the conditions specified in the adjunct clause serve not only as the temporal frame of reference for those in the main clause, but also as the grounds for the situation (the disasters lasted nineteen years because Stephen was king). Such an inference to grounds for the situation is dominant over temporality in some examples dating from the later fourteenth century and highlights the subjectivity of the clause combining relationship, in other words, the degree to which clause combining expresses the speaker's construal of relationships between propositions:

(10) d. Thar mycht succed na female, *Quhill* foundyn mycht be ony male.
'No female was able to succeed while any male could be found.'
(1375 Barbours Bruce 1.60 (*OED while* 2a])

The causal inference from *while* did not become conventionalised in English. However, in some languages this inference to the grounds for the situation has become the main extension of the term equivalent to temporal *while*. For example, in German the temporal meaning of *weil* 'during' has become obsolete and causal inference has been semanticised (see the chapter in this volume by Rudi Keller).

An inference that did become conventionalised in English is that of surprise concerning the overlap in time or the relations between event and ground. This led to the adversative, concessive meaning. Probable instances of the semanticisation of surprise, unexpectedness, and hence modal concessivity appear in the seventeenth century, among them:

(10) e. The Duke of York is gone down thither this day, *while* the Generall sat sleeping this afternoon at the Counciltable. (1667 Samuel Pepys, Diary p. 317 (*HDCET*))

f. The new Parliament . . . as their custome has ever ben going on violently, without reserve or moderation: *whilst* wise men were of opinion that the most notorious Offenders being named & excepted, an Act of Amnesty were more seasonable. (*c.* 1689 John Evelyn, Diary p. 903 (*HDCET*))

(10e, f) could both be interpreted as statements about simultaneous behaviours. However, there is an inference in (10e) that it was unexpected, even inappropriate, that the General should sleep under the circumstances. Similarly, in (10f) contrast between the folly and obnoxiousness of Parliament and the wisdom of others is pragmatically more relevant than temporal overlap.

An interesting example is provided by (10g). Here the cooccurrence of *while* and *yet* out of context might allow for a temporal reading ('at the same time as she was still pretending'), but in context *yet* cannot be temporal since there is no prior allusion to pretence. Therefore *yet* must be interpreted as concessive ('however'), a meaning which reinforces the concessive inference from *while*:

(10) g. She was a woman of great beauty, but most enormously vicious and ravenous, foolish but imperious, ever uneasy to the king, and always carrying on intrigues with other men, *while* yet she pretended she was jealous of him. (bef. 1680 Gilbert Burnet, Reign of Charles II, I 168–9 (*HDCET*))

Unambiguous concessivity occurs when both clauses have stative verbs, most especially in the present tense: *While Kim liked the movie, I hated it*. The overall shift of *while* is from reference to a relatively concrete state of affairs (a particular time) to expression of the speaker's assessment of the relevance of simultaneity in describing events, to assessment of contrast and unexpected relations between propositions.

Nevalainen (1990) has studied a similar shift of meaning in the development of the OE preposition *(on)butan* 'outside of, except' to the adversative conjunction 'on the contrary' after a negative clause, and in ME to a meaning close to 'yet'. Again, we find increased subjectification: in this case the negative ceases to be overtly required, and can only be inferred as an attitude of the speaker regarding the likelihood of two situations coexisting simultaneously (cf. *She was rich but she was happy*).

2.6 Rather than

Another example is *rather (than)*. Originally meaning *sooner (than)*, it came already in OE to have a 'preference reading' (largely in modal contexts):

(11) a. Wiste þæt seo dohtor þe drihten hæfde
knew that that daughter SUBORD Lord had
coren *hraðor* wolde sweltan ðonne
chosen sooner/rather wanted die-INF than
ceorlian.
take-a-husband-INF
'Knew that his daughter, who had chosen the Lord, would rather die than get married.' (*c.* 1000 AELS (Agnes) 301)

A ME example has already been given in (7e). A metalinguistic meaning in which the speaker expresses preference for one linguistic formulation over another (Thompson 1972:242–3) arose in later ME as in:

(11) b. certes youre wyf oghte *rather* to be preised *than* yblamed. (*c.* 1380 Chaucer, CT Melibee p. 221)

This type of discontinuous construction continues throughout Early Modern English (ENE).

(11) c. and in the lat[t]er many wits and industries haue ben spent about the wit of some one; whom many times they haue *rather* depraued *than* illustrated. (1605 Bacon, Adv. of Learning p. 23R [*HDCET*])

although the continuous (and hence more grammaticalised) construction occasionally appears early in the period. The *OED* cites

(11) d. A thing begun *rather than* finished. (1536 Tindale Doct. Treat. 390 (*OED rather* 5a))

2.7 Even

The last detailed example to be discussed here is the development of the scalar particle *even*. In OE through about 1600 it meant 'evenly, equally, regularly, uniformly':

(12) a. Tak there fore a plate of metal or ellese a bord þat be smothe shaue by leuel & *euene* polised.
'Take for it a plate of metal or else a board that is smooth shaven by a level and evenly polished'. (15th century, Towneley Plays, p. 14 (*HDCET*))

A second stage is evidenced from ME through *c.* 1820, during which time *even* meant 'namely, exactly, precisely, just, indeed'.

(12) b. There is one that accuseth you, *even* Moses in whom you trust. (1534 Tyndale Bible, NTest. *John* v, 45 (*HDCET*))

c. Crane confessed the most part *even* as Paulmir did before, and more also. (1550 Edward XVI, Diary p. 361 (*HDCET*))

d. Me thought I harde you saye *euen* now that . . ./*euen* as you wyll, husbande. (1567 Thomas Harman p. 71 (*HDCET*))

e. The good father himselfe priuilie procured that I should *euen* then by ['be'] chosen fellow. (1563–8 Roger Ascham p. 280 (*HDCET*))

In examples like (12d, e), where *even* specifies a temporal deictic, the shifting temporal reference weakens the specificity of *even*: *even now* in (12d) specifies a temporal moment already in the past at the time of speaking; *even then* in (12e) specifies a temporal moment in relation to a time of utterance now being reported at some distance from that time of utterance. It is contexts like these that may have allowed the newer scalar meaning which designates the extreme end of a scale.[6] Likely examples of this newer meaning occur as early as the first half of the sixteenth century, primarily in the context of prepositional phrases expressing spatial or temporal source of goal of motion:

(12) f. For the imagynacion of mannes hert is evell *even* from the very youth of hym. (1534 Tyndale Bible, OTest. *Genesis* viii, 20 (*HDCET*))

g. He went on his journey from the south *even* vnto Bethel. (Ibid. xiii, 1)

By the late 1560s probable examples of the scalar meaning appear in a wider range of contexts, without shifters or source-goal constructions, although at first often with another form that serves the specifying function instead of *even* (cf. *it selfe* in (12h)):

(12) h. . . . to cloath and adorne the obscuritie *euen* of Philosophie it selfe, with sensible and plausible elocution. (1605 Francis Bacon, Advancement of Learning I p. 19 (*HDCET*))

i. . . . did it with so fine a thread, that *even* those who hated the Subjects that his Fancy ran up on, yet could not but be charmed with his way of treating them. (1680 Gilbert Burnet, Life of Earl of Rochester 7 (*HDCET*))

j. Evil Men, then, *even* when they are punished, have something of Good annexed. (1695 Preston, Boethius Pr. 4, p. 180 (*HDCET*)).

2.8 Stance adverbs and degree modifiers

Powell (1992) has shown that a whole class of 'stance' adverbs such as *actually*, *generally*, *loosely*, *really*, *strictly*, etc. show similar developments, in this case from manner adverbs to encodings 'of the speaker's normative judgment respecting degree or conditions of truth' and as adverbs of modality which may 'act preemptively to inform and to persuade a hearer of the nature and importance of the speaker's evaluation' (Powell 1992:76).[7]

Similarly, degree modifiers like *very* (< 'truly'), *pretty*, *awfully*, and most recently *virtually*, have undergone a shift from manner adverbs to particles indicating the speaker's assessment of the normative referentiality of the lexical item selected. Others have originated in N-PP constructions; see Tabor (1994) for a model based on connectionist networks of the grammaticalisation of *kind of* and *sort of* as in (13a) to degree modifiers as in (13b):

(13) a. He lett ['stopped'] for no *kind of* thyng. (*c.* 1470 Percy's Rel, Estmere 193 (*OED*))

b. I *kind of* love you, Sal – I vow. (1804 T. G. Fessenden, *Orig. Poems* 100 (*OED*))

In addition to stance adverbs and degree modifiers, adversative connectives (for example, *while*, *but*), focus and scalar particles (for example, *even*, *merely*), and especially modal particles such as are found in German (for example, *ja*, *nun*, *doch*) are among classes of grammatical

words that may be used 'to indicate the degree of strength (evidence, confidence, insistence) with which a statement is made or a directive is uttered . . . to identify inconsistencies and . . . to select the context in which a new utterance is to be processed' (König 1991:180). All of these show in their histories an increase in subjectification – interactive to the extent that they provide ways for speakers to guide the hearer in interpretation, but primarily subjective in that they are the devices by which speakers take responsibility for success in communication and seek to meet hearers' attempts 'to integrate new information with information that is already accessible' (Blakemore 1990:364).

3 Unidirectionality

Subjectification has constituted a major factor in the development of my hypotheses concerning unidirectionality of meaning change. It is certainly only one factor in unidirectionality. In the case of grammaticalisation, it is accompanied by other factors, such as generalisation of syntactic or morphological context, bonding, and, at later stages, by phonological reduction. But the evidence from English, and other languages I have looked at, suggests that the hypothesis of unidirectional increase in subjectification over time is very robust, at least in the early stages prior to affixation. Many subjectified forms can become even more subjective. Thus perfects may be subjectified to 'discovery' markers (see Kathleen Carey's chapter in this volume), and progressives may be subjectified to an 'experiential' marker in represented speech and thought (see Susan Wright's chapter in this volume). Alternatively, subjectified forms may be replaced by other newly subjectifying forms, as in the case of the futures (cf. the gradual replacement of *shall* by *will*, and of *will* by *be gonna*, etc.). As Meillet (1915–16) pointed out, conjunctions are some of the least stable forms in a language, and are often replaced. The unexpectedly large array of focus particles and stance verbs in English suggests these forms too develop easily, and may be replaced easily.

Counterexamples to unidirectional subjectification in the early stages of grammaticalisation would, for example, be instances of connectives that originated as adversatives and over time became temporals or temporal/locative prepositions, of scalar particles that became markers of specificity, of futures that became verbs of going or wanting. As is the case with most regularities identified in change, some counterexamples do exist, but they all involve later stages of grammaticalisation. One is the development from perfect to perfective in English (see Kathleen

Carey's chapter in this volume), and in Spanish a somewhat similar change from the use of the perfect to mark surprise, and information value, to mark hodiernal past time (Schwenter 1994). Another is the development of the French subjunctive from a marker of modal attitude to a marker of subordination.[8] In neither of these cases, however, is there complete desubjectification, since tense and clause connectives function at least in part to code relation to speaker time or discourse organisation.

It is particularly striking that even where counterexamples to unidirectionality in grammaticalisation occur, there may nevertheless still be an increase in subjectification. For example, resegmentation of material may occur such that a clitic is resegmented as a free form, contrary to the far more usual path of grammaticalisation, which proceeds from free > bound form.[9] Matsumoto's (1988) study of the resegmentation of a number of subordinating clitics as free morphemes in Japanese is particularly suggestive of the robustness of the tendency toward subjectification, since all the examples Matsumoto discusses involve increased subjectification, for example, *dakara* 'because' (*da* 'copula' + *kara* 'because') > 'therefore, that's why' > epistemic insistence particle 'I'm telling you'.

A related topic that deserves further study is whether subjectification is characteristic of all domains of grammaticalisation. To date it appears that it may be. Essays in this volume attest to its operation in connection with word order (Stein), grammatical relations such as are coded by collectives and reciprocals (Kemmer), and auxiliaries (Carey, Wright); more recent work attests to its operation in additional domains such as deictic adverbs (Smith 1993) and case markers (Company 1993). The reason for the ubiquity of subjectification presumably lies in the speaker's attempts to communicate the relevance of what is said to the communicative event, which includes hearers as well as speakers, but which ultimately depends for its occurrence on the speaker. For speakers' communicative purposes to be achieved, forms are constantly recruited from lexical domains expressing concrete, objective meanings, and are construed in terms of the perspective of the speaker, the speech event, and the discourse context (Lehmann 1985, Blakemore 1990). But such recruitment is far from arbitrary; the original meanings and the inferences that can be drawn from them that made the terms eligible for recruitment in the first place constrain the linguistic domains in which they can be used and the subjective functions they can perform.

Readers familiar with my earlier work may have noted that I have not spoken here, as I once did, of unidirectionality from what I called propositional to textual to expressive meanings (cf. Traugott 1982), a

hypothesis based on Halliday and Hasan's (1976) proposal that there are three functional domains of language, which they call the 'ideational', the 'textual', and the 'interpersonal' domains, respectively. Although this has proved a useful hypothesis for testing evidence for change, and has provided overwhelming evidence for increase in expressiveness (which I have redefined as subjectivity), it has also raised a number of questions about the ordering of the changes. *While* does show a clear development from textual (clause-combining) to subjective (concessive) meaning. However, the internal ordering is not always supported (see Powell 1992). In an important paper, Herring (1991) suggests that Tamil rhetorical question markers (for example, 'and then what did he do?' in narratives) and tags (for example, 'right?') have grammaticalised to causal conjunctions (for example, 'because') and relativisers respectively. The evidence is synchronic. If, as appears likely from the distributional evidence, a diachronic analysis confirms this hypothesis, then these changes provide a counterexample to the shift from textual to expressive meanings. However, they do evidence a shift from attention directed primarily to the hearer toward more internally oriented, more solely speaker-based text organisation.[10] Another reason for modifying the original hypothesis is that linguists now tend to treat as 'metalinguistic' a variety of phenomena that Halliday and Hasan distinguished in different components, for example, metalinguistic constructions serving obvious textual functions (e.g. *rather than*) and others serving what Halliday and Hasan called interpersonal functions (e.g. *must*). Therefore the theoretical basis for the ordering no longer exists. The unidirectionality I am speaking of is the more general one mentioned at the beginning, the tendency to recruit lexical (propositional) material for purposes of creating text and indicating attitudes in discourse situations; in other words, the tendency for 'meanings to become increasingly based in the speaker's subjective belief state/attitude toward the proposition' (Traugott 1989:35). As already noted, this tendency is constrained by the meanings of the items undergoing change, and the communicative purposes for which they are being used. My hypothesis is, furthermore, that the tendency for subjectification is, to a large extent, correlated with the early grammaticalisation of elements; this presumably follows, at least in part, from the greater accessibility of the original meaning to speakers and hearers before this has been obscured by frequent reanalysis.

It should be clear from the preceding discussion that subjectification in grammaticalisation does not operate along a single dimension. Rather, there are separate processes involving correlated diachronic continua, among them:

Propositional function	⟶	Discourse function
Objective meaning	⟶	Subjective meaning
Non-epistemic modality	⟶	Epistemic modality
Non-syntactic subject	⟶	Syntactic subject
Syntactic subject	⟶	Speaking subject
Full, free form	⟶	Bonded form

Such correlations of continua serve as frames of reference for distinguishing the development of different items, as well as for showing their commonalities.[11] Ultimately specific paths of change for particular items or particular domains of grammaticalisation in particular languages will need to be plotted against larger sets of correlated continua before a full understanding of the phenomena of change can be achieved.

A word on what my proposals suggest for a characterisation of grammaticalisation, especially what has been known as bleaching. Following Givón (1979) and others, many linguists characterise grammaticalisation as a process involving bleaching, phonological loss, etc. Langacker takes a similar view, associating grammaticalisation with semantic attenuation and arguing that part of this attenuation is the process of subjectification. His particular theory of cognitive grammar and mental paths leads him to identify maximal subjectivity with maximal absence. His analogy is the viewing situation mediated by glasses. If one takes the glasses off and looks at them, they are maximally profiled and in consciousness; when one wears them and pays no attention to them, they fade from consciousness. In his view, zero expression is iconic of maximum subjectivity (1985, 1990), as in the case of (1c) *An earthquake is going to destroy that town*, or (4d) *Vanessa is sitting across the table*. It is not surprising, then, that Langacker identifies subjectification with 'semantic attenuation' and 'bleaching'. But many other examples do not provide comparable evidence of a correlation between zero expression and subjectification: there is, for example, no comparable distinction among adversative connectives, focus particles, stance adverbs, degree modifiers, and so forth. It appears that Langacker's identification of subjectification with semantic attenuation is an artifact of his attention to a narrower subset of subjectification processes, specifically to constructions which originate in argument structure (events, particularly motion events, and the participants in them).

There is an alternative way of interpreting the changes involved. As has been pointed out in a number of papers (Brinton 1988, Traugott 1989, Bybee 1990, Sweetser 1990, Traugott and König 1991), in the process of grammaticalisation, certain semantic properties may be

reduced, but they are replaced by pragmatic strengthening. Lehmann (1985) and others have spoken of increased expressivity. I have argued here that what is strengthened is specifically the subjective stance of the speaker – 'the speaker in his [sic] role as intruder' (Halliday and Hasan 1976:27).

A puzzle that arises in considering the process of subjectification over time is why reuse of an already existing term rather than innovation of a new term should lead to strengthening and greater expressivity. Rudi Keller suggests a solution in the third part of his chapter in this volume. In discussing the development of German *weil*, he hypothesises that speakers may use 'a more "reserved" and less obliging variant in a context where the causal or adversative interpretation is obvious for pragmatic reasons'. More generally, we may hypothesise that a speaker allows a hearer the option of reaching the stronger interpretation. Over time, repeated invitations by speakers to infer more than what is said may lead hearers to attribute intrusive and expressive purposes to speakers; hence the reanalysis of pragmatic meanings as semantic, that is, semanticisation. Once semanticisation has occurred, speakers may select an unambiguous form (for example, *although*), the strengthened form (which is still potentially ambiguous out of context, but now unambiguous in context, for example, *while*), or may invite inferences through conversational implicatures with a form that is not yet semanticised, but may eventually come to be so (for example, *at the same time as*). This can be exemplified by the choices available in:

(14) The attorney said that although/while/at the same time as the churches did not show 'evil intent', they knowingly made a choice contrary to rules.[12]

The process of pragmatic strengthening can therefore be seen to follow from the motivation for grammaticalisation to discourse functions outlined above: the attempt on the speaker's part to increase the informativeness to the interlocutor of what is being said, i.e. a cognitive-communicative motivation.

4 Conclusion

The present chapter suggests that a detailed study of the relationships between modality, most especially epistemic modality, and subjectification is called for. So is a study of those paths of grammaticalisation in which subjectification is reduced or possibly reversed. Both of these lines of research will give us increased insights into the cognitive as well as communicative structure of grammatical material in a language.

NOTES

1 Earlier versions of this chapter profited from lively discussion with members of the Stanford University historical linguistics group, the University of California at San Diego working group on cognitive linguistics, and the University of Helsinki English linguistics group. I am especially grateful to Kathleen Carey, Michele Emanatian, Edward Finegan, Suzanne Fleischman, Rudi Keller, Suzanne Kemmer, Merja Kytö, Roger Lass, Matti Rissanen, and Whitney Tabor for their helpful comments. All lapses of fact or interpretation remain, of course, my responsibility.

2 Several of these domains have been discussed elsewhere in my work; however, most of the examples in this chapter are new. I am especially grateful to the compilers of the *Helsinki Diachronic Corpus of English Texts* (*HDCET*) for permission to use the corpus, and to Alison Reid and Elizabeth Ewing of the Stanford University Academic Text Service for developing searcher programs and databases including Old English, Middle English (Chaucer), early Modern English, and present-day English materials. All Old English examples are from *DOECF*; all Chaucerian examples are from Benson (1987) unless otherwise specified.

3 Although this process is often called 'lexicalisation', I prefer the term 'semanticisation', since the former is also used for reanalysis of erstwhile morphological material into lexical material (see note 7 below, and examples like *sit-set*, where a former causative morpheme has been lost and only lexical difference remains).

4 'Pragmatic reanalysis', like more well-known types of syntactic or morphological renalysis, involves a realignment of material, in this case the inferential relationship between the speaker's perspective and the subject of the sentence. At the earlier stage these are not inferentially aligned, but in the new meaning they are.

5 It is usual to think of the development of lexically selected oblique arguments into behavioural and then syntactic subjects (Cole et al. 1980), for example, the loss of impersonal constructions in English, as the result of syntactic processes (Lightfoot 1979), or of changes in lexical specification (Fischer and van der Leek 1987). Another approach more akin to the one taken here is that such changes are relatable to topicalisation and to the empathy hierarchy (Kuno and Kaburaki 1977).

6 A similar development occurred in French *même*. However, no Germanic language other than English shows this development.

7 At the conference Ed Finegan questioned whether stance adverbs should be considered *bona fide* examples of grammaticalisation or rather of lexical change. Since these adverbs (and adverbials in general) typically serve adjunct or specifying functions, I consider them partially grammaticalised. However, since meaning changes in grammaticalisation are a subset of meaning changes in the lexicon, and those evidenced by stance adverbs are consistent with changes in grammaticalisation, it is not essential here to decide on the grammaticalisation status of stance adverbs.

8 I am grateful to Suzanne Fleischman for this example.

9 I exclude here the full lexicalisation of grammatical morphemes, as in *to up the ante*. These appear not to involve subjectification.

10 Of course, the purportedly later uses are clearly less strongly attitudinal and therefore less strongly subjective in that sense. What the historical order of development actually was, remains to be determined.
11 More elaborate sets of synchronic correlations have been proposed for clause combining by Lehmann (1988), and by Matthiessen and Thompson (1988). Similar ones can be shown to operate semantically and diachronically, as here.
12 Based on a text from United Press International, July 1990. The original has *while*.

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4 Emphatic and reflexive *-self*: expectations, viewpoint, and subjectivity

Suzanne Kemmer

In this chapter I examine the semantics/pragmatics of the pronominal *-self* forms in English (*himself*, *herself*, *themselves* etc.; collectively referred to hereafter as *-self*). I describe two distinct kinds of meanings associated with *-self*, namely *emphatic* and *reflexive -self*, and show that each of these is associated with a closely related configuration involving a 'viewpoint'. I then consider the viewpoint uses of *-self* in terms of the semantic parameter of subjectivity, in the sense of Langacker (1990), and relate it to other current notions of subjectivity.

In the following analysis, crucial reference is made to the notion of *referential accessibility*, a discourse concept developed by Ariel (1988, 1990) and very similar to the theoretical framework elaborated by Givón (1983) under the name 'topic continuity'. Accessibility can be defined as the degree of ease with which a discourse referent can be identified or 'picked out' mentally via the use of a given referring element (with 'referring' understood in a broad sense including mental conceptions of any degree of specificity or definiteness). The fundamental claim of Accessibility Theory is that 'referring expressions are no more than guidelines for retrievals' (Ariel 1988:68), and thus the inherent semantics of each type of expression is the very processing procedure by which the referent is accessed. Referring expressions fall along a cline of degree of accessibility, from low accessibility signals like full, elaborated noun phrases, to high accessibility markers like pronouns and zero anaphora. The linguistic element of concern in this chapter, *-self*, is, as we will see, a marker of high accessibility.

1 Two kinds of *-self*

It is reasonable to distinguish two basic senses of *-self*, emphatic and reflexive *-self*, as illustrated by (1) and (2) vs. (3) and (4), respectively (underlining is for ease of reference only; it does not represent stress):

(1) I myself want no part of it.

(2) I wanted Marie herself to tell me.

(3) The old horse heaved himself out of the mud.

(4) I gave myself a treat for Christmas.

Functionally, there is an intuitively obvious distinction between the emphatic and reflexive: the emphatic expresses some kind of focus on a particular participant, while the reflexive signals referential identity of one clausal participant with another. These characterisations are, as we will see, both imprecise and incomplete, but they are sufficient to allow the identification of emphatic *-self* in (1) and (2) and reflexive *-self* in (3) and (4).

On formal grounds, emphatic and reflexive *-self* can be distinguished, first of all, by stress. The emphatic is always stressed to some degree, often bearing sentence stress, while non-emphatic reflexive uses of *-self* are necessarily unstressed. Thus (3) and (4), when read as non-emphatic, have unstressed *-self*. Moreover, the characteristic syntactic range of the two is different. Emphatic *-self* typically (but not always, as we will see below) occurs adjoined to a head nominal (noun or pronoun), while reflexive *-self* forms constitute a noun phrase by themselves. Emphatic *-self* can occur in subject noun phrases, as in (1), but reflexive *-self* does not: it occurs only on non-subject participants of a clause, such as direct or indirect object ((3) and (4), respectively).

It is possible for both functions to exist simultaneously in a given instance of *-self*, as can be seen by stressing the *-self* forms in (3) and (4). This possibility exists for any reflexive use, given an appropriate contextual reason for emphasising the participant marked with *-self*.

We can consider such cases as those in which emphatic function is superimposed on reflexive function: the emphatic meaning can be removed by removing the stress, leaving the reflexive function. Where this superimposition of functions occurs, the emphatic can appear without a head nominal. The pronominal part of the *-self* form, as well as the antecedent nominal, both give information about the referent to be focussed on.

2 Emphatic *-self*

Let us now turn to elucidating the nature of emphatic *-self*. Many investigators characterise the value of *-self* in uses such as (1) and (2) as 'emphasis' without further defining the term. This is problematic, since not only is the term itself imprecise, but it is necessary to distinguish the

kind of emphasis signalled by *-self* from other types of emphasis (signalled by, for example, repetition, or constructions like topicalisation or clefting).

Erteschik-Shir (1973, 1981) attempted a precise characterisation of emphatic *-self* in semantic/pragmatic terms. For her, cases of emphatic (as opposed to reflexive) *-self* are those in which the *-self* NP is read as 'dominant' within its sentence. Dominance has two subcases; in the first, the dominant NP is identified as the one bearing sentence focus (cf. (2) above). In the second, an NP is dominant if it is one focussed element in a multiple focus construction, as in sentences such as *John thinks that Mary is in love with himself, not Peter*. Multiple focus cases include comparative structures, conjunctive or disjunctive listing, or cases where the nominal is implicitly understood as belonging to a closed set, as in sentences like *John thinks that Mary hates even himself*. In all these cases, the dominance or pragmatic prominence is underscored by stress on the *-self* element.

The notion of dominance is a good beginning, but in itself is not sufficient. For one thing, 'sentence focus' can be somewhat difficult to determine; presumably sentence stress cannot be the only criterion since one can easily imagine more heavily stressed elements coexisting in a sentence with emphatic *-self*. Example (1) for example could be modified so that the heaviest stress falls on elements other than *-self*: 'I myself want *absolutely no part* of it!' Furthermore, the two subcases of dominance are not explicitly related, and the second subcase looks suspiciously like a list. Finally, the definition of dominance relies on the notion of a focussed element. As such, it does not distinguish emphatic *-self* from other focus constructions.

For a more comprehensive view, I believe it is necessary to consider the meaning of emphatic *-self* in terms of the relation of its referent to speaker expectations. In most general terms, emphatic *-self* is a signal that the discourse referent indicated by *-self* is a referent that is to some degree unexpected in the discourse role or clausal role where it occurs. In other words, some other potential referent or referents might have, for whatever reason, been more likely or expected. The *-self* form functions, in fact, to exclude any alternative potential referents that might have been expected to occur instead of the one the *-self*-marked noun phrase refers to. This analysis ties together the various types of 'dominance' constructions identified by Erteschik-Shir: all invoke an explicit or implicit set of possible referents; the head noun or pronoun names or points to the referent, and its adjunct, the *-self* form (which I will assume redundantly points to the same referent) signals that that referent has been selected to the exclusion of the others.

The basic analysis of emphatic *-self* as a signal of a referent selected unexpectedly over other potential alternatives was proposed by Plank (1979), and perhaps others, but I think it is possible to go beyond this characterisation if we consider how emphatic *-self* is typically used in discourse.

Examining emphatic *-self* in discourse leads to the identification of a few recurrent discourse patterns in which it typically features. We can relate these patterns to arrive at a more general characterisation of the meaning of emphatic *-self*.

The first discourse pattern can be schematised as follows (where the arrows indicate temporal sequence):

Topic

→ shift of topic to associated entity

→ unexpected shift back to topic.

This pattern, which is strongly associated with human referents, occurs again and again in discourses with emphatic *-self*. To characterise it, I will make use of the Cognitive Grammar notion of *reference point* (Langacker 1993), a conceptualisation used as a way of accessing other conceptualisations. Langacker notes that topics can be characterised as reference points around which discourse is structured. A topic is a prominent conceptualisation which acts a kind of cognitive anchoring point; other more subordinate conceptualisations are brought into the discourse by virtue of their perceived ties to the reference point.[1]

The example in (5) illustrates the pattern, which can be termed the *return to topic* use of *-self*:

(5) (several leading figures were revealed as Stasi agents)
Chief among them was Sascha Anderson, an ultra-hip writer, publisher, ceramic designer and musician. Revelations about the extent of his betrayals have astonished and enraged many of the people who lived and worked with him.

A strange day in Berlin: I spend the morning with one of the people Anderson spied on, the writer Lutz Rathenow, and the afternoon with Anderson himself. [The article goes on to describe both meetings.] (NY Times Magazine, 12 April 1992, p. 50)

In this piece of discourse, first Anderson is introduced, and becomes a local topic. Then, attention is shifted to other entities associated with this referent in some way. Anderson is here serving as a reference point; the other entities mentioned are mentally accessed via the conceptuali-

sation of Anderson set up in the first sentence: his betrayals, his associates, then one particular associate (Lutz Rathenow, who will also be topically important in this discourse). Finally, the discourse goes back to the reference point of the local discourse, Anderson. The entities that were accessed via the conceptualisation of Anderson are excluded with the use of *-self*. Although these entities, by virtue of being accessed via Anderson, are subordinate conceptualisations in this discourse, they are activated in the discourse by being referred to, and thus have a local salience that leads to the expectation that one of them would be a more likely next referent in the chain of predications in the discourse. In particular, the last named referent has a high degree of local salience, in part by being the most recently referred to, and also by virtue of being introduced in an elaborated way, via a characterisation and a name, which indicates the coming importance of this referent in the discourse. The return to Anderson, therefore, is relatively unexpected, and is signalled as such by *-self*.

The following example is a slight variation on the above pattern. The relevant referent is, in contrast to the above, inanimate and not highly topical. We might call this the *secondary topic* pattern.

(6) . . . silliest of all, Glenda and Glenys Kinnock pretending to build a wall together at the Blackburn Road Builders Training Centre. Photos show the two women crouched behind a palisade of brick and wet mortar, Glenda wielding trowel and spirit level, Glenys brandishing a supportive trowel of her own . . . Subsequent cross-examination of those at the training center revealed that the two G.s had laid only one brick between them, and that the wall itself, after the witnesses had gone, was to be demolished and reconstructed in a different shape. ('Letter from London' by Julian Barnes, *New Yorker* 4 May 1992, p. 81.)

In (6), the referent selected by *-self*, 'wall', is subordinate to other more topical reference points, viz. the human participants in the discourse. Nevertheless it does have some measure of discourse prominence: it is mentioned overtly in the first sentence of the passage, and has some discourse continuity in that it is referred to again in paraphrase ('a palisade of brick and wet mortar').

In this passage, the other potential referents excluded by *-self* are not other entities of the same type as the selected referent (like the other humans in the Anderson passage), but are rather *aspects* of the entity, or related entities that might be evoked in an encyclopedic conception of the scene of wall-building: trowel, spirit-level, and a brick.

The two patterns exemplifed above are very common in natural

discourse. In both cases, the referent that is signalled by *-self* as relatively unexpected has some discourse prominence, although the degree of prominence can differ a great deal. We might be therefore tempted to say that *-self* indicates an unexpected return to some entity serving as a reference point in the discourse, although the reference point need not be the most prominent one in the local discourse.

Further investigation, however, shows that this characterisation does not fit all the data. Cases of the above type might be the most prototypical kinds of examples of emphatic *-self*, but a more general characterisation is possible. Consider the following constructed examples:

(7) – 'How was the banquet?'
– 'The dinner itself was fine, but after that it was all downhill. I was bored to death.'

(8) On the way we stopped to have a look at old Miller's place. The gardens were overgrown, but in a picturesque kind of way; the layout was charmingly old-fashioned. The little lake was mostly dried up, and the dock was pretty much rotted away. The house itself was in pretty good repair, though . . .

In these cases, the referents indicated by *-self* (*dinner* and *house* respectively) are first mentions, rather than reintroduced entities. (Thus, we might call this pattern the *first-mention* emphatic.) Yet as in (6), these referents are salient entities in the conceptualisations evoked by the referents in the discourse. *Banquet* evokes a scenario which has, as a prominent or focal part, a relatively formal sit-down meal. In addition the concept evokes other possible ancillary activities, for example, speeches, toasts, social interaction, etc., all of which non-focal aspects of a banquet are explicitly excluded as referents by *-self*. Similarly, the house belonging to a property is a highly salient aspect of the property, more so than gardens or outbuildings. In both cases, the entities referred to by *-self* are naturally prominent in an overall conceptualisation that has been evoked. We might term this use the *implicit antecedent* emphatic.

Thus, the function of *-self* is to signal a particular entity in contrast to other potential entities that the speaker assumes might have been more likely to be referred to instead at that point in the discourse. Entities accessed by *-self* have a relatively high degree of prominence compared to the entities excluded in their favour.[2] Their prominence may derive either from the discourse, or it may be inherent to some degree. For example, reference points are conceptually prominent by virtue of their role in the discourse. In the case of human reference points, as in (5),

there is no difference in intrinsic prominence among the entities in the relevant set (humans); thus the relative prominence of the selected entity derives entirely from the discourse. With non-human referents, on the other hand, natural prominence is more likely to be a factor: In (6), for example, the referent of *-self* is a reference point that is less prominent in the discourse than other entities (in fact it is subordinate to a more global reference point), but it is nevertheless a naturally prominent part of a conceptualisation introduced in the discourse. Finally, in (7) and (8), the NP marked with *-self* does not hark back specifically to an entity overtly mentioned previously, but rather to a prominent aspect of another conceptualisation serving as a reference point. In each case, other potential referents are excluded by *-self*.

Emphatic *-self* is therefore a grammatical device for accessing referents of some degree of prominence in the discourse. Such referents are in the usual case mentioned in the discourse preceding the *-self*-marked NP, and thus are 'on-stage' in the sense of Langacker (1990), but they may also be implicit, and invoked by the conceptualisation of some other 'on stage' element (7)–(8). The relation holding between the *-self*-marked nominal and the entity it accesses is therefore *subjectively construed*; some other ways in which *-self* involves a subjective construal are discussed in section 5.

The analysis sketched above makes certain predictions about the occurrence of emphatic *-self* nominals in the functions described above. Since the emphatic marker accesses some referent already introduced, explicitly or implicitly, we would expect it not to occur with discourse-initial nominals (except perhaps to *create* an effect of referring back, as at the beginning of a story), nor would we expect it to occur in positions associated with the introduction of new discourse participants. The fact that *-self* forms do not occur with indefinite head nouns lends some support to the latter prediction.

Moreover, this analysis can be used to bring out the differences between emphatic *-self* and other focus constructions. Cleft constructions, for example, are functionally similar to the emphatic in that there is reference to one entity to the exclusion of other potential entities. Examples (9) and (10) illustrate, respectively, a cleft construction and the emphatic sentence most closely corresponding to it.

(9) It was Marie who finally told her.

(10) Marie herself finally told her.

In (9), the teller is asserted to be Marie as opposed to Sue, Bill, Kim, or anyone else the speaker and addressee might have considered relevant candidates for the telling. Unlike with the emphatic construction,

however, there is no sense that the entity focussed on has any particular prominence in the preceding discourse, nor is there any necessity for the entity to have been evoked conceptually at all before that point. In fact, (9) is most natural in a situation in which the topic is something or someone *other* than Marie, thus contrasting most highly with the prevalent return-to-topic pattern found above to be strongly associated with the emphatic. The sentence in (10), in contrast, could very naturally be embedded in a discourse with Marie as a global or local topic.

The contrast between the two constructions, which I believe will be borne out by a study of the discourse use of the cleft construction, is that with the cleft the focussed element is low in accessibility, while with the emphatic, the element is high in accessibility. In support of this analysis, we might note that in cleft constructions we normally find nouns or proper nouns in the focus position, rather than pronouns (notice that *it was she who . . .* seems less natural than *it was Mary who . . .*). The emphatic, on the other hand, easily occurs with pronouns. As Ariel (1988) has observed, nouns are associated with lower accessibility than pronouns.

The uses of the emphatic described above are semantically and grammatically quite similar, and might be thought of as representing more specific instances of one particular function of emphatic *-self*, which for simplicity's sake I will term *-self*$_E$.

There are at least three additional uses of emphatic *-self*, found mainly with human referents, which are formally and functionally more divergent than the subsenses discussed above. The scalar emphatic, found in sentences like *The emperor himself could not do anything about it* (on the reading 'Even the emperor could not do anything about it') has been discussed elsewhere (see in particular König 1991 and references therein), as has the agentive use in sentences like *Jones repairs his car himself* (see Moravcsik 1972). These uses can be analysed as extensions from the semantic value of *-self*$_E$ in that their semantic and/or grammatical specifications are similar to, but not entirely compatible with, the value of *-self*$_E$. The third use type, called the viewpoint emphatic, will be discussed in section 4.2.

Regarding the syntactic properties of the emphatic, we can say that with the exception of the agentive use (which, following Moravcsik we can assume is more adverbial than nominal/referential in function), and the emphatic reflexive, emphatic *-self* forms are necessarily adjuncts of their head nominal. The head is the element that fulfils a particular argument function in the clause; hence emphatic *-self* forms can occur on NPs serving any argument role in the clausal predication. In the case of the emphatic reflexive, i.e. simultaneous emphatic and reflexive

function, the (stressed) *-self* form by itself constitutes a noun phrase, with no separate head. This is presumably because the structural/semantic properties of the specific reflexive construction of which it is an instance specify the NP whose referent is to be interpreted as the antecedent.[3]

In sum, emphatic *-self* represents a complex category with a number of different but related senses.[4] It is useful to distinguish a sense with the relatively schematic value of accessing a referent with a fair degree of prominence in place of other potential referents that might have been expected in its stead. This sense, *-self*$_E$, has three discernible subcases characterised by different discourse properties: the return-to-topic, secondary topic, and implicit antecedent uses.[5] It seems likely that the return-to-topic pattern is prototypical for the emphatic, if frequency is any indication.

3 Reflexive *-self*

The reflexive use of *-self* is found in examples like the following, taken from the LOB corpus:

(11) a. the old horse heaves himself out of the mud and jumps it cleanly.

b. in those seventeen days he had earned himself more fame than in twenty years at the bar.

c. your dream clearly expresses you have certain doubts about yourself or your fiancée.

In this case, the main function of the *-self* forms is to signal co-reference of one clausal participant with another (in general the subject). As we can see, the co-referent participant can fill any of a number of semantic roles in the sentence: patient, beneficiary, or other oblique participant roles; in short, whatever non-subject roles can be filled by non-co-referent participants. Most reflexive uses referentially link participants in one clausal predication (but cf. sections 4.1–2 below).

In section 1, it was mentioned that emphatic and reflexive semantics can co-occur. In fact, any co-reference configuration coded by a reflexive marker can have emphatic semantics superimposed on it, where the co-referent participant is being explicitly or implicitly contrasted with another potential referent. Example (11c) is particularly apt with an emphatic reading, since another referent is named in disjunction with the co-referent one, thus providing an explicit contrast.

Co-reference of two entities filling two different participant roles in

the sentence is a crucial aspect of reflexive semantics. Being the most obvious property of reflexives, it forms a part of all approaches to reflexives that I am familiar with. Aside from co-reference, however, there are two other important aspects which must be considered in an adequate account of reflexive semantics.

First, the discourse referent that the *-self* NP is linked to is *highly proximal*, in the sense that it is easily accessible mentally (i.e. identifiable as the intended referent) due to the conceptual prominence of its antecedent. Ariel (1988) was to my knowledge the first to identify reflexive markers as indicators of conceptual proximity in this sense. She states (p. 77) that reflexives are 'higher Accessibility markers than pronominals (and names, of course) . . . [They] are restricted to finding their antecedents within the same minimal domain as that in which they occur.' The participant marked by *-self*, in her view, must be referentially linked up with an antecedent that is very easily accessed, or, in an equivalent term she uses, highly salient.

The notion of a minimal domain for the occurrence of reflexive markers is well known from Chomsky's Binding Theory, where the domain is understood as a particular sort of local syntactic context, definable in terms of a tree-structure. Ariel considers the relevant domain to be semantic/conceptual in nature; it has to do with the information structures that are constructed when processing language, against the background of which reference to discourse entities is made. In her view, the Binding Conditions are based in Accessibility Theory, i.e. are a highly grammaticalised and conventionalised version of it. Similarly, van Hoek (1992), building on Accessibility Theory, draws the generalisation that the antecedent of an English reflexive must be a maximally prominent conceptual reference point (in the Cognitive Grammar sense of the term 'reference point', cf. Langacker 1993).[6]

One of the measures of conceptual closeness proposed by Haiman (1985) is the degree to which two entities are referentially distinguished from one another. Thus, the very fact of co-reference of two discourse participants filling roles that might potentially be filled by completely distinct entities is itself an indication of relative conceptual proximity. Nevertheless, the conceptual proximity of the two participants in a reflexive configuration is greater than simple co-reference would license, because of the specification of a minimal conceptual domain within which the co-reference relation holds. Ordinary anaphoric pronouns also involve referential linkage, yet do not entail the high accessibility associated with reflexive markers. This difference emerges in various ways, as shown by Ariel (1988, 1990). In section 4 we will see some manifestations of it in cases allowing a contrast between reflexive

and non-reflexive pronouns, but where use of *-self* is strongly associated with greater conceptual proximity.

Co-reference and a high degree of conceptual proximity, even taken together, do not fully characterise the reflexive semantic configuration. A crucial aspect of reflexive semantics that often goes unnoticed by investigators has to do with the two participant roles mentioned above: Most typically, reflexive markers appear with predicates that evoke two participant roles, i.e. ordinary transitive verbs. The function of reflexive markers, in English and cross-linguistically, is to signal co-reference specifically *where we would not expect to find* co-reference. With reflexive semantics, there are two distinct participant roles, for which the normal case is referential distinctness, but which happen, unusually, to be filled by the same entity (cf. Faltz 1977).[7]

This property of the reflexive distinguishes it from a related semantic category, namely middle voice, as shown in Kemmer (1993, 1994). Middle voice event types comprise cases of intrinsic co-reference (i.e. co-reference that is expected or predictable; thus, for example, body actions such as 'wash', 'dress', 'sit down', etc. are semantically middle, not reflexive).[8] With the middle, there is only one semantic role inhering in the event, in contrast to the reflexive in which two separate semantic roles are invoked, but whose participants happen not to be referentially distinct. The middle, therefore, is characterised by a lower degree of conceptual distinctness of participants than the reflexive; it approaches the intransitive prototype in that respect.

The reflexive, like the emphatic, is a complex category, with multiple subtypes representing conventional syntactic/semantic configurations.[9] For example, each of the examples in (11) represents a particular participant configuration: direct object reflexives as in (11a) are associated with a pattern in which an entity expressed as direct object is referentially linked to the subject; similarly for indirect object and oblique reflexives. The direct object co-reference configuration appears to be privileged, constituting a central or prototypical sense for the category of reflexive. It might also be noted that each pattern involving reflexive semantics also represents a special case (i.e. the case where co-reference happens to hold) of its corresponding non-reflexive configuration,[10] within a larger network of clausal patterns in English.

Most of the reflexive configurations involve co-reference between a clausal participant and a subject referent; but there are other patterns involving non-subject antecedent referents. The propensity of reflexive markers to select subjects as antecedents is due to the high salience of subjects. For most reflexive configurations, a local subject

is the most salient potential antecedent. Non-subject antecedents are sanctioned by the viewpoint reflexive pattern discussed below in section 4.1.

Now let us consider the relation between the emphatic and the reflexive use of *-self*. The principal function of markers of reflexive semantics is to signal (unexpected) co-reference between two clausal participants. Emphatic *-self*, on the other hand, has the very different function of identifying a referent that is salient in the discourse in contrast to other potential referents that were just mentioned or could be mentioned. Thus, the emphatic serves largely at a level of organisation higher than the individual clause, while the reflexive *-self* gives information about the referential relation of clausal participants (specifically, that they correspond semantically).

The differences sketched above support the view of Plank (1979:334), who considers the reflexive to belong to a different functional realm than the emphatic, namely that of diathesis or voice. They lead me to set up these two uses of *-self* as two quite distinct semantic/pragmatic configurations, each of which is associated at the formal level with the polysemous form *-self*. Each of these basic senses represents a schematic value which in turn has its own set of more specific conventional subconfigurations or subsenses as described above.

The reflexive and the emphatic are related in the fact that each signals a semantic configuration in which there is something that is counter to expectation: in the case of the reflexive, what is counter to expectation is the fact of co-reference, while for the emphatic, the unexpected aspect is the fact of one particular referent, in contrast to others, filling a particular role in the clause or discourse.[11]

The two types differ somewhat in the degree of accessibility of the referent they signal. As seen in section 2, the entity accessed by the *-self* noun phrase is relatively prominent, yet not the predictable or expected referent at the point of utterance of that noun phrase. Thus the *-self* NP seems to unexpectedly reactivate an entity that is latent, but easily accessed due to its prominence. The occurrence of stress on the emphatic NP coheres with this analysis; as noticed by Ariel (1988), stress is used to indicate a lowered degree of accessibility. The reflexive, on the other hand, activates the most accessible entity in the clausal predication. It is thus a marker of higher accessibility than the emphatic.

I now move to two senses of *-self* that directly relate to the two more general senses proposed above, reflexive and emphatic. Both of the senses to be discussed involve the notion of *viewpoint*.

4 Viewpoint uses of *-self*

In this section I consider some semantic configurations associated with *-self* that have been described in the literature. Some investigators (notably Kuno 1987 and Zribi-Hertz 1989) have proposed very fine-grained analyses involving interactions of various licensing factors for the occurrence of *-self*; I will make no attempt to recapitulate all aspects of these analyses, but instead will identify what I see as the principal features of viewpoint uses. Viewpoint uses are closely connected with the notion of subjectivity, to be discussed in section 5.

4.1 Viewpoint reflexives

It was first noticed by Cantrall (1969) that reflexive markers in English are associated with point of view phenomena. One of his most telling examples is the contrast in (12a) and (12b), both possible utterances describing the same photograph, in which a group of women appear, standing with their backs to the camera.

(12) a. The women were standing in the background, with the children behind them.

b. The women were standing in the background, with the children behind themselves. (Cantrall 1969, cited in Zribi-Hertz 1989:704)

The two sentences have different sets of interpretations. (12a) is ambiguous as to where the children can be interpreted to be standing: they might be behind the women (farther from the camera); or they might be behind the women's backs, hence nearer to the camera, and in front of the women from the vantage-point of an observer of the picture. (12b), on the other hand, has only one possible interpretation: the children are behind the women's backs. Thus the reflexive marker specifically indicates that the 'behind' relation is calculated from the point of view of the women, the antecedent of the *-self* form, and not from the vantage point of anyone outside the picture (i.e. camera or onlooker).

From this, and a host of other examples, Cantrall drew the generalisation that wherever reflexive and non-reflexive pronouns alternate, the reflexive expresses an 'internal' point of view, in other words a point of view associated with a participant in the clause or sentence. Non-reflexive pronouns, on the other hand, are essentially neutral as to point of view.

Beginning in the early 1970s, Susumo Kuno developed a research program whose ultimate aim was 'to build a theory of point of view as part and parcel of a theory of grammar' (Kuno 1987:270). In a series of studies focussing on English and Japanese (synthesised in Kuno 1987), Kuno explored the semantic nature of nouns and pronouns of various types, showing that they were associated with inherent point-of-view properties, which interact in interesting ways with how a speaker chooses to portray referents in a local discourse context. Unlike earlier investigators, Kuno recognised that point of view is a continuum, i.e. that a speaker can adopt to varying degrees the perspective of a particular discourse participant.

Most relevant to the present study are Kuno's generalisations about English *-self*. He presents a set of hierarchies designed to capture the relative potential for various types of elements to be the antecedent of a reflexive marker or to be reflexive-marked. These capture, for example, the fact that subjects are strong controllers for reflexive markers, and that given a co-reference relation with a subject, direct objects are most likely to be marked reflexive. These proposals for likely antecedents essentially map on to those framed in terms of 'most prominent element in minimal domain' discussed above in section 3.

Kuno identifies in addition specific semantic constraints that operate on top of these general principles. One of these is concerned with *-self* in noun phrases headed by nouns designating pictorial or imagic representations of an entity (*picture*, *statue*, *photograph*, *reflection*) or linguistic representations featuring an entity as topic (*book*, *story*, *gossip*, etc.). 'Picture noun phrases' of this type have been of interest in the linguistic literature on reflexives because they are difficult to incorporate into structurally based conditions on the distribution of pronominal and reflexive forms.

The special nature of such noun phrases is captured in Kuno's 'Awareness Condition on picture noun phrases'. It states that in a picture noun phrase, the use of the reflexive pronoun is obligatory if at the point of utterance the referent perceives (or has perceived or will perceive) that the referent of the picture noun contains or concerns that referent. The example in (13) illustrates the operation of the condition (the non-reflexive pronouns are to be read as involving the same co-reference relation as the reflexive ones):

(13) a. John was asked about all that scandalous gossip about himself/?him.

b. John was oblivious to all the gossip about *himself/him. (Kuno 1987:164–5)

The possibility of the reflexive marker occurring depends on whether John is understood to be aware of the gossip. In (13b), if *oblivious* is understood as unaware, the reflexive pronoun is not possible.

Kuno notes that the Awareness Condition is based on Cantrall's generalisations about point of view, discussed above. Picture noun reflexives, he says, are '"point of view" expressions that are best when they are used with the speaker taking the "camera angle" of the referents of the reflexives' (Kuno 1987:202). Thus, in this analysis, the reflexive forms found in picture noun phrases are conventionally associated with a specification that their antecedent represents a locus of point of view.

Deane (1992) and van Hoek (1992) follow Kuno in incorporating point of view into their analyses of the English reflexive, the latter explicitly using the Cognitive Grammar conception of a competition model in which the various constructions act as syntactico-semantic templates against which individual instances of use of a form are evaluated for goodness of fit. The following discussion assumes this general mode of understanding the acceptability patterns found with reflexives (and indeed, linguistic elements in general).

The connection between awareness and viewpoint is simply, as Deane points out, the fact that one must necessarily be aware of one's own point of view; a point of view presupposes awareness (of the thing viewed) on the part of the viewer. Thus, if a potential antecedent (i.e., a discourse referent matching the semantic specifications of the reflexive marker in a particular construction) cannot be a locus of point of view (because of lack of awareness of the representation), then the use of the reflexive form is not appropriate.

It is, of course, no accident that point of view is an important part of the semantics of reflexives in picture noun phrases. Picture nouns designate representations, and thus necessarily evoke as part of their semantics a point of view from which the representation is viewed. The conception of a picture evokes the notion of someone to see the picture, gossip presupposes someone to hear the gossip, etc. A picture noun by itself, as Deane notes, does not require the point of view to be made explicit; but in the picture noun reflexive construction, the reflexive marker must have a viewer as its antecedent.

In Kuno's analysis, awareness of the contents of the picture noun by the antecedent is stated as the relevant condition on the occurrence of the reflexive marker, rather than viewpoint status *per se*. Moreover, as his condition is stated, such awareness is presumed to make the reflexive marker obligatory. The question mark in (13a) and similar examples he presents, however, suggests that 'obligatory' is too strong. In many cases there is a difference in degree of acceptability or at least natural-

ness of the two forms with picture nouns. Where this is true, we are dealing with a case of better or worse fit of the semantic specifications of the pronominal elements with those of the picture noun reflexive construction. The following example of my own supports this view:

(14) Jackson is captivated with the media's potential for giving back amplified reflections of himself. (New Yorker)

In (14), it is hard to imagine that Jackson is not a viewer or perceiver of the reflections referred to, hence the natural occurrence of *-self*. Unstressed co-referential *him* is also possible in my judgement, but seems less natural in this context, because of the obvious point of view status of Jackson signalled by the predicate *is captivated with*.[12]

There is another potential locus of point of view in this example, namely the media, who are also presumably aware of the reflections; taking this alternative point of view would not sanction the reflexive form, since there would then be a conflict between the specifications of the point of view antecedent (the media) and the reflexive form *himself*. The two forms cannot refer to the same entity given their specifications (for example number, gender) and if they do not, then the co-reference specification of the reflexive construction would be violated. The non-reflexive form, on the other hand, would be sanctioned, since this form is used to indicate an anaphoric relation to a non-co-referential entity. Awareness is therefore a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition for use of a picture noun reflexive. The condition on the use of the reflexive, therefore, is best stated directly in terms of point of view rather than awareness *per se*.

Compare the case of (15):

(15) Picture the boyish version of himself that Richard Selzer, the well-known surgeon and writer, offers up in his memoir 'Down from Troy: a Doctor comes of age'. (New York Times)

The antecedent is embedded in a relative clause following the reflexive, and, unlike in (14), the reflexive form is required on a reading of co-reference. Here, the antecedent is the subject of the verbal relation linking the antecedent and reflexive marker (making it the most accessible referent, despite the non-canonical word order relation between the two elements), and is, moreover, the only possible candidate in the sentence for locus of point of view. Thus the reflexive marker is strongly sanctioned by virtue of fitting all the specifications of the relevant reflexive construction and of this example (co-reference, anteceded by most accessible referent, antecedent a locus of viewpoint), while the

non-reflexive pronoun is in conflict with various aspects of the sentential context and hence is not sanctioned at all in this sentence.

A large number of the cases of viewpoint reflexives contain a verb of perception or other mental awareness (cf. (13)–(15)), or a verb designating a speech action of some type. Such verbs explicitly code the relation of viewing between the viewer-antecedent and the viewed representation coded by the picture noun phrase. Reflexives in picture noun phrases, as it happens, when embedded in complements of such verbs, allow antecedency relations across clauses in a way that ordinary reflexives in English do not. Consider the following examples:

(16) a. John told Mary there was a picture of himself in the paper.

b. *John told Mary a car hit himself.

There are a number of other constructions which allow such 'long-distance' reflexivisation (cf. section 4.2 below), all subject to the same principle. As Kuno describes it, these constructions are associated with another special licensing factor, which is the existence of a 'direct discourse perspective' taken in the embedded clause. The antecedent says, thinks, or is told what is predicated in that clause, and the perspective taken on that predication is the antecedent's, not the speaker's. For example, in (16a), the embedded clause contains a fact that John told Mary, from his own perspective. Such a complement clause, which represents the thoughts or words of the antecedent, is termed *logophoric*.

Deane (1992) makes explicit the connection between picture noun phrases and logophoric reflexives in general. The common factor is the presence of a representation, whether accessible to vision (picture, statue) or to understanding, as with *book*, *story*, or the propositionally represented thoughts or speech of a conceptualiser. In both cases there is some expression evoking an observer/observed relation. The use of the reflexive depends, not just on co-reference (because co-reference can be present without necessarily requiring *-self*), but on the antecedent being a conceptualiser who has mental access to, and actually processes, the representation implied or expressed.

A representation in this sense, it might be noted, is a specific case of what Fauconnier (1985) calls a *mental space* – a real or imagined conceptual domain with its own internal structure and coherence. The conceptualiser can be said to be a metaphorical 'viewer' of the contents of the mental space, whether it is an actual picture or more abstract representation of an entity, or even a proposition involving a state of affairs.[13] The reflexive marker, then, is used when the antecedent is construed by

the speaker as a viewer of the contents of the mental space set up in the predication.

Deane also observes a significant constraint on the ability of logophoric relations to license reflexive markers in English: long distance reflexives, he argues, are licensed only with arguments of predicates that *inherently* impose a point of view. Picture nouns, as we saw above, do evoke a point of view, but ordinary nouns and verbs do not. The verb *hit* in (16b) does not inherently impose a point of view; and hence, even though the embedded clause does represent the thoughts of the intended antecedent, there is no point of view relation evoked by any element of the embedded clause which can be linked up with that antecedent. It is well known that in other languages, for example, Icelandic, this constraint does not hold, and equivalents to (16b) are perfectly grammatical. In such languages, the logophoric relation between the conceptualiser (thinker or speaker) in the main clause and the contents of the clause licenses the use of the reflexive, with no need for any other predicated viewing relation.

We might ask, what is the relation between the viewing reflexive and the reflexives discussed in section 3? Both specify a relation of extreme conceptual proximity between two co-referential participants; but a crucial difference between them lies in the relative importance of the notion of point of view in their characterisation. Deane (1992:335) puts it this way: 'ordinary reflexives involve viewpoint only incidentally, as a background relation. By contrast, picture noun and logophoric reflexives involve viewpoint as an actual semantic relation, creating the possibility for long-distance control of reflexives.'

I agree with this basic insight, although I would state the connection in a slightly different way. As I see it, there is a viewing relation in the prototypical reflexive that derives most directly from the two-participant semantic configuration of which it is a subcase. As Kuno observes, there is a natural tendency for subjects to be taken as the point of view in a sentence; the prototypical subject is human and hence a candidate for a point of view. Since a reflexive marker in an ordinary reflexive construction has its local subject as antecedent, the consequence is that the antecedent is likely to represent the point of view. Thus, the orientation towards antecedent as point of view is derivative of other aspects of the ordinary reflexive construction, and of its non-reflexive, transitive 'parent' construction. Picture noun and logophoric reflexives, on the other hand, have a specification for a viewpoint antecedent as an explicit and central aspect of their characterisation.

The semantics of the viewpoint reflexive coheres very well with the high-accessibility, high-proximity value of *-self* identified in section 3.

The viewpoint use, in fact, takes conceptual proximity to an extreme, in that it effects an additional degree of conceptual fusion between reflexive-marked entity and its antecedent. As a consequence of the fact that the viewpoint reflexive explicitly signals an antecedent-internal point of view, there is an extremely minimal conceptual separation between the antecedent entity and the representation (which is not perceived by the antecedent as being in any measure distinct from it). Where there are alternative possibilities for expression of a represented co-referent entity (reflexive/non-reflexive), the non-reflexive signals a greater conceptual separation between the two – in this case, not a shift to a different entity, as with the ordinary reflexive, but simply to a different point of view (cf. (14) above).

In addition to the Awareness Condition and the logophoricity constraints, Kuno identifies and meticulously demonstrates the interaction of a number of other semantic hierarchies that influence reflexive marking, specifically scales of definiteness, humanness and agency (not coincidentally, the same scales that are relevant to the characterisation of a prototypical subject). The best antecedents for reflexives are those that are high on these scales, and Kuno relates all of them under the rubric of 'empathy', i.e. the degree of speaker's identification with the antecedent. Deane, once again, makes explicit the connection between viewpoint and empathy: the higher on the empathy scales a given entity is positioned, the easier it is for a speaker to take that entity's point of view.

As a final note on viewing reflexives, I will mention one special subtype that turned up rather frequently in a sample of about 500 uses of *-self* forms extracted from the LOB corpus. In this use, *-self* is the direct object of certain verbs that predicate a logophoric or viewing relation, and is followed by a complement acting as a kind of secondary predicate.

(17) He still regards himself as the only legal Prime Minister of Laos.

(18) It is not altogether surprising that the Belgian royal family so often seems to find itself at loggerheads with its subjects.

(19) A man of forty feels himself a very different person from what he was at ten.

The verbs in these examples explicitly suggest perceptual relations, although the presence of the complements requires a metaphorical interpretation involving more complex mental processes such as evaluation and understanding. (17) involves the projection of a mental image, while (18) and (19) suggest the undergoing of experience of certain

types. The latter two examples seem to shade off into a middle-voice construal, in which there is minimal conceptual separation between the viewer and (co-referent) viewed entity. (19) in particular suggests necessary co-reference; in this construction and with this verb, a non-co-referent object participant is not possible. For the possibility of a non-co-referent entity, one must use a sentential complement construction (*a man of forty feels that . . .*), implying a viewing arrangement in which the object participant is viewed as a relatively distinct participant from the subject; even if the two are co-referential, the experiential participation of the object entity is not focussed on. (See Kemmer 1993 for a discussion of logophoric reflexives and their possible relation to the middle.)

4.2 Viewpoint emphatic

The cases discussed in the preceding section involve situations where there is co-reference between two clausal participants, and no special emphatic function. Emphatic *-self* too, however, can signal viewpoint; the coincidence of these two functions defines a use type that has its own distinctive properties.

The most in-depth account of emphatic viewpoint *-self* is found in Zribi-Hertz (1989); less detailed accounts are given by Kuno, Deane, and van Hoek (the latter two, however, making no distinction between emphatic and non-emphatic viewpoint uses). I confine myself here to presenting the phenomenon and a few observations regarding the relation of this use with the other uses of *-self* that will be useful for the discussion of subjectivity below.

The account offered by Zribi-Hertz is framed in terms of licensing conditions requiring, most crucially, that the antecedent is a 'subject of consciousness' whose point of view is taken in a clause. This account embraces Kuno's generalisations about picture noun phrases and related, prepositional-phrase cases of *-self*, but also breaks new ground in its treatment of *-self* in narrative discourse. Zribi-Hertz, following up on Kuroda's (1973) observations regarding Japanese *zibun*, noticed that viewpoint *-self* in the third person is highly genre-specific, functioning as a literary device for manipulating point of view in narrative.

(20) illustrates an emphatic reflexive use of viewpoint *-self*. It is reflexive, in that it signals co-reference of one participant (an oblique) with the most accessible participant (in this case the subject). It is also emphatic: *-self* must be stressed, and occurs in a context typical of emphatics, namely conjoined to another distinct referent. Such cases constitute one mode of using *-self* to identify the precise referent intended via the exclusion of another entity.

(20) Several times in recent weeks she had caught his thoughtful, measuring gaze on her after some sharp exchange between herself and Jessie, and now she suddenly knew without any doubt that this was his reason for taking her away. (New Yorker)

Here, the bare pronoun could be used, and stress alone could carry the emphatic meaning. The *-self* form, however, has an effect reminiscent of the viewpoint reflexives discussed in section 4.1: the point of view is that of a clausal participant as opposed to that of the speaker or some external observer. The third person protagonist's thoughts and experiences are being described, and the use of *-self* induces in the reader the feeling of being inside her mind, thinking along with her.

Emphatic viewpoint *-self* is not confined to reflexive cases; it can simply be emphatic, although it has some syntactic/semantic properties that distinguish it from the ordinary emphatic. Consider (21):

(21) . . . or his accent, which had carefully acquired a neutrality as unidentifiable as some composite creature evolved by statisticians, could break down unbeknown to himself, on the pronunciation of a common and tell-tale word. (LOB corpus)

As in the previous example, the thoughts and worries of a third person protagonist are being described, and *-self* indicates that his point of view is being taken. Interestingly, the situation described is one in which the character is *not* aware of something happening, which at first might suggest that the generalisation (cf. section 4.1) that viewing requires awareness is too strong, or even that a viewing relation does not hold in this example. In fact, (21) is an excellent example of a viewpoint use of *-self*. The content of the mental space viewed by the character is a hypothetical situation in which his social class is betrayed by tell-tale linguistic shibboleths, observable by others, but not by him. Unlike the simpler case considered in section 4.1, the 'he' referred to has both a viewer role and a role within the contents of the mental space he is viewing. Inside the mental space, he is unaware of what is happening, but in his role as viewer, he is aware of it, as indeed he must be in order to have the status of viewer.

The example in (21) is emphatic, but not reflexive. Contrasting with typical emphatics, it lacks a separate head noun; the pronominal part of the *-self* form serves as the head, much like the reflexive *-self*. Unlike the latter, however, this use does not signal co-reference with any prominent clausal participant. Although the referent of *his* could conceivably be analysed as the antecedent, it is likelier, given many closely parallel examples ((22) below and a wealth of other examples cited in Zribi-

Hertz) that the 'antecedent' is simply a character in the discourse, which need not actually occur overtly in the clausal predication as a participant.

We might hypothesise that the property of lacking a head noun is motivated by the same type of considerations that motivate this lack in emphatic reflexives. With the latter, the antecedent is highly salient, in fact the most accessible entity in relation to the reflexive (co-reference) relation; thus expressing it as a separate head would lead to the triple expression of a highly salient entity (cf. *?John hit him himself*). It is reasonable that the least informative of these expressions, the separate pronoun, would be dispensed with. With the viewpoint emphatic, the viewer antecedent has been evoked conceptually by some element in the preceding discourse, and is thus highly activated and easy to access in regard to the viewing relation. Both the viewing and the reflexive relation provide an immediate point of access to the intended referent, despite the relative unexpectedness inherent to emphatic semantics. With the ordinary emphatic there is no such special point of access, and therefore nothing to obviate the motivation for reactivating the entity first by means of a head noun.

If correct, this account would help to explain the extreme readiness of emphatic viewpoint *-self* to access entities not specifically named in the clause or even the sentence. The following example is from Zribi-Hertz:

(22) She looked at him. Did he mean herself–herself and the baby? (Zribi-Hertz 1989:707)

It is striking that the entity accessed by *-self* is neither the subject nor any other sentential participant. Equally noteworthy, there is no overt predication of a viewing relation or any other explicit indicator of the existence of a mental space in the sentence with *-self*. The examples in section 4.1 all contained some element evoking such a relation, explicitly or implicitly. For example, (20) contains the verb *caught*, which specifies mental apprehension of an experience. The sentence with *-self* in (22) is totally lacking in indicators of a viewing relation.

Nevertheless, there is such a relation. A viewing scenario is set up by the elements in the previous sentence: the verb *looked*, although predicating a perceptual relation, certainly implies the more complex mental processing of interpretation or judgement, and the following sentence confirms this inference. As a result, the verb's subject, *she*, provides the viewer. Once a viewing relation can be inferred, emphatic *-self* can directly access the (highly salient) viewer-antecedent, excluding other conceivably possible referents, without the need for a prior reactivation of the entity in the form of a head noun.

5 Subjectivity

Langacker (1990) calls attention to an important distinction that often goes unnoticed in linguistic analysis, based on how elements of conception are conceptualised or *construed* by the language user. There is a fundamental asymmetry between the conceptualiser, or subject of conception, and the objects of that entity's conception, which is pervasively reflected in human language.

The distinction is that between *objective* and *subjective* construal. It turns on the degree of awareness by the conceptualiser of elements of conception as entities to be communicated about. To the extent that conceptual elements are singled out for conscious awareness by the speaker and given linguistic expression, they are *objectively construed.* When elements remain part of the conceptual background of the speaker and are hence not expressed overtly, they are *subjectively construed* (cf. also Carey this volume, Traugott this volume).

Subjective vs. objective construal is most easily discussed in terms of a perceptual metaphor. A construal is maximally objective when a conceptualiser views a given element of conception as maximally distinct from him- or herself, and as merely part of the conceptual scene to be expressed via language. It is as though the objects of conception are 'on stage', that is, placed where they can be observed by all who are at some optimal distance from the objects viewed. Langacker suggests the analogy of a pair of glasses which are examined at arm's length: 'they function solely and prominently as the object of perception and not at all as part of the perceptual apparatus itself'. The same object, however, can be taken 'off-stage', and backgrounded to the point of non-awareness, as when the glasses are being worn and used to examine some other object: 'The glasses then function exclusively as part of the subject of perception' (Langacker 1990:6–7).

Elements that are normally maximally subjectively construed include the conceptualiser and the attendant circumstances of the speech situation: the here-and-now of the setting and the interlocutors. Together, these elements make up what Langacker terms the *ground.* For example, when a person makes a statement, normally, the fact of utterance of the statement is not part of the content to be communicated. However, the speech-act itself can be objectified; performatives serve exactly this function. Thus, elements of the ground can be placed onstage, as in *I claim that this is true.*

Maximal subjective construal is achieved when the conceptualiser or other aspects of the ground are part of the conceptualisation designated by the expression, but are completely outside the scope of the linguistic

predication. Langacker's example is *Vanessa is sitting across the table*, which invokes an implicit reference point for the calculation of the spatial relation, most probably the speaker. The speaker in such cases does not place him or herself on stage with the other participants as a separate, discourse-manipulable entity (as would be the case with *Vanessa is sitting across the table from me*); instead, the conceptualiser entity is undifferentiated into the two roles of viewer and viewed. Another way of putting it is that the conceptualiser is minimally aware of his/her status as part of the viewed conception.

Armed with this background we can now consider how the most complex uses of *-self*, the viewpoint uses, can be described in terms of subjectivity.

Reflexive *-self* has an antecedent that is a highly prominent participant in the clause (section 3). It therefore points to an entity that is on-stage in the clausal predication. With the viewing reflexives of section 4.1, there is a further specification that the antecedent be a viewer. The viewing relation is typically expressed linguistically in the clause. In the case of the logophoric reflexives, there is a direct expression of it in the form of a viewing predicate; the relation is thus maximally objectively construed.

In the picture noun case, the viewer and the viewed representation are overtly expressed, and the construction itself specifies the viewing relation between them. The construal of this relation is therefore objective in so far as it is part of what is designated by the construction; but not maximally objective, since it is not actually overtly predicated. (In (13)–(16), which have logophoric predicates as well as picture nouns, the relation is fully on-stage in the clause and hence objectively construed.)

The viewing emphatic is rather different. A viewing relation is present, but it does not need to be set up by any particular constructional configuration or linguistic predication in the clause. Instead, it can be inferred from linguistic elements somewhere in the local discourse. Thus, the viewing relation can be entirely off-stage *vis-à-vis* the clausal predication, and hence maximally subjectively construed.

The viewpoint uses of *-self* can illustrate a number of current senses in which the term 'subjective' is employed, and reveal the commonality of insights behind these senses.

With viewpoint *-self*, an on-stage or off-stage participant is taken as the point of view. This participant has its own 'ground' or here-and-now (called by Langacker a 'surrogate ground', as it is distinct from the actual ground of the speaker or narrator). *-Self* induces a construal that is *subjective* as calculated from the standpoint of the participant, or 'subject of consciousness'. This is the sense in which Zribi-Hertz (1989)

refers to viewpoint uses of *-self* as 'subjective': they invoke the subjective consciousness of a character, and not the objective observation of that character by the speaker. Filtering a proposition through a subjective consciousness, of course, blurs the distinction between viewer and viewed, and hence the viewing relation is subjectively construed (by the character) in Langacker's sense as described above as well.

We can also consider the viewing relation from the standpoint of the speaker, i.e. the actual ground. From this standpoint, the viewing relation can be *objectively* construed, to the extent that it is placed on-stage linguistically/conceptually. This is the sense in which van Hoek (1992) takes viewpoint *-self* to be objectively construed. To this we may add that viewing relations can differ in degree of objectivity of construal. Viewpoint reflexives typically contain overt predications of a viewing relation (cf. (13)–(19)). Viewpoint emphatics, on the other hand, easily occur without predicated viewing relations. Emphatic viewpoint *-self* induces a viewpoint construal that is not placed on-stage as a logophoric predicate; the viewing relation is backgrounded, and thus more subjectively construed.

A final sense in which viewpoint *-self* invokes a subjective construal relates to its employment to convey a particular effect by the speaker or author. The expression subtly instructs the hearer what point of view is to be taken; the effect is a sense of the speaker's empathy with the character, the feeling of being in the character's shoes or seeing from the character's eyes. The choice of expression to convey a particular speaker attitude such as empathy is an example of subjectivity in this sense, which is discussed by Traugott (1989). For Traugott, subjectivity is defined in terms of speaker purposes; an expression is subjective to the extent that it encodes speaker attitudes and discourse-building functions. The focus is slightly different from Langacker's definition; nevertheless, the two notions of subjectivity are related through the role of the speaker or conceptualiser as a kind of 'filter of consciousness' for observed phenomena.

6 Conclusion

English *-self*, we have seen, is a complex linguistic unit with a number of distinguishable, but related senses. The approach taken here has made possible a fairly explicit description of the main conventionalised senses of this linguistic unit, and the conceptual links among these senses that motivate the similarity in form of expression for them. The role of speaker expectations and viewpoint in the semantics of the various senses has also been described; these two notions have been invoked

before in a few descriptions of *-self*, although never, to my knowledge, in the same account. Finally, I have called attention to the dimension of linguistic subjectivity and its relation to the semantics of *-self*. Subjectivity is a multilayered concept, but one which adds a necessary dimension to our understanding of linguistic semantics.

NOTES

1 Topics can be reference points of varying types. In the case of people (and perhaps concrete objects in general), the 'point' metaphor is most appropriate because the individual entities are viewed holistically. In the case of situational topics (for example, a trip to Europe, etc.), which are cognitively complex entities, it is perhaps more appropriate to speak of a 'frame' of reference, into which entities can be 'slotted in' by virtue of their relevance to the frame.
2 The excluded entities are often only salient (hence potentially expected referents) by virtue of recency of mention. We might hypothesise that recency is a relatively weak source of conceptual accessibility, easily overridden by other indications of prominence.
3 Historically, the pronominal portion of the *-self* form served as the head of an NP of which *-self* was a (lexically independent) adjunct, indicating emphatic semantics. Over time, the *-self* element fused to the pronouns and became obligatory in cases of co-reference (hence it no longer indicated any special emphatic semantics; stress now serves this role), thus creating a new reflexive construction out of emphatic source material (cf. Faltz 1977, Kemmer 1993).
4 The general approach to analysing and relating senses of a polysemous morpheme used here is described in greater detail in Kemmer (1993). It is essentially equivalent to the 'network model' of polysemy elaborated in Langacker (1987 and elsewhere), and with minor differences, to the 'radial category model' of Lakoff (1987 and elsewhere).
5 Whether these subtypes should be distinguished as senses in their own right is an empirical matter; it depends on whether the discourse patterns they are associated with show evidence of some degree of entrenchment as conventionalised patterns, and the extent to which each is associated with its own idiosyncratic properties.
6 It should be mentioned that determining what is the 'maximally prominent conceptual reference point' for a reflexive depends partially on tree-structure configurations, in that one must be able to identify such entities as 'trajector of the profiled process' (subject of a verb). Both Ariel and van Hoek interpret tree-structures as conceptually based, rather than autonomously syntactic.
7 Referential distinctness is a special case of what I call relative distinguishability of participants. The prototypical reflexive configuration is intermediate semantically between two semantic prototypes corresponding to transitive and intransitive events with respect to distinguishability of participants (Kemmer 1993, 1994).

8 In English the reflexive marker does not generally occur in middle voice contexts, except in a few cases of conventionalised expressions involving expected co-reference. Many of these are cases where there is no possible contrast between co-reference and non-co-reference (for example, *pride oneself on, enjoy oneself*, etc.).

9 The general approach to the reflexive taken here builds on the following antecedent analyses: Kemmer (1993 and earlier publications), based on cross-linguistic data, proposed a 'semantic map' of related senses onto which language-specific reflexive and middle markers map in constrained ways. Deane (1992) and van Hoek (1992) contain language-specific polysemy accounts, similar in essentials, but differing in mechanics and coverage, which explicitly describe a range of reflexive configurations for English *-self*.

10 There are a few idiomatic uses of the reflexive marker in fixed expressions like *in (and of) itself, by itself*, etc., that do not have corresponding non-reflexive expressions.

11 Van Hoek (1992) considers the emphatic a subtype (perhaps an extension) of the reflexive, and seems to consider, like most other analysts, the co-reference use of *-self* to be primary. She does not relate the two senses via unexpectedness, as done here.

12 Stressed *him*, on the other hand would suggest a different referent; this fits with Ariel's view that stress indicates lowered accessibility, hence greater conceptual distance, which for third-person referents induces the interpretation of a different referent.

13 Van Hoek's (1992) discussion of the viewpoint use of the reflexive, it might be noted, is entirely couched in terms of this metaphor.

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5 Subjectification and the development of the English perfect

Kathleen Carey

1 Introduction

Present perfects are typically characterised as encoding a relation of relevance between a past event and the present moment: some version of the 'current relevance' view is adopted in Jespersen (1931), Li, Thompson, and Thompson (1982), Anderson (1982), and Langacker (1991). For example, the utterance *John has mowed the lawn* (so he can come to the movies) indicates that the past event (the completion of the lawn mowing) is related to John's present ability to go to the movies. Current relevance is an inherently subjective notion in that the link between the past event and the current situation is dependent on the attitude/judgement of the speaker. Harris (1982:54) comments that, in some contexts, 'only the speaker's subjective judgement determines the presence or otherwise of "present relevance" and hence the choice of the paradigm'. The view that the perfect is imbued with subjectivity is prevalent throughout the literature on tense and aspect (cf. Benveniste 1959, Fleischman 1990).

The purpose of the present chapter is to explore the association of the perfect with subjectivity from a diachronic perspective. Recent cross-linguistic studies such as Dahl (1985) and Bybee et al. (1994) have demonstrated that 'have' perfects develop from resultative constructions. Dahl characterises the difference between a resultative and a perfect in the following way:

> The term 'result' may be understood in a wider or narrower sense . . . For instance, if a person dies, the result in a narrow sense is that he is dead: the results in a wider sense include e.g. his relatives being sad. It is results in the narrower sense that characterize resultative constructions: in the case of the PFCT [perfect], the delineation is much harder to draw. (Dahl 1985:135)

Importantly, results in the 'wider sense' are not constrained by the semantics of the verb particle, depending instead on the particular intentions of the speaker within the discourse context. The semantic

shift from resultativity → perfect can be reframed as a gradual widening of the notion of result: as this widening occurs, the link between the event and the result becomes less and less dependent on the semantics of the verb participle and more and more dependent on the attitude/judgement of the speaker. The first part of this chapter investigates how this gradual widening occurred during the development of the English perfect. Using data from four periods in the history of English, the chapter demonstrates how particular semantic-pragmatic contexts bring about the shift from resultative to perfect.

The second part of the chapter examines the ramifications of the shift from resultative → perfect for recent proposals regarding subjectification in grammaticalisation. Both Traugott (1989, this volume) and Langacker (1990) characterise grammaticalisation as a unidirectional process involving subjectification. However, they define subjectification in different ways. Traugott's definition emphasises the role of function: subjectification is a process in which a form or construction that serves an objective function comes to encode more speaker-based, discourse functions. Langacker's notion emphasises the role of construal: some aspect of the here-and-now of the speech event can be construed with a lesser or greater degree of subjectivity; the lower the level of awareness, the more subjective the construal. The second part of this chapter examines how the shift from resultative → perfect provides insight into the points of convergence and divergence between the two models of subjectification.

2 The 'have' + participle construction in Old English

The status of the 'have' + participle construction in Old English has long been a controversial topic. While some scholars argue that the Old English examples should be considered semantically well-formed perfects (cf. Brinton 1988:102), others contend that the 'have' + participle construction was functionally different from the Modern English perfect (cf. Mitchell 1985:208). The difficulty of assessing the semantic status of the 'have' + past participle construction in Old English can be attributed to several factors: grammatical clues such as word order and inflection were not reliable indicators of the semantic interpretation of a particular example (cf. Mitchell 1985, Traugott 1992). Also, it is virtually impossible to determine from the surrounding context whether a particular example is to be given a perfect interpretation or one that is more adjectival in its semantics.

In a recent paper (Carey 1994), I have argued that the Old English construction should be considered a type of resultative: a semantically

well-formed perfect does not emerge until early Middle English. Given the constraints of an analysis based on the grammatical or semantic properties of individual examples, my conclusions were instead based on frequency data. The section below summarises these findings and demonstrates how they serve as the foundation for explicit semantic characterisations of the Old English (resultative) and Middle English (perfect) constructions.

3 The Historical Data

In order to trace historical trends in the data, data were collected from four different time periods in Old English and Middle English: the time periods were separated by approximately 200 year intervals. The Old English data were taken from the Old English Concordance (Venezky and DiPaolo Healey 1980). For the Alfred period (*c.* 850), examples were taken from Alfred's translations of Boethius, Orosius, and *The Pastoral Care*. For the Ælfric period (*c.* 1050), examples were taken from the works of Ælfric: the first and second series of homilies, the Catholic homilies, Lives of the saints, and his letters. Layamon's *Brut* (*c.* 1225) was used for the early Middle English period and *Sir Gawain and the Green Knight* was used for Middle English. Both pieces have a substantial amount of dialogue and were therefore able to furnish many present-tense 'have' + participle examples. For both the Old English and Middle English texts, all present tense 'have' + participle examples encountered were included in the data sets.

Each verb participle that appeared in the data set was assigned to one of the following semantic categories: mental state, communication, perception, or other. (The significance of these particular semantic categories will become evident later on.) The verb was also categorised as stative or non-stative, using the typical criteria for stativity, for example, the inability to occur in the progressive tense: **I am wanting a new car*. Any adverbs appearing in the collocation were noted and, if possible, assigned to one of the following categories: (i) adverbs referring to the time of the final state, for example *nu* 'now, now that'; (ii) anterior, up-to-the-present adverbs such as *ær* 'before' and *siþþan* 'since'. Tables 1 and 2 display the verb participle results; Table 3 the adverbial data.

The frequency data clearly indicate that the Old English 'have' + participle construction was a resultant state construction rather than a perfect. Since resultatives involve 'narrow' results, that is, results that are tightly connected to the semantics of the verb participle, they are restricted to verbs that inherently bring about a goal or result (telic

Table 1. *Frequency of verb participles by semantic class*

	Alfred (*c.* 850) n = 129	Ælfric (*c.* 1050) n = 104	Lay. Brut (*c.* 1225) n = 161	Sir Gawain (*c.* 1375) n = 47
Mental state	50 (38.8%)	6 (5.8%)	4 (2.5%)	4 (8.5%)
Commun.	21 (16.3%)	30 (28.8%)	15 (9.3%)	1 (2.1%)
Perception	2 (1.6%)	25 (24.0%)	9 (15.6%)	3 (6.4%)
Other	56 (43.3%)	43 (41.4%)	133 (72.6%)	39 (83.0%)

Table 2. *Frequency of stative verbs by historical period*

Alfred (*c.* 850) n = 129	Ælfric (*c.* 1050) n = 104	Lay. Brut (*c.* 1225) n = 161	Sir Gawain (*c.* 1375) n = 47
0 (0%)	0 (0%)	7 (4.3%)	7 (10.6%)

Table 3. *Frequency of present state and anterior adverbials*

	Alfred (*c.* 850) n = 129	Ælfric (*c.* 1050) n = 104	Lay. Brut (*c.* 1225) n = 161	Sir Gawain (*c.* 1375) n = 47
Present state	50 (38.8%)	37 (35.6%)	20 (12.4%)	0 (0%)
Anterior	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	8 (5%)	7 (14.9%)

verbs): unlike perfects, resultatives are incompatible with stative verbs (cf. Bybee et al. 1994). Perfects designate a relation of relevance between a past event and the here-and-now of the speaker, so there is necessarily some degree of emphasis on the past event itself. Resultatives, on the other hand, refer only to the present state resulting from the action. This difference can be captured by the contrast between the Modern English *He is gone* (resultative) and *He has gone* (perfect). Perfects permit some temporal reference to the anteriority of the event via adverbials such as 'before' and 'since' whereas resultatives only permit adverbials referring to the time of the final state, for example, 'now'. The absence of stative verbs in the Old English data strongly suggests that the construction in Old English still referred to a present state. The adverbial data concur with this hypothesis: the percentage of examples with an adverbial that refers to a final state declines over the four periods: 38.8% (*c.* 850), 35.6% (*c.* 1050), 12.4% (*c.* 1225) and 0%

(*c.* 1375), with the sharpest drop occurring from late Old English to early Middle English. Not unexpectedly, one finds the reverse trend with adverbials such as 'since' and 'before' which refer to an anterior up-to-the-present time period: these adverbials do not appear in either period of Old English but comprise 5% and 14.9% of the early Middle English and middle Middle English data, respectively.

The frequency data on adverbials and stative verbs indicate that the Old English construction referred to a present resultant state, but leaves open the question of how this resultant state should be characterised. Table 1 demonstrates that over 50% of the examples from early Old English and late Old English occurred with mental state verbs, communication verbs, or perception verbs. The preponderance of these semantic classes of verbs, which all take internal (abstract, non-pre-existing) objects, indicates that the relevant resultant state is in the subject rather than the object: the resultant state of internal objects is typically inconsequential. For this reason, these verbs are awkward in the Modern English stative perfect (with the object postposed), which typically focusses attention on the final state of the object: ???*John has the idea understood.*

The Old English 'have' + participle construction can therefore be characterised as a type of resultative construction in which the subject is in a relation of possession/control with the final state of a completed process. The subject is construed as bearing a final resultant state, for example, a final mental state or a state of accomplishment: the subject necessarily serves as the locus of relevance for the process referred to by the past participle. Consequently, we would predict that dummy subjects would not appear in this construction, and indeed, no dummy subjects are found in the Old English data.

4 The perfect in Middle English

By early Middle English, the 'have' + participle construction has clearly become a full-fledged perfect. One finds numerous examples with stative verbs, such as (1) and (2) below, and with anterior up-to-the-present adverbials, such as 'hitherto' and 'before', as shown in (2) and (3) below.

(1) Lay. 13641
Ich habbe iðis ærd ibeon eower kinges stiwærd. & ispæken hin wið & iluued hine swa mi lif.
'I have been in this realm your king's steward and spoken with him, and loved him as my life.'

(2) St Kath. (1) 466 (*c.* 1225) (MED)
Ich am kinges dohter . . . & habbe ihauet hiderto swiðe hehe meistres.
'I am a king's daughter . . . and have had hitherto very high powers.'

(3) Lay. 25022
Swiðe sære me gromeð & vnimete me scomeð. þat he atwit us ure luren þat we ifeor habbeoð forloren.
'Exceedingly sore it incenseth me, and immoderately it shameth that he reproacheth us our loss that we before have lost.'

Dummy subjects appear in the construction in early Middle English, providing clear evidence that the locus of relevance was no longer restricted to the subject:

(4) Vsp. A. Hom. 239 (1225) (MED)
þus hit hað ibi and is and wrð oft domesdei.
'Thus, it has been and is and will be often doomsday.'

5 The shift from resultative → perfect

In the previous section, the appearance of stative verbs, anterior adverbials and dummy subjects was adduced as evidence that the 'have' + past participle construction had a conventionalised perfect sense in early Middle English. The purpose of this section is to demonstrate how the gradual shift from resultative → perfect occurred. The first part will argue that perception and communication verbs play a crucial role in this shift by (i) increasing the salience of the anterior event in the conceptualisation; (ii) implicating that the locus of relevance for the anterior event is not just the subject, but in addition the discourse itself: these verbs are the first to pragmatically strengthen the notion of 'wide result' or current relevance. The second part will demonstrate that, as the construction extends to other event verbs, the notion of result widens even further; the locus of relevance expands from the discourse itself to any aspect of the discourse context that the speaker chooses to construe as involved in a cause–effect relationship with the anterior event.

Several articles on the perfect in the history of Romance have claimed that certain semantic classes of verbs play a crucial role in the early development of a perfect, in particular, communication, cognition, and perception verbs (cf. Pinkster 1987, Vincent 1982, and Benveniste 1968). The central claim in these articles is that the inherent semantics of these verbs necessitates a correspondence between the subject of *habere* and the agent of the process denoted by the past participle, thereby facilitat-

ing the syntagmatic realignment from *habere* + (object + participle) → (*habere* + participle) + object. I concur with this analysis but believe it can be taken a step further by differentiating between the respective roles of mental state and perception verbs: perception verbs appear at a slightly later stage in the grammaticalisation process, helping to bring about the first 'current relevance' uses of the construction.

An examination of Table 1 (from section 3) reveals some striking differences in the relative frequencies of mental state and perception verbs between the early and late Old English periods. In early Old English, mental state verbs comprise the largest portion of the data set (38.8%) while perception verbs are quite rare (1.6%); in late Old English, the reverse is true: perception verbs are well-represented (24%) whereas mental state verbs comprise only 5.8% of the data. Verbs of communication are prevalent in both early and late Old English, making up 16.3% of the data in early Old English and 28.8% of the data in late Old English.

Since the signs of a full-fledged perfect first emerge during early Middle English, one would expect the shift from resultative → perfect to have occurred during late Old English. The relative dearth of mental state verbs during this period (5.8%) suggests that they do not play a significant role in this process, but instead typically occur in contexts with simply a resultative interpretation. In contrast, the fact that perception verbs barely appear in early Old English suggests that they do not readily occur in contexts with a 'pure' resultative interpretation, and instead, given their high frequency during late Old English, serve as a catalyst for the resultative → perfect shift. Communication verbs, which are well-represented in both periods, appear to be compatible with a resultative interpretation, but may also help bring about the shift from resultative → perfect.

The different semantic/pragmatic properties of mental state, perception and communication verbs can account for the differences in their respective roles in the grammaticalisation process. Mental state and communication verbs are compatible with a pure resultative sense in which the subject is in possession/control of the final state of a completed process. With mental state verbs, such as verbs of understanding and deciding, the resultant state is typically tightly connected with the event itself, that is, they involve 'narrow results' in Dahl's sense of the term. Mental events such as understanding, discovering, planning, and deciding are frequently completely internal to the subject (in the case of one-participant events) and need not be associated with a particular spatio-temporal location. With these verbs, the event can be conceptualised with a very low degree of prominence in relation to the

present resultant state. The tightness of the connection between the event and the state, and the high degree of prominence of the present resultant state in relation to the anterior event is evidenced by the fact that 'have' + participle constructions with mental event verbs can often be paraphrased by the present tense form of their homophonous stative counterparts:

(5) *I have it planned that I will visit you in April.*
'I plan to visit you in April.'

Communication verbs, but not perception verbs, are frequent in early Old English, when, it is proposed, only the pure resultative sense was possible. This difference can be traced to the different levels of control/energy exerted by the communicative or perceiving subject. Communicators are, more or less, in complete control of the communicative situation: consequently, they can be conceptualised as being in an immediate state of accomplishment in relation to some communicative task. In fact, these verbs can readily appear in the Modern stative-perfect construction: *Now that I have that part talked about/written about, I can go on to the next part.* Speakers frequently summarise their own progress as a means of creating coherence in the discourse. The hearer, however, is virtually powerless in the communicative situation, controlling only the level at which s/he pays attention to the speaker. For this reason, hearers are not easily construed as being in an immediate state of accomplishment in regard to the hearing task. A pure resultative accomplishment reading would be permissible only in particular circumstances, and, even then, with some difficulty: ??*Now that I have my Spanish tape heard/listened to, I can go to the beach.*

The single example with *gehyred* 'heard' that appears in the early Old English data set is shown below:

(6) Bo 29.67.12
Hu licað þe nu se anwald & se wela, nu ðu gehered hæfst þæt hine mon nawðer ne butan ege habban ne mæg ne forlætan ne mot, þeah he wille?
'How like you now the power and the glory now that you have heard that one can neither possess it without fear nor abandon it, even though one wants to.'

This example illustrates why contexts with perception verbs do not fit easily with a pure resultative interpretation, and instead typically involve strong implicatures to a more perfect-like sense. The subject is not in a 'heard' state, but is rather in an experiential/knowledge state as a result of the anterior perception event. Unlike the case of mental state

verbs, with perception verbs, the resultant state is implicated rather than entailed by the anterior event; note that the resultant state implicature can be cancelled: *I have heard everything you said, but I didn't understand a word.* The resultant knowledge state construal is, in part, contributed by the 'have' + participle construction itself, an extension made possible by the conventionalisation process that had already occurred with mental state verbs.

In situations with communication and perception verbs, it is the event rather than the resultant state that is typically construed with a greater degree of prominence. Unlike mental events, the scene associated with perception and communication events typically involves two or more participants, external signs of the communication process (sounds, gestures, etc.), and is associated with a specific spatio-temporal location. Even when a resultative construal is imposed on perception and communication situations, the anterior event remains prominent to some degree.

The significant rise in the frequency of perception verbs from early to late Old English (1.6% to 24.0%) therefore indicates that the anterior event has become more salient in the conceptualisation. Further evidence that the uses of perception verbs in late Old English represent a step beyond the resultative interpretation is their appearance in iterative contexts, in which there is necessarily some focus on the anterior events, as in examples (7) and (8):

(7) ÆC Hom I 32 478.1 (*c.* 1050)
Nu hæbbe ge oft gehyred be his mæran drohtnunge . . .
'Now you have often heard about his distinguished life . . .'

(8) ÆC Hom I, 39 578.24
Fela Godes wundra we habbað gehyred and eac geswene.
'We have heard and also seen many of God's wonders.'

The appearance of communication verbs in iterative contexts in late Old English indicates that they, too, were bringing about the resultative → perfect shift. In (9) below, the adverb *git* 'still' which has present-time emphasis is clearly meant to contrast with *We habbað oft gesæd* 'We have often said', which instead refers to multiple events occurring within an up-to-the-present interval.

(9) ÆC Hom I 141 216.4
We habbað oft gesæd and git secgað þæt cristes rihtwisnys is swa micel þæt he nolde niman mancynn . . .
'We have often said and still say that the justice of Christ is so great that he would not forcibly have taken mankind . . .'

The preceding paragraphs have demonstrated that the appearance of

perception verbs (and iteration with verbs of perception and communication) indicates that a shift towards the perfect has occurred. However, since perception events can be construed as producing a resultant knowledge state in the subject, it has not yet been demonstrated why these verbs would expand the locus of relevance from the subject to the here-and-now of the discourse situation. The section below argues that perception and communication verbs are uniquely suited for this task.

Nearly all of the communication verbs in the data set appear with first person subjects, typically fitting the template 'Now I have (often) said/explained x', and nearly all of the perception verbs appear with second person subjects, fitting the template 'Now you have often heard about x.' A speaker's intention in referring to anterior communication or perception events is typically not to shift focus to the anterior events themselves, but rather to somehow relate these events to the current discourse: how the speaker will continue the discourse depends crucially on what has been previously said (by the speaker) and heard (by the listener). Although both communication and perception uses involve a resultant state in the subject, a state of accomplishment in the speaker, or a resultant knowledge state in the listener, these resultant states are significant not for their own sake, but rather for their relevance to the current discourse situation. Given hearers' 'tendencies to select the most informative among possible competing interpretations' (Traugott and König 1991:191), the hearer will infer that the more informative interpretation is one in which the locus of relevance is the discourse context rather than the grammatical subject.

It is not surprising that the first uses of a perfect appear as implicatures with verbs of communication and perception: since a perfect construction relates a past event to the here-and-now of the discourse context, it is understandable that the notion of current relevance arises with verbs that directly relate to the ongoing discourse itself. What could be more currently relevant to the 'now' point of the discourse than what the speaker assumes has been said or heard previously?

As the perfect interpretation extends to other event verbs, the locus of relevance expands from the ongoing discourse itself to any aspect of the discourse context that the speaker construes as causally related to the anterior event(s). Consider example (10) below from early Middle English:

(10) Lay. 12482
Ye us habbeð ofte imaked wrað þer uore inne Rome ye beoð lað for ofte ye us habbeð at-halden þat gauel of þissen londe
'But you have oft made us wrath, therefore in Rome you are odious! For oft you have withheld from us the tribute of this land.'

The speaker, who is the representative from Rome, is about to tell the hearers that the army will no longer protect them, and that, from now on, they will have to protect themselves. This example typifies the majority of the iterative examples from early Middle English in the following ways: (i) the subject can be construed as bearing an experiential state as a result of their participation in the anterior events; (ii) the speaker, using a causal connector such as 'for' or 'therefore', explicitly refers to a cause/effect relationship between the anterior events and some aspect of the discourse situation. In this case, past withholdings of 'tribute' by the second-person subject have brought about the present state of affairs in which the Romans are angry and will no longer protect them. Although the context satisfies the resultative constraint of having the locus of relevance for the anterior events reside in the subject (who bears some experiential state), the hearer infers that the more relevant relation is between the anterior events and some aspect of the current discourse context. Unlike the case of past perception and communication events in which their cause/effect relationship with the here-and-now of the discourse is inherent and obvious, with other types of event verbs, the speaker must overtly articulate how the events are related to the discourse context, for example, through causal connecting phrases.

Similarly, example (11) below permits a resultative interpretation (in which the subject 'we' is in a final experiential state of having 'long laid still'), but through the overt reference to a cause/effect relationship, the speaker points to the present state of dishonour as the intended locus of relevance for the up-to-the-present durative situation.

(11) Lay. 24924
For yare we habbeoð stille ileien ure wurðscipe is þa lasse.
'For long we have lain still; our honor is the less!'

Iterative/durative examples, such as (10) and (11) above, provide a stepping-stone from resultative → perfect because they permit an experiential resultative interpretation, yet, through the explicit mention of causality, invite hearers to select the more informative current relevance interpretation. My data do not definitively indicate that examples such as (10) and (11) diachronically preceded a conventionalised perfect sense. The presence of stative verbs and dummy subjects in other examples from early Middle English indicates that the current relevance sense was already conventional during this period. However, the prevalence of examples like (10) and (11) above during a period in which a true perfect had just emerged strongly suggests that contexts of this type played a crucial role in the resultative → perfect shift. This hypothesis is further supported by evidence from Romance: both Alarcos Llorach (1947) and Harris (1982) claim

that the current relevance sense is first established in iterative/durative contexts.

Once the notion of current relevance has been conventionalised, the construction can extend to contexts in which the speaker-assessed relevance is presumed rather than explicitly stated. Consider the following example from early Middle English:

(12) Lay. 25667
Lauerd king queð þe cniht to soðe ich þe cuðe her riht.
he hafueð inome þine maye mid hahliche strenðe.
heye wimmon iboren Howeles dohter icore.
Eleine wes ihaten aðelest maidenen.
To þan munte he heo uerede aðelest maidene.
nu fulle feowertene niht þe feod heo hafueð ihalden þer
'Lord king', quoth the knight, 'in sooth I make known to thee right here, he hath taken away thy relative, with great strength, a nobly born woman, Howels daughter choice, who was named Helen, noblest of maidens; to the mount he carried her; now it is a fortnight, the fiend hath holden her there;'

Such an example differs from other current relevance of anteriors in that it contains new information, and the relevance of the event to the discourse situation is not made explicit through a reference to a cause/effect relationship. Instead, with lines such as 'In sooth I make known to thee right here' and 'Listen, lordings, of our tidings', the speaker conveys his/her own judgement that the perfect-marked information that follows (the capture of Helen) is significant on its own merits. Examples such as this one therefore seem to be incipient 'hot news' perfects (cf. McCawley 1971), in which the event itself is foregrounded and highly salient: note that it appears in a main clause rather than a subordinate clause. Since example (12) is told to a person in power who is expected to act on the basis of the information, it still has a rather specific (though implicit) relation to the discourse situation. In Modern English 'hot news' uses, the result is maximally diffuse and non-specific. Consider example (13) below:

(13) *A runaway priest has shocked a village by quitting his post and walking out on his heartbroken family. The Rev. Barrie Hinksman, 38, vanished from his vicarage home of Offchurch, Warwicks., after telling his congregation he would not be taking any more services.* (Daily Mirror 3 August 79; Fenn 1987: 129)

The event in example (13) above has no specific relevance for the discourse context, narrowly interpreted, in the sense that the reader/

Table 4. *Summary of the resultative → perfect shift*

	Stage	Evidence that stage has been reached
I	resultative	mental state verbs
II	resultative → perfect (a)	perception verbs, iteration with perception and communication verbs
III	resultative → perfect (b)	iteration with event verbs in cause-effect contexts
IV	perfect	stative verbs, dummy subjects, anterior adverbials
V	hot news perfect	foregrounded, new information contexts

hearer is in no way affected by its consequences. Subsequent lines of discourse elaborate the past event itself rather than its effects. However, interpreted as broadly and diffusely as possible, the discourse context is equivalent to present immediate reality. The speaker/author is therefore asserting the relevance of the existence of the past event to present immediate reality. In a 'hot news' use, the objective relevance relation is greatly attenuated; the link between the event and present immediate reality is instead purely a reflection of the speaker/author's assessment of the event's immediacy and significance. Although it is somewhat difficult to pinpoint exactly when the 'hot news' use was conventionalised, Schwenter (to appear) demonstrates that perfect-marked examples that place emphasis on the past event rather than on its present effects (one of the distinguishing characteristics of the 'hot news' use), do not emerge until early Modern English.

Table 4 above summarises the stages in the resultative → perfect shift:

6 The resultative → perfect shift as a subjectification process

Traugott (this volume) characterises subjectification in grammaticalisation in the following way:

> subjectification in grammaticalisation is, broadly speaking, the development of a grammatically identifiable expression of speaker belief or attitude to what is said. It is a gradient phenomenon, whereby forms and constructions that at first express primarily concrete, lexical, and objective meanings come through repeated use in local syntactic contexts to serve increasingly abstract, pragmatic, interpersonal and speaker-based functions, in other words, discourse functions. (p. 32)

As indicated in the above passage, Traugott's definition of subjectification in grammaticalisation is grounded in her view of the grammaticalisation process itself. Traugott and König (1991) demonstrates that

grammaticalisation can result from the conventionalisation of conversational inferences through pragmatic strengthening. These conversational inferences arise because speakers attempt to be as informative and expressive as possible, given the needs of the situation. Traugott presents a unified and coherent account in which the result of the process, an increase in the degree to which the expression encodes the attitude or belief state of the speaker, i.e. subjectification in her terms, is a natural consequence of the process itself, the attempt of the speaker to be as informative and expressive as possible in a particular context.

The gradual shift from resultative → perfect is clearly an instance of subjectification in Traugott's sense of the term: the notion of result becomes increasingly speaker-based during this process. In the pure resultative sense (Stage I), the result is narrowly defined by the verb participle itself, and is therefore completely independent of the attitude/judgement of the speaker. Uses with perception verbs (Stage II) involve a slight widening of the notion of result. In the paradigm case of a perception verb Stage II use, for example, 'Since you have (often) heard about X . . .', the context makes it clear that the speaker presumes the listener to bear a resultant knowledge state (which is in turn relevant to the 'now' of the ongoing discourse), not just the state of having 'heard' something. In this way, the relevant result is implicated by the speaker rather than entailed by the proposition itself. The cause/effect relationship between perception and resultant knowledge state is, however, such a basic part of human experience that it is an assumption shared by all speakers and does not reflect the idiosyncratic judgement of an individual speaker.

As the construction extends to expressions of cause/effect relationships with other event verbs, the relevance relation becomes more speaker-based. In her characterisation of present relevance and its various manifestations, Fleischman (1983:191) notes that expressions of cause/effect relationship are inherently subjective: 'The speaker can, however, choose to represent that event in various ways . . . One such representation involves placing the event in a logical or causal relation to a reference point. This is clearly a subjective determination, not necessarily shared by other speakers describing the same event.'

The following examples from *Sir Gawain* illustrate Fleischman's point: the cause/effect relationships are steeped in the judgement of the particular speaker:

(14) *Gawain* 918
Wich spede is in speche, vnspurd may we lerne,
Syn we haf fonged þat fyne fader of nurture.

'We can learn here without inquiry what profit there is in the art of conversation,
since we have welcomed here this perfect master of good breeding.'

(15) *Gawain* 323
Haþel, by heuen þyn askyng is nys,
And as þou foly hatz frayst, fynde þe behoues.
'By heaven sir, your request is foolish,
and as you have asked for a foolish thing, you deserve to have it.'

Although the expression of cause/effect relationships can be highly tainted by speaker attitude/judgement, some degree of objectivity is retained in the logical causal relation itself, that is, use of the perfect in examples (14) and (15) above are not pure expressions of speaker judgement. In a 'hot news' use (Stage V), there is no objective justification of the event's relevance to the here-and-now of the discourse: the perfect marking simply reflects the speaker/author's judgement of the significance and immediacy of the event, hence the emphatic colouring associated with most 'hot news' uses.

The gradual shift from resultative → perfect is undoubtedly an instance of subjectification in Traugott's sense of the term. In each step of the process the result becomes less dependent on objective factors and more dependent on the attitude/judgement of the speaker. In the initial resultative stage, the result is completely dependent on the semantics of the verb participle. In the final 'hot news' stage, the relation of relevance between the event and the present moment is entirely a matter of speaker judgement.

Unlike Traugott, Langacker does not concern himself with the details of the process of semantic change, and does not point out specific contexts in which the change first occurred. His focus is not on developing a theory of grammaticalisation, but rather on developing a coherent theory of grammar based in a conceptualist view of semantics: 'an expression's meaning cannot be reduced to an objective characterisation of the situation described: equally important for linguistic semantics is how the conceptualiser chooses to *construe* the situation and portray it for expressive purposes' (Langacker 1990:6). Langacker must refer to the subjective/objective distinction to adequately capture the different ways that an entity can be construed within the conceptual scene. He attempts to elucidate his notions of objective and subjective construal with the following analogy:

Consider the glasses I normally wear. If I take my glasses off, hold them in front of me, and examine them, their construal is *maximally objective* as I will

understand the term: they function solely and prominently as the *object of perception* and not at all as part of the perceptual apparatus itself. By contrast, my construal of the glasses is *maximally subjective* when I am wearing them and examining another object, so that they fade from my conscious awareness . . . The glasses then function exclusively as part of the *subject of perception*. (Langacker 1990:6–7)

Similarly, a particular entity within the conceptualisation of a linguistic expression is construed objectively when the viewer/conceptualiser conceives of it with a high degree of awareness and subjectively when with a low degree of awareness. Entities that are construed objectively are placed 'on-stage' as the explicit focus of attention in the conceptualisation. In contrast, entities that are construed subjectively are non-salient and can be considered to be in the 'off-stage' region.

A crucial component of Langacker's notion is how the 'ground', which he defined as the speech event, its participants and its immediate circumstances, is involved in the conceptualisation. All deictic expressions involve the ground in some way. Langacker identifies two classes of deictic expressions: one class contains expressions such as *yesterday*, *tomorrow*, and *last year* in which the ground is an implicit reference point and construed subjectively. The other class includes expressions such as *I*, *you*, *here*, *now*, and *me*, in which some facet of the ground is put on-stage and construed objectively. A relation that does not evoke the ground in any way is said to run along the 'objective axis': the relation exists between linguistically coded, objectively construed participants. In contrast, a relation between the ground (when it is off-stage and subjectively construed) and the object of conception lies along the 'subjective axis'. Subjectification is then defined as *the realignment of some relationship from the objective axis to the subjective axis*. To illustrate this rather difficult concept, let us consider one of the simpler examples that Langacker provides.

(16) a. *Vanessa is sitting across the table from Veronica.*

b. *Vanessa is sitting across the table from me.*

c. *Vanessa is sitting across the table.*

In (16a), *Veronica*, an objectively construed participant, serves as the reference point for locating *Vanessa*, another objectively construed participant. The ground is not involved in the relation and the reference-point relationship lies entirely along the objective axis. In (16b), the ground is included in the conceptualisation, since the speaker, an aspect of the ground, serves as the reference point for locating *Vanessa*. The ground in (16b) is objectively construed, however: it is put on-stage

by virtue of the linguistic coding in the form of the pronoun *me*. The reference-point relationship is therefore between two objectively construed participants and still lies along the objective axis. In (16c), the reference point of *across* is again the speaker, but the speaker, and therefore the ground, is not linguistically coded and so is construed subjectively. The reference-point relationship in this case lies along the subjective axis: it is between the ground, subjectively construed and *Vanessa*, an objectively construed participant in the on-stage region. In this way, the shift from (16a) to (16c) involves a realignment of the reference-point relation from the objective to the subjective axis, and is therefore an instance of subjectification in Langacker's terms.

Langacker, himself, describes the shift from resultative to perfect as a subjectification process. The process is analogous to the *across* example outlined above in that it involves a realignment of a reference-point relation from the objective to the subjective axis. He characterises the pre-perfect (resultative) stage in the following way:

> The hypothesized starting point is thus an expression such as *He has finished*, which is the same in form as the modern English perfect construction, albeit different in meaning. Specifically, the precursor of the perfect *have* is assumed to have profiled relationship of relevance or potency between its trajector (specified by the subject) and the prior event described by the complement. On this interpretation, *He has finished* would indicate, roughly, that the subject stands in a relationship of accomplishment *vis-à-vis* the finishing, or that the prior occurrence of finishing remains relevant to him. (Langacker 1990:15)

In the pre-perfect stage, the reference point for the completed process is the subject, a linguistically coded, objectively construed entity. The reference-point relation between the subject and the completed process therefore lies entirely along the objective axis. In the present perfect sense, Langacker claims that the reference point is no longer the grammatical subject, but rather the ground (which is not coded linguistically and is therefore subjectively construed). Consequently, in the shift from resultative → perfect, the reference-point relation between the ground and the completed process comes to lie along the subjective axis.

Langacker's characterisation meshes well with the grammaticalisation stages posited in section 3 above. In the shift from resultative to perfect summarised in Table 4, the subject (an overtly coded linguistic entity) is gradually replaced by the here-and-now of the speaker (the ground) as the locus of relevance for the past events. Uses with perception and communication verbs (Stage II) constitute the first small step in this process: while they typically refer to a resultant knowledge state in the subject, they may also implicate that the ongoing discourse itself is an alternative reference point for the anterior process(es). In the extension

to iterative contexts with event verbs, the overt mention of a cause/effect relationship enables the speaker to point to an interpretation in which the ground rather than the subject is the relevant reference point. Once the ground completely replaces the subject as the locus of relevance (Stage IV) through the conventionalisation of the perfect sense, dummy subjects become permissible. Finally, in the shift to a 'hot news' use, the relevance relation becomes more covert (subjectively construed): as attention becomes more focussed on the past event itself rather than on the event's present consequences, the relevance relation becomes entirely implicit and speaker based, simply a reflection of the speaker's subjective judgement regarding the event's significance to the present moment.

The shift from resultative → perfect also constitutes subjectification in a slightly different sense of Langacker's use of the term. Consider Langacker's characterisation of the shift from root to epistemic modality:

> It thus seems natural to analyze an epistemic modal as representing a limiting case, that in which diffuseness of the locus of potency is pushed to its ultimate conclusion. In the senses we regard as epistemic, the locus of potency is the polar opposite of a focused, well-delimited source of authority – rather, it is identified holistically as the nature of evolving reality itself. Because the locus is undifferentiated and all-encompassing, factors that correlate inversely with objectivity, extension from a root to an epistemic meaning constitutes a type of subjectification. (Langacker 1990:13)

The shift from resultative to perfect is analogous to the shift from root to epistemic modality in that the locus of relevance (reference point) becomes increasingly diffuse and less well delimited during this process. It begins as the subject (a highly focussed and delimited entity) and then, with some uses of perception and communication verbs (Stage II), shifts to the ongoing discourse itself, clearly a less-focussed entity. In the shift to Stage III, the reference point becomes even less differentiated as it expands from the ongoing discourse itself to any aspect of the discourse context that the speaker construes as participating in a causal relationship with the anterior process. Finally, the 'hot news' use is essentially a limiting case which is analogous to the epistemic modal sense: the locus of relevance is not some specific effect present in the discourse situation, but is instead present immediate reality construed in a maximally diffuse way.

7 Conclusion

The above discussion has shown that the shift from resultative to perfect constituted an instance of subjectification in both Traugott's and

Langacker's use of the term. Is this convergence accidental or does it stem from shared, underlying assumptions? Central to Langacker's construal-based notion is the idea that subjectivity inversely correlates with linguistic coding: 'the position of a ground element along the subjectivity scale is claimed to correlate iconically with the extent to which it receives objective phonological symbolization' (Langacker 1985:126). Traugott's functional definition of subjectification is closely tied to her view of the underlying process: meanings become more speaker-based because, in their drive toward expressivity, speakers will conversationally implicate meanings that are not linguistically coded. Through repeated use in local syntactic contexts, these implicatures can become conventionalised. An implicature-based account entails that some aspect of the new, speaker-based meaning will not be overtly coded – hence, it will be subjectively construed in Langacker's sense.

In the case of the shift from resultative → perfect, the conventionalisation of implicatures in particular localised contexts simultaneously brings about the following two changes: (i) the notion of result becomes more and more an expression of speaker attitude/judgement; (ii) the locus of relevance shifts from the subject (a linguistically coded, objectively construed entity) to the here-and-now of the speech situation (the ground), which is not linguistically coded and therefore subjectively construed. In this way, the two models of subjectification are linked by the nature of the underlying process, that is, the fact that conversational implicature plays a crucial role in instigating semantic change. While they differ in their surface characterisations, the two models are, in effect, simply highlighting different facets of the same process.

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6 Subjectification, syntax, and communication

Arie Verhagen

1 Introduction[1]

The notion of subjectification has arisen, and is mostly used, in the context of the study of semantic change through time (cf. Traugott 1989, this volume; Langacker 1990). My purpose in the present chapter is to apply the notion to certain phenomena of synchronic variation (in modern Dutch, but also observable in modern English) which look very similar to diachronic subjectification. In particular, I will examine the use of the predicates *promise*, *threaten*, and *refuse* in Dutch and English, focussing on the relation between descriptive ('objective') applications (as in *He promised to defend the constitution*) and modal ('subjective') uses (as in *Thursday promises to be a very fine day. The incident threatened to ruin his chances*).

Whereas some other chapters in this volume (for example, by Elizabeth Traugott and Kathleen Carey) discuss details of the conceptual content of subjectification, the aim of this chapter is to extend the scope of this notion to new domains. Therefore I will not be concerned here with distinctions between different construals of the notion of subjectification (important as the issue may be), but rather start from what they have in common.

I will try to show that an approach in terms of subjectification supplies us with a coherent conceptual framework for an integrated description of the use of the predicates mentioned above, provided that we are willing to take syntactic and discourse analytic considerations into account as well. Firstly, I will argue that the semantic analysis implicitly imposes certain structural differences on subjective versus objective uses of the verbs involved (which in a language like Dutch correlate with formal structural differences in certain contexts); thus syntactic considerations turn out to be an integral part of the semantic analysis. Secondly, a specific way of construing the relationship between subjective and objective uses also appears to shed light on varying uses of

different syntactic constructions in actual discourse, which in turn seem to provide motivation for the existence of the constructions.

Thus the goals of this chapter are in one sense restricted, and in another somewhat ambitious. On the one hand, I will be concerned only with certain aspects of the use of three words, claiming that their analysis is properly included in an analysis of subjectification. But on the other hand, I am trying to justify an integration of the research perspectives of semantics, grammar (in particular phrase structure syntax), and discourse analysis. Put radically: I will be pursuing the idea that one cannot be an optimal semanticist without also doing syntax and discourse analysis – with similar comments applying, *mutatis mutandis*, to the syntactician and the discourse analyst. The main 'programmatic' point of this chapter is that these different points of view should be integrated in a linguistic analysis of subjectification (at least as a synchronic phenomenon): semantic, syntactic, and discourse analysis can each be enriched by integration.

2 Subjectification of *promise*

First, let us see why it makes sense to apply the concept of subjectification to a verb like *promise*. Consider the examples in (1)–(4).

(1) *Hij beloofde de grondwet te verdedigen*
He promised the constitution to defend
'He promised to defend the constitution'

(2) *Het debat belooft spannend te worden*
The debate promises exciting to become
'The debate promises to be exciting' <ec> (cf. note 1)

(3) *Tomorrow promises to be a fine day*

(4) *Het beloofde een mooie dag te worden*
It promised a fine day to become
'It promised to be a fine day'

Sentence (1) (both in Dutch and in English) ascribes an act of promising to the referent of the subject ('He'); the infinitival complement ('to defend the constitution') represents the propositional content of the speech-act being reported. An expectation on the part of the audience that the referent of 'He' will indeed carry out this activity may thus be justified by the fact of the commitment undertaken by this referent. The basis for such an expectation is referred to in the sentence, it is, in the terminology of Langacker (1990), 'on-stage'.

Sentence (2), on the other hand, does not ascribe an act of promising

to the referent of its subject ('The debate'). Any sense of expectation it induces cannot be justified in terms of something referred to in the sentence, but must be attributed to a subjective evaluation by the conceptualiser, who is not referred to in the sentence; he is 'off-stage'. Similar comments apply to the weather-sentences (3) and (4): whether the subject is a noun or a 'dummy' pronoun, the expectation that it will be a fine day cannot, in either case, be justified by reference to something mentioned in the sentence, but must be taken as a judgement by the conceptualiser.

The difference between (1) and (2)–(4) can be described in terms of subjectification. In terms of Traugott (1989:35), the interpretation of the element *promise* in (2)–(4) is much more 'based in the speaker's subjective belief state/attitude toward the proposition' than in (1). I have already used Langacker's (1990) terms 'off-stage' and 'on-stage' to refer to the same difference, and other characterisations by Langacker also have immediate parallels for these cases. For example, Langacker describes the subjective meaning in examples like *Beyond the 2000 meter level, the trail {rises/falls/ascends/descends} quite steeply* in the following terms:

> The directionality inherent in these latter expressions, and the sense of 'movement' they inspire, can only be attributed to subjective motion by the conceptualizer, who traces a mental path by scanning in a particular direction along the subject's expanse. (p. 19)

And on the 'future senses of "go"' (as in the French *Elle va fermer la porte*), he comments as follows:

> Observe, for example, that with the spatial reading [i.e. with the *Elle* moving through space in the direction of the door – AV] the subject necessarily intends to carry out the infinitival process. However the temporal reading carries no such implication – instead we find a generalized conception of imminence or predictability, such that the *speaker* (as opposed to the *subject*) foretells the event's occurrence. (p. 23)

These descriptions allow analogous application to the difference between example (1) and those in (2)–(4); we may say that the sense of expectation inspired by (2)–(4) can only be attributed to a subjective evaluation by the conceptualiser, and that he, rather than the subject of the sentence, foretells the event's occurrence.[2] The fact that these characterisations – in terms of Traugott as well as Langacker – can be used to describe adequately the meaning differences involved here, clearly shows that a similar semantic mechanism is involved. That does not mean that there are no differences between subjectification of *promise* and that of a case like French *aller*; for example, *promise* suggests

evaluation, normally positive. But the notions that are central in the concept of subjectification carry over directly to *promise*.

As I said before, I will not be concerned with differences between details of Traugott's and Langacker's elaborations of the concept of subjectification, but rather take it as established that they overlap to a large extent, and sufficiently so in order to proceed on the assumption that the discussion to follow is relevant to both approaches. The first point I want to turn to is that of the relation between subjectification in verb meaning and syntax.

3 Subjectification and syntax

3.1 Interpretation structure

One of the important features that the characterisations of subjectification above have in common is the idea that the two readings differ in the relations between the verb and the subject of the sentence. In one case the verb meaning is related directly to the referent of the subject: In (1), it is effectively taken as specifying an action emanating from that referent, or, to put it another way, *promise* is located in the subject's sphere of influence. In the other cases, there is no such direct relation between the verb and the subject: In (2)–(4), *promise* is not located in the subject's sphere of influence (but rather in the conceptualiser's state of mind). In other words, the *semantic* characterisation of the difference between (1) and (2)–(4) in terms of subjectification in fact imposes two different *structures* on the interpretation of the sentences involved: one with a direct link between verb and subject, the other with no such direct link.

Another way of showing the structural component of subjectification in the sentences involved is the following. Sentences like (1), with *promise* used objectively, can be paraphrased by means of a series of answers to gradually more specific questions. The first element of the sentence is taken as the answer to the question what the topic of discussion is, the verb is taken as an immediate answer to the question what kind of activity or process the subject originated (which represents the direct link between subject and verb), and the infinite complement is taken as the answer to the question what constituted the content or object of that process. Schematically:

(1)' – 'What about?' – *He*
– 'What did he do?' – *promised*
– 'What did he promise?' – *to defend the constitution'*

Specifically, we can take the element *promise* on its own as it denotes a certain concept independently of other elements in the sentence, and relate it interpretively to the subject. The idea of 'promise' is conceptualised independently of a particular content of the promise as an act of a particular kind, the content of which is only specified subsequently. Following suggestions by Daalder (1989), and Pardoen (1993, in preparation), this structural aspect of the interpretation can be depicted graphically as a kind of phrase structure (with the condition that it is to be read from left to right) specifying how the interpretation of the sentence is built up gradually, by sequential addition of elements to the interpretation built up 'so far'. I call such a representation the 'interpretation structure' of a sentence; for example (1)":[3]

(1)" He promised to defend the constitution



The interpretation structure connected with subjective *promise* is different. The finite verb in *The debate promises to be exciting* cannot be paraphrased as an answer to a question of the type 'What did the debate do?' It cannot be paraphrased as providing a specification of the subject independently, for that would amount to describing the sentence as stating that the debate made a promise, the propositional content of which was to be a fine day – and that is utterly inadequate. Rather, an adequate way of paraphrasing (3) is as in (3)':

(3)' – 'What about?' – *The debate*
– 'What about the debate?' – *promises to be exciting*

The corresponding interpretation structure is given in (3)":

(3)" The debate promises to be exciting



It appears that we have to use two different 'schemas' for sentence interpretation: X–Y–Z and X–Y, the former interpreted as '$\underline{X}$ – What did X do? → $\underline{Y}$ – What did X Y? → $\underline{Z}$' (a 'transitive-event-schema'), the latter as '$\underline{X}$ – What about X? → $\underline{Y}$' (a 'subject-predicate-schema'). Application of the first schema corresponds to the objective reading of a verb, for it is taken as denoting a concept independently of other elements in the sentence, and construed as originating from the subject. The verb in turn assigns the role of promiser to its subject, and may assign the role of promisee to another participant, both independently of the contents of the promise. The second schema corresponds to the subjective reading, in which the verb does not denote a concept that

could be construed as independently denoting some activity or process emanating from the subject; it does not assign roles of promiser and promisee. The subject is not a promiser, but rather a 'theme' being located in a certain conceptual space, essentially denoted by the copular construction, and a promisee is excluded in such cases. In other words, rather than being conceptualised independently, the verb evaluates the applicability of the rest of the predicate, i.e. it is a subjective modifier of the complement. As indicated in (3)″, it is only this complex expression that can be taken as providing a specification of the subject *The debate*.

One of the merits of viewing things this way is that it actually *explicates* what is different in these cases, rather than merely labelling it in terms of 'literal' vs. 'figurative' or 'metaphorical'. This is not, however, to say that such labels are incorrect, but rather that such categorisations do not in themselves provide as much insight as is both needed and possible. As will become clear in section 4, the present approach provides a much better basis for a comprehensive explanatory analysis of semantic, syntactic, and pragmatic aspects of the phenomena involved.

3.2 Verb ordering in Dutch subordinate clauses

The concepts introduced so far apply equally to the English and the Dutch examples. All of the sentences considered so far lack systematic formal indications for the semantic differences; it is the semantic combination, and (in)compatibilities involved in it, that give rise to one interpretation rather than another. In particular, the differences between the *interpretive* orderings are not formally indicated in the *linear* order of the words. However, in *subordinate* clauses in Dutch, we do find a systematic formal distinction. With nominal objects, subordinate clauses in Dutch exhibit SOV-order, but with other complements things are more variable. It is here that we may find different patterns corresponding to objective versus subjective readings. With objective readings we typically find patterns of the type $S(O)V_1$–OV_2, i.e. with *promise* separated from the non-finite verb V_2, while with subjective readings we find $S(O)$–V_1V_2, i.e. with the two verbs constituting a cluster. Consider (5) and (6), which contain subordinate variants of (1) and (2), respectively.

(5) [*Er klonk applaus*] *toen hij beloofde de grondwet*
[There sounded applause] when he promised the constitution
te zullen verdedigen
to shall defend
'[Applause resounded] when he promised to defend the constitition'

(6) [*We gaan naar de Kamer*] *omdat het debat spannend belooft te worden*
[We go to the Chamber] because the debate exciting promises to become
'[We will go to the House] because the debate promises to be exciting'

Note that in (5) *beloofde*, denoting an act of promising by the subject, precedes all of the complement, i.e. it precedes the whole specification of the contents of the promise. But in (6), the predicate nominal precedes *beloofde* (which forms a verbal cluster with the copula). In accordance with the theory of functional word order outlined in Verhagen (1986, to appear) and especially Pardoen (1993, in preparation), *beloofde* in (6) is not conceptualised independently of the predicate nominal 'to be exciting', since the former does not precede the latter (linear precedence being a necessary condition for independent conceptualisation). So the element *beloofde* can only be integrated into the interpretation of the entire sentence as a part of the entire complex 'promise to be exciting' – which is in fact the reading we need. In cases like these, we may conclude that there *is* a formal indication of the interpretative difference between subjective and objective readings of a verb like *beloven*, since an objective reading is conceptually independent of the complement and may therefore precede it. That is, the linear order in subordinate clauses provides an indication of the required interpretation structures; compare (5)′ and (6)′ with (1)″ and (3)″, respectively.

(5)′ *toen hij beloofde de grondwet te zullen verdedigen*
when he promised the constitution to shall defend



(6)′ *omdat het debat spannend beloofde te worden*
because the debate exciting promised to become



An interpretation structure of the type in (5)′/(1)″ is excluded by the linear order of (6), since in the latter case, the element *beloofde* is located, so to speak, in the middle of the complement. Cases like (6) are sometimes described in terms of an assumed syntactic process of clause union. What I am claiming here is that the occurrence of such a phenomenon is perfectly understandable in terms of concepts that we have to use anyhow in a semantic analysis.

Actually, the relations between form (order) and interpretation (objective/subjective) are asymmetric. Clustering is a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition for a subjective reading of *promise* (objective use of the verb is not disallowed in the order (O)–V_1V_2), while the 'disjoint' order V_1–OV_2 imposes an objective reading on the verb (this order is a sufficient, but not a necessary, condition for an objective reading). This difference can be exploited in discourse, as we shall see in section 4; for the moment, however, we may abstract from this asymmetry.

Another example exhibiting this syntactic phenomenon is (7):

(7) [*Er wacht hem een nieuwe taak,*] *die tijdrovend*
[There awaits him a new task,] which time-consuming
belooft te zijn
promises to be
'[He has the prospect of a new task] which promises to be time-consuming' <ec>

Notice that (7) and the other examples of subjective *promise* given so far have infinitival complements denoting states, while the complement of objective *promise* in (1) and (5) denotes an activity. This difference in aspectual type correlates (in terms of frequency) with the difference between subjective and objective, but what is really crucial is the relation between the subject and the verb. We do find examples like (8), with a stative complement and an objective promise, and also cases like (9), with a non-stative complement and a subjective promise. What matters is the nature of the subject; the question is: can it be thought to be capable of committing itself to actively producing the result specified in the complement?

(8) *Zij beloofde haar moeder een goede verpleegster te worden*
She promised her mother a good nurse to become
'She promised her mother to be a good nurse'

(9) *De twaalfde Jumping-Amsterdam belooft al zijn*
The twelfth Jumping-Amsterdam promises all its
voorgangers te overtreffen
predecessors to surpass
'The 12th Jumping-Amsterdam [tournament] promises to surpass all its predecessors' <ec>

In fact, an objective interpretation of (8) is required because of the presence of 'her mother'. This participant needs a semantic role, and the only plausible one is that of promisee, which imposes an objective reading on the verb. Without that participant, the sentence would allow both a subjective and an objective reading, which confirms that the

aspectual type of the complement does not itself indicate a particular construal of the relation between finite verb and subject (a particular interpretation structure). In a subordinate clause, however, the interpretation structure can be reflected linguistically whether a promisee is present or not. With *beloven* preceding the entire complement (as in (10)), it is construed objectively, while the subjective reading requires verb-clustering (as in (11) – the asymmetry in the formulation here relates to the asymmetry alluded to above).

(10) . . . *omdat zij beloofde een goede verpleegster te worden*
. . . because she promised a good nurse to become
'. . . because she promised [= made the promise] to be a good nurse'

(11) . . . *omdat zij een goede verpleegster beloofde te worden*
. . . because she a good nurse promised to become
'. . . because it looked like she would be a good nurse'

So we seem to have a systematic connection between semantics and syntax involving subjectification. The lack of conceptual independence implied by a subjective construal of a verb requires it to follow non-verbal elements of its complement in subordinate clauses, i.e. to take the position of V_1 in the schema S(O)–V_1V_2 rather than in the schema S(O)V_1–OV_2.

3.3 Extending the description

Before moving on to further questions of explanation, it is useful to point out that the semantic and syntactic phenomena illustrated above are not restricted to the verb *promise* and its Dutch counterpart *beloven*. They may also be observed with the (related) verb *threaten*, Dutch *dreigen*. Consider (12)–(14):

(12) *De rector dreigde het onderwijs voor onbepaalde*
The headmaster threatened the instruction for indefinite
tijd te staken
time to suspend
'The headmaster threatened to suspend teaching for an indefinite period of time' <ec>

(13) *The incident threatened to ruin his chances*

(14) *Het incident dreigde zijn kansen teniet te doen*
The incident threatened his chances to-null to do
'The incident threatened to destroy his chances'

Sentence (12) reports an act of threatening by the headmaster; i.e. *dreigen*, as well as *threaten* in the English translation, is construed objectively. But *threaten* and *dreigen* in (13) and (14) are construed subjectively, completely parallel to the cases with *promise* discussed above. The syntax also works analogously in these cases: subjective *dreigen* does not precede the complement, but forms a cluster with the other, non-finite verb, as illustrated in (15):

(15) [*Het is een*
prestigeslag] *waarvan vooral de kleuter het*
[It is a battle-
of prestige,] where-of for-all the pre-schooler the
slachtoffer dreigt te worden
victim threatens to become
'[This is a fight for prestige,] from which especially small children threaten to become victims' < ec >

Here, a subjective reading of *dreigt* is required and the verb may appear only 'in the middle' of the complement, adjacent to the complement verb. In an objective reading, however, it is typically separated from the complement verb, especially when the matrix clause entails that *dreigen* must refer to an utterance by its subject (cf. *ANS* 1984:584). Putting the verbs in (16) in a cluster would remove the sense that 'he' is actually uttering threats:

(16) *De agent hoorde hoe hij dreigde de gijzelaar neer*
The officer heard how he threatened the hostage down
te schieten
to shoot
'The officer heard how he threatened to shoot the hostage'

The verb *refuse*, Dutch *weigeren*, exhibits a similar pattern: (17) is a case of a refusal construed objectively, whereas (18) contains a case of subjective *refuse*.[4]

(17) *De president weigerde haar tot premier te benoemen*
The president refused her to prime-minister to appoint
'The president refused to appoint her as prime minister'

(18) *De motor weigerde warm te worden*
The engine refused warm to become
'The engine refused to get warm'

The syntax seems to work differently here, though. The ordering in (18)′ and that in (18)″ allow for a subjective reading, while a subjective

construal of *beloven* or *dreigen*, as we observed above, does not permit the second type of ordering:

(18)′ . . . *dat de motor warm weigerde te worden*
. . . that the engine warm refused to become

(18)″ . . . *dat de motor weigerde warm te worden*
. . . that the engine refused warm to become

The most reasonable explanation for this difference seems to be that *weigeren* and *refuse*, unlike *beloven* and *dreigen* and their English counterparts, allow for a subjective reading even without a complement. In other words, a clause like *De motor weigerde* ('The engine refused') is itself a well-formed expression (conveying the message that the engine did not start), while phrases like *Het debat beloofde* ('The debate promised') and *Het incident dreigde* ('The incident threatened') simply do not constitute well-formed expressions by themselves. In principle then, the difference between subjective and objective construal does not have to correlate (precisely) with conceptual dependence and independence in the case of *weigeren*, allowing both (18)′ and (18)″. However, I will suggest below that *in actual usage* the difference between *beloven* and *dreigen* on the one hand, and *weigeren* on the other, is not as great as these intuitive judgements suggest.

In fact, there is another issue which makes the difference smaller than it might seem – one that will take us into the area of discourse considerations. As I suggested above, there is an asymmetry in the relations between linear order and interpretation. Note that we have in fact two such relations: one between objective, independent construal of the verb and its preceding the complement, and one between subjective, non-independent construal of the verb and its not preceding the complement. As it turns out, the logical properties of the relations are not exactly the same in the two cases. In the former, the precise statement of the relation must be that precedence imposes objective construal, while, in the latter case, the precise statement is that subjective construal requires non-precedence. That is, *beloven* in its subjective sense may not precede its complement (**dat het debat beloofde spannend te worden*, lit.: 'that the debate promised exciting to become'), but in its objective sense it does sometimes occur in a verbal cluster, to the right of (part of) the complement (cf. also *ANS* 1984:585):

(19) . . . *omdat hij het tekort beloofde aan te zuiveren*
. . . because he the deficit promised up to make
'. . . because he promised to make up the deficit'

The 'reverse' situation (putting a case of subjective *beloven* to the front

of the complement as in (20)) always results in the odd reading in which the subject is assigned the role of promiser:

(20) . . . *omdat het debat beloofde spannend te worden*
. . . because the debate promised exciting to become
'. . . because the debate promised [= made the promise] to be exciting'

So the question is: whence this asymmetry? I want to suggest below that the answer may come from considering the role of the verbs involved, in both their objective and their subjective senses, in connected discourse.

4 Argumentation and coherence

4.1 Argumentational orientation

Clearly, one wants the different uses of the verbs discussed to be related. An analysis that would imply the necessity of assuming homonyms of subjective and objective *promise*, *threaten*, and *refuse*, would surely be missing a generalisation (to put it mildly). So how could one undertake an analysis that relates the uses discussed, and still accounts for the differences? More precisely, how exactly should we conceive of the mechanism of subjectification in these cases? While we are not discussing diachronic developments,[5] but rather synchronic variation, it is still possible to construe the relationship between the two variants in different ways. Assuming there to be *some* kind of overlap, there are still different ways of conceiving what is common and what is distinct. One way might be to assume that subjectification involves the *addition* of subjectivity to the meaning; or it might be construed as a *replacement* of objectivity by subjectivity while retaining certain structural semantic features (as a kind of metaphorical mapping from the domain of describing reality to the domain of predicting it). Here I want to argue for another assumption, viz. that the subjective use of *promise*, *threaten*, and *refuse* is related to the objective use in the sense that it in fact *shares subjective* elements of meaning with the objective use, but *lacks* elements of objectivity. In other words: what is called objective use does not differ from subjective use in that subjectivity (of the relevant kind) is lacking, but rather in that it exhibits a certain descriptive objectivity that is absent from the subjective use. I will try to argue that the role of the objective sense of *promise*, etc. in connected discourse in fact incorporates certain features that are definitional of the subjective sense.

The central concept in this approach is argumentation. In a developing discourse, the interpreter (short for 'reader or hearer') has a certain

representation of what the discourse is about, and, in particular, of the direction it is taking at that precise point in time. A new utterance is firstly interpreted with respect to his understanding of the discourse so far, and then, more importantly, construed as providing a coherent *next step* in the process of constructing the discourse representation. As is generally assumed in discourse studies, understanding a discourse is an incremental process. Coherence may be taken to mean that the interpreter can establish a conceptual link between the segments of a discourse (notably clauses), but the link does not, of course, have to be one that simply continues the direction the discourse was already taking. On the contrary, a very important coherence relation is that of Contrast (cf. Spooren, 1989), which in fact involves a reversal of the direction a discourse is taking.[6] It is useful to elaborate this point somewhat further before discussing how *promise*, *threaten*, and *refuse* fit into this framework. Consider a simple case like (21).

(21) This room has a nice view, but it is very expensive.

In terms of incremental discourse understanding, this sequence can be analysed as follows. The first clause contains information supporting the conclusion that the room should be hired. It counts as an argument towards conclusions of that type, so by the end of that clause it has oriented the interpreter towards such a conclusion. Then the next segment arrives, introduced by *but*, and this contains information supporting the opposite conclusion that the room should not be hired. At the end of that clause, the interpreter is oriented towards the latter type of conclusion (in terms of Spooren (1989) the orientation of the second clause in a pair connected by *but* is dominant). So whatever the position of the (assumed) producer of the discourse at the beginning of his utterance (or, for that matter, at the end), the sequence of discourse segments provides a series of argumentational steps, first orienting an interpreter towards a positive conclusion, and then subsequently reversing it.

Anscombre and Ducrot (1989) emphasise that many ordinary expressions in natural languages have the function of orienting an interpreter, at the point in the discourse where they occur, towards conclusions of a particular type. Everyday expressions like *expensive*, *tall*, etc., have some particular argumentational force, and are never (in their terms) 'purely' informative. One can make 'purely' descriptive phrases, like *costs £50* and *is 1.80m*, but they must be constructed *ad hoc*, and in an everyday discourse an interpreter must still find out (in some other way) whether these are to count as (respectively) expensive and tall or not before he knows what he can *do* with the information. This illustrates

that the presence of some argumentational orientation is the default situation in natural language, 'pure' informativity being the exception.[7]

Now notice that the report of an act of promising, at the point in the discourse where it is reported, also has a certain argumentational force. That is, it does not merely describe an event, it also orients the interpreter towards conclusions of a particular type. The report that someone promised X counts as an argument in favour of the conclusion that X will occur; it strengthens the assumption that X will actually happen. Consider the exchange in (22).

(22) A: *Is Peter coming to the party?*
B: *Sure – he promised.*

Interpreting B's utterance coherently requires taking the report of Peter's promise to come as an argument supporting the conclusion that he will indeed come, and such an interpretation is in fact established automatically. This view is confirmed when we consider the use of connectives like *so* and *but*, which mark argumentational relations between discourse segments in an explicit way. Consider (22a and b) as alternative answers to A's query in (22):

(22) a. *He promised to come, so he could be here any minute*

b. *He promised to come, but I'm not entirely confident*

So marks the next step in the interpretation of a discourse as a conclusion licensed by the previous segment, so the naturalness of (22a) confirms the idea that the report of his promise to come counts as an argument for the conclusion that he will in fact come. In (22b), the first segment of course orients the addressee towards precisely the same conclusion, and this explains why in this case the next step, reversing the argumentational orientation, is introduced by the contrastive connective *but*.

It should be stressed once more that this analysis is in no way intended to reflect the conceptualiser's *mental state* in the production of the utterance – it is quite conceivable (perhaps even natural) that B has reached the conclusion that Peter will not be coming to the party even before A asks the question. Rather, what is at stake is the *route*, that is, the successive steps, by which the producer of the discourse is trying to *change* the cognitive state of the *addressee*, in other words, the way communication is taking place.

This perspective on the function of *promise* in connected discourse is also corroborated by the behaviour of linguistic elements that weaken the argumentational force of an expression (argumentational operators in the sense of Anscombre and Ducrot 1989). For example, introducing

a statement with *Well* and/or uttering it with a somewhat rising intonation, has the effect of weakening the force with which the addressee is oriented towards the relevant conclusions (compare *Well, the room has a nice view . . .*).[8]

(23) A: *Is Peter coming to the party?*
B: *Well – he promised . . .*

Having an operator change the argumentational force of an expression presupposes that the expression has a particular force to begin with. Furthermore, notice that the direction of the argumentational orientation is not changed. In terms of incremental interpretation of the discourse, the addressee is oriented towards the same type of conclusions at the end of B's utterance in (23) as was the case in (22) (albeit with less force). Thus, the same pattern of use of connectives shows up here as in (22a and b):

(23) a. *Well – he promised to come, so I guess he might be here any minute*

b. *Well – he promised to come, but you know Peter: he might just forget*

The use of *promise* not only counts as strengthening the assumption that the event denoted by the complement of the verb will occur, it also indicates a positive evaluation of this event (in other words, the discourse orients the addressee towards a positive evaluation). The second segment in (24) is explicitly positive and it is introduced by *so*, which illustrates that the first segment, with *promise*, does have a positive orientation. This is also confirmed by the fact that in (25), a clearly negative second segment is introduced by *but*:[9]

(24) A: *Is Peter coming to the party?*
B: *He promised; so let's hope he'll be on time*

(25) A: *Is Peter coming to the party?*
B: *He promised; but I wouldn't care if he changed his mind*

Thus we have suggested a particular answer to the question 'What is the function of *promise* in communication?' that is, 'How does it contribute to changing the cognitive state of an interpreter in an ongoing discourse?' The answer consists of two parts: first, at the point in the discourse where it occurs, *promise* counts as strengthening some assumption (given contextually and/or denoted by the complement) that a certain event will actually occur; second, it indicates positive evaluation of this event.

Note now that the subjective use of *promise* shows exactly the same argumentational orientation, in both respects. Uttering *Tomorrow promises to be a fine day* orients the addressee towards the conclusion that it will actually be a fine day, and it is also clear that this is evaluated positively. In fact, this describes the function of the verb in such a case *exhaustively*. In its subjective use, orienting the interpreter towards expecting the event denoted in the complement and indicating positive evaluation is *all* that the verb contributes to the meaning of the sentence. In its objective use it does the same. But it also does something else; namely reporting a particular event, i.e. the act of promising performed by the referent of the subject (which justifies the argumentational orientation). It is precisely this aspect of the denotation of an independently conceptualised event that is lacking in the subjective use (and that we therefore still invoke as motivation for calling this use 'subjective').

So I am suggesting that from the point of view of argumentation (in incrementally interpreting a discourse), objective and subjective uses do not really differ. The difference is rather that in the objective uses evidence for the argumentational orientation is given in the sentence itself, while in the subjective uses it is not. This amounts to assuming that subjectification in these cases can be construed as a lack of objective features: 'subjective' and 'objective' use share features of subjectivity, but it is the former only that is *purely* subjective.

Notice that we have now constructed a *conceptual* asymmetry between subjective and objective senses of the verbs: semantic aspects of the objective sense are lacking in the subjective sense, but not vice versa. We will see later how this may serve as the basis for explaining the *syntactic* asymmetry noted at the end of section 3.3. But first, let us extend the analysis in this section to *threaten* and *refuse*. This can in fact be done in a straightforward manner.

Note that *threaten* is parallel to *promise* in that it also strengthens a (contextually given) assumption. Exchanges like those in (26) and (27) are exactly parallel to those given above for *promise*:

(26) A: *Are they really going to freeze the budget?*
B: *Well, they did threaten to do so.*

(27) a. *He threatened to come, so be prepared that he could appear any minute*
b. *He threatened to fire us, but things might not be as black as they look*

So, like the use of *promise*, the use of *threaten* at a particular point in a discourse orients the interpreter towards the conclusion that some event

will actually come about. But, unlike *promise*, *threaten* indicates negative, rather than positive evaluation (the conclusion drawn from the first segment in (27a) is a warning; the second segment in (27b) suggests reassurance given to contrast with the first segment which is clearly evaluated negatively). The use of *threaten* in an example like *The incident threatened to ruin his chances* shares the argumentational orientation with the objective uses, while lacking the denotation of an independently conceptualised event justifying the conclusion indicated.

The verb *refuse* displays an argumentational orientation opposite to both *promise* and *threaten*, in that it *de*creases the strength of an assumption, in particular one that would otherwise be *expected* to come true. Again, this can be demonstrated in a manner similar to the discussion of *promise* and *threaten* above. Consider (28) and (29):[10]

(28) A: *Would John accept a decoration?*
B: *Definitely not – he has always refused one*

(29) a. *He refuses to come, so we will have to do without him*
b. *So far he has refused to come, but he might have a surprise for us*

Again, the subjective sense of *refuse* as in *The engine refused to get warm*, shares precisely the same argumentational orientation with the objective sense. The subjective sense is exhausted by this argumentational orientation, while the objective sense additionally denotes an independently conceptualised event justifying the relevant conclusion. Thus, the analysis of both *threaten* and *refuse* can clearly proceed along the same lines as that of *promise*.

This approach not only has the advantage that it provides an integrated analysis of objective and subjective senses of the same verbs; it also puts some other issues in a new light. For example, at least *beloven* in Dutch is sometimes also used in an 'objective' sense which nevertheless does *not* report an actual act of promising. Consider the following fragment:

(30) *'Gelukkig gaan zulke galbulten vaak vanzelf weer weg.'*
'Maar als u niet weet hoe ik er áán kom, hoe kan ik er dan àfkomen?' *merkte Annelies op.*
'Wacht maar af', beloofde ik haar. 'Je krijgt tabletten van me.'
'Fortunately, such hives often just disappear spontaneously.'
'But if you don't know how I gòt them, how can I get rìd of them?', Annelies observed.
'Just wait and see', I promised her. 'You'll get tablets from me.'
< ec: margri 8–5–6–cgbl >

An approach according to which 'objective' *promise* would denote a particular type of commissive speech-act only would have difficulty

analysing the expression *'Just wait and see,' I promised her*, for the doctor's utterance *Just wait and see* would in itself count as an instruction, or perhaps an advice, but not at all as a promise. In the context, however, it is obvious that the relevance of the entire expression is that the reader should understand that confidence in a good outcome is justified: a contextually given assumption should be strengthened. In actual discourse, such a difference between what the referent of a subject (whether also 'first person' or not) strictly speaking can commit himself to, and what he ultimately wants his addressee to conclude, is not rare at all (compare routine utterances like *He won't come back – I promise/she promised*). As another example, consider the following text from an advertisement for a firm transporting parcels, in which a third person is introduced, recommending this firm in the following way:

(31) *'Ze weten dat het vertrouwelijk is.*
Echt, je kunt dit met een gerust hart aan ze toevertrouwen.
Nee, je betaalt iets meer, maar ik weet uit ervaring dat zij hun werk goed doen.
En snel.
Beloofd.'
'They know it is confidential.
Really, you can safely trust them with this.
No, you pay a bit more, but I know from experience that they do the job well.
And fast.
Promised.'

The alleged speaker does not commit *himself* to deliver the parcels well and fast, as is made abundantly clear by the statement from the company (outside the quotation marks) following the text cited: *Wij doen wat u belooft* ('WE do what you promise'). Still, the text as produced is not at all deviant, so that we may once more conclude that this use of *beloven* simply counts as an attempt to strengthen the addressee's belief in a positive result.

Related to the previous point is the following. According to our analysis the difference between first-person present tense use of *promise* (so-called performative use) and its use in other grammatical contexts (for example, third person, and/or past tense) is only a matter of degree. Both aim at a change in the cognitive state of the interpreter, resulting in a certain expectation being strengthened; the direction of the argumentational orientation is the same (though not its force). Thus they do not belong to *completely* distinct categories of communication. In view of the fact that the linguistic expression of performative and non-

performative promise overlap to a very large extent, I find this consequence attractive.

Finally, the approach sketched above also allows us to explain *why* it is that an utterance of *I threaten* does not count as the performance of an illocutionary act in the way *I promise* does, and in fact sounds strange. Suppose we assume, contrary to what I am claiming here, that the negative evaluation of the complement of *threaten* is actually an object-oriented rather than a speaker/hearer-oriented feature; i.e. that it is evaluated negatively from the point of view of an (explicit or implicit) person threatened, rather than from the point of view of speaker and addressee. Then it would remain unclear why it is that it is strange to say something like *I threaten to ruin your party*, for why couldn't I say that I was going to do something that is evaluated negatively by someone else (for example you)? But this is explained easily under the assumption that it is the speaker who orients the addressee towards a negative evaluation of the complement-event: committing oneself to something while at the same time judging this undesirable amounts to inconsistency, at least communicatively.

We may take the fact that the approach proposed here allows for such generalisations and explanations as additional evidence that it is correct to attribute features of subjectivity to so-called objective senses of the verbs involved too.

4.2 Discourse coherence

As pointed out above, our analysis entails a conceptual asymmetry between subjective and objective senses of the verbs: semantic aspects of the objective sense are lacking in the subjective sense, but not vice versa. The objective sense, unlike the subjective one, denotes some independently conceptualised event that justifies the argumentational orientation. Now can we relate this conceptual asymmetry to the syntactic asymmetry observed in section 3.3?

In the subjective sense, the verb does not denote an independently conceptualised event, and serves only to indicate a particular argumentational orientation. In the objective sense it both indicates some argumentational orientation and denotes an independently conceptualised event. But it might very well be, in a specific context, that the fact of someone actually performing an act of, say, threatening, is not at all relevant, that the speaker/writer is actually concerned only with the conclusions suggested by the sentence, i.e. the consequences of the act, rather than its being an act of threatening. In our analysis, objective and subjective senses share features that exhaustively characterise subjec-

tivity, while the objective sense also has some additional features. We might expect, then, that both senses also share the *syntactic* possibilities that are specific for the subjective sense, with the objective sense having additional possibilities. More specifically, we may expect that when the verbs in their objective sense show up in final position (in the pattern $S(O)–V_1V_2$, characterising V_1 as not conceptualised independently of the complement), they do not constitute a possible separate step in the reasoning developed in the discourse at that point.

It is hard, if not impossible, to explicate the linguistic content of this argument in vacuo; so let us turn to an actual example, both in order to make the argument more concrete and to provide evidence for it. Consider the clause in (32), and the fragment it is taken from in (33).

(32) *Wanneer de arts de vrouw weigert te helpen*
When the doctor the woman refuses to help
'When the doctor denies the woman treatment'

(33) *Steeds meer vrouwen die ongewenst zwanger zijn geraakt, wenden zich tot de NVSH-consultatiebureaus om hulp. Of die hulp gegeven wordt is afhankelijk van de instelling van de arts. Wanneer de arts van het consultatiebureau de vrouw weigert te helpen, kan zij zich nog wenden tot de afdeling hulpverlening van het centraal bureau van de NVSH.*

De hulpverlening bij ongewenste zwangerschap is pas dit jaar op gang gekomen. [. . .]

'More and more women who have become pregnant unwantedly, turn to the NVSH clinics for help. Whether aid is supplied or not depends on the doctor's attitude. When the doctor of the clinic denies the woman treatment, she may still turn to the support department of the central bureau of the NVSH.

Assistance in case of unwanted pregnancy has only just started this year. [. . .]' <ec: sextan 12–12–8–cgbl>

Sentence (32) contains an occurrence of the verb *weigeren* ('to refuse') that describes an act of refusal by a doctor, but in the position that is characteristic for subjective use. However, it does not refer to a particular act by one particular doctor. More importantly, as is evident from (33), the sentence follows the remark that the help a woman will get 'depends on the doctor's attitude', and is followed by a description of what she can do in case she does not get help from a doctor (she may then turn to the central bureau). The point that some doctor might perform an act of refusal is not communicatively important here, but the conclusion that as a consequence of such a refusal a woman might not get help, clearly is. The entire text is about the question of women getting help, and the non-independent position of the verb denoting a

doctor's refusal guarantees that this main thread of the discourse is not broken in this particular clause. Even while denoting an act of refusal, the sole function of the verb in this context is to evoke the conclusion that a woman might sometimes not get the help she needs in order to allow the text to continue with a discussion of how that problem (not the problem of the doctor's refusal) might be resolved.

Similarly, (34) displays clustering of a verb denoting an act performed by the subject (in this case, threatening):

(34) *nu religieus Scherpenzeel hier een persoonlijke rel van*
now religious Scherpenzeel here a personal fight of
dreigt te maken
threatens to make
'now that [the] religious [party of] Scherpenzeel threatens to turn this into a personal dispute'

This occurs in a context where it is the consequences rather than the act as such that constitute the topic of the discussion (cf. (35): there is a conflict between two Labour Party officials. The first, De Jonge, has been discharged as alderman of the town of Scherpenzeel by his own party under the leadership of the second, Van Bruggen; the latter also became the new alderman, while the religious party had wanted De Jonge to keep this position).[11]

(35) *Of zijn 'Fatsoen' het zwaarstwegende argument voor zijn partijgenoten was hem zondermeer uit te rangeren, vooral nu religieus Scherpenzeel hier een persoonlijke rel van dreigt te maken? De Jonge: 'natuurlijk moesten er ook nog een paar nieuwelingen op die lijst, van die jonge snuiters. Die begonnen al direct van de hoge toren af te blazen, meer openbare scholen en zo.'*
v. Bruggen: 'Er is niets aan de hand, ze hebben het allemaal verschrikkelijk zitten opblazen. De Jonge heeft een denkfout gemaakt; op die bewuste partijvergadering heeft hij me over dat geritsel met die papieren verteld dat-ie er uiteindelijk hetzelfde over dacht als ik. De zaak is trouwens weer voor mekaar. Hij heeft ons een briefje geschreven met de beste wensen voor het nieuwe gemeentebestuur.'
'Whether his "Decency" was the most important argument for his fellow party-members to put him off side, especially now that the religious party of Scherpenzeel threatens to turn this into a personal dispute? De Jonge: "Of course a couple of newcomers had to be on the list as well, those young customers. They immediately began beating the drums, you know, more public schools and things like that."
v. Bruggen: "There is really nothing the matter, they've all been

> exaggerating tremendously. De Jonge made an error; in that particular party meeting he told me about this rustling with those papers, that he ultimately felt the same about it as I did. Anyway, the case has been settled. He wrote us a note, wishing us the best with the new city council."' <ec: vne 12–9–3–cobl >

Note that in the text following (34) neither of the interviewees discusses the acts of the religious party in Schwerpenzeel; for what counts is the possible consequences for the positions of the old and new aldermen. Van Bruggen (the second interviewee) in particular suggests that a real dispute has actually been prevented, and he ends with the conclusion that 'things have been settled'. Clearly then, what the interviewees (are reported to) respond to is the issue of a threatening dispute, not an act of threatening to create a dispute – which fits the non-independent status of 'refuse' in the actual order of (34).

These cases can be contrasted with examples such as (36), occurring in the context (37).

(36) [Ik moet hem drie keer opbellen,]
'[I have to call him three times,]'
omdat hij weigert zijn bed uit te komen [en onze twee kinderen naar school te helpen]
because he refuses his bed out to come [and our two children to school to help]
'because he refuses to get out of bed and help our two children to get to school'

(37) *Haal je echter niet in je hoofd dat ik thuis de broek aan heb, die heeft mijn man. Zelfs toen ik hem de bons gaf, betaalde hij me mijn huishoudgeld en de huishoudrekening, al wist ik dat het geld uit de zaak kwam. Ik ben geen voorvechtster van vrouwengelijkheid. Ik geloof niet in dat soort onzin. Ik mag dan ettelijke keren meer verdienen dan mijn echtgenoot, dat maakt me nog niet de baas in huis. Als we echter naar kantoor gaan, zal hij toch precies moeten doen wat ik zeg. Als ik 's morgens heel vroeg weg moet, is het geen doen als ik hem vanaf de zaak drie keer op moet bellen, omdat hij weigert zijn bed uit te komen en onze twee kinderen naar school te helpen.*
'But don't imagine that I'm in charge at home, for my husband is. Even when I brushed him off, he paid me my allowance and the bills, even though I knew the money came from the company. I'm not a fighter for women's equality. I don't believe in that kind of nonsense. I may make several times more money than my husband, that still doesn't make me the boss at home. But when we go to

work, he'll just have to do exactly what I tell him. When I have to be away very early in the morning, it's just impossible when I have to call him from the office three times, because he refuses to get out of bed and help our two children to get to school.' <ec: libell 15–5–4–cgbl>

This fragment stems from an interview with a woman about the distribution of responsibilities between her and her husband at home. In this case, the conclusion that the children might not get to school is just an *example* of the important things that might go wrong if the husband does not do what his wife tells him to do. The sentence very strongly makes the point that the husband is fully responsible for such behaviour and its consequences. It is this type of behaviour – behaviour of refusing – that is the topic of the woman's discourse here: the husband shouldn't exhibit behaviour of that *type*. So here too, the position of the verb, this time allowing for independent conceptualisation, is entirely coherent with the overall character of the discourse.

Thus, not only is the conceptual asymmetry we have argued for further confirmed by the fact that the syntactic asymmetry runs parallel, but examination of actual occurrences of the different orderings in their contexts also supports our proposal on the precise nature of the asymmetry. Sometimes the subjective element present even in 'objective' senses of the verbs (that of orienting an interpreter towards conclusions of a particular type at a particular point in a discourse) completely outweighs the denotation of a speech-act.

5 Conclusion

In the preceding sections we have been adopting points of view in linguistic analysis that are not frequently integrated fully: semantic (how to describe the relation between different senses of the verbs *promise*, *threaten*, and *refuse*?), syntactic (how to explain the different ordering possibilities – in Dutch – of these verbs in subordinate clauses?), and discourse analytic (how to analyse the communicative function of both the verbs themselves, and the different syntactic patterns that they occur in?). In each case, the analysis derived support from considerations arising within other perspectives; within each perspective taken in isolation, the analysis does not stand as strong as on the level where these analytic perspectives are integrated. Precisely the fact that integration of these perspectives allows for deeper understanding of the phenomena involved in turn constitutes a strong argument for a view of language that makes such an integration natural. Speaker/hearer-subjectivity appears to be one very important concept encompassing semantics, syntax, and communication.

NOTES

1 This chapter has profited from responses by the participants in the Cambridge Seminar on Language, Subjectivity, and Subjectivisation. In particular, I want to thank Elizabeth Traugott for very useful comments on another presentation of some of these ideas, and Saskia van As, Frank Jansen, and Ted Sanders for comments on a draft version. Naturally, I am solely responsible for any remaining errors. One of the main sources for this research has been the so-called Eindhoven Corpus (Uit den Boogaart 1975), in the version available from the Free University in Amsterdam; examples that stem from that corpus are marked with 'ec'. Terms like *conceptualiser*, *addressee*, etc., and pronouns referring to them, are to be read as indications of roles and functions, and thus gender-neutral.

2 Note that in (1) and (2), the difference between objective and subjective corresponds with, respectively, past and present tense. In the corpus used for this study, this is evidently a frequent correlation (not an obligatory one; cf. (4)), and one which seems only natural, given the nature of 'reporting' inherent in the past tense, and the connection between subjectivity and the 'here-and-now'. I hope to come back to this issue elsewhere, as well as to other issues – for example, the facts that the distribution of negation and adverbials differs in the two types of constructions, that asking *Why?* in response to an objective case of *promise* means asking for the subject's motives for promising, whereas it means asking for the conceptualiser's motives for his utterance in a subjective case, etcetera. Here, I confine myself to issues immediately relevant to the main topic.

3 For the view of phrase structure as a way to divide a clause in pieces that can each be construed as an answer to a question based on the preceding part, see Winter (1982). The leftward orientation of the lines connecting a unit to a preceding one in the interpretation structure is intended to indicate the incremental nature of interpretation. The structure is to be read as a result of a series of steps: (1) Interpretation of *He* (possibly with respect to context); (2) interpretation of *promised*, joining it with the result of step 1; (3) interpretation of *to defend the constitution*, joining it with the result of step 2, i.e. with the interpretation for *He promised*. The unit used in step 3 can itself also be viewed as the result of a series of interpretative steps, i.e. as having internal structure (see also Daalder 1989, Pardoen 1993, in preparation), but this is not relevant for present purposes. For other applications, see the references cited, and Verhagen (1993; to appear).

4 The fact that in Dutch one does not normally hear things like *Het weer weigerde op te knappen* ('The weather refused to get better'), even though it does not sound impossible, might be attributable to the existence of *niet willen* ('not want to') as a standard way of expressing such messages, as in *Het weer wilde maar niet opknappen* ('The weather wouldn't get any better').

5 In this particular case, it seems plausible that the subjective uses of the verbs are later than the objective ones. Cf. Traugott (1993).

6 Cf. Sanders et al. (1992), for a discussion of several types of fundamental coherence relations.

7 See also Nølke (1992) for an introduction into the theory of linguistic argumentation by Ducrot and Anscombre. Another approach that is worth mentioning here is that of Relevance theory (Sperber and Wilson 1986), since this is also explicitly concerned with mechanisms by which inferences are licensed. Especially their notion of 'strengthening of an (accessible) assumption' seems to be applicable to at least some of the issues raised in this chapter; on a theoretical level, it is not clear though, that their views are compatible with the other theoretical approaches mentioned in the text.

8 These brief remarks, of course, in no way constitute an *analysis* of the meaning of particles like *well*. I only use them here as evidence for the applicability of the concept of argumentation.

9 The (conceptual) presence of a promisee allows for differences between evaluation by the conceptualiser and by the promisee. Imagine the sentence *John promised his mother to be home early* being produced as an explanation of John's leaving early by someone who actually regrets this event. Then the event is presented as positive for the promisee, but less so with respect to producer and addressee. Similarly, a particular event may also be interpreted as negative for the promisee, but positive from the point of view of the promiser (and the conceptualiser), as in *She promised (him) to make him regret his unfaithfulness for the rest of his life*. Without a promisee, the addressee is generally oriented towards a positive evaluation of the event unequivocally.

10 Whether evaluation plays a role in the argumentational orientation of *refuse* is not so clear. The naturalness of both (i) and (ii) suggests that it does not:
(i) *Unfortunately, he refuses to accept my invitation*
(ii) *Fortunately, he still refuses to betray the hiding-place of his comrades*
On the other hand, especially *subjective* use of *weigeren* seems to suggest that the thing not happening is something desirable (cf. the presupposition with the objective use, that the act refused had actually been requested from the subject). It is somewhat strange to say something like *Fortunately, the engine refused to get warm*. This implies *two* subjects of consciousness: one evaluating the event negatively (for *refuse*), and one evaluating it positively (for *fortunately*).

11 I want to thank Luuk Lagerwerf for helping me find out the context of this particular fragment.

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7 Subjective meanings and the history of inversions in English

Dieter Stein

1 Purpose

The history of inversions in English is particularly relevant to the notions of subjectivity and subjectivisation, since several facets of these notions are directly involved in the meaning history of this syntactic structure. Some types of inversions in English have distinct 'emotive', 'expressive', 'subjective', or 'discourse' meanings, which historically have not always been attached to this syntactic structure. This chapter tries to analyse the mutual relationship of structural history and the history of the subjective meanings of inversions.

2 On subjectivity

In the literature at large and in the chapters in this volume there seem to be five notions of subjectivity and subjectivisation:

1. A general notion of subjectivity in the analysis of literature, such as expounded in the analysis of *Tristram Shandy* by Iser (1988). This is closely related to the concept of individualism. This concept is about the – predominantly literary and artistic – expression of subjective feelings and emotions. It is about the relationship of the artist and the subject of his message.
2. Related to 1: the language of such literature as the vehicle of expression in texts belonging to type 1 may be called 'subjective' to the extent that the flow of thought represented and the feelings communicated concern 'emotions' in the narrower sense. Subjective language and individualistic writing may not contain emotional language, such as expressing feelings like anger, joy, despair etc. The best common denominator is 'expressive' language in the speech-act sense.
3. To the extent that all manner of language usage contains an inbuilt perspective of the speaking ego, subjectivity in a wide sense of deictic

anchoring is inherent in all language use and to some extent encoded in the language system. Very likely it is here that an etymological and metaphorical connection may be found between the grammatical notions of 'subject' and 'subjectivity' or 'subjectivisation'. Kuno and Kaburaki (1977) point out that the subject is the unmarked anchoring point for speaker empathy. It is the me-now-here origo of viewing. This slot – the one to the left in English – is also the one to which material is being moved which is emotionally salient and enters the speaker's mind the first time (but see section 6). It may be speculated that the subject position is the bleached, grammaticalised ('subjectified', in the sense of 4 below) position of the emanational locus of subjective viewing.

4. Subjectivisation in the Traugottian sense of transfer into the speaker's mind (Traugott 1989; this volume). This is primarily a diachronic concept and designates the unidirectional semantic development observed in a great number of grammaticalisation processes. This version of the concept refers to semantic developmental directionality in individual morphemes.

5. Subjectivity in the sense of Langacker (1990) is primarily a synchronic concept and designates the 'construal' of referents or processes as either objective or subjective, depending on the degree in which the speaker is also 'on-stage'.

While most of the chapters in the present volume make explicit reference to, and elaborate on, – mostly – one specific version of subjectification and subjectivity, it is suggestive to think of the versions of this concept as not unrelated, such as a relationship between 3 and 4 above. Also it may be suggested that the presence of a type 1 text tradition necessitates the availability of lexicalised, if not grammaticalised, means of expression as in type 2.

3 Inversions

To the extent that the semantics or the functions of inversions are at all discussed, it is widely recognised that some inversions have 'emotional', 'expressive' meanings and discourse functions (Green 1980; 1982), which have not always existed in English. The rise of these and whatever other meanings is the subject of this chapter. It is clear that this approach has to concentrate on the functional aspect of inversions, while other analyses may concentrate on the formal or exclusively structural

aspects (for example, Stockwell 1984; Coopmans 1992; for a modern functional analysis of inversion, see Dorgeloh forthcoming). The following discussion will make clear that the two aspects are closely bound up with each other, but will focus on the functional aspect.

That subdepartment of the history of English word order called 'inversion' will be treated here only to the extent that it is relevant for the present perspective. The history of subject-finite verb inversion (as in 'in came Chomsky', or 'never would he go to the movies') is part of the wider history of word order in English. Thus it is obvious that preposings are an equally good candidate for the analysis of discourse meanings.

The restriction to inversions is due to the present state of the analysis of historical data as part of a larger research project on the history of word order. At the moment, data on inversions are available only to the extent that empirically based claims can be made. That such an analysis is urgently needed is evident even in synchronic approaches to the analysis of the function of inversions in Modern English. Green (1980:598) observes that inversions 'may be semi-frozen relics of processes more productive in an earlier stage of the language', and that what is left in Modern English of older verb second constraint (henceforth V2) 'may have to be sought in a historical description rather than a synchronic one'. Stockwell (1984:589) notes that 'a good deal of searching and counting remains to be done'. Up to now, with the exception of Schmidt (1980), Jacobson (1975; 1981) and Jacobsson (1951), there has been a lack of corpus-based diachronic studies of inversions. The most comprehensive survey of inversion types in present-day English is Erdmann (1979).

The initial basic facts about inversions, providing a starting-point for further analysis are as follows:

- from Old English with plenty of V2 (verb second) a decrease of types of inversions until Early Modern English (*c.* 1800).
- absence of 'emotional' meanings in Old English, – the acquisition of this type of meaning is a more modern development.
- grammaticalisation of SVO (V3, verb third) as a gradual process between late ME and Early Modern English (say 1500).

4 Markedness and semantics of inversions in present-day English

Green (1980; 1982) and Schmidt (1980) have demonstrated in detail that inversions in English have distinct meanings and functions in English.

To cite two examples:

(1) a. Bitterly did they repent their decision.

b. Bitterly they repented their decision.

c. They repented their decision bitterly.

(1a–c) represent a cline of emotional expression, with (1a) most emotional and (1c) least. (1a) is clearly the most heart-felt. In addition, (1a–c) represents different degrees of archaism, or literariness, in the same order as the emotionality cline.

(2) a. Embalmed were two dozen corpses.

b. Exhumed were two dozen corpses. (from Schmidt 1980)

Although both (2a) and (2b) are unproblematic in terms of grammaticality, one is happier with (2b) than with (2a). In order to make (2a) more acceptable one would have to put in more work in terms of contextualisation such that the act of embalming would be more unexpected in this particular type of situation (cf. below), i.e. it is richer presuppositionally.

The two examples demonstrate that, way beyond grammaticality or not, there are different meanings of an emotional and discourse type attached to different types of inversions in an unmistakable and interindividual (*langue*-) way. At first glance there seem to be different types of such meanings of functions attached to different types of inversions.

It is equally clear that not all structures that show the formal structure of inversions have any emotional or discourse meaning in addition to their propositional meaning (for example, 'said he', 'next comes John'). Nor, as will be shown below, has this structure, while it has been formally present in English, always had the same such range of meanings and functions (to be used interchangeably henceforth). This means that the notion of 'inversion', if examined from the functional side, is by no means the unitary concept that it must be considered if it is broached from the formal side only.

The concept of meanings of inversions seems tied to the notion of deviation from an unmarked pattern. In both groups of examples (1 and 2) the versions with unmarked word order (SVO) preserved seem not to have those additional meanings, or clearly less so:

(1) c. They repented their decision bitterly.

does not have the same emotional acuity as (1a).

(2) c. Two dozen corpses were embalmed.

and

(2) d. Two dozen corpses were exhumed.

are much less dramatic than (2a) and (2b).

Compare (3a) and (3b).

(3) a. In came Chomsky.

b. Chomsky came in.

The version that departs from unmarked word order (3a) has an additional special meaning effect which (3b) does not have.

What is involved is the same meaning generation mechanism that is active in other areas of the grammar. Additional meanings are created as 'motivated choices' in the Hallidayan sense in the same way as in the following example:

(4) Him I killed.

The rise of an additional meaning as in (4) through the marked choice of word order is based on the evocation of a 'presuppositional set' (Enkvist 1979) of candidates from which a choice is made, the other candidates being discarded. The candidates (a range, at least two, of people that I could have killed) have been established during the previous discourse.

It should be noted that the structure in (4) has at least two meaning elements:

- A discourse aspect: the candidates have been introduced in previous discourse.
- An affective component: it contains an affective component to the extent that the candidate singled out is in contrast to others or another that had been expected to be killed. This involves an element of surprise which the version with the unmarked order (and normal stress) does not have.

What (4) has in common with the examples of inversion in (1) and (2) is that it contains front-shifted elements. As such (cf. also clefts) they contain an inherent proclivity towards cognitive saliency in the sense of natural sentencing established by Osgood and Bock (1977) and DuBois (1985): what comes to mind first is expressed first. The operation of this natural tendency seems to be the reason for the tendency for left-shifted elements to have some sort of affective meaning in addition to propositional meaning.

There are two centrally important points of logical priority of structural facts over functional possibilities. Mithun (1987 in Payne 1992) has made explicit the relationship between word order and the potential for other meanings to be expressed. Obviously, the generation of additional meanings through marked word order is possible only in a situation in

which a 'hurting' feeling of markedness can arise. This is the case with a grammaticalised SVO order in English. Here, this particular affective, non-propositional meaning cannot have existed before the grammaticalisation of SVO – which created the structural prerequisite for the generation of these meanings. The meanings generated by parallel movements of constituents in German with less firmly grammaticalised SVO are 'weaker' and do not have the same meaning potential as in English.

Beyond these language-specific considerations, it is an interesting question to what degree front-shifting generates additional meanings in languages which are not SVO. Mithun (1995) points out that there is a general prosodic basis for left-shifting material which is the most newsworthy, and which by virtue of that fact has the highest pitch and amplitude level. The drop in prosodic contour – termed 'declination' – correlates with the decrease in newsworthiness. This natural tendency to move the most newsworthy material to the left at the peak of prosodic energy is manifested whenever language structure allows space and flexibility for the operation of these pragmatic principles. Obviously, there seem to be different degrees of newsworthiness, a point that will be taken up in the next section.

The other dialectic with structural facts is based on a paradigmatic fact. In discussing a related domain, VP preposing, Ward and Birner (1992) demonstrate that in order for a non-propositional discourse meaning to arise, it is necessary that a choice exists in that structural slot. This local paradigmatic effect accounts for the absence of such additional meanings in certain cases. In the case of inversions this means that subjective and emotive meanings can arise only where the unmarked, non-inverted form would also be possible.

Various types of inversions have undergone different developments. There are many 'local' developments, even grammaticalisations, as in the case of questions and negation. As such structures are grammaticalised (and there is no choice), they do, of course, not have the meaning potential associated with the freely disposable types. It is with the latter that I will primarily deal here.

5 Classification of inversions

The classification of inversions by different students of the subject varies according to aim and theoretical orientation. For instance, Stockwell (1984) has a syntactic explanation of the history of inversion in mind and sets up a classification different from Green (1982), who has a stylistic analysis in mind. Obviously, for the purposes of the present

analysis, i.e. analysing changes in function, a functional classification is in order. Apart from that necessity arising from the purpose of the study, there are, as Stockwell's (1984) analysis shows, many open problems in a formal account of the history of inversions. Below, we will demonstrate another one.

A consequence of the basic difference between purely formal syntactic and functional analyses of inversions is that the former must treat inversions as a unitary phenomenon. A functional analysis cannot overlook the fact that there are distinct differences in what inversions 'do' in discourse. Green (1982) has shown convincingly that there are very clear differences in the register and varietal associations of different types of inversions. The existence of these connotations is also acknowledged by more formal accounts through the term 'stylistic' inversions (for example, Safir 1985).

Before setting out the classification used here, it should be pointed out that included in the following discussion will be only those inversions which are not grammaticalised, or semi-grammaticalised; negatives and questions, as well as the inquit formula, are excluded.

6 Two types of inversion

The classification applied in the present study distinguishes two categories according to two basic types of functions, type A and type B. Type A is represented by the following examples:

(5) a. In came Chomsky.

b. Down with the rebound comes . . .

c. Beyond it rose the peopled hills.

d. Developing offshore drilling in California are two Texas oil men.

To give a more historical and contextualised example:

(5) e. . . . but the curtain had hardly dropped when the box-door opened, and in came Mr. Love, the man who . . . – I turned away my head, and began talking to Miss Mirvan, for I was desirous to avoid speaking to him; – but in vain, for as soon as . . . he bent his head forward, and said to me . . . (Burney, *Evelina*, 1778, p. 78)

By way of a first approximation to a description of the discourse function of this structure, it may be said that it is 'presentative' in that it puts a referent on stage or into focus. It establishes new topic entities, or a new scene. It is not definitional that one or several new indefinite NPs or

referents are introduced, though this would be a natural consequence of this discourse definition. The essential point is that any – known or unknown – referent may be put on stage. In that new topic elements are introduced, it is a focus-management device. In all of the above examples in (5) one expects the new scene to be followed up by material in which the new topic entities are agents, or are central. For instance, in example (5a), the expectation is that Chomsky is central in what is being said in the further development of the discourse, or that he is centrally relevant to the transactions related. This is, indeed, the point of introducing him in the first place. In example (5e), it is to be expected that the newly introduced gentleman will change the course of action, and so he does; the action takes a different course. This is what is meant by focus-management. To be more precise, it is a focus-change-device: it would never occur at or close to the beginning of a discourse, but some way down the development, after something has been built up that can be changed.

However, this initial description of the discourse function can be considerably sharpened. By being classed as a presentative structure it is no different than the 'there' presentatives. There are, however, as Drubig (1988) points out, a number of significant structural and discourse-related differences between what he terms the 'deictic' type of presentative with inversion and the 'lexical' type with main verb inversion – our type A ('In came Chomsky'). For instance, while the former can occur with any intransitive verb and also transitive ones ('there entered the hall a procession of dancing girls', Drubig's example 12, p. 84), the latter is restricted to intransitives, indeed to a very restricted set of intransitive verbs of motion like 'come' and 'go', or verbs denoting a process of appearing or disappearing.

The deictic type has one peak of intonation only, while the lexical type has two peaks: it is a bifocal structure. This is connected to the main difference in discourse function between the two types. The deictic type ('there', 'here' . . .) is used 'in a situation of optimal perceptual access (Langacker 1985) where pointing is possible, whereas lexical SVI typically occurs in non-optimal situations characterised by the relative distance or displacement of one speech act participant . . . from the region of optimal perceptual access' (Drubig 1988:91). The lexical type is the one occurring in the specific pragmatic conditions of displaced speech, prototypically fictional narrative texts. This explains the bifocal intonational pattern: the preposed constituent identifies or moves into centre-stage of focus; a locality (place or direction) which forms the anchoring or background relative to which a newly focussed entity moves toward a terminal point defined with respect to the observer.

Thus the definition of the observer in a viewing position is part of the semantics of the construction (Drubig 1988:89). The type A inversion is therefore a focus-management device congenial to the communicative pragmatics of a very specific type of discourse. Does this lead to a hypothesis about the historical point of its rise in the functional history of this particular structure? Before considering this question, another aspect of the structure has to be pointed out.

Apart from the discourse function, there is an emotive element. As pointed out above (section 4), there is an element of surprise involved in type A inversions. There is apparently something like a cline of novelty in the introduction of new information in discourse, which ranges from the introduction of new elements – though not necessarily new referents – in a 'neutral' or 'normal' fashion, by putting indefinites at the end of an utterance. It seems useful here to take up the idea of degrees of informativity or newsworthiness as elaborated by de Beaugrande (1980: chapter 4). His first-order informativity concerns the most 'normal' or 'neutral' addition of information. Emotionality is involved only to the extent that any use of language as presentation of novelty carries a degree of interest. Of greater interest in the present discussion is his second-order informativity, which involves cases where 'the strongest defaults and preferences are noticeably overridden' (de Beaugrande 1980:106f.). These cases involving the breaking of expectations have a clear affective component. It is the type of case of second-order informativity that is meant by Mithun's (1995) principle of left-shifting on the basis of a natural, prosodically based cline of newsworthiness from left to right, structure allowing. De Beaugrande's (1980) third-order informativity involves rule-breaking for the sake of foregrounding and is of no interest here. First-order informativity seems to be typically associated with essayist literacy, which arose in England in the seventeenth century as a stylistic ideal of the orderly, linear, unemotional presentation of ideas in ordered portions.

It has been variously pointed out (Akatsuka 1985, Labov 1984) that a high degree of expectation-breaking informativity is automatically associated with affectivity. Bolinger (1989, cf. Ladd 1990) points out that the mere existence of a sentence focus alone already ensures an association with 'interest', and thereby has an affective component. In addition to stating a proposition, the speaker is expressing surprise and affect at the fact that this state of the world should hold. There is a natural affinity of these structures to discourse types where second-order informativity is possible and expected, such as in narrative discourse.

There is an element of constructional iconicity to left-shifting and

second-order informativity. It may be assumed that within the range of second-order informativity cases, there is a correlation between disruption of a normal sentence pattern towards marked patterns and the degree of surprise value. The more expectation-breaking there is, the more signs that materiality has to be expended, i.e. the stronger the disruption of the normal pattern will be. An intermediate degree is given in the use of negative forms (either preposed negation, or additional material like 'do'). A maximal degree is given in marked syntactic structures, like preposings or inversions, which take the place of, or supplement, prosodic features in the spoken language (Bolinger 1989). If negation is high on the ladder of surprise, some structures seem to be even higher on this scale, such as extrapositions to the left ('this man, he makes me furious') or cleft constructions. While the latter are certainly focussing devices (Erdmann 1990), they also score high – higher than simple negatives – on the informativity scale.

It is along this dimension of counter-expectation informativity that this A type inversion must be seen to represent an advanced point, containing both a discourse (= focus)-management element as well as a subjective/affective element of evaluation. With this affective component correlates the fact that inversions are the type of structure which appears in evaluations in stories. Brinton (this volume) notes that inversions are a frequent device in indirect free style, the style whose *raison d'être* is the expression of subjective feelings.

There are further grammatical correlates of this characterisation of type A inversion. First of all, they all involve full inversion (either copula or full verb). This means that, as against semi-inversion, the subject is moved even further to the right of the lexical verb to the very exposed right slot, a position normally reserved for constituents focussed in first-order informativity, a very marked position for a subject in English (but only after the grammaticalisation of the second position as subject). In accordance with this is the finding that the heavier the subject, the better it is. Consider the penultimate sentence in the preceding paragraph of the present contribution ('With this affective component . . .'). Unless contrastively stressed, pronouns are bad, but (5e) is excellent. In addition, type A does not normally occur with compound tenses. This testifies to the 'presentative' or initiating nature of these constructions. The aspectual value of compound tenses would mean that ongoing or continuing states are expressed. Furthermore, they occur with intransitives only. With transitives, the direct object is affected. As an affected entity it is presupposed to be already pre-existing.

It is clear that category A subsumes inversions under a common

semantic function that classifications along different parameters would set up as different categories, such as inversions with preposed participles or preposed directional adverbs. There are, however, good reasons for setting up A as one, if prototypical, category: they are all presentative (in the above sense of focus-management), which coincides with the fact that they all have full inversions. The presentative *par excellence* in English, 'there is . . .', is equally of this formal category, although without the affective component. Section 9 will discuss the reason for this exception. Section 8 will turn up another fact that justifies the treatment of these inversions under one heading.

Type B is more homogeneous, both formally and semantically:

(6) a. Rarely did I hear such overtones of gratitude as went into the utterance of this compound noun.

b. Not until the Book of Splendour did appear in Spain in the thirteenth century did a formidable metaphysical text on cabalism appear.

c. Often did she visit the inhabitants of that gloomy village.

d. Only of late have I learned about the complexities of subjectivity.

e. Never did I hear about cabalism

The definitional feature of this type B is semi-inversion, i.e. inversion of subject and finite auxiliary. The members of this class B include preposed adverbials as well as negative and restrictive elements. This type is more directly emotionally expressive. The sentences in (6a–c) are much more emotionally expressive than their counterparts without the preposed elements with semi-inversion:

(6) e. (without preposing and inversion:)
I never heard about cabalism.

The function of this type B seems very directly to be what type A is only secondarily, namely the expression of affect. It is surely not accidental that a preferred, but not exclusive, environment of occurrence with this type are negatives and restrictives, which are inherently intensive. As pointed out above in a different context, the negation of expectations is inherently emphatic.

There are important differences between types A and B, apart from the differences in structural privileges. In type B the speaker says: '. . . and that is how it affected me emotionally'. The sentence focus is on the preposed constituent and on the constituents following the verb. In (6e)

the focus is on 'never' and 'about cabalism', but not on the subject and the verb. In type A the speaker says: '. . . and here is something happening that is unexpected and will surprise you'. In type A the whole sentence is focussed.

There are therefore two basic types of prototypes of inversions in English with distinct functions. It will be noted that, while type A is more or less freely available, type B is more restricted, and also tends to be slightly archaic and literary-sounding.

7.1 The semantic and structural history of inversions

In section 4 it was pointed out that the semantic history of inversions was dependent on the structural history in so far as the semantic potential rested on the markedness status of the preposed and inverted forms. In particular, the semiotic mechanism presupposes a tightening of SVO. Does this mean that, prior to this process, word order did not have those subjective meanings, or, for that matter, any meaning at all? As far as diachronic detail is concerned the following discussion is based on Schmidt (1980) and Traugott (1972).

In Old English the unmarked word order was probably SVO (cf. Stockwell 1984 and Bean 1983 on the V2 possibility). Apart from SVO there was XVS, which was used to introduce a new event structure: XVS, SVX, SVX, SVX, SVX . . . (Hopper 1979).

In addition, there was obligatory inversion (V2) after 'tha, nu, ne', as in 'ne cunna we iett noht seggan', 'nu gife ic'. There was no functional distinction between full and semi-inversion.

Middle English sees a dramatic decrease of the OE regularities of V2: introductory adverbs like 'nu' or 'tha' are now followed by SVX. There is now an incipient tendency to use XSVO with known and topical subjects, and inverted forms with new subjects. In particular, full inversion is associated with new agents, new referents and new scenes, while semi-inversion comes with focus on individual constituents. It is obvious that this feature of ME inversions initiates the distinction of two rough classes of inversions as set out in the two classes A and B in section 6.

The gradual process of grammaticalisation of SVO (= V3, or XSVO), with the concomitant loss of whatever V2 with inversion occurred, created a new structural situation in which the markedness situation existed which was the prerequisite for the affective meaning of type B and the affective component of type A.

If this statement is a common denominator for both the A and the B type, there are interesting developmental differences.

7.2 The B type of inversions

If, on the one hand, Old English had a fairly regular V2 pattern with the 'tha', 'nu' class, and, on the other hand, Modern English has the B type, the first and natural reaction is to assume a historical continuity of V2: the persistence of a pattern adverb + aux + subject + full verb. Apart from structural arguments (König 1988:63f.), there are significant differences. First of all, in OE the verb could be both a full verb and the precursor of the auxiliary. Further, the OE pattern did not have any affective meaning attached. There was no markedness basis for the generation of such a meaning. Most importantly, the class of preposed adverbials was very different in Old and Middle English. The typical fronted constituents in Old and Middle English were: 'now, then, else, yet, thither, thereon, there, thus, so, right so, for this cause, to + noun'. If direct objects, indirect objects, and prepositional phrases were fronted, they were contrastively focussed. By contrast, from early Modern English onwards, we find as fronted elements with semi-inversion a very different set of adverbials, namely the set exemplified in examples (6a–e), i.e. very heavy adverbials ('very semblably glad I am', 'very sure I am' – More, 1520).

(7) a. . . . justly you make this decision. (Thynne, p. 33)

b. . . . but well may one woman be afraid of many women. (Cavendish, 1664, p. 209)

To add another prototypical example from the late eighteenth century:

(7) c. Yesterday morning, with truest concern, I quitted the dear inhabitants of Howard Grove, and most impatiently shall I count the days till I see them again. (Burney, *Evelina*, 1778, p. 165)

The main difference is the nature of the preposed adverbials: they are heavier, include four nouns, rather than function words, and have the semantic potential of expressing intensity and affect, i.e. are inbuilt emotional. The list given for Old and Middle English contains predominantly items which are connective, without being affective. So there is a drastic change in the semantics of the preposed constituents, which goes hand in hand with a further syntactic change to explain the emergence of the B pattern, new style, in early Modern English. It is the availability of a new syntactic category of auxiliary, including 'do', which supplies the structural potential for the use of this pattern (adv + aux + subj + V) on a major scale. It is not until this point in the history of English that the pattern exemplified by

(1) a. Bitterly did they repent their decision.

becomes available. So what from a purely structural point of view seems at first sight a continuity, is really only a partial continuity in functional terms, and in terms of the privileges of occurrence for preposed constituents. It is a renewal of a pattern that had wellnigh vanished during the course of Middle English.

This renewal, including the quantitative change of trend, is embedded in a stylistic movement: the language of the sixteenth-century literature is characterised as highly emphatic (Borinski and Uhlig 1975). There seems to be a close connection between the rise of this pattern and the stylistic modes of the time. This pattern, typified by example (1a), persists – in the texts studied – until about the eighteenth century, from when onwards it began to fall from favour. It may well be that the period and style affinity of this pattern is the cause for the archaic and literary character of many of the cases subsumed under type B.

7.3 The A type

In section 7.1 it was pointed out that the groundwork for the A type was laid in late Middle English as part of a functional specialisation of full and semi-inversion with respect to differences in focus. Stockwell (1984) notes that this type does not yet come into existence until after Middle English, as a *terminus post quem*. What seems to be certain at this stage of analysis – and is getting increasingly more certain as more texts are analysed – is that this type does not exist as a fully-fledged functional pattern with the properties described above until the eighteenth century. The first examples are cases like

(8) a. This day died Samuel Pepys. (In a diary of 1703, cf. Schmidt)

with a possible affect value not quite as certain as in the following examples:

(8) b. And away he went. (Burney, *Camilla*, 1796, p. 70)

c. Up comes the boy with a new pair of gloves . . . (Burney, *Camilla*, 1796, p. 90)

d. Away I went. (Burney, *Evelina*, 1778, p. 72)

as well as the full example (5e) above.

To the extent that the pattern X + full verb + subject existed in Old English, we have here the same phenomenon as with type B; a case of a structural pattern surfacing again with a different function.

It is an interesting point to consider what triggered this development. After all, Middle English all but phased out this construction. On the reasonable assumption that patterns do not get entirely lost and become recreated *ab ovo* a couple of centuries later, we must assume that the formal pattern (not the function) has been 'dormant', and was re-awakened in the eighteenth century. Why exactly in the eighteenth century? This question is to be taken up, in a larger context, in section 8. At this point it suffices to point out that a verb-initial pattern exists in English which may be a formal continuation of the Old English V1 pattern:

(9) a. Didn't nobody tell me.

b. Boy, do I remember!

c. Was I surprised!

d. Came a terrific flash of lightning and clap of thunder.

e. Bang went the gun.

f. Says actress . . . (sentence initial, not inquit formula)

g. He lied a lot, did that man.

h. And fail he did.

It will be noted that all of these V1 structures (with the exception of (9h) all of them with inversion) are highly marked stylistically, either as very colloquial or American journalese (9f). Most of them are scene-introductory, an overlapping set is highly emotional, all of them carry an amount of intensity, and (except 9f) all of them tend to occur in narratives, as does the A type. None of these inversions was found in the texts studied, nor do they seem to surface in ME and OE texts, a statement subject to further scrutiny. What this shows is that a syntactic pattern 'full verb (very) early' with a prototypical meaning affect/intensity/surprise, as part of discourse management, has been present in English all the time. It seems to have been submerged or dormant for a long time, to surface in written texts only in the newest English, in genres which permit or exploit oral strategies as part of their stylistic gesture – obviously a very modern development. So 'dormancy' may well mean 'not thought to be appropriate to the decorum of writing in earlier periods', with that decorum being strategically more liberal again in modern times.

8 Stylistic factors

One should, of course, be very careful with relating linguistic developments to stylistic or intellectual developments. But, as pointed out in section 2, in the present case it seems too suggestive not to offer a couple of speculations. It seems a priori impossible to discuss syntactic change from the sixteenth century onwards without even considering the potential effect of mass literacy, the rise of a written standard, and the development of stylistic ideals. Given the fact that type A does not surface before the eighteenth century on the one hand, and, on the other, the great attention given to stylistic matters in that period, it is suggestive to see whether there are comments by rhetoricians.

There is, indeed, plenty of comment on the 'arrangement of words'. The Baroque age had been an age of stylistic libertinism, with language use depending on mood, laying open the workings of the mind. The counter-movement was carried by science, the plain style movement, puritanism, and utilitarianism. The mood of the time was against the rearranging of words. Campbell, the Scottish rhetorician, turned against 'affected word-order changes' (Wackwitz 1962:128). Hugh Blair (cited by Wackwitz 1962:145) notes that 'since the Restoration we use fewer inversions'. It is interesting to note (by the examples they give) that what is meant are not inversions in the strict linguistic sense, but all kinds of preposings. What is meant by true inversions is the B type ('bitterly did they repent'). The A type did not yet exist. So the comment was really directed against the emotional type of changes in word order, including inversions, which were felt to be archaic and as belonging to an outgoing type of style, which made visible the working of the mind.

Interestingly enough, Campbell (Wackwitz 1962:145) gives a very modern-sounding definition of natural sentencing reminiscent of the one mentioned in the previous discussion: 'That order of words and members of a period is justly termed natural, which corresponds to the natural order of ideas which compose the thought.' And further: 'Whatever most strongly fixes the attention, or operates on the passion of the speaker, will first seek utterance by the speaker.'

B-inversions and preposings are part of emotional Baroque style, against which an Age of Reason and benevolence turned. The workings of one's own mind should not be intruded upon the other person, 'cares . . . should by no means be obtruded upon our friends' (Steele – cf. Berger 1978).

If these explicit comments go some way towards accounting for the fall from favour of the B type, is there a similar cultural factor which

correlates with the rise of the A type? All that the texts scanned up to now will allow as a very tentative statement is that the first occurrences appear in writings of the Burneys – middle-class women of society. Given the fact that the A type as analysed here is a predominantly narrative type (scene management), one could speculate that it appears as a typical linguistic tool of *Empfindsamkeit* manifested in narrative texts – a case of subjectivity type 1 causing subjectivity type 2 (cf. section 2). It may be a significant fact that the contemporaneous woman writer who is not part of the polite culture – such as Maria Edgeworth – has no inversions in her narrative (a dialect narrative). It may be the case that this need to express subjective feelings prompted recourse to an older (full) verb early pattern (cf. section 7.2), reintroducing it to linguistic nobility. It must remain a speculation – although an interesting and suggestive one – that the rise of the experiential progressive described by Wright (this volume) has to be seen in the same stylistic climate. Generally, early romanticism tended to emphasise the emotional aspects of language again (Rauter 1970: especially 208). Language in its primitive state was supposed to be full of 'inversions' (presumably including also real ones). Blair assumed Ossian's language to be full of inversions, as part of a natural or primeval language state (Frank 1990). Obviously, the intellectual climate did provide correlates to the observed linguistic developments.

There is, however, another aspect which follows from the discussion of the discourse function of the A type as discussed in section 6. Since the discourse function of this type is tied to discourses with displaced speech, it would not be surprising if this new function of an older form arose with the needs of this type of new discourse. The obvious candidate is the rise of modern fiction, as it appears in fully-fledged fashion in the eighteenth century, but in incipient fashion during the early Modern English period. The timing of the appearance of the A-structure does certainly not contradict such an hypothesis, to say the least. Further research involving scanning of more texts of the relevant period will have to show whether that hypothesis can be further instantiated.

9 The overall semantic history of inversions

The history of the semantics of inversion in English is part of the larger story of the semantics of word order in English. With respect to inversions only, and to that extent a preliminary account, it must be stated that the most prominent feature is the dialectic between grammaticalisation and the rise of supra-propositional meanings, as it were. It is the

characteristic of the history of inversions that they are not amenable to an explanation in terms of one single perspective only (section 4), be it formal or functional. Instead they contain several local phenomena and developments which may be marginally or metaphorically related to any mainstream developments that are identified. For instance, it is hard to incorporate the history of the inquit formula, or the occurrence of inversion in enumerations. This is true with a vengeance for the dialectic with grammaticalisation. If, in the Traugottian sense, grammaticalisation involves epistemisation as subjectivisation, grammaticalisation also gives rise to subjective meanings in a different sense. Note that the Traugottian tendencies concern the meaning of morphemes, and in those cases subjectivisation is a development within the expression itself. In the present case, dealing not with morphemes, but with taxemes, the rise of subjective meanings seems tied to the notion of markedness. It seems to involve the same principle of creating non-propositional meanings through deviating from a canonical semantics or syntax, and presupposes their existence, as do the processes described by Verhagen (this volume) who also establishes a connection between subjectivity and word order. It seems, then, that logical priority must be given to the structural history of English. It does not seem to be the case that eighteenth-century stylistics determines the long-term structural history.

On the other hand, the curves and turn-arounds in the functional histories of the syntactic structures under discussion cannot be a possible consequence of structural facts or changes.

The logical posteriority of the meaning potential (cf. section 4) is also transparent in the fact that the presentative *par excellence* in English ('there is . . .') has no emotional/subjective meaning at all. With the grammaticalisation of the subject position there is in this case no more choice in that position, and consequently no more potential to meaningfully deviate – another example of how local developments annihilate all attempts to arrive at a unified account of inversion in English.

Prior to the central structural process, the grammaticalisation of SVO, inversion (or not) did have non-propositional meaning, which is best described as 'textual' or discourse meaning, but no affective meaning. (Things are probably different for preposings of objects!) After the dissolution of the Old English types of inversions, the late Middle English situation shows an incipient tendency for use as a focussing device. The modern developments include the rise of the B type (the emotional type), expressive and subjective in meaning, as well as the rise of the A type, with a discourse-cum-affective type of meaning. The latter type is in part a renaissance of a discourse meaning that

was present in the Old English (VSO) pattern, which did not have the affective component. To that extent the development has gone full circle.

Going back to the types of subjectivity distinguished in section 2, the essential new development was the addition of subjectivity in the sense of 2, which may have been helped or triggered, or whatever – the temporal and stylistic coincidence cannot be overlooked – by subjectivity type 1, i.e. the 'literary' type. It would be interesting to investigate to what extent the rise of this type of non-epistemic subjectification is generally tied to the notion of deviation for this mechanism to work. Finally, subjectivity is involved in the sense of 4 (the Traugottian type), in the grammaticalisation of inversions in question and negation. These cases present epistemisations – subjectivity, not in the guts, as with type 2, but in the logical mind, more congenial to the writing and reading mind.

It has not been customary to discuss the history of inversions, and more generally, of syntactic patterns, in terms of a history of their semantics, in particular with respect to the presence or not of subjectivity. The impression created by the study of inversions from this point of view must be supplemented by the semantic history, in its dialectic with the structural history, of other word order phenomena, above all preposings, to arrive at a more comprehensive picture of the semantics of word order in English, and to be able to compare it to other languages. Needless to say that, to resume the Stockwellian phrase, a lot (more) of counting and text analysis will have to be done.

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8 Subjectivity and experiential syntax

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1 Introduction

There is a historical lag between the way in which subjectivity may be structurally encoded in the grammatical system of any language, and the way in which speakers may (consciously) realise and exploit it for expression. An area which exemplifies effectively the variable relationship between structure and use over time is the domain of literary language. The historical development of literary styles demonstrates a changing consciousness on the part of speakers of the potential held by grammatical resources for subjective expression. This essay is intended to address the problem of historicising subjectivity in the literary language of narrative.

The construal of subjectivity is not straightforward, as is amply demonstrated by the chapters in this volume. The dominant definitions do however offer some guide to interpretation. Elizabeth Traugott's approach is based on the understanding that a speaker's consciousness of self is imprinted in his or her linguistic expression of his or her relation to the world, its events, and its objects. And this understanding informs the now familiar definition of subjectification as 'the development of a grammaticalised expression of speaker attitude to what is said'. Traugott's treatment assumes a clearly historical or at least temporal context for subjectification. By contrast, Langacker's (1985, 1990) notion of subjectivity does not. For Langacker, subjectivity is the implicit presence of a speaker in an expression, for the more overtly or explicitly a speaker is present in an utterance, the more objective that utterance is likely to be. He uses the relationship between audience and actors on a stage to explain this: 'To the extent that these observers are totally engrossed in the performance, thereby losing all awareness of self, their own participation in the viewing process is maximally subjective' (1985:122). Underlying this essentially ahistorical view of subjectivity is the idea that the less marked the language is by the presence of the speaker, the more subjective it will be.

My interest in subjectivity in language is concerned with the extent to which speakers apprehend the subjective structure of language. It seems to me that these processes of apprehension or, more explicitly, recognition, can themselves be addressed and understood only by scrutinising their pragmatics; that is, the ways in which language use makes their recognition manifest. Stylistic variation in the domain of literary language provides a promising arena for this kind of search, not least because the use of literary language could (reasonably uncontroversially) be said to be markedly self-conscious. The treatment resulting here assumes an understanding of subjectivity that may be closer to John Lyons' (1982:102) succinct statement that '[i]n so far as we are concerned with language, the term 'subjectivity' refers to the way in which natural languages, in their structure and in their normal manner of operation, provide for the locutionary agent's expression of himself and of his own attitudes and beliefs'. Lyons' definition allows room for a pragmatic as well as a structural construal of subjectivity, which means that there is space for examining the difference between unmarked (or off-stage) and marked or inscribed subjectivity in language. I am interested in addressing this difference in historical terms.

The marking of subjectivity in literary texts involves the strategic exploitation, for example, of morphosyntactic features which underline subjectivity in non-literary discourse. Another way of putting this is to talk about the textual realisation of subjectivity – the manifestation or development of what I shall call 'experiential' syntax. Now it might not be the case that the subjectivity of syntactic structure declares itself in any particular way in literary texts. It may not be evident in the markedness of a single feature. Instead we have to look to a matrix or combination of features.

This realisation of subjectivity as a collection of features is perhaps most clearly indicated in the linguistic construction of a style such as *free indirect style* (*erlebte Rede*, *empathetic narrative*), 'where tense is based in the point of view of the narrator, but other time and place expressions are based in the consciousness of the characters' (Traugott and Pratt, 1980:403). Not surprisingly, neat yet comprehensive definitions of FIS are as difficult to find as satisfactory definitions of subjectivity. Arguably central to FIS is what Adamson (this volume) calls the WAS–NOW paradox, which is directly embodied in a past tense in construction with a proximal deictic temporal adverbial. It prompts readers to 'reconstruct two separate deictic centres, and to relate events simultaneously to the spatio-temporal position of both a narrating subject and a narrated subject'.

The distal past tense that specifies an event as remote from the

narrator combines systematically with a proximal temporal adverb specifying it as close to a character to establish an empathetic relation between narrative and character consciousness. So proximal deictic adverbs and demonstratives (*now, here, this, these*) invite the inference of what Adamson calls 'a speaking subjectivity describing the events and thoughts of current experience', while third person pronouns (*she, he, they*) and past tense suggest 'the presence of another voice for whom the experience is remote or fictional'.

2 The experiential progressive

2.1 Literary discourse

I am going to examine the historical pragmatic role of the English progressive (*be* + *ing*) construction in the textual or literary construction of experiential syntax. The subjective pragmatics of the progressive are relevant to the linguistic study of free indirect style, in terms of how we infer the simultaneity of narrated events and the represented act of consciousness. This use of the progressive is not a narrative backgrounding function.[1] For one thing, its main clause position focusses a non-punctual event in the sequence of narrative. Susan Ehrlich (1990:89) has drawn attention to the contrast of simple and progressive aspect in approaching the interpretation of represented speech and thought (RST), remarking that 'the events described in progressive aspect are understood as a character's observations or perceptions (i.e. relayed through the consciousness of a character) because they are contemporaneous with that character's thought events'.[2] It is not, however, necessary to focus on the property of (temporal) simultaneity. Traditionally, as Fludernik (1993:308) observes, perception is explained as a 'punctual directedness of the perceiver's gaze in relation to which perceived activities appear to be simultaneous'. In such an approach, the customary 'simultaneity' meaning is reflected in the (past) tense, while the perception itself is identified with the pattern of incidence; as she elaborates, 'while something is going on, PERCEIVER'S gaze impinges on it'. Fludernik herself goes much further than this, arguing that what she calls 'the perceptual implication', the 'consciousness factor' of the construction, is primary.

I suggest that the progressive is one resource in the systematic combination of grammatical elements characterising the linguistic structure of this literary style. Consider the following extract from Doris Lessing's novel, *The Fifth Child*, in which the progressive features prominently in both dialogue and narrative:

(1) 'Listen', said Harriet. 'I don't think you understand. I'm not just going away, you know. I've come to see my son, and that's what I'm going to do.'

He knew she meant it. He slowly nodded, as if saying, Yes, but that isn't the point. He was looking hard at her. She was being given a warning, and from someone who was taking the responsibility for it. He might be a rather pitiable young man, and certainly an overtired and inadequately fed one, doing this job because he could not get another, but the weight of his position – the unhappy weight of it – was speaking through him, and his expression and his reddened, smoke-tired eyes were severe, authoritative, to be taken seriously. (1988:80)

The paragraph following Harriet's statement provides an interpretation of the utterance. The narrator's position in this extract is utterly effaced by the points of view or perceptual perspectives of the characters. The first response presented apparently belongs to Harriet's addressee, the young man: 'He knew she meant it', but it is actually Harriet's interpretation of his reception of her warning. She interprets his look ('He was looking hard at her') in terms of what it signifies in words, making this connection between senses, this inference from looks to words, quite explicit in the expression 'as if saying'.[3] Her consciousness, her understanding, is behind the passive statement 'She was being given a warning'. It is striking that the agent issuing the warning is not mentioned at all; indeed, the receiver of the warning, 'She', is thrust into the foreground, syntactically speaking, and the fact that she is in the very process of realising this is marked by the progressive. There are no endpoints to this process of realisation – or to her inference that the warning is unmistakably located in the young man's look. In Fludernik's terms, the

> incidence can be identified with an awareness of interruption of ongoing being, state or activity. Action, that is, impinges on a consciousness, and this consciousness is signalled in the text by the use of a 'perceptional' tense . . . the perception seems to be part of the contextual meaning of the language, but the expressive features mark the perception as consciousness. (1993:309)

The progressive thus dominates this piece of text, continuing the sense that it is Harriet's view rather than the narrator's in which we are being involved.

Lessing's writing here exemplifies the narration of thought more clearly than the narration of successive events. Moreover, it is suffused by the perspective of the main character, Harriet. The inference that Harriet is the psychological centre of the narrative depends on our

ability to make it coherent. We manage this (almost as a matter of course) by following the movement of one character in relation to the actions and words of others, that is, working out the extent to which we are manoeuvred towards one or the other. The passage is striking for the sense of a character reflecting on a situation from inside it. There are no end-points, no successive events each with a beginning and an end. And as we reflect upon the situation through the character's eyes, so the tense framing the construction is rendered as a purely formal category. The dominant tense is the conventional past narrative tense, which has no real, temporal significance. Indeed, the lack of any temporal (as opposed to narrative) weight borne by tense is emphasised as the progressive draws us into the experiential purview of the character.

The construction occurs in the dialogue as well as in the narrative of this excerpt. Here, in contrast with the narrative, it occurs in the present tense. These present progressives, however, do bear temporal significance, though each token is quite different. The first is a negative present progressive with *go* as an activity verb. In the simplest terms, this expression situates the speaker's proposed action (actually, lack of action) in her present and immediate future, her *now*. But it has other expressive meanings. Most notably, it provides the listener (and thus the reader) with the speaker's assessment of her situation as requiring an urgent and aggressive response. Her choice of the progressive (rather than, say, a modal verb construction like 'I won't just go away') indicates unmistakably that her decision is immediate and firm. Her resistance almost amounts to a threat.[4] By contrast, the second present progressive, 'I'm going to', is a straightforwardly idiomatic expression of intention to act soon in the future.[5] The thing to notice is that the temporal significance of the tenses used with the construction in narrative (typically past) and in dialogue (and conversation) respectively varies. The specifically temporal significance of tense in narrative, compared with the function it has in dialogue, is negligible.

2.2 Conversation

It is reasonable to assume that the experiential status of the progressive colours its conversational incidence as much as its extended use in narrative and in dialogue in this literary style. The pragmatic analysis of the progressive in modern English conversation indicates that this is another, non-literary, context where the construction serves as a strategy for speaker-expression. The basic interpretation of the progressive as aspect in Modern English concerns the temporal organisation and linear dissection of situation types (events, states,

achievements, etc.). But the *experiential* meaning of the progressive is arguably non-aspectual; it is not always or directly apprehendable in truth-conditional terms, and is not even temporally salient. It focusses not on an event in time, but on the (speaking) subject's consciousness of being inside an event, state, activity, looking out. It is a foregrounding strategy, focussing on an experience, perception, observation from inside the speaker's consciousness. This function of the progressive tends to occur in the present tense in conversation, rather than in the past tense typical of narration, and is expressive of a speaker's consciousness rather than of a narrated subject's consciousness.[6] So the choice of a progressive draws attention to the stance or positioning of the emotional experience of the speaker with respect to what is being talked about.

The experiential progressive is common in present day conversational English, though it is often considered secondary or special compared with the aspectual progressive. The *experiential* progressive has been described variously as 'emotive', 'vivid', 'interpretative', and 'phenomenal'. Ljung (1980), for example, draws on the link or contrast between the description of an event or action (what is true) and the implications that its interpretation has for the situation in which it occurs. And he argues that the non-aspectual (experiential) progressive is 'interpretative' or evaluative in force. The present-day English progressives in (2) invite subjective construal on the grounds that they signpost the speaker's interpretation or evaluation of some state of affairs. These utterances are speaker-centred in so far as their meanings are contingent on, and only calculable in terms of, the nature of the interpretation or evaluation they express in particular given contexts. In effect, (2a) says that the speaker concludes from what her interlocutor has said that he does not love her anymore. This is the only meaning that the speaker offers of her reading of the situation, and, while it might be shown subsequently to be a wrong reading, and one not intended by the interlocutor (for instance, by the interlocutor cancelling explicitly the implicature inferred by our speaker), it is wholly indicative of what the speaker believes the situation to signify. Truth-conditions are therefore not relevant to the interpretation of this utterance; it would not be correct to say that (2a) has a *true* meaning; it has a speaker-meaning rather than an objectively or demonstrably false one. The source of the resulting experiential force of these utterances is thus not in any truth-conditional or aspectual function:

(2) a. You're telling me you don't love me anymore.

b. You're imagining things.

c. I'm not talking to you.

Leech (1971:21) argues that uses of the progressive like these focus on the consciousness of the speaker in the act of sensation, perception, or cognition, and that they are 'intended to describe active perception or cognition'. While these utterances could be interpreted in a routine manner in terms of general aspectual notions like duration, temporariness, iteration or framing, each reads more pragmatically as an interpretation of the situation in which the speaker finds herself. This function amounts to an expression of the speaker's epistemic stance and perspective of a given state of affairs. So returning to (2a), it functions as the speaker's evaluation of her interlocutor's utterance in terms of the real salience of the performance witnessed – the speaker focusses the meaning as interpretation by foregrounding it with a speech-act verb *tell*. (2b) arguably can serve only as an interpretation or evaluation of the interlocutor's (mental) action since the speaker has no access to his mental processes. Finally, as (2c) is actually said, it can only be an imaginatively expressed evaluation, for otherwise it is blatantly a contradiction. None of these utterances is odd or peculiar in ordinary usage; they simply do not serve a primarily aspectual function. This use of the construction interprets the speaker's attitude and perspective of the situation; and, in so doing, conveys her epistemic stance at a particular moment in the context of utterance.

I have offered a brief survey of two apparently distinct sites in which the progressive has a subjective function: the literary discourse of *free indirect style*, and modern conversation (which, as I have illustrated above, may also find literary representation in the language of fiction). The question is whether there is any, specifically historical, relation between the two. The progressive construction *per se* is extremely sparse, particularly in literary texts until the eighteenth century.[7] So what of the historicisation of the progressive's subjectivity in literary texts?

3 In search of the experiential progressive in history

I suggest that the subjective meanings of the progressive that are conventionalised in *free indirect style* as a narrative style are already available in non-narrative discourse long before the conventionalisation of *free indirect style*. If subjective meanings may be pragmatically inferred from the choice of the progressive construction in non-literary, non-narrative discourse at least as early as the seventeenth century, though unmarked, the progressive may be a powerful and active

resource of the expression of subjectivity in spoken, natural discourse long before it is identified as a feature with the potential for subjective expression in literary discourse.[8] Furthermore, there may be a time-lag between its appearance as an innovation and its regular and systematic occurrence as a strategy for subjective expression (in written, particularly, literary discourse). This latter possibility is suggested by the sporadic occurrence of the experiential (present) progressive in the language of intimate, private letters from at least the seventeenth century onwards. The expressive uses to which letter writers like Dorothy Osborne and Lady Mary Wortley Montagu put the construction are strikingly similar to the modern conversational use of the construction.[9] These writers convey very clearly what their interpretations are of the situations and events being referred to, and leave little doubt about their attitudes both to what they are talking about, and to their correspondents. Here are some brief illustrations:

(3) a. *I am combing* and *curling* and *kissing* this Lock all day, and *dreaming* ont all night. (*Dorothy Osborne* (1652–4))

b. Daughter, daughter, don't call names. You *are always abusing* my pleasures, which is what no mortal will bear. Trash, lumber, sad stuff, are the titles you give to my favourite amusements. (Lady M. W. Montagu to Lady Bute, 30 September 1757. *Lady Mary Wortley Montagu* (1713–76))

It might be considered necessary at this point to justify reading these instances of the construction as experiential or at least expressive in force. Such a justification relies on the validity of historical pragmatics as a method of investigation – being able to reconstruct implied or contextual meaning from the available resources – since the grammars roughly contemporary with these texts reveal that the progressive construction, even in formal syntactic terms, was very poorly understood. John Fell (1784:121–3) tries to explain the present progressive, saying: '[it] denotes the continuance of the action, passion, energy, or state, expressed by the verb'. Although we might be tempted to construe the terms *passion* and *energy* as marking subjective, involved meaning, this interpretation must be more suggestive than dependable.

In the absence of any substantially informative treatment of these early experiential progressives, it is possible to draw on a set of typical collocational features to help identify potentially subjective meanings of the construction. These formal features might guide an historical pragmatic reading. For example, it might be argued that main clause (as opposed to subordinate clause) occurrence of the construction disposes

the reader to infer the progressive's foregrounding rather than backgrounding function. Both Dorothy Osborne and Lady Mary Wortley Montagu adopt main-clause progressive constructions, pushing the verbal expression into the syntactic foreground. One consequence of this is the focalisation of action or emotion. In addition, lexical support for the progressive in the guise of evaluative, affective, or evidential manner adverbs draws attention to the expressive communicative force associated with the construction. Lady Mary's somewhat weary *always* seems to bear this out.

An important lexical feature that may distinguish the experiential use of the construction is the verb-type patterning with it. Private (including perhaps cognitive) verbs are transparently more likely to support an experiential or expressive reading than the use of activity verbs. Dorothy Osborne uses verbs such as *dream* and *kiss*; Lady Mary chooses the expressive, clearly interpretative *abuse*. The identity of person in subject position (first, second, third person) is also, quite obviously, likely to contribute to, and emphasise, the sense of the construction's expressive (as opposed to reportive or backgrounding) function. First-hand experience can be expressed by a first-person subject, whereas, if predicated of second or third person, experience can only be offered by a speaker as inferred, interpreted, or evaluated (as in the conversational example (2b) above). So Lady Mary's accusing second person leaves no room for doubting that this expresses her judgement of the situation.

These features – syntactic environment, lexical support, verb type, and subject – combine to provide a reasonable basis for inferring experiential meaning in particular uses of the progressive. Because they provide solid, material aids to pragmatic interpretation, the earlier the text, the more important these features may become in identifying an experiential progressive. Indeed, if they reliably support experiential readings of the progressive in non-literary texts as early as the middle of the seventeenth century, they may be useful in diagnosing experiential progressives in other kinds of texts of the same period.

3.1 The historical 'dialogue' of prose drama

In trying to historicise the experiential progressive as a syntactic strategy for encoding subjectivity in literary texts, it is important to find some historical juncture where we can identify its potential for subjective expression, however sporadic its actual instantiation may be. The Helsinki Corpus of Early Modern English provides the appropriate collection of representative text samples for the period between 1500 and 1710, and so allows a diagnostic search for the construction in a

body of material from a period contemporary with the letters mentioned in (3) above. A rapid search through the Corpus revealed that the construction's occurrence increases in frequency overall in the subperiod 1640–1710, compared with earlier subperiods.[10]

In trying to explore the gap between non-literary and literary discourse types as regards the subjective pragmatics of the progressive, it seems reasonable to consider a literary genre from this period whose form is comparable to a greater or lesser degree with naturally occurring discourse. Ideally, scrutiny of such a genre might provide some sense of the nature of the pragmatic function of the progressive in antecedent texts that could be considered to preserve discourse types similar to conversation. Prose comedy is a written genre primarily concerned with the representation of dialogue and its performance.[11] There is some attempt to represent speech, however artificial we may judge the result to be, so it allows a degree of comparability with the kinds of example dealt with by linguists examining the present-day construction.[12] The study of the progressive in selected prose comedies from 1670 to 1710 essentially supports my contention that the experiential progressive is available as an expressive resource, albeit sporadically and inconsistently employed, in a form of discourse considered (perhaps not unproblematically) to be close to non-literary spoken discourse.[13] Briefly, an examination of the progressive's distribution (across main and subordinate clauses), collocation (with past and present tense), and frequency demonstrated that, though the construction is sparse overall, it occurred most frequently as present-tense forms in main clauses.[14] The large proportion of progressive tokens in main-clause environments (as opposed to subordinate-clause contexts) suggests that seventeenth-century playwrights were aware of the foregrounding function of the progressive construction in performance. It is possible, too, that, in its non-aspectual meanings, they recognised the potential for subjective expression.

A quick examination of the collocational contexts of some of these main-clause progressives is instructive. It is clear, for example, that most main-clause uses are straightforwardly aspectual, and not experiential at all. However, the other collocational features discussed turn out to be important in exposing occurrences which may be read as being experiential in force. For instance, the progressive frequently occurs in main clauses with verbs of report, predictable perhaps in performative, purportedly conversational texts. Some of these verbs are richly expressive, like *consider*, *rave*, *ruminate*, *debate*, *praise*, *brag*, *cry*, *presume*, *reckon*, *whisper*. Often, less expressive verbs like *talk* and *tell* may pattern with the progressive to convey the cognitive or emotional

stance of the speaker, rather than simply describing an act or event. In these cases, they contribute to the expression of a speaker's construal or interpretation of an act or event. So in Congreve's *The Double Dealer*, Maskwell raves on:

(4) < MASKWELL > Let me perish first, and from this hour avoid all sight and speech, and, if I can, all thought of that pernicious Beauty. Ha! but what is my distraction doing? I *am wildly talking* to myself, and some ill chance might have directed malicious Ears this way. (Congreve, *The Double Dealer* V.i.43–7)

Here, *talk* occurs in a first-person present progressive construction, lexically supported by the clearly affective adverb *wildly*. Following a self-directed question, itself modal in force, Maskwell's answer is his emotive interpretation or gloss of what he is doing. The verb *think* is a prominent modal instrument for conveying characters' attitudes towards themselves and towards one another. The following example, from Congreve's *The Way of the World* (1700) is strikingly modern in its interpretative force:

(5) < FAINALL > No, I'll give you your Revenge another time, when you are not so indifferent; you *are thinking* of something else now, and play too negligently. (Congreve, *The Way of the World* I.i.5–7)

The pragmatic force of Fainall's choice of the progressive with *think* is very similar to the present day conversational examples offered in (2) above. The particular combination of present tense, second person, and main-clause context cumulates to underline the experiential force of the construction in this example. It is striking that the examples in (4) and (5) are not dissimilar in force and form from the conversational progressives (or indeed from the epistolary ones) discussed above. The collocational props clearly help to identify the progressive as a syntactic resource for expressing a speaker's or character's attitude towards what is being said or done.

The progressive's collocation with interpretative verbs in main clauses results in witty commentary on activities rather than description. The conversational progressive observed in Congreve's use is given a rhetorical turn in Wycherley's *The Plain-Dealer* (1676):

(6) < MANLY > Damn all these impertinent, vexatious people of business, of all sexes. They *are still troubling* the world with the tedious recitals of their lawsuits, and one can no more stop their mouths than a wit's when he talks of himself, or an intelligencer's when he talks of other people.

< WIDOW > And a pox of all vexatious, impertinent lovers. They *are still perplexing* the world with their tedious narrations of their love-suits and discourses of their mistresses. (Wycherley, *The Plain-Dealer* I.i.505–18)

The progressive plays a signal role in this verbal jousting between the Plain Dealer Manly and the litigious Widow. The temporal or durational *still* provides lexical support for each occurrence, helping to prepare the ground for the balance created by the construction's repetition, and its consequent rhetorical effect. The progressive here occurs with abstract, even psychological verbs such as *trouble*, *perplex*, marking a departure from what might be treated as purely conversational verbs. The subject in each case is the anonymous, or at least general, third-person plural *they*, rather than first or second person, pushing the force of the expression onto the level of generalisation. The wit of this wordplay stems from the transformation of a use of language that is ostensibly typical of conversational banter into a more formally elaborate mode of utterance.

The most affecting and persuasive instances of the experiential progressive in the prose comedies surveyed occur in Aphra Behn's writing. What is striking about her use of the experiential progressive is that, compared with, say, Congreve, it seems more literary than conversational. Of the four Behn plays, *The Widow Ranter* (1690) has the highest number of progressive tokens.[15] This play is noteworthy too because it is not a straightforward situation comedy or intrigue like most of the plays surveyed, but has, according to Hume (1976:211), a 'drastically mixed plot'. A tragi-comedy, it accommodates a complex combination of heroic, tragic elements with high comedy, tolerating as many registers as character types and actions. The progressive's subjective force is most evident in the heroic parts of the play, where it could be said to capture the (self-) consciousness of the speaker in the centre of a dramatic moment. The following examples from intense, highly charged moments of the play are unambiguously interpretative, highlighting the speaker's attitude at the expense of any aspectual meaning. The verbs in these excerpts are predicated of the first person; they are often used metaphorically (*dying*, *fainting*); and most persuasively for an experiential perspective, they occur in the present tense.[16]

(7) <BACON> You've only breath'd a Vein, and given me new Health and Vigour by it. [They fight again, wounds on both sides, the King staggers; Bacon takes him in his Arms; the King drops his Sword.] How do you, Sir?

<KING> Like one – that'*s hovering* between Heaven and Earth; *I'm* – *mounting* – somewhere – upwards – but giddy with my flight, – I know not where.

In this extract (IV.ii), the Indian king is dying at the hands of Bacon, and, as he does, he interprets (aloud) his final moments from the very centre of the experience. The same experiential perspective provides the impulse behind Bacon's description of Love (II.ii):

(8) <QUEEN> Alas for me if this should be Love [Aside

<BACON> It makes us tremble when we touch the fair one; and all the Blood runs shivering through the Veins, the Heart's surrounded with a feeble Languishment, the Eyes *are dying*, and the Cheeks are pale, the Tongue *is faltring*, and the Body *fainting*.

Behn's speakers use the progressive to express momentary, but intense, experiences; experiences that are cognitive or emotional, rather than physical. So the King's last moments are turned into a spiritual journey; love turns the experiencer into a languishing, afflicted body. The occurrence of the experiential progressive in these examples does not appear to represent an unmarked, conversational use. Indeed, their dramatic intensity suggests the conscious exploitation of the pragmatic strength of the non-aspectual progressive.

It appears that a range of experiential meanings can be inferred in the progressives used in the genre of prose comedy in the second half of the seventeenth century. The construction's adoption as a subjective resource is, however, not consistent, as its effects vary from the conversational to the formal, more literary. This variation seems to indicate a continuous connection between the unmarked and marked uses of the experiential construction.

3.2 The grammaticalisation of subjectivity in prose fiction

On the whole, the use of the progressive in the plays discussed seems to be modelled, consciously or unconsciously, on its conversational use. Yet Aphra Behn's dramatic exploitation of the experiential pragmatics of the construction is different. The singular effectiveness of the experiential progressive in her plays in particular, prompted me to investigate ways of finding out how far Behn subjectivises the progressive in her fiction. The question is whether there is any evidence to suggest that she might have recognised the progressive's broader potential for expressing speaker subjectivity. In other words, it is possible that she generalised the experiential force of the construction from one genre to the quite different genre of prose narrative. The alternative is that she might have used the experiential progressive as a dramatic performance feature in the plays, while quite unaware of the progressive's potential for the systematic expression of speaker-subjectivity.

I examined the construction's frequency and distribution in the epistolary and narrative sections of her (1683–4) novel *Love-Letters between a Nobleman and his Sister*.[17] Table 1 summarises the distribution of the construction according to syntactic environment and tense:

Table 3.1. *Distribution of the progressive in Behn's writing*

Genre	Main clause %	Total N	Present tense %
Comedies	70.3	37	75.7
Epistolary	66.7	36	69.4
Narrative	35.4	48	9.1

The relative proportions illustrated in this table distinguish clearly between the comedies and the epistolary sections of the novel on one hand, and the narrative sections on the other. The progressives in the epistolary sections of the novel (Part 1, and a large section of Part 2) are principally in main clauses. They occur frequently in the present tense, they usually collocate with the first person, and they pattern with the intimate, though by this time, rapidly fossilising second-person pronoun *thou*. In a number of instances, the epistolary use of the progressive reflects an almost dramatic self-consciousness. It seems to imprint the subjectivity of the speaker on the text. Of course, given the subjective force of the progressive in the authentic letter extracts (in (3)), it is not particularly surprising to find the experiential progressive in the epistolary section of the novel. At the same time, the dramatic self-consciousness of utterance in Behn's use of the letter-form reflects its strategic use as a literary model.[18] The following are typical instances:

(9) And I at last have recourse to my kind pen: for while I write, methinks *I am talking* to thee; I tell thee thus my soul, while thou, methinks, *art all the while smiling* and *listening* by; this is much easier than silent thought, and my soul is never weary of this converse; and thus I would speak a thousand things, but that still, methinks, words do not enough express my soul; (p. 31)

(10) no, no, thou art not false, it cannot be, thou art a god, and art unchangeable: I know, by some mistake, *thou art attending* me, as wild and impatient as I; perhaps you thinkest me false, and thinkest I have not courage to pursue my love, and fly; and thou perhaps *art waiting* for the hour wherein thou thinkest I will give myself away to *Foscario*: oh cruel and unkind! (p. 100)

Although they are less moderate and more impassioned than Dorothy Osborne is in her letters to William Temple, Behn's characters draw upon the same grammatical resource for subjective expression. But it occurs sporadically and sparsely. Indeed, the construction's collo-

cational properties, with activity verbs (*come, go, approach*) and situation verbs like *attend* and *wait*, confirm that the dominant meaning of the progressive is aspectual (over two-thirds of occurrences). Yet even the aspectual progressive does not exclude subjective interpretation. Although they are certainly primarily aspectual (since they bear on the representation of the internal structure of the situation), the progressives in the second extract (10) tend to connect with epistemic verbs (such as *know*) and clearly modal adverbs (*perhaps*). The effect is to declare the speaker's judgement (appraisal or assessment) of her lover's state of mind. The overall effect of self-consciousness is borne by a matrix of features which are together susceptible to subjective interpretation. The progressive itself, while clearly available for subjective expression, is by no means a marked literary stylistic strategy in the search for self-conscious speaker-expression.

What then of the role of the experiential progressive in the narrative sections of the novel? Predictably, the past tense dominates the narrative frame, and 90% of the progressives in this section are in the past tense. The proportion of main-clause progressives (only 35.4%) is much lower than in the comedies. We might therefore expect there to be even fewer transparently experiential progressives in the narrative. But this is not the case. Or, more accurately perhaps, the progressive appears to be lent subjective force by being itself absorbed into a larger matrix of features which together open a window on the soul of a character. Let me illustrate this:

(11) *This* suffering with *Octavio* begot a pity and compassion in the heart of *Sylvia*, and grew up to love; for he had all the charms that could inspire, and every hour *was adding* new fire to her heart, which at last burnt into a flame; such power has mighty obligation on a heart that *has* any grateful sentiments! and yet, when she was absent a-nights from *Octavio*, and thought on *Philander's* passion for *Calista*, she would rage and rave, and find the effects of wondrous love, and wondrous pride, and be even ready to make vows against *Octavio*: but *those* were fits that seldomer seized her *now*, and every fit was like a departing ague, still weaker than the former, and at the sight of *Octavio* all would vanish, her blushes would rise and discover the soft thoughts her heart conceived for the approaching lover; and she *soon* found that vulgar error, of the impossibility of loving more than once. (pp. 269–70).

Here Behn is apparently using a nascent empathetic narrative style, to adopt Adamson's term. She combines the dominant narrative third-person past tense with proximal deictics – *this*, *now* (and vaguely, *soon*).

The progressive's incorporation into such a nexus invites interpretation as experiential, despite its iterative semantics (note its modification by *every hour*). But she also makes use of tense shift – from past to (gnomic) present – in a rather Sternean narratorial interruption. In this, she deftly combines indefinite specification (*a heart*) with a defining relative in the generalised present to state a truism. But, overall, Behn uses the progressive too seldom and too sporadically for it to be regarded as a consistent member of a matrix of features that could be called a stylistic strategy.

Yet Behn is a passionate writer. She is concerned both to dramatise the romantic stories of her characters and to make them psychologically credible. So what strategies does she use to impassion her narrative? How does she seek to make an imprint of her subjects' psychological stances, and to what extent are these strategies conventionalised?

Her primary grammatical resource for imprinting subjectivity is the deictic system. Free indirect style is predominantly dependent upon the superimposition of the deictic centre of a narrated subject onto that of the narrating subject. This is achieved by basing proximal time and place expressions (such as *here*, *now*, and *this*) in the consciousness of the character, while using the (distal) tense frame of the narrator. Behn's narrative strategies evidently do not adhere consistently or systematically to standard techniques for constructing free indirect style. Instead, she constructs a narrative nexus of proximal and distal by manipulating tense deixis in the narrative body of the novel. Notably, she makes extensive use of the historic present within the narrative past frame. In some of these sections, Behn's language is transparently similar to the rhapsodies of her heroic characters in *The Widow Ranter*. Take the following:

(12) It was thus they passed their time, and nothing was wanting that lavish experience could procure, and every minute he *advances* to new freedoms, and unspeakable delights, but still such as might hitherto be allowed with honour; he *sighs* and *wishes*, he *languishes* and *dies* for more, but *dares* not utter the meaning of one motion of breath; for he loved so very much, that every look from those fair eyes charmed him, awed him to a respect that robbed him of many happy moments, a bolder lover would have turned to his advantage, and he treated her as if she had been an unspotted maid; with caution of offending, he had forgot that general rule, that where the sacred laws of honour are once invaded, love makes the easier conquest. (271)

The historic present occurs in main clauses. All the verbs are emotive; either private ones like *wish* or *languish*, or overtly expressive ones like

sigh. Some, like the metaphorical *die*, are precisely those that occur in the progressive in *The Widow Ranter* (8). This pattern is consistent. Far from moving the pace of the narrative forward, the switch to historic present seems instead to freeze the frame, holding a character's experiential consciousness aloof from the narrative.

(13) They remained thus a long time silent, she not daring to defend herself from a crime, of which she knew too well she was guilty, nor he daring to ask her a question to which the answer might prove so fatal; he *fears* to know what he dies to be satisfied in, and she *fears* to discover too late a secret, which was the only one she had concealed from him. *Octavio runs* over in his mind a thousand thoughts that perplex him, of the probability of her being married; he *considers* how often he had found her with the happy young man, who more freely entertained her than servants use to do. He NOW *considers* how he had seen them once on a bed together, when *Sylvia* was in the disorder of a yielding mistress, and *Brilliard* of a ravished lover; he *considers* . . .

The role of the historic present is actually not very different from that of the experiential progressive in (modern) emphathetic narrative. (Try substituting a past progressive where the historic present occurs.) It alternates with the past tense (notice, in main clauses) to throw the narrative into stasis, to focus on each character in turn as a (new) centre of consciousness. But this exploitation of the historic present does not give the narrative a mimetic glow of oral performance, as Fleischman (1990:36) implies in her suggestion that 'events are represented as if they were occurring before the speaker's eyes . . . speaking of what one *has seen* is to speak of *past news*, of *presents* in the past'. Nor does the shift necessarily replace past-tense *histoire* with timeless, ideal or generic present-tense *histoire*, as Adamson has argued occurs in twentieth-century narratives. The switch to historic present allows Behn to exploit the alignment of self-consciousness with proximity, to centre each character's point of view, instead of elevating the narrative to 'something more epic than simple historical event'. Behn does use a different, gnomic historic present (illustrated in (13)), to signpost the intrusion of the knowing, moralising perspective of the narrator into the story. This clearly contrasts with the proximal (one might say frozen) historic present.

So Behn does have the seeds of a strategy for impassioning her narrative, for constructing an empathetic style. But her own realisation of the WAS–NOW paradox at the heart of the style principally involves the marked manipulation of *tense* as well as temporal and spatial deictics.

4 Concluding remarks and speculations

How to conclude then? First, on the experiential pragmatics of the progressive, and its historicisation as a resource in the construction of empathetic narrative. The progressive is evidently available in the seventeenth century as an instrument for registering a speaker's experiential interpretation of an event or situation. Suggestive illustrative (though not statistically strong) evidence is provided by prose comedy of the period, notably that of Aphra Behn. In this kind of discourse, which might be regarded as mimetic of conversation, its experiential pragmatic meaning is relatively unmarked just as it is in present day conversational English. This is to say that it does not strike the hearer forcibly, but is so much a part of conversational interaction that it is (virtually) below the level of consciousness. It appears, too, in discourse like the private letter, but again it occurs erratically and sporadically, not as a consciously wielded stylistic strategy.

Perhaps because the experiential pragmatics of the progressive in this period appear to be unmarked, that is, below the level of the speakers' consciousness, its occurrence in literary narrative discourse cannot be anything other than sporadic and unsystematic. For what we see illustrated in Aphra Behn's narrative writing is a kind of reconnaissance of the grammar's potential for achieving psychological complexity. And her search for subjective *vraisemblance* takes her into the exploration of deictic shift.[19] It draws her into tasting the literary effects of conversational subjectivity (through the progressive) without properly developing a recipe for consistent use. There is evidently an historical lag between the subjectivity that is pragmatically operative in non-literary discourse, and its systematic construction as literary style.[20]

NOTES

1 For elucidating discussion of this point, see Fludernik (1993:204ff.). Her survey of the functions of the past progressive in narrative contexts has particular relevance for the construal of subjectivity. She acknowledges that the past progressive can serve as a 'consciousness marker in contexts of narrated perception and consciousness presentation in general'. But, she continues, 'for this consciousness operator to become operative, one needs to be able to align such a progressive with an available consciousness or SELF on stage, with what Stanzel calls a reflector-character'. Fludernik goes on to suggest that the past progressive can signal a structural consciousness in a passage of narrated perception, rather than a consciousness that warrants the 'imputation of individual perception'.

2 As Helen Aristar Dry observes (p.c.), 'when we as readers, find the progressive occurring (without overt Reference Time but) with an Event Time that is "now" to a character, we conclude that we are encountering syntax which

reflects his/her consciousness, that is, syntax which only someone in the character's temporal situation could use'.

3 Incidentally, the 'speech–look' connection is extended, from the explicitly hypothetical 'as if he was saying' to the observed connection made between the warning look and the responsibility and authority that the young man represents. And this connection is again achieved through the progressive: 'the [unhappy weight of this position] *was speaking* through him'.

4 The subjective pragmatics of this present-day construction appear to bear out what Adamson (this volume:199) discusses as the subjectivisation of temporal meanings; actually the temporal proximity combined with aspectual meaning denoted by the present progressive seems to be submerged by an emotive proximity (urgency) with experiential, non-aspectual meaning.

5 This idiom is frequently represented by the contraction *gonna*, and is often treated as similar, in its semantics, to the modal auxiliary verbs, notably *will*. Since it is invariant in both meaning and form, it might be treated, not as a progressive proper, but as a fossilised, lexicalised modal token.

6 Past-tense progressive constructions in conversation are usually aspectual. In reporting a previous experience, a speaker might shift from past into present tense (specifically, the historic present), in order to focalise, enhance, or emphasise the force of the remembered, reported experience.

7 Barbara Strang (1982) argues that the progressive becomes fully established as a grammatical construction only in the second half of the eighteenth century.

8 Leech and Short (1981:332 and fn. 10) point out an extended example of free indirect style occurring as early as 1612, and Short suggests (p.c.) that there are instances in *The Canterbury Tales*.

9 See Wright (1987, chapter 6) and (1989a, b) for discussion of early subjective progressives in the non-narrative discourse of personal letters.

10 The Helsinki Corpus of Historical English Texts was developed by Professor Matti Rissanen and his group in the English Department at Helsinki University as a diagnostic tool for the investigation of lexical and syntactic developments in the history of the English language. With the group's permission, I consulted the Early Modern part of the Corpus, which contains text samples representing a range of genres and written and speech styles. Text-types include prose narrative, prose comedy, personal and official letters, diaries, statutes, handbooks, and sermons. Here is a summary of the Helsinki Corpus findings:

	subordinate clause				main clause			
period	Total	past	present	other	Total	past	present	other
E1	14	13	1	0	10	2	5	3
E2	22	19	2	1	14	5	9	0
E3	53	26	20	7	31	21	10	0

E1: subperiod 1510–1570;
E2: subperiod 1570–1640;
E3: subperiod 1640–1710.

11 Strang (1982) argues that extended prose narrative is the medium most conducive to analysing and clarifying the growth of the construction in the late eighteenth century onward. However, this choice of medium, because it is itself developing as a genre in her chosen period, partially obscures the issue. In particular, it is easy to either confuse or merge the history of the experiential progressive with that of the (literary) genre itself. So it is possible to infer a diachronic line between subordinate, backgrounding, aspectual use of the progressive, and its main clause, foregrounding, experiential use. This gives the impression that the progressive acquires subjectivity as a parallel development to the diachronic relation between historical narrative and psychological narrative styles, in the context of the history of the novel.

12 I agree with Fleischman (1990:65–6) that 'dialogue often strikes us as more "real" than transcripts of actual conversations, which are filled with disconcerting disjunctions, false starts, repair mechanisms, and so forth. Textual dialogue filters out the performance errors, conferring on speech an illusion of grammatical perfection that spontaneous utterances typically lack.'

13 This work is reported fully in Wright, 1994a. I provide a brief summary here.

14 *Percentage distribution of progressive in sixteen prose comedies* (1670–1710)

[16 plays]	Wycherley	Behn	Congreve	Centlivre
Main clause	78	70	68	67
Subordinate	22	30	33	31
100% (N) =	101	74	106	67
Mean per play:	26	21	36	12
Mean % main:	78	67	55.5	67
Mean % present:	66.3	75.7	68.9	76.1

The corpus contains four prose comedies each by William Wycherley (*Love in a Wood* (1671); *The Gentleman Dancing Master* (1672); *The Country Wife* (1675); *The Plain-Dealer* (1676)), Congreve (*The Old Batchelor* (1693); *The Double Dealer* (1694); *Love for Love* (1695); *The Way of the World* (1700)); Susannah Centlivre (*The Gamester* (1705); *Love at a Venture* (1706); *The Busie Body* (1709); *The Man's Bewitch'd* (1709)), and Aphra Behn. The sample for each playwright is about 90,000 words.

15 The other Behn plays are: *The Rover* (1677), *The False Count* (1681), and *The Lucky Chance* (1686). The text used is Maureen Duffy's (1990) edition (*Five Plays*, London: Methuen).

16 Interpretative readings are not precluded from use in the past tense, but the present tense is particularly salient for the intensity of the psychological picture. See notes 1 and 6 above.

17 The text used is Maureen Duffy's (1989) Virago edition. All page references are to this text. For the purposes of comparing the frequencies of the progressive in the novel with the figures gained for the plays, I have normalised the figure for the comedies to 45,000 words.

18 The artificiality of this intimate epistolary style is evident in the use of what is by this time a largely archaic, determinedly poetic use of the singular second person pronoun *thou*. The fact that it is a feature that is adopted rather than being natural to the author is illustrated in the occasional lapse (extract 10) in which the more usual every day second-person pronoun *you* is mismatched with the singular verb form: *thinkest*.

19 See Wright (1994b) for an extended and much more detailed exploration of this issue.

20 Earlier versions of this chapter were presented at the Subjectivity Seminar at St Catharine's College, Cambridge, May 1992, and at the First International Conference on Literary Semantics at the University of Kent at Canterbury, August 1992. I am grateful to Sylvia Adamson, Monika Fludernik, Helen Dry, and Michael Short for their advice and comments on earlier drafts.

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9 Non-anaphoric reflexives in free indirect style: expressing the subjectivity of the non-speaker

Laurel J. Brinton

1 Introduction

The attention of most chapters in this volume is on devices of language for the expression of speaker subjectivity, such as modals, first- and second-person pronouns, place and time deictics, attitudinal nouns, rhetorical questions, and exclamatory sentences. In contrast, this chapter focusses on the devices available – if not in the core grammar, then in discourse grammar – for the expression of non-speaker subjectivity, which is understood as the consciousness of a third person, the inner thoughts, feelings, and perceptions of a person other than the speaker. In ordinary-language use, the need to express another's subjectivity arises only in 'reportive' contexts such as indirect speech. In literary discourse, however, the need to express the subjectivity of others is central, as an author portrays the subjectivity of different characters, from the vantage-point of either the reporting or the experiencing consciousness.

In English, a device for the representation of a non-speaker's subjectivity from his or her own point of view appears to be a third-person reflexive pronoun with no antecedent in its immediate syntactic domain, as in the following examples:

(1) a. John told Mary that as for *himself*, he wouldn't be invited. (Kuno 1987:129)

b. It is *himself* that John likes best. (Cantrall 1974:23)

c. Miss Stepney's heart was a precise register of facts as manifested in their relation to *herself*. (Wharton, *The House of Mirth*; cited in Zribi-Hertz 1989:709)

d. That was one of the bonds between Sally and *himself*. (Woolf, *Mrs Dalloway*, 114; cited in Banfield 1982:91)

I call these 'non-anaphoric reflexives' (cf. Carroll 1986a:137; 1986b:2). I will use a simplified version of the theory of binding here: namely that reflexives are anaphors, that they have antecedents, and that the ante-

cedents c-command the anaphor and are in the same minimal governing category (the same clause) as the anaphor (Zribi-Hertz 1989:697).[1] The above sentences violate either the c-command or the locality constraint on proper binding. While third-person non-anaphoric reflexives may occur in non-literary discourse, they are more common in literary discourse, where they are a little-recognised linguistic marker of the narrative technique known as free indirect style:

(2) a. He still belonged to *herself*, she believed. (Lawrence, *Sons and Lovers*; cited in Banfield 1982:91)

b. And that was exactly it, he thought, he really didn't care too much what happened to *himself*. (Highsmith, *The High Cell*; cited in Zribi-Hertz 1989:709)

The function of non-anaphoric reflexives can be understood in comparison to two related phenomena: logophoric pronouns in certain West African languages and long-distance reflexives in a number of European languages.

2 Non-anaphoric reflexives in English

2.1 Non-anaphoric reflexives in non-literary discourse

Ross (1970:228, 230, 232, 233) was the first to note that certain structures in English permit first- and second-person reflexives without an antecedent in the same clause:

(3) a. This paper was written by Ann and *myself*.

b. Physicists like *myself* were never too happy with the parity principle.

c. As for *myself*, I won't be invited.

d. This is a {picture of, story about, joke about, description of} *myself*.

He uses the fact that these sentences are acceptable with third-person reflexives only when they are complements of a verb of communication (for example, *I told Albert that physicists like himself were a godsend* but not **Physicists like himself were a godsend*) as evidence for his 'performative analysis'.[2]

Kuno (1972:172–5; 1976:158–69; 1987:118–33) accounts for the unusual cases of third-person reflexivisation noted by Ross by what he calls the 'direct discourse' analysis or perspective. That is, a reflexive is

possible in the complement clauses of verbs such as *say*, *tell*, *ask*, and *complain* only if it represents a first- or second-person pronoun in the corresponding direct discourse version:

(4) a. Mary told Tom, 'The paper was written by Ann and me.'
Mary told Tom that the paper was written by Ann and herself.

b. Mary heard from Tom, 'The paper was written by Ann and me.'
Mary heard from Tom that the paper was written by Ann and himself.

c. Tom told Mary, 'The award was won by Ann and you.'
?Tom told Mary that the award was won by Ann and herself.

d. Mary said of John, 'The paper was written by Ann and him.'
*Mary said of John that the paper was written by Ann and himself.

Reflexivisation can occur in the above structures only if the pronoun is in the complement of a 'logophoric' verb (i.e., a verb whose complement represents the thoughts of one of its arguments (Kuno 1987:107–8); see below section 3.1) and if the reflexivised pronoun is coreferential with either the speaker/experiencer or the addressee in the main clause (Kuno 1987:136). Thus, (4d) is not possible since 'John' is neither speaker nor addressee. For Kuno, third-person reflexives are restricted to logophoric contexts, while first- and second-person reflexives are not. However, he notes the acceptability of the following 'discourse fragment', in which a third-person reflexive occurs outside of a logophoric complement (1972:174; 1976:160):

(5) John was worried about what Sheila would do. As for *himself*, he knew the best plan.

He explains this example in the following way: 'It is not the case that the narrator is *reporting*, as an observer, on what John knew. The sentence is the direct representation of John's own point of view, without the narrator's mediating interpretation . . . the narrator has identified himself with John, and is putting out what John felt in the raw form' (1976:160). This process of identification Kuno terms 'empathy': 'the speaker's identification . . . with a person/thing that participates in the event or state that he describes in a sentence' (1987:26). The direct discourse perspective, which 'represents the internal feeling, or its external manifestation, of the referent constituent (agent or experiencer) as if it were the speaker's own internal feeling', is thus directly related to

the notion of empathy (Kuno and Kaburaki 1977:659–62; Kuno 1987:240–5). Finally, an 'empathy constraint' on the use of reflexives requires that a sentence containing a reflexive represent the point of view (be produced from the 'camera angle') of the referent of the reflexive (Kuno 1987:156–7).

Cantrall (1974:21–3) identifies a further six structures in which third-person reflexives violating the c-command and/or clause-mate constraint on binding occur; he terms these 'irregular reflexives'. In the first three cases either the reflexive or the simple pronoun may occur:

(6) a. They placed their guns in front of {*them/themselves*}.

b. John smeared oil on {*him/himself*}.

c. John sees Mary as ill disposed towards {*him/himself*}.

d. The man that John shaves most often is *himself*.

e. It is *himself* that John likes best.

f. This picture of *himself* will make John happy.

He argues that all of these examples are connected with indirect discourse contexts (p. 34) and postulates that a verb of knowing or thinking, whose subject is the antecedent of the reflexive, has been deleted (p. 44). Cantrall makes a number of insightful observations about the function of these reflexives. The reflexive, he suggests, indicates 'that a thought originating in one mind has been revealed to another mind – not necessarily by speech' (p. 35). For example, in the case of (6c), when the non-reflexive *him* is used, the speaker himself is identifying John's perception of Mary's ill will, whereas when the reflexive *himself* is used, the speaker is indicating that John has revealed his perception previously (pp. 95–6). Such reflexives occur in 'dramatic' or emotional contexts in which the speaker 'empathizes' with the third person (p. 45), puts himself in his place (p. 46), or reports how the world looks from his viewpoint (p. 7).[3]

Carroll (1986a:137, 141; 1986b:7) gives an additional nine examples of what she terms 'non-anaphor reflexives', only one of which contains a third-person reflexive in a non-literary context:[4]

(7) There's no way we can stay within those limits. No one can, including ourselves. (BC union leader in CBC radio broadcast)

On the basis of these examples, she establishes the syntactic characteristics of non-anaphoric reflexives. She argues that non-anaphoric reflexives (including picture-noun reflexives, reflexives in *for* subjects of

infinitives, and focus reflexives in topicalised, cleft, and pseudo-cleft sentences) represent a class distinct from both bounded anaphors and pronouns: they are not necessarily c-commanded by their antecedents (1986a:142; 1986b:9–10, 19), and they need not be locally bound (1986a:137, 143; 1986b:11, 19). They may take any NP or no plausible NP as antecedent (1986a:147, 162), and they are referential (1986a:142; 1986b:2, 7, 19). She suggests that since they can occur in the same contexts as bounded anaphors, their distribution is 'more properly the subject matter of discourse analysis' (1986a:137, 139). Although they may be used to establish 'point of view', Carroll believes that this is a conversational implicature, not an inherent part of the reflexive's use (1986b:29–30).

From these accounts of non-anaphoric reflexives in non-literary discourse, two points emerge. First, third-person non-anaphoric reflexives are analysed as occurring in indirect discourse contexts, but as in some way marking the discourse as a direct representation rather than as a report. Second, the reflexives express either 'point of view' or 'empathy': that is, they indicate that the speaker is assuming the viewpoint of the referent of the reflexive or that the speaker is identifying with the referent.

2.2 *Non-anaphoric reflexives in literary discourse*

I have collected a number of non-anaphoric reflexives from a variety of literary texts in English. My examination of these texts suggests that such reflexives are not of high frequency, but occur in a sufficiently wide set of contexts to be considered neither a grammatical aberration nor the stylistic peculiarity of one author.

The relevant features of these irregular reflexives are the following. They occur optionally in environments where simple pronouns occur; they are not in complementary distribution with pronouns:

(8) Indeed, she had the whole of the other sex under her protection . . . for an attitude towards *herself* [*her*] which no woman could fail to feel or to find agreeable. (Woolf, *To the Lighthouse*, 8)

The reflexives violate the two conditions on proper binding for anaphors. First, they are not necessarily c-commanded by their antecedents:

(9) a. She was not clever at all. She thought Ursula clever enough for two. Ursula understood, so why should she, Gudrun, bother herself? . . . For *herself*, she was indifferent and intent as a wild animal, and as irresponsible. (Lawrence, *The Rainbow*, 270)

b. For *herself*, she scarcely ever read the papers. (Woolf, *Mrs Dalloway*, 284)

Second, the reflexives are not locally bound. Either the reflexive and its antecedent are not clause-mates, but occur in different clauses of the same sentence (10), or, more importantly, the antecedent of the reflexive may not be present in the sentence at all (11):

(10) a. Did he, or did he not believe he belonged to this world of Cossethay and Ilkeston? There was nothing in it he wanted. Yet could he never get out of it? Was there anything in *himself* that would carry him out of it? (Lawrence, *The Rainbow*, 27–8).

b. He hadn't had the gift of making the most of what he tried, and if he had tried and tried again – no one but *himself* knew how often – it appeared to have been that he might demonstrate what else, in default of that, *could* be made. (James, *The Ambassadors*, 50–1)

c. Very pleasant, he thought, to have affairs. But for *himself*, what with his height (Napoleon was five feet four, he remembered), his bulk, his inability to impose his own personality (and yet great men are needed more than ever now, he sighed), it was useless. (Woolf, *Jacob's Room*, 143)

(See further examples in I of the Appendix.)

(11) a. The world seemed a dreary place, where nothing else would happen for her – at least until William grew up. But for *herself*, nothing but this dreary endurance – till the children grew up. (Lawrence, *Sons and Lovers*, 12)

b. She was sorry for him; it was worse for him to have this deflected love than for *herself*, who could never be properly mated. (Lawrence, *Sons and Lovers*, 344)

c. What she would say was that she hated frumps, fogies, failures, like *himself* presumably. (Woolf, *Mrs Dalloway*, 115)

d. There had been times enough for a month when it had seemed to him that he was strange, that he was altered, in every way; but that was a matter for *himself*. (James, *The Ambassadors*, 216)

(See further examples in II of the Appendix.)[5] However, true non-anaphoric reflexives must be distinguished from sequences of possessive adjective + noun (*self*), which frequently appear as a single word, and

are thus homophonous. These are not normally bound anaphors. In the following, Woolf plays on the ambiguity between the two forms:

(12) [Clarissa saw] the delicate pink face of the woman who was that very night to give a party; of Clarissa Dalloway; of *herself* . . . She pursed her lips when she looked in the glass. It was to give her face point. That was *her self* – pointed; dartlike, definite. That was *her self* when some effort, some call of her to be *her self*, drew the parts together . . . (Woolf, *Mrs Dalloway*, 54–5)

Non-anaphoric reflexives are generally third person, but first-person non-anaphoric reflexives can be found in novels narrated in the first person:

(13) a. Here are two men; three women; there is a cat in a basket; *myself* with my elbow on the windowsill – this is here and now. (Woolf, *The Waves*, 219)

b. I buried match after match in the turf decidedly to mark this or that stage in the process of understanding (it might be philosophy; science; it might be *myself*) . . . (Woolf, *The Waves*, 349)

The exceptional first-person reflexive in a third-person novel can be considered a case of partial direct quotation (cf. Banfield 1982:114–16):

(14) a. at the same time he doubted whether you could have your Darwin and your Titian if it weren't for humble people like *ourselves*. (Woolf, *To the Lighthouse*, 83)

b. Instantly . . . there issued from him such a groan that any other woman in the whole world would have done something, said something – all except *myself*, thought Lily, girding at herself bitterly, who am not a woman, but a peevish, ill-tempered, dried-up old maid presumably. (Woolf, *To the Lighthouse*, 172)

While these reflexives might appear to be syntactically and referentially 'free', they are not entirely so. First, although non-anaphoric reflexives violate the conditions for structural binding, they appear to be somewhat constrained syntactically. Reinhart and Reuland (1991:289, 312–13) assert that they can only occur in non-argument positions (cf. Napoli 1979:3–10). I have found that the reflexive normally occurs in an adjunct prepositional phrase (for example, as the complement of prepositions such as *for*, *to*, *like*, *of*, *from*, *about*, *than*, *towards*, *in*, *but*); however, four of Zribi-Hertz's examples (1989:707, 720) show the reflexive in direct object position:

(15) a. Maggie looked at him. Did he mean *herself – himself* and the baby? (Woolf, *The Years*, 188)

b. his wife was equally incredulous of her innocence and suspected *himself* . . . (Gerhardie, *Of Mortal Love*, 56)

c. Arthur's fulsomeness seemed to embarrass the Baron as much as it did *himself*. (Isherwood, *Mr Norris Changes Trains*, 132)

d. He added a reference to Overkirk which did *himself* harm in Holland . . . (Churchill, *Marlborough. His Life and Times*, vol. 1, 1976)

Compare also my examples II6 and II7 in the Appendix.[6] Second, the antecedents of non-anaphoric reflexives are neither new nor unknown. Though not within the minimal syntactic domain, they are present in the immediate discourse context. Zribi-Hertz (1989:710, also 716) points out that non-anaphoric reflexives are not used deictically and are always 'bound' in a sense: they 'cannot introduce a new referent into a discourse; in other words, they always . . . require an explicit antecedent somewhere in the discourse'. Their referents are, as Carroll terms it (1986b:8), 'discoursally available'.

3 Related phenomena

A comparison of non-anaphoric reflexives with two related phenomena might be useful in clarifying their function.

3.1 Logophoric pronouns

The first related phenomenon is the 'logophoric pronoun' of West African languages (Clements 1975; Hyman and Comrie 1981). A logophoric pronoun is usually distinct morphologically from both a simple and reflexive pronoun. It occurs in a 'reportive' or indirect context and refers back to an individual other than the speaker or narrator whose words, thoughts, feelings, states of knowledge, or awareness are transmitted in the embedded clause (Clements 1975:141, 171–2; Hyman and Comrie 1981:20). An Igbo example, taken from Hyman and Comrie (1981:19), is given below, in which the non-logophoric (*ó*) contrasts with the logophoric (*yá*):

(16) a. ọ sịrị nà ọ byàrà. 'he$_i$ said that he$_j$ came.'

b. ọ sịrị nà yá byàrà. 'he$_i$ said that he$_i$ came.'

Though the antecedent of the logophoric pronoun is generally the matrix subject, a non-subject 'source' of the reported discourse, as well as the experiencer of a psychological verb, may also serve as antecedent (Clements 1975:160, 172, 173). A logophoric pronoun may be separated from its antecedent by several clauses (Clements 1975:154) or even extend across utterance boundaries, in what Hyman and Comrie (1981:20) call 'paragraphing'. Clements believes that primarily semantic or 'discourse' conditions, rather than syntactic factors, control the use of logophoric pronouns: their use is determined by the 'speaker's imputation of certain linguistic characterizations to individuals other than himself' (Clements 1975:169, 171).

3.2 Long-distance reflexives

The second phenomenon related to non-anaphoric reflexives is the 'long-distance' or 'non-clause-bounded' reflexive found in a number of languages: e.g. Latin *se*, Italian *sè*, Dutch *zich*, Icelandic *sig*, Norwegian *seg*, Chinese *ziji*, and Japanese *zibun*.[7] The defining characteristics of long-distance reflexives are that they allow an antecedent outside their governing category; they most commonly take the matrix subject as antecedent; they cannot be reciprocals; they are morphologically simple; and they are not in complementary distribution with pronouns (Reuland and Koster 1991:10–11; cf. Giorgi 1983/4:312–13).

The long-distance reflexive of Icelandic can be taken as a prototype (see Maling 1984:211–13; Anderson 1986:66–7; Sells 1987:45–51; Sigurðsson 1990:310–11; Thráinsson 1990:289–90). It occurs in the context of indirect speech, normally in the complement clause of a verb of saying, thinking, or feeling. The reflexive can optionally cross a clause boundary only if the embedded clause has a subjunctive verb (17a), not an indicative verb,[8] and it may cross a number of clause boundaries as long as the chain of subjunctives is unbroken (17b) (see Thráinsson 1990:297–300 on the 'domino effect'):

(17) a. Jón$_i$ segir að María elksi (subj.) *sig*$_i$. (Cited in Maling 1984:212; Thráinsson 1990:290)
'John says that Maria loves himself.'
cf. Jón$_i$ veit að María elskar (ind.) *hann*/**sig*$_i$.
'John knows that Maria loves him/*himself.'

b. Jón$_i$ segir að María telji (subj.) að Haraldur vilji (subj.) að Billi heimsæki (subj.) *sig*$_i$. (Cited in Maling 1984:213; Thráinsson 1990:290)
'John says that Maria believes that Harold wants that Bill visit himself.'

The antecedent of the long-distance reflexive is normally the matrix subject, but it may also be the genitive modifier of a noun expressing belief or opinion, such as *skoðun* 'opinion' and *saga* 'story' (Maling 1984:221–2); verbs of communication and cognition and such nouns act as 'transmitters' of the point of view of the subject down into the embedded clause (Sigurðsson 1990:335):

(18) Skoðun Siggu er að *sig* vanti (subj.) hæfileika. (Cited in Maling 1984:222)
'Sigga's opinion is that talent is wanting in herself.'

A 'source' may be chosen over a subject as antecedent (Maling 1984:233), as long as it has the intention to communicate (Sells 1987:451; Thráinsson 1990:293). The subject of a passive sentence cannot be the antecedent because it cannot be the source of a reported discourse (Maling 1984:232; Sigurðsson 1990:336).

Long-distance reflexives in Icelandic are not obligatory; perhaps the most revealing cases are those which permit either an anaphoric or a long-distance reflexive, resulting in subtle semantic differences:

(19) a. Jón$_i$ segir að Haraldur elski (subj.) stúlkuna sem kyssti (ind.) *hann*$_i$. (Cited in Thráinsson 1990:301)
'John says that Harold loves the girl that kissed him.'

b. Jón$_i$ segir að Haraldur elski (subj.) stúlkuna sem hafi kysst (subj.) *sig*$_i$. (Cited in Thráinsson 1990:301)
'John says that Harold loves the girl that kissed himself.'

As Thráinsson explains (1990:293, 298), in (19a), the clause 'that kissed him' is not part of John's report, while in (19b), the clause 'that kissed himself' is part of John's report.

While long-distance reflexives are 'syntactically unbounded' (Sigurðsson 1990:316), they do not have 'free' reference. Like all anaphors, they are incapable of picking up any 'definite referent in the world, or [freely] in the previous discourse' (Giorgi 1983/4:309; Sigurðsson 1990:317; Thráinsson 1991:59ff.; cf. Carroll above). It seems clear from the examples cited by Sigurðsson (1990:316–17) and Thráinsson (1991:58) that the antecedent must be mentioned or assumed in the immediate context (Reinhart and Reuland 1991:316–17), as in the following:

(20) Formaðurinn$_i$ varð óskaplega reiður. Tillagan væri (subj.) svívirðileg og væri (subj.) henni beint gegn *sér*$_i$ persónulega. (Cited in Sigurðsson 1990:316)

'The chairman became furiously angry. The proposal was outrageous, and was it aimed at himself personally?'

Maling argues (1984:213) that long-distance reflexives do not permit discourse antecedents, though she gives one example from a novel (1984:239, n. 27).

Both structural and semantic accounts have been given for the binding properties of long-range reflexives. For example, Anderson (1986:65) believes that the binding theory must be enriched to allow parametric choice of the domain within which certain anaphoric dependencies hold (cf. Sigurðsson 1990:314–16); Giorgi (1983/4) suggests that long-distance reflexives are 'prominence bound'. Maling (1984) raises certain difficulties for proposed structural solutions, concluding that semantic factors must account for the binding of long-distance reflexives; Thráinsson 1990:297, 301; 1991:50–9), Sigurðsson (1990:310, 316), and Hellan (1991) all concur with Maling on the need for a semantic rather than syntactic explanation of long-distance reflexives.[9]

4 The function of non-anaphoric reflexives

4.1 The function of long-distance reflexives in Icelandic

The function of the Icelandic long-distance reflexive in indirect discourse may be described as logophoric. The reflexive is used to report the internal states of another, namely, the referent of the reflexive's antecedent: long-distance reflexives 'are bound in the indirect discourse, that is, in the "logophoric domain" in which the speech, thought, perception, and so on of an individual or a SELF, distinct from the speaker or the narrator, is reported on' (Sigurðsson 1990:316). This third-person other has been called the 'experiencing self' (Cohn 1978), the SELF (Banfield 1982), the 'subject of consciousness' (Zribi-Hertz 1989:706), the 'secondary ego' (Sigurðsson 1990), and the SELF or 'internal protagonist', which Sells (1987:455, 457) defines as the 'one whose mental state or attitude the content of the proposition describes'. Furthermore, discourse containing long-distance reflexives or logophorics is reported *from the point of view of this SELF* rather than from the perspective of the speaker (Maling 1984:232; Sigurðsson 1990:318, 320; Hellan 1991:34; Thráinsson 1990:293, 304); the 'essence' of long-distance reflexives is that the SELF is 'seen from its own point of view' (Sigurðsson 1990:320). As Sells describes it (1987:456), 'someone outside the sentence (the external speaker) will in some way "take the

part" of someone in the sentence, the internal protagonist'. In his framework, not only is the SELF 'internal', but so is the PIVOT (or point of view), 'the one with respect to whose (space–time) location the content of the proposition is evaluated' (pp. 455–7).

4.2 The function of non-anaphoric reflexives in English

It has been noted that English is a language which makes logophoric use of (otherwise anaphoric) reflexives in special contexts (Zribi-Hertz 1989:696; Sigurðsson 1990:340, n. 5; Reuland and Koster 1991:15, 23). In fact, Reinhart and Reuland assert that 'contrary to the prevailing assumption, long-distance (logophoric) anaphora is quite common also with [*self*] anaphors, and, specifically in English' (1991:289, also 283, 311), citing examples such as the following (288, 297):

(21) a. Lucie saw a picture of *herself* in the paper.

b. Max saw a snake near *himself*.

Kuno's 'direct discourse' analysis also interprets such structures as logophoric. Zribi-Hertz (1989) gives the most complete treatment of English non-anaphoric reflexives as logophorics. She argues that non-anaphoric reflexives occur in discourse written from a 'subjective' point of view, discourse which 'describes facts as if filtered by a subject of consciousness' rather than as 'part of objective reality' (pp. 713–15). Assuming the terminology of the binding theory, she argues that a non-anaphoric reflexive is bound by a 'minimal' subject of consciousness, which is normally the nearest NP to the left of the reflexive (p. 711), though it may be further removed. In any case, the reflexive and its antecedent must be in the same 'domain-of-point-of-view', which is understood as a clause or sequence of clauses with only one subject of consciousness (p. 715); the reflexive and its antecedent cannot be separated by a 'domain-of-point-of-view boundary' (p. 713).[10]

The examples of non-anaphoric reflexives cited in section 2.2 would seem to be logophoric – to report the internal state, or subjectivity, of a third-person non-speaker. They often occur in contexts expressing the content of cognitive acts of a third person, that is, following verbs of consciousness such as *think* (9a), (10c), *believe* (10a), *know* (10b), *remember* (10c), and *seem* (11a), and psychological verbs and adjectives such as *sorry* (11b). Example (11a) is particularly revealing since the verb *seem* normally requires a dative expressing the subject to whom the perception occurs, but occurs here without one; for Dry (1977:93–5) the fact that the dative must be understood is a mark of the representation

of a character's consciousness. The examples also contain expressive material, such as the rhetorical questions in (9a) and (10a), which must be attributed to a third-person subject. Furthermore, the content of the character's consciousness is depicted from his or her point of view rather than from that of the reporter, since the content is often that which the narrator or another character cannot presume to know.

4.2.1 The occurrence of non-anaphoric reflexives in free indirect style

It has not been widely recognised that the non-anaphoric reflexives of literary discourse occur predominantly, though not exclusively, in passages narrated in a long-recognised technique known variously as *style indirect libre* 'free indirect style' (Bally 1912), *erlebte Rede* 'experienced speech' (Lorck 1921), *represented speech* (Jespersen 1924), *quasi-direct discourse* (Vološinov 1929), *narrated monologue* (Cohn 1978), and *represented speech and thought* (Banfield 1982).

The linguistic markers of free indirect style are well known. They are exemplifed in the brief passage given below, which depicts the character Laura's thoughts as she looks at herself in a mirror:

(23) Never had she imagined she could look like that. Is mother right? she thought. And now she hoped her mother was right. (Mansfield, 'The Garden Party', 79–80)

First, the narrative past tense is co-temporal with present-time deictics ('now she hoped'). The temporal and spatial deictics and demonstratives are attributable to the character's here and now. Second, a third person ('she') is the referent of the expressive content of the passage. Generally, the third person is referred to by a pronoun rather than a proper name, and other characters are referred to by pronouns, or descriptions indicating their relation to the character ('mother'). Third, the clauses are normally non-embeddable; they may contain inversion, topicalisation, right dislocation, adverb preposing, or an initial conjunction ('is mother right', 'never had she . . .', 'and now she hoped . . .'). Fourth, verbs of communication or of consciousness occur in parentheticals ('she thought'). Fifth, expressive elements and constructions, such as interjections, exclamatory, optative, or incomplete sentences, repetitions, or hesitations, are attributable to the character. Sixth, certain lexical items, such as qualifying adjectives and adverbs, epithets, nicknames or pet names, and attitudinal nouns, may express the character's emotions, attitudes, or beliefs. And finally, definite articles and demonstratives may have no referent in the previous discourse, and pronouns no antecedent. (See Dillon and Kirchhoff 1976:431–2 or Brinton 1980:366–7 for tabulations of these linguistic markers.)

Many of the passages containing non-anaphoric reflexives cited in section 2.2 and in the Appendix exhibit the linguistic features of free indirect style. Most generally, the third person, not the narrator, appears always to be the referent of the expressive content. More specifically, different types of non-embeddable structures can be found: inversion in (9a), (10a), (15a) and Appendix II2, and II5; topicalisation in (9a), (9b), (10c), (11a), and Appendix II3, II6, and II7; right dislocation in Appendix I5; adverb preposing in (8) and Appendix I7; and initial conjunctions in (2b), and Appendix I2, I3, I8, and II9. Parentheticals containing verbs of communication or of consciousness occur in (2a), (2b), (10c), and (14b), and expressive elements such as incomplete sentences occur in (13a), and Appendix II4, and II5. Finally, definite articles and demonstratives without anaphors in the preceding context can be found in Appendix II1 and II10. While such features are not exclusive to the style, they point strongly to these passages being either free indirect style or the narrator's depiction of a character's consciousness.

The behaviour of reflexive pronouns in free indirect style has not received the attention of scholars.[11] While many of Zribi-Hertz's examples appear to be taken from passages of free indirect speech, she makes only passing reference to this style. Cohn (1978:101) cites the following passage as prototypical of free indirect style, but allows the reflexive to pass without comment:

(22) he, Septimus, was alone, called forth in the advance of the mass of men to hear the truth, to learn the meaning, which now at last, after all the toils of civilisation – Greeks, Romans, Shakespeare, Darwin, and now *himself* – was to be given whole to . . . 'To whom?' he asked aloud. (Woolf, *Mrs Dalloway*, 101–2)

Banfield (1982:91) briefly notes the existence of non-anaphoric reflexives, giving three examples, and Dillon and Kirchhoff (1976:432, 435) see the occurrence of 'viewpoint reflexives' in free indirect style as pointing 'to the character as the speaker' or as 'source of the . . . subjective responses'.[12] Dry (1977:91–3) has the most to say: she sees 'reflexives without overt antecedents' as a feature of free indirect style in Jane Austen, but she also finds them outside the style, in the narrator's expository passages which reflect Emma's consciousness or point of view. Finally, Dry (1990:136–7) adduces a number of instances of non-anaphoric reflexives in free indirect style in *Emma* which serve to identify the character as speaker; she observes, however, that *himself* or *herself* can frequently have a nominal use in nineteenth-century English (see above). I believe that it can be concluded from the examination

above that non-anaphoric reflexives are an important linguistic marker of free indirect style, a marker which can be added to the list of recognised markers, such as parentheticals and present time and place deictics.[13] They are a particularly effective marker of free indirect discourse because, since they cannot refer independently, but must refer to an antecedent in the discourse, they require the reader to identify the character whose consciousness is being represented (Reinhart and Reuland 1991:317).

4.2.2 The function of non-anaphoric reflexives in free indirect style

Scholars are generally agreed upon the narrative function of free indirect style. It enables an author to overcome the limitations of one narrator and hence one point of view per text by portraying different characters' subjective impressions from their point of view, at the same time maintaining the third person and past tense of narration. Unlike indirect discourse, which can only report a character's thoughts, feelings, and perceptions in the author's language, and unlike direct discourse, which must present these as fully conscious and articulated speech, free indirect style permits the author to *represent*, in the character's own expressive or emotive language, all levels of the character's consciousness (see further Brinton 1980:367–8).

The non-anaphoric reflexives of free indirect style thus differ in one important respect from (syntactically bound) long-distance reflexives, logophorics, and third-person non-anaphoric reflexives such as those in (4): they do not occur in contexts of indirect speech. They are like the syntactically unbounded long-distance reflexives (as in (20)) and 'irregular reflexives' identified by Cantrall (as in (6)) in that they occur outside of passages marked syntactically as indirect speech. These are passages which Kuroda (1975) identified as 'non-reportive' or 'non-narrator'. In reportive contexts where reflexives or logophorics occur, it is argued that the reporter (the speaker or narrator) assumes the viewpoint of the SELF, is identifying with the SELF, or has taken the part of the SELF. In non-reportive contexts in which reflexives or logophorics occur, on the other hand, there is no speaker or narrator (Banfield 1982:93–4); there is only the SELF, a non-speaker, which is source of the discourse.[14] The subjectivity of the SELF is portrayed without the intermediary of a speaker, without the process of identification between speaker and SELF required in indirect logophoric contexts. Furthermore, the subjectivity of the SELF is directly represented rather than reported, and there is thus both a greater mimetic quality and a higher degree of subjectivity since the consciousness of the SELF is not filtered through the speaker.[15]

5 Conclusion

In conclusion, non-anaphoric reflexives represent a fairly rare but significant marker of free indirect style. Their significance can be understood in comparison to the function of non-anaphoric and long-distance reflexives in contexts of indirect speech, in which the subjectivity of the non-speaker is reported by a speaker, who identifies or empathises with the non-speaker, and thus depicts the subjectivity from the non-speaker's point of view. The non-anaphoric reflexives of free indirect style and the syntactically unbounded long-distance reflexives of Icelandic, which they most closely resemble, occur outside of indirect speech, in non-reportive contexts. Here, the subjectivity of the non-speaker is likewise expressed from his or her vantage-point, but without the mediation of a speaker; the non-speaker himself or herself is the source of the subjectivity depicted. Thus, these markers serve to underscore the immediacy of the representation of non-speaker subjectivity in free indirect style.

Appendix

I. REFLEXIVE IN THE SAME SENTENCE AS THE ANTECEDENT, BUT IN A DIFFERENT CLAUSE:

1. A good many of the nicest men he knew were like *himself*, bound in by their own virginity, which they could not break out of (Lawrence, *Sons and Lovers*, 341).
2. And it was torture to him, that he must give himself to her actively, participate in her, that he must meet and embrace and know her, who was other than *himself* (Lawrence, *The Rainbow*, 95).
3. And again Tom Brangwen was humble, thinking his brother was bigger than *himself*. But if he was, he was. And if it were finer to go alone, it was: he did not want to go for all that (Lawrence, *The Rainbow*, 142).
4. The vision of her tormented him all the days of his life, as she had been then, a strange, exalted thing having no relation to *himself* (Lawrence, *The Rainbow*, 185).
5. staged for *himself* as he sat in the boat, a little drama (Woolf, *To the Lighthouse*, 189).
6. This marked for *himself* the flight of time, or at any rate what he was pleased to think of with irony and pity as the rush of experience (James, *The Ambassadors*, 202).
7. Only it had perversely happened, after his morning at Notre Dame, that his consistency, as he considered and intended it, had come back

to him; whereby he had reflected that the encounter in question had been none of his making, clinging again intensely to the strength of his position, which was precisely that there was nothing in it for *himself* (James, *The Ambassadors*, 207).

8. But since it was in a manner as if Mrs Newsome were thereby all the more, instead of the less, in the room, and were conscious, sharply and solely conscious, of *himself*, so he felt both held and hushed, summoned to stay at least and take his punishment (James, *The Ambassadors*, 258–9).

II. REFLEXIVE NOT IN THE SAME SENTENCE AS THE ANTECEDENT:

1. That was the first real tribute to *herself* (Lawrence, *Sons and Lovers*, 69).
2. He had a dread of her as she lay there. What had she to do with him? She was other than *himself* (Lawrence, *The Rainbow*, 81).
3. Within *himself* his will was coiled like a beast, hidden under the darkness, but always potent, working (Lawrence, *The Rainbow*, 185).
4. A being so differently constituted from *herself*, with such a command of language; able to put things as editors like them put; had passions which one could not call simply greed (Woolf, *Mrs Dalloway*, 165).
5. Had he, then, been nothing? An unanswerable question, since even if it weren't the habit of the undertaker to close the eyes, the light so soon goes out of them. At first, part of *herself*; not one of a company, he had merged in the grass . . . (Woolf, *Jacob's Room*, 16).
6. He looked satisfied; indeed masterly; which expression changed slightly as he stood there, the sound of the clock conveying to him (it may be) a sense of old buildings and time; and *himself* the inheritor; and then to-morrow; and friends; at the thought of whom, in sheer confidence and pleasure, it seemed, he yawned and stretched himself (Woolf, *Jacob's Room*, 45).
7. Wild and frail and beautiful she looked, and thus the women of the Greeks were, Jacob thought; and this was life; and *himself* a man and Florinda chaste (Woolf, *Jacob's Room*, 78).
8. It was indeed as if they were arranged, gathered for a performance, the performance of 'Europe' by his confederate and *himself* (James, *The Ambassadors*, 235).
9. And now at last Madame de Vionnet must leave them, though it carried, for *herself* [Sarah], the performance a little further (James, *The Ambassadors*, 235).

10. *That* was part of the typical tale, the part most significant in respect to *himself* (James, *The Ambassadors*, 336).
11. It was a question about *himself*, but it could only be settled by seeing Chad again; it was indeed his principal reason for wanting to see Chad (James, *The Ambassadors*, 350).

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NOTES

1 This study was originally presented at the annual meeting of the Linguistic Society of America, December 1988, in Minneapolis, Minnesota. Zribi-Hertz (1989) treats the phenomenon of non-anaphoric reflexives in English from a somewhat different perspective than I take in this chapter. I have benefited from both her discussion and her examples.

2 The 'performative analysis' gives the following deep structure for a sentence such as (3a): I SAY TO YOU [the paper was written by Ann and myself].

3 Cantrall offers two psychological explanations for the use of such reflexives: 'first, the author (and reader) sees himself as the character and thus takes the second reference to be, in effect, to himself; second, the author (and reader) projects his feelings onto the character, knowing that if he were that character he would see himself in such a way' (1974:45).

4 Four of Carroll's examples, all occurring in sportscasts, contain non-anaphoric first- and second-person reflexives. One example contains a nominal use of *self*: 'I remembered that another person had been in the sittingroom later than Penelope. That person was *yourself*' (Collins, *The Moonstone*) (see below). The three remaining examples are cases of free indirect style (see below):
(a) They didn't notice either Mr. Flay or *himself* (Peake, *Titus Groan*).
(b) The advantages to *himself* were too absorbing to ponder (Peake, *Titus Groan*).
(c) In her last job there had been only *herself* (P. D. James, *Death of an Expert Witness*).

5 A parallel to the behaviour of non-anaphoric reflexives is that of reciprocals, which likewise may occur without a plural antecedent in the local syntactic domain:

> but that somehow in the streets of London, on the ebb and flow of things, here, there, she survived, Peter survived, lived in *each other* . . . (Woolf, *Mrs Dalloway*, 12).

6 Carroll (1986a:146; 1986b:19) argues that non-anaphoric reflexives are syntactically very free. Her small corpus would seem to confirm this, since two examples show the reflexive in direct object position and an equal number show the reflexive in subject complement position.

7 See Koster and Reuland (1991:12–20) for an inventory of languages having long-distance reflexives. The literature on long-distance reflexives is now quite extensive: see Sigurðsson (1990:312), Thráinsson (1991:49, 54–5), and the bibliography in Koster and Reuland (1991) for citations. The treatment of the topic in this chapter is perforce rather cursory.

8 However, subjunctives in adverb clauses do not permit long-distance reflexives (Thráinsson 1990:295, 300–1).

9 Most recently, Reuland and Koster (1991:23–4) and Reinhart and Reuland (1991:284) have postulated the existence of three classes of reflexives, two syntactically conditioned and one semantically conditioned: (a) local reflexives, which obey the Specified Subject Condition; (b) medium reflexives, which obey the Tensed S Condition; and (c) long-range, or logophoric, reflexives, which have no domain. Binding conditions do not apply to the third category; they are controlled by factors outside sentence-level grammar (Reinhart and Reuland 1991:285, 311, 313).

10 Unlike Reinhart and Reuland (1991) (see previous note), Zribi-Hertz (1989:721–3) rejects the idea that there are two homophonous classes of reflexives in English, arguing instead that there are two domains-of-point-of-view in which they can be bound. If such reflectives are bound in an 'objective' domain, they will be clausally bound, by antecedents which c-command them within the same minimal governing category. If they are bound in a 'subjective' domain, they will be discourse bound, by antecedents which function as minimal subjects of consciousness within the same point-of-view domain.

11 Fludernik's (1993:128–33) discussion of syntactically unbound reflexives came to my attention too late to be included in the discussion here. She concludes that such reflexives can 'help to signal or enhance immediate subjective experience, i.e. non-reflective experience of the self as self, both in contexts of speech and thought representation and in contexts of narrated perception . . . In contexts where a consciousness reading is possible but not mandatory . . . the reflexive may need other consciousness markers to create a viable reading' (p. 133).

12 Dillon and Kirchhoff (1976:435–6) argue that non-anaphoric reflexives in free indirect style may not always point to the character as speaker. In the following passage from D. H. Lawrence's *Lady Chatterley's Lover*, the terms 'nihilist' and 'anarchic', they argue, 'seem more characteristic of the narrator's vocabulary than [the character's]: 'They had not really killed him.

Yet, to her, emotionally, they had. And somewhere deep in *herself*, because of it, she was a nihilist, and really anarchic.'

13 Non-anaphoric reflexives are optionally present in passages of free indirect style, alternating, as they do outside free indirect style, with simple pronouns. Their presence is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for free indirect style.

14 Sells argues that the SOURCE, 'the one who makes the report' or 'who is the intentional agent of communication' is always 'internal' in the case of logophoric verbs (1987:455–7). I would argue that this is true only in non-reportive contexts. The test for internal source, Sells says (1987:462–3) is the attribution of 'speaker-evaluative' expressions such as *that fool* to the SELF rather than to the speaker. This is indeed true in free indirect style (Banfield 1982:89) (for example, *That old fool loved her, she realized*), but not necessarily in indirect speech (for example, *She realized that that old fool loved her*).

15 Sigurðsson (1990:317) notes that long-distance reflexives do not appear in free indirect style in Icelandic. The reason appears to be a syntactic one – free indirect style in Icelandic is expressed in the indicative, not the subjunctive – rather than the semantic argument Sigurðsson gives. He suggests (p. 320) that since long-distance reflexives require that the SELF be seen from its own point of view, and since the SELF is viewed from the narrator's point of view in free indirect style, viz., in the third person, long-distance reflexives are impossible in free indirect style. However, as his own table (p. 321) shows, the SELF is generally viewed from the narrator's point of view in indirect discourse, where long-distance reflexives occur. The possibility of non-anaphoric reflexives in English shows that the SELF can be viewed from its own point of view in free indirect style, even if it is referred to in the third person.

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10 From empathetic deixis to empathetic narrative: stylisation and (de-)subjectivisation as processes of language change

Sylvia Adamson

In this chapter I try to relate a problem in the history of literary style to wider issues in the theory of language-change. The stylistic question I address concerns the historical origin of empathetic narrative (Bally's *style indirect libre*). I contest the standard account, which associates its first appearance with the nineteenth-century novel, and argue instead for a linguistic origin in the everyday use of shifted (empathetic) deictics, and for a historical origin in the emergence of modern subjectivity in seventeenth-century epistemology. I propose a quantificational method for comparing the incidence of empathetic narrative in texts and a theory of *stylisation* to account for its progressive development across a historical corpus. The chapter's interest to non-literary readers lies, on the level of data, in the evidence it presents of the use of tense-adverb combinations as an exponent of aspect and, on the level of theory, in its challenge to Traugott's account of the role of subjectivisation in language change.

1 Introduction[1]

(1) a. Mr Woodhouse . . . commended her very much for thinking of sending for Perry, and only regretted that she had not done it. 'She should always send for Perry, if the child appeared in the slightest degree disordered, were it only for a moment. She could not be too soon alarmed, nor send for Perry too often. It was a pity, perhaps, that he had not come last night; for, though the child seemed well now – very well considering – it would probably have been better if Perry had seen it.' (Austen, *Emma*, 1816)

b. Poor Annie was almost crying. It had been such a nice day up to now and now everything was going wrong. To cover her whimpering sniffs, she took up the tray and went with it down the stairs into the kitchen. Mr Marble eyed the whisky bottle. He felt he needed some, despite the fact that he had already had three

or four – or was it five or six? – whiskies that day. He was very tired, very, very tired, and his head ached. Just as it ached this time yesterday. No, he didn't want to think about yesterday. (Forester, *Payment Deferred*, 1926)

c. The other three all lay flat in the cockpit now. Harry sat on the steering seat. He was looking ahead, steering out the channel, past the opening into the sub-base now, with the notice board to yachts and the green blinker, out away from the jetty, past the fort now, past the red blinker; he looked back . . . The others were all looking astern except the one that was watching him. This one, one of the two Indian-looking ones, motioned with a pistol for him to look ahead. No boat had started after them yet. (Hemingway, *To Have and Have Not*, 1937)

The three passages above exemplify the main varieties of the style of writing which Bally named, in respect of its syntax, *style indirect libre*, and Jespersen named, in respect of its function, *represented speech* (Bally 1912; Jespersen 1924). Both designations apply most transparently to variant (1a), which reports speech (here Mr Woodhouse talking to Mrs Weston) in a syntactic form that cuts across the traditional distinction between *oratio recta* and *oratio obliqua*. Like *oratio recta* it is *libre* (i.e. not subordinated to a *verbum dicendi*), but it shares the pronoun and tense structure of *indirect* speech report. This account looks far less apposite as a description of types (1b) and (1c) and almost every commentator who has written on the style has felt the need to rename it, in an attempt to register the fact that (1b) represents consciousness rather than speech, (1c) represents perception rather than articulate consciousness, and both function as modes of narration rather than modes of quotation. My own contribution to its catalogue of titles is *empathetic narrative* (Adamson 1982).

What unites the variant forms of the style is that its literary functions – to create an image of selfhood or the illusion of events as experienced rather than reported – depend on the systematic reinterpretation of subjective expressions. By that I mean that those linguistic forms which are canonically defined as encoding the viewpoint of their speaker appear to lose their definitional dependence on *I*. This applies to the full range of subjective expressions: deictic locating terms such as *now*, *ahead* (1c), epistemics such as *perhaps*, *seemed* (1a), and affective-emotive terms such as *nice*, *no*, *very very* (1b). In all the instances I have cited from (1a–c), these forms are interpreted as expressing the position, beliefs, or feelings of a character within the story rather than of the (real or fictive) narrator who tells it. In the spirit of Lyons (1977:677), I call

this transference of subjectivity from the discourse agent to the discourse referent *empathetic subjectivity*: a he/she is understood 'as if' it were an I.

The deviation involved in the transfer of subjectivity is so radical and its effects so striking as to prompt the question: how and under what conditions does it take place? One way of answering that question might be to ask in turn: how and under what conditions did empathetic narrative historically appear?

Yet, despite the renewed attention that the style has attracted over the last two decades from both linguists and literary critics, the question of its historical origin has been curiously neglected. By and large, recent commentators have been content to repeat without further enquiry the early accounts of Bally (1912, 1914) and Lips (1926), in which empathetic narrative is seen as a product of the nineteenth-century novel, first appearing 'as a prominent and continuous feature . . . in Goethe and Jane Austen' (Pascal 1977:34) and becoming fully theorised and systematised by Flaubert as 'a device of style in the proper sense of the term' (Ullmann 1957:101). Two of the most influential studies of the style have suggested that, before the nineteenth century, there is no history to be written: 'there is until modern times . . . no continuous tradition of its use and transmission as a literary technique . . . one cannot draw a graph of a tradition or of an evolution' (Pascal 1977:34); 'what is striking is the absence of a transitional period in its development . . . this style seems to spring full-born into literary usage' (Banfield 1982:231–3).

Since the birth of Athena strikes me as an implausible analogy for the genesis of any linguistic practice, I have taken up the challenge of seeking a 'transitional' form of empathetic narrative in English literary history before Austen. In this chapter I present an interim report on the progress of my quest. The findings so far are sufficient, I believe, to unsettle a number of orthodoxies in current accounts of the form, function, and history of the style. But their implications extend beyond the field of stylistics. More generally, they throw light on the relation between subjectivity in its technical linguistic sense (where it is roughly synonymous with indexicality) and subjectivity as it is more widely understood (meaning consciousness or selfhood). And, in consequence, they modify our picture of subjectivisation, suggesting that it may be a process of language change whose direction owes as much to particular cultural conditions as to universal linguistic tendencies.

The first challenge of the quest, however, is methodological. By what criteria can we identify early examples of empathetic narrative?

2 Quantifying narrative empathy

In the 1970s, structural description of empathetic narrative was conducted almost exclusively at the level of the sentence. This applies not only to Banfield (1973, 1982), who offers what remains the most rigorous attempt to define 'the sentence of represented speech and thought' within a framework of generative grammar, but also to her opponents, whose attempts to ground the style in the response of the reader rather than the grammar of the text generally took the form of asking 'what features induce the reader to take *a particular sentence* as an instance of [empathetic narrative]' (McHale 1978:264; my italics). More recent commentators, however, (notably Ehrlich 1990), have demonstrated the inadequacy of a sentence-based approach for the synchronic analysis of the style; and for the diachronic investigation I have undertaken here, its weakness is even more evident. Most importantly, it provides no means of distinguishing between sporadic and systematic manifestations of empathetic syntax. For, as a construction type, 'the sentence of represented speech and thought' can be found in a wide range of pre-nineteenth-century texts; it has been attested, for example, in Fielding, La Fontaine, and the *Chanson de Roland* (Lips 1926:120ff; Leech and Short 1981:332). And yet it would be massively counterintuitive to claim that any of the texts that have been cited is 'written in empathetic narrative' in the same sense in which that claim can be made for, say, Austen's *Emma*. The style of a narrative, that is, depends not so much on the fact that certain features occur in one or more of its sentences, as on the consistency with which they occur across a given sequence of sentences. In other words, the empirical classification of narrative styles demands a quantitative as well as a structural analysis.

It is, however, by no means easy to establish the basis on which empathetic narration might be quantified. Previous studies (for example, Ullmann 1957:101ff and Burrows 1987:166–75) have tried to compare texts in terms of their proportion of empathetic sentences. But this method runs into insuperable difficulties. Not only are the criteria of well-formedness for such sentences controversial (Leech and Short 1981:325–331, McHale 1983:22–32), but a large number of sentences in any given narrative in this style are not marked as empathetic by their form at all; they are interpreted as such through the constraints of context (Ehrlich 1990:16ff). In (1b), for example, the statement *he was . . . tired* could be construed as authorial in origin (that is, as reporting a structural fact for the world of the fiction) or as an empathetic representation of Mr Marble's self-justification for having a drink. In this

instance, the reiterated intensifier that immediately follows – *very very tired* – provides a context which favours the second reading; but many contexts are indeterminate and some authors, notably Jane Austen and Henry James, construct the epistemological ironies of their fiction precisely on their ability to leave sentences such as 'he saw the truth' ambiguous between the two possibilities (Adamson 1982).

To avoid these difficulties, I propose to adopt a version of the variationist methodology pioneered by Labov for the stylistic differentiation of contemporary spoken varieties, and by Romaine (1982) for sociohistorical varieties. To make it applicable here, I need to find a stylistic variable that meets certain criteria: it must unequivocally express the empathetic/non-empathetic contrast; it must occur across the full spectrum of the attested varieties of the style; and it must be likely to occur with some frequency in any reasonably-sized narrative sample.

I believe these criteria are best satisfied by what I shall call the WAS–(WHEN) variable, which I define as a grammatical frame consisting of *past tense plus cotemporal deictic adverbial.* Temporal adverbials are among the commonest types of adverbial and in narrative, the form of discourse canonically concerned with ordering events in time, their rate of occurrence is much enhanced. This means that, even restricting the range of (WHEN) to *deictic* expressions, there are likely to be enough tokens in any narrative sample to satisfy the frequency criterion. The point of imposing the restriction and excluding sentences with non-deictic adverbials, or with no adverbial at all, is that every token in the sample then represents a binary choice on the writer's part between proximal and non-proximal expressions, for example:

(2) Charles was asleep NOW (now, today, at this time, etc.)
THEN (then, that day, at that time, etc.)

In such contexts, the NOW–THEN opposition correlates strongly with the contrast between empathetic and non-empathetic styles, since the choice of the proximal option in the adverbial is an instance of the more widespread cotemporality of past tense with non-past time deictics which is one of the most commonly cited indicators of empathetic narrative (it heads the list given by Brinton, for instance, on p. 185 of this volume). Moreover, this is a feature which, unlike some other indicators, appears in all varieties of the style (examples can be found in each of (1a–c)); and it creates syntactic co-occurrences which in other contexts are likely to be judged anomalous or even unconstruable, for example:

(3) a. John *was* reading the paper *at present*.

b. Mary *had* flown to Venice *this evening*.

c. *Tomorrow* it *was* Christmas.

To some commentators, such constructions (which I shall call the WAS–NOW paradox) are not simply typical of the style, but unique to it, and hence constitute its central defining feature (Bronzwaer 1970:46).

Analysis in terms of the WAS–(WHEN) variable allows us to quantify any text's preference for proximal forms and to compare texts by assigning them relative positions on a scale of empathy. In a text which, in Banfield's terms, contains 'all and only' sentences of empathetic narrative, we might expect all tokens of (WHEN) to be realised by proximal deictics, as in (1c): lay . . . *now*; was . . . steering . . . *now*; had started . . . *yet*. But for a variety of reasons, including grammatical indeterminacy and typological variation (an issue to which I will return), most actual instances of the style contain some non-proximals too. In (1b), for instance, *that day* appears alongside *now* and *this time yesterday*. I therefore provisionally define an empathetic narrative as a narrative in which proximal values of WAS–(WHEN) predominate over non-proximal.

3 The historical prototype of empathetic narrative

3.1 Data

Since all standard accounts of empathetic narrative link it with the novel as a genre, the obvious place to begin the search for its historical antecedents is in the narrative forms of the Early Modern period from which the novel is thought to have evolved. Is a proto-novel in genre also a proto-novel in style? For this pilot study, I have selected the works most commonly cited as the novel's ancestors: Sidney's *Arcadia* – the most popular fictional narrative before the eighteenth century, a recognised influence on Richardson, Fielding and the late eighteenth-century novel of sensibility; Nashe's *The Unfortunate Traveller* – traditionally regarded as an early precursor of the picaresque novel and more recently as a stylistic innovator; Bunyan's *Grace Abounding* – the most celebrated example of the conversion narrative, a genre which provided the pattern for confessional novels, such as *Moll Flanders*; and *Pilgrim's Progress* – a transitional form between medieval allegory and *Bildungsroman* which, until the end of the eighteenth century, was more widely read than any novel. Two of these are third-person narratives (*Pilgrim's*

Progress and the *Arcadia*); the other two are first-person narratives. Although most discussion of empathetic narrative has centred on the third-person forms illustrated in (1a–c), first-person variants do occur in the modern period (see Bronzwaer 1970:50–62; Banfield 1982:171–80) and it therefore seemed advisable to include representatives of both types in the Early Modern sample. To avoid blurring the typological distinction, passages of direct speech were excluded from *Pilgrim's Progress* and the *Arcadia*.[2]

Table (4) below places these works on a scale of empathy by applying the method outlined in the previous section. The variable WAS–(WHEN) is here defined as a grammatical frame consisting of past-tense verb in construction with a deictic temporal adverbial, where verb and adverbial are read as cotemporal in their reference; WAS is construed as any verb in any form of the past tense (past simple, past progressive, and past perfect); and (WHEN), the variable component, may be realised either by proximal deictics (which I shall call NOW tokens) such as *during these years*, *tonight*, *till now*, or by the corresponding non-proximal forms, (the THEN tokens) for example, *during those years*, *that night*, *till then*. What (4) records is the percentage of WAS–(WHEN) tokens realised by WAS–NOW as opposed to WAS–THEN.

Since there is no received opinion on what constitutes a natural narrative span, I based the analysis for this pilot study on a complete Book of the *Arcadia* (Book 1) and for the other narratives, which are not sub-divided, the complete work. This means that the number of WAS–(WHEN) tokens in every case well exceeds the minimum (N = 30) thought necessary to establish a norm of usage (Milroy 1987:135): *Arcadia* N = 97, *Unfortunate Traveller* N = 78, *Pilgrim's Progress* N = 323, *Grace Abounding* N = 321.

(4) A scale of narrative empathy

WAS–(WHEN) in four proto-novels: percentage of WAS–NOW tokens

Grace Abounding	67
Arcadia	31
Unfortunate Traveller	31
Pilgrim's Progress	29

Table (4) shows that the empathy rating of *Grace Abounding* is more than twice that of any other text in the sample. It is the only narrative in which proximal values of WAS–(WHEN) predominate over non-proximal.

3.2 Discussion

Given the restricted range of data, any conclusions drawn from the results of this experiment must be provisional. Nevertheless, the fact that one of these texts does meet my provisional criterion for empathetic narrative indicates that the standard assumption that it is a nineteenth-century innovation may need to be revised. The specific nature of that text puts in question other key notions in existing accounts of empathetic narrative as a literary style.

First, it challenges the derivational model implicit in the ordering of (1a–c). A common assumption about the style, inherited from Bally (1912), is that it developed by diffusion, from the representation of speech (1a) to the representation of thought (1b) and thence to the surrounding narration of events (1c), which is interpreted as a product of the fictional consciousness. However, although Bunyan's stylistic repertoire includes (1a) (for example, '[my father] told me, No, we were not' 11), it occurs very rarely in this text. *Grace Abounding* is primarily a narrative of consciousness (closer in type to (1b) or (1c)) and, where it incorporates a representation of speech, its style characteristically shifts *away from* empathetic narrative into *oratio obliqua* or, more commonly, *oratio recta*.[3] This suggests that either we should reverse the traditional model and propose that type (1a) develops in the wake of (1b–c), or we should posit independent origins for the quotative and narrative functions of the style (see Adamson 1994 for arguments in favour of the second of these views).

The second question raised by (4) concerns the relation between first- and third-person variants of empathetic narrative. Synchronic studies (based on the novel since Austen) have invariably taken the third-person variant (for example (1a–c)) as the norm. The first-person variant has, by comparison, been discussed rarely and dismissively. Hamburger denies its very existence (1973:311–41); Pascal takes it to be 'comparatively rare, and sometimes contrary to the very spirit' of the first-person novel (1977:67–8; 76); Cohn, while claiming credit for discovering the technique (1978:302), describes it as scarce and aberrant (1978:166–71). The fact that the highest empathy rating in our sample is achieved by a first-person narrative may require these views to be revised, at least for a diachronic account of the style. The data of (4) suggest that it may well have been in first-person narration that the form first evolved. The comparison between *Grace Abounding* and *Pilgrim's Progress* is particularly suggestive. These are both by the same author, and there is practically the same number of deictic temporal adverbials in each. But the ratio between NOW and THEN tokens is almost exactly

inverted, with empathetic forms dominating in the first-person narrative, non-empathetic forms in the third-person narrative.

The priority of first-person over third-person realisations of empathetic narrative in Bunyan anticipates the sequence of its discovery by later practitioners of the style: Flaubert, for instance, made his initial experiments with empathetic narrative in a first-person novel (Ullmann 1958:101–2) and Joyce progressed from first- to third-person variants within the sequence of *Dubliners*. This pattern recurs in the compositional history of some of the novels now cited as prime exemplars of the form: Kafka started *The Castle* as a first-person novel, then rewrote the first fifty pages substituting K. for I; Dostoevsky wrote the first drafts of *Crime and Punishment* in the first-person form (Cohn 1978:171). It is possible that in all these cases the developmental history of modern authors and novels may have followed the same path as the history of the narrative form itself – a stylistic diffusion from first person to third. And, if so, it can only be because the first-person form is, in some sense, more basic or natural than the third-person form.

This brings me to the third question raised by the data of (4), which is their challenge to claims that the WAS–NOW construction occurs only in fiction (Hamburger 1973:71–81) or that empathetic narrative is an 'exclusively literary style' (Banfield 1982:68 & *passim*). For both these accounts, it is at least embarrassing that among the group of proto-novels, empathetic narrative appears most markedly in the one which makes the strongest claim to factuality – a non-fictional autobiography – and comes closest to an oral genre – the Puritan conversion narrative. The pre-eminent position of *Grace Abounding* in (4) provides at least *prima facie* support for the claim that empathetic narrative as a literary style has its roots in 'some linguistic habit in common usage' (Pascal 1977:34), rather than being dependent, as Banfield argues, on the emergence of specialised written forms and the suppression of ordinary communicative functions (Banfield 1982:235–53).

I have suggested elsewhere (Adamson 1994:197–201) that the relevant 'common usage' is the practice that Lyons calls *empathetic deixis*, in which speakers momentarily shift the centre of the deictic field of reference from themselves to the addressee or referent of their discourse (Lyons 1977:677). But, while this hypothesis might explain the appearance of empathetic narrative in a non-literary genre, it would not necessarily predict the priority of first- over third-person variants. Why should first-person, non-fictional narration be the locus most conducive to the operation of empathetic deixis?

If, following Labov 1972, we construe narration as the linguistic ordering of events that take place in the (real or imagined) world, then

by far the most common form of narrative in everyday spoken language is first-person: what we typically narrate is our own activities, observations, and experiences. In such narrations, the *I* occupies two roles: it is both deictic and pronominal, standing simultaneously for the agent and the referent of the discourse, for both narrator and character. Canonically (and indeed factually) subjectivity is a property of the speaking-I not the referent-I, but given our normal (western) assumptions about the continuity of personal identity, we readily attribute subjectivity to our past self, especially if the events we are narrating are acts of consciousness or states of feeling. It is in these circumstances that linguistic empathy most naturally arises, transferring deictic, epistemic, and expressive terms from the *I* who narrates to the *I* who is at the centre of the narrated experience. The following two sentences, which may be read as a narrative sequence, show the process in action, as the speaker shifts focus from her current state of knowledge, marked by the modal in (5a), to her past state of feeling, empathetically made present by the proximal time deictic in (5b).

(5) a. It *must* have been the crowd that did it for me.

b. I suddenly got the feeling that *this time* I wasn't going to fade in the last lap.

What distinguishes non-fictional autobiography as a genre is that its narration of events inevitably involves a protracted act of memory. And, although the functions of memory could be fulfilled by a set of propositions about the past, we more commonly think of memory as an experiential mode which works, as in (5b), by reactivating the past in our mind.[4] This equation between memory and experience is often seen as a product of Romantic thought; but it is already present in Bunyan's time in the philosophy of Locke:[5] 'Whatever Idea is in the mind, is either an actual perception, or else having been an actual perception, is so in the mind, that by memory it can be made an actual perception again' (*Essay Concerning Human Understanding* 1.4.20). Locke explicitly excludes from the category of memory the case of a blind man who remembers the fact that he once saw colours, but cannot recall the sensation of them: such a man can make a proposition about the past, but cannot turn it into 'an actual perception' in present consciousness. On the other hand, a memory, for Locke, is never confused with a perception, because 'the mind finds it in it self, and knows it was there before'. An important qualification is added here. The shift from perception to memory involves a shift from consciousness to self-consciousness, in which the mind is both agent and object of cognition, and what

it discovers as present experience it simultaneously knows to be past. Of this temporal and cognitive paradox the WAS–NOW construction is a remarkably apt grammatical symbol. Nor is the correlation between Locke's model of the mind and Bunyan's narrative grammar a mere coincidence. For the consequences of subjectivity that Locke wrestles with in his epistemology had been at the heart of religious debate since the early sixteenth century, in the progressive secessions and self-definitions by which Protestantism emerged from Catholicism and Puritanism from Anglicanism. Each stage of this debate led to some form of linguistic innovation. And by the mid-seventeenth century the religious tradition that Bunyan represents had created a narrative genre that was polemically committed to the representation of experiential memory.

4 Puritan subjectivism and the narrative of experiential memory

The first linguistic consequences of the Reformation appear at the simple level of vocabulary selection, in the famous Tyndale–More controversy over the most appropriate English terms for translating certain words of the Bible. Where More, the Catholic, preferred *charity*, *penance*, and *confession*, Tyndale, the Protestant, preferred *love*, *repentance*, and *knowledge*. Tyndale's choices are often seen as part of the Protestant rejection of specific Catholic practices – confession and penance – but, as the Tyndale–More exchanges make clear, they also involve the division of religious observance into subjective and objective domains and the prioritising of subjective over objective. For the Protestant, love, repentance, and knowledge take place in consciousness (and are therefore *known* to be sincere), while charity, penance, and confession are, at best, only their external correlates, at worst, their hypocritical surrogates.[6]

The Puritans carried this predilection for inwardness to greater lengths. The Quaker George Fox rejected the Anglicans on much the same grounds as Tyndale had rejected the Catholics:

(6) Their original ground and religion is external, their word and light is external, and their gift . . . is an external gift and they go to yon magistrates who have an external law to uphold in their external ministry. (Ebner 1971:125–6)

Even the most inattentive reader could hardly fail to notice that the key word of reproof here is *external*. A Puritan, by implicit contrast, is advised to seek his 'light' and 'law' in inner experience, guided by the soul, which Bunyan eulogised as: 'his best part, his life, his darling,

himself, his whole self and so, in every sense, his all' (Ebner 1971:25). Bunyan's repetition of *self* is significant both ideologically and linguistically. As the concept of the self became increasingly important in Puritan thinking, it could no longer be adequately discussed within the options offered by the existing word-stock, and this led to a vigorous policy of word-formation, which had a lasting impact on the contents of the English lexicon. As van Beek (1969) has shown, there was a vast influx of *self*-compounds in the seventeenth century, and in those cases where the first occurrence has been tracked down, it is preponderantly in Puritan writing.

Puritanism also had an impact on the semantic structure of the language (see, for example, Tucker's 1972 study of *enthusiasm*). Most relevant to the present discussion is the history of the word *experience*. Borrowed from French, probably in the late fourteenth century, it was initially used to describe events in both inner and outer worlds: someone could equally 'make an experience' and 'have an experience'. Modern French retains this duality; hence the possibility of labelling cosmetics 'préparé sans expérience sur les animaux'. The reason this sounds odd if translated as 'without experience on animals' is that Modern English has established in many contexts a distinction between *experience* and *experiment*. The origins of this split lie in the seventeenth century when *experience* was adopted by the Puritans as the most appropriate term to describe the form of empirical knowledge that they opposed to the knowledge handed down by authority or law. But, since the Puritans' notion of empirical evidence was exclusively subjective, a coexisting alternative form – *experiment* – began to be favoured by those who shared the Royal Society's preference for objectively verifiable routes to empirical knowledge. Hence as *experience* increasingly subjectivised in meaning, *experiment* objectivised.

The linguistic consequences of these emphases in Puritan thought appear also in the larger structures of discourse. Puritan narrative practice is founded upon what we might call, using their own favoured terminology, 'experience of self' (in a modern terminology it would be 'introspection'). The Baptist writer, Jane Turner, describes the substance of her book, *Choice Experiences*, as 'meditation, self-examination, self-watching, self-judging, self-humbling and prayer' (Turner 1653:185). The quality and conduct of Puritan self-watching is summed up in a couplet from George Goodwin's suggestively titled *Auto-Machia* (given here in a contemporary Early Modern translation):

(7) I sing my SELF; my *Civil-Warrs* within;
The *Victories* I howrely lose and win. (Watkins 1972:12)

It is clear that, for many Puritans, the self was as much a source of

conflict as of illumination, and it is quite normal for Puritan self-examinations to decompose the self into hostile factions representing Grace and Sin. Most characteristically the automachia is expressed as a temporal split, laid out in narrative form, focussing on the experience of conversion as the pivot between unregenerate and regenerate phases of self-being. The Presbyterian Richard Baxter saw the product as a powerful rival to existing literary genres:

(8) The report of one Souls Conversion to God . . . [is] as far better than the Stories of these grand Murderers, and Tyrants, and their great Robberies, and Murders called Conquests, as the Diagnosticks of Health are than those of Sickness. (Haller 1938:101)

Baxter explicitly dismisses the kind of protagonist and events celebrated in such Elizabethan 'poppit-plays' as *Tamburlaine*; just as Goodwin implicitly rejects the martial hero of nationalist epic by revising the Virgilian formula, 'arms and the man I sing', to 'I sing myself'. In the new epic of consciousness, the hero is the writer's own soul, and the conversion narrative, as the account of its self-conquests, provides the Puritan counterpart to the external narratives fostered by other ideologies.

Grace Abounding is probably the most celebrated of these conversion narratives, and in its preface Bunyan announces and justifies the programme I have sketched out above.

(9) It is profitable for Christians to be often calling to mind the very beginnings of Grace with their Souls . . . O the remembrance of my great sins, of my great temptations, and of my great fears of perishing for ever! They bring afresh into my mind the remembrance of my great help, my great support from Heaven, and the great grace that God extended to such a Wretch as I. My dear Children, call to mind the former days, the years of ancient times; remember also your songs in the night, and commune with your own heart . . . Yea, look diligently, and leave no corner therein unsearched, for there is treasure hid, even the treasure of your first and second experience of the grace of God toward you. Remember, I say, the Word that first lay hold upon you; remember your terrours of conscience, and fear of death and hell: remember also your tears and prayers to God; yea, how you sighed under every hedge for mercy. Have you never a Hill Mizar to remember? have you forgot the Close, the Milk-house, the Stable, the Barn and the like, where God did visit your Soul? (4–5)

The reiterated keyword here is *remember*. For the Puritan, introspection always entails retrospection. In this passage, the difference between the self that remembers and the self remembered is both psychological and theological: the remembering self has attained grace, which separates it

in kind as well as in time from the remembered self; the remembered self is unregenerate, and of value solely for its exemplification of what it is like to be in a state of sin. Thus the gap between narrating and narrated selves takes on an ideological force: the narrated self is not only past, but other. At the same time, Bunyan expresses the need to lessen this gap. The redeemed man is urged to revisit his past sinfulness, both for his own sake and for that of others: for him such memories reinforce his gratitude for the contrasting grace he has been given; for others they may act as a warning of the tribulations of the unredeemed state. The task for memory, then, is to recreate the past in all its experiential vividness, the more so since the objective co-ordinates of time, place, and circumstance ('the Stable, the Barn and the like') provide simply the context for the significant events, which are subjective: the Puritan pilgrim makes progress not through successive actions, but through successive stages of consciousness.

It would not be surprising, then, if empathetic narrative made its historical début within this narrative genre as the technical means of realising its aims – to report on consciousness in the mode of experiential memory. But how typical is Bunyan's style of the genre his narrative represents? To answer this question, it will be necessary to extend the database of (4).

5. Extending the data

The table below shows the empathy ratings for a number of first-person narratives of the Early Modern period. Since the primary aim of this first extension of the study was to test the correlation between empathetic narrative as a form and the conversion narrative as a genre, I included three Puritan autobiographies directly comparable with *Grace Abounding* (the narratives of Turner, Powell, and Baxter), but I also added a group of narratives from Hakluyt's *Principal Navigations*. They contrast with Nashe's *Unfortunate Traveller* on the dimension of fictionality (Hakluyt's travellers are all recounting their own experiences) and with *Grace Abounding* on the dimension of consciousness (they are describing physical not spiritual journeys).[7]

(10) WAS–(WHEN) in first-person narratives: percentage of NOW tokens

Bunyan:	*Grace Abounding*	67
Turner:	*Choice Experiences*	48
Powell:	*The Life and Death*	42
Nashe:	*The Unfortunate Traveller*	31
Baxter:	*Reliquiae Baxterianae*	26
Hakluyt:	*Principal Navigations*	15

At the bottom of the scale is Hakluyt's *Principal Navigations* with an empathy rating of only 15, well below that of Nashe's fictional narrative. At first sight the low rating is rather surprising, since the narrators are all recounting what Hakluyt calls 'memorable enterprises' from their own lives and might be presumed to be mentally recreating the events they describe. But what distinguishes them from Bunyan is that the narrated events are what Fox called 'external'. Hakluyt's narrators are almost all concerned with themselves as objects/agents in the world; on the whole they are too busy contending with the vagaries of a hazardous environment to consider the state of their souls, and instead of records of consciousness they are more inclined to offer their readers information on geography and history. By contrast, those works which are closest to *Grace Abounding* in empathy ratings are closest to it in genre: Turner and Powell are both Baptist autobiographers, describing the experience of 'truth brought home to the heart' (Turner 202). Apart from *Grace Abounding* itself, these narratives show the highest incidence of WAS–NOW tokens in the sample, with empathetic forms accounting for almost half of their totals.

The contrast between Nashe, the Baptists, and Hakluyt's narrators suggests a refinement to the hypothesis formulated in section 3. Of the factors that converge in *Grace Abounding* – first person; non-fiction; narrative of consciousness – it now appears that, while the first two may be, as I have argued, the pragmatic conditions that foster the emergence of empathetic narrative as a stylistic option, the third may be the essential condition for the option to be realised.

But this hypothesis seems immediately to be put in question by the low empathy rating of Baxter's *Reliquiae Baxterianae*. This work is generally included in the category of spiritual autobiography; indeed, Bunyan's apart, it is possibly the most famous example of the genre in the period. Yet its empathy rating, while higher than Hakluyt, is significantly lower than Nashe (and the other two fictional narratives in the earlier sample). In fact, as we shall see, this apparent counter-example to the hypothesis provides its strongest support.

6 The evidence of Baxter's narrative

The hypothesis I have put forward is that the historical emergence of empathetic narrative as a style in England is linked to the rise of the Puritan conversion narrative as a genre. The low empathy rating of Baxter's narrative provides strong negative evidence in support of this hypothesis when it is seen in the light of his repeated refusal to fulfil the demands of his genre:

(11) a. Because it is soul-experiments which those that urge me to this kind of writing do expect that I should especially communicate to others, and I have said little of God's dealing with my soul since the time of my younger years, I shall only give the reader so much satisfaction as to acquaint him truly what change God hath made upon my mind and heart since those unriper times, and wherein I now differ in judgment and disposition from myself. (103)

b. Thus much of the alterations of my soul, since my younger years, I thought best to give the reader, instead of all those experiences and actual motions and affections which I suppose him rather to have expected an account of. (128–9)

Like Bunyan, Baxter is aware of a split self (*I now differ . . . from myself*) and aware of the didactic benefits of publishing the nature of that difference ('that my faults may be a warning to others' 132). But for him, one self is finished with; hence his self-analysis is conducted in terms of a simple contrast between *those unriper times* and *now*. He is willing to describe the nature of the contrast between the two states, but not the moment by moment experiential development of the self from one state to the other. In fact he seems to regard such self-scrutiny as one of the self-indulgences he has left behind: 'I was once wont to meditate on my own heart . . . but now . . . I see more need of a higher work' (113).

Baxter's reasons for marginalising the role of introspection in his narrative seem to be both epistemological and moral. He doubts the reliability of the self as a source of knowledge:

(12) a. the soul is in too dark and passionate a plight at first to be able to keep an exact account of the order of its own operations. (10)

b. whatever men may pretend, the subjective certainty cannot go beyond the objective evidence. (111)

and is inclined to equate self-contemplation with 'the radical, universal, odious sin of selfishness', which he opposes to 'the excellency and necessity of self-denial, and of a public mind, and of loving our neighbour as ourselves' (124).[8]

What this points to is an ideological split over the value of subjectivity even within Puritanism itself. Baxter's reservations reflect those of his sect, the Presbyterians, who are credited with coining the pejorative term he uses here, *selfish* (see *OED* entry). Bunyan, Turner, and Powell represent the Baptists, who saw self-preoccupation as a duty, not an indulgence. For Baxter there is a greater duty to look outwards from the

self, and as a consequence his narrative has a public dimension lacking in Bunyan's. Whereas Bunyan's modern biographers complain that he denies them any account of the scenes he must have witnessed as a soldier in the Civil War, Baxter dramatises political as well as personal conflicts:

(13) Things being thus ripened for a war in England, the king forsaketh London and goeth into the north; in Yorkshire he calleth the militia of the country which would join with him, and goeth to Hull and demandeth entrance; Sir John Hotham is put in trust with it by the parliament, and denieth him entrance with his forces. (33)

Stylistically, this passage – which narrates one of the decisive steps on the road towards open warfare – draws attention to itself by the fact that for every verb Baxter uses the historic present. Consider, by contrast, the passage below, where, satisfying for once his audience's demand for the history of his heart, he describes the moment when 'it pleased God to awaken my Soul'. In doing so, he bridges the gap that he normally maintains between I–now and I–then and slips into the WAS–NOW construction of empathetic narrative. The first four tokens of NOW (here italicised) refer to the past moment of conversion, the fifth (here capitalised) refers to the present moment of writing and marks Baxter's disengagement from his past self at the boundary of this episode of experiential memory.

(14) Whether it were that till *now* I came not to that maturity of Nature, which made me capable of discerning; or whether it were that this was God's appointed time, or both together, I had no lively sight and sense of what I read till *now* . . . The same things which I knew before came *now* in another manner, with Light, and Sense, and Seriousness to my Heart . . . Yet whether sincere Conversion began *now*, or before, or after, I was never able TO THIS DAY to know[.] (I, 3)[9]

What the comparison between (13) and (14) suggests is that Baxter's sense of an opposition between subjective and objective modes of knowledge (in (12b)) has a correlate on the level of style. Within his stylistic repertoire, there are two devices available for foregrounding significant events from the past: the historic present and empathetic deixis. Both operate by distorting normal time reference to make the past present – either by the use of a literally inappropriate tense (historic present) or by an incongruous adverbial (empathetic deixis); but they coexist in a complementary distribution, where the historic present is associated with the representation of external events, recorded without authorial

comment or introspection, and the WAS–NOW construction is associated with the representation of events in consciousness.

Whether the complementary distribution of the two styles in Baxter holds good for seventeenth-century narrative in general must be a subject for further research (Adamson in preparation). But a similarly suggestive correlation is found in Bunyan. In the consistently introverted narrative of *Grace Abounding*, the high percentage of WAS–NOW tokens coincides with a virtual absence of the historic present (I have found only one instance and that is the parenthetical *inquit* form: 'what care I, *saith* he' 37); whereas in *Pilgrim's Progress*, when introspection is replaced with allegorical action and Despair externalised as a physical antagonist, Bunyan chooses the historic present to dramatise his attack:

(15) he getteth him a grievous Crab-tree Cudgel, and goes down into the *Dungeon* to them; and there, first falls to rateing of them as if they were dogs . . . then he falls upon them, and beats them fearfully[.] (231)

There is, then, at least preliminary evidence that where Puritan writers register a stylistic distinction between the narration of event and the narration of consciousness, it is the latter that is primarily associated with the use of empathetic narrative. By the end of the seventeenth century, in other words, the first-person variant of this style may already have been specialised in the function characteristically fulfilled by the third-person variant in the nineteenth-century novel.

7 The stylisation of empathy

7.1 Diffusion

But how are we to interpret the difference between the other Baptist narratives in the sample, in which empathetic and non-empathetic variants are held roughly in balance, and *Grace Abounding*, where the empathetic form strongly predominates? Does the statistical difference represent a difference in degree or a difference in kind?

I believe there is a difference in kind, marking a shift from empathetic deixis as a sporadic feature of ordinary language use to empathetic narrative as a systematic style. The specific demands of the Puritan conversion narrative, I have argued, were such as to promote an increased use of empathetic deixis, and this is what we find in Turner and Powell. But, as literary commentators have noted, Bunyan took the further step of revising the genre:

(16) a. it [*Grace Abounding*] is typical in its concentration on the inner life of grace at the expense of historical incident, but exceptional in the proportion of the whole narrative which is devoted to Bunyan's spiritual conflicts. (*GA* ix)

b. He lengthened his treatment of despair and used the new space for a local structural pattern of alternating hope and gloom. (Ebner 1971:52)

and with this extension and reiteration of the motif of conversion comes a series of related or entailed innovations in language which mark *Grace Abounding* as an instance of what I call *stylisation.*

By stylisation I mean an equivalent on the level of discourse to the more familiar process of grammaticalisation at the level of the rules and categories of grammar. Stylisation can be said to occur when a figure of speech is extended syntagmatically across a discourse and paradigmatically through related elements in the language system in a double diffusion which both generalises and conventionalises the figure. The statistical evidence of (10) points to the syntagmatic diffusion of the WAS–NOW construction in Bunyan's narrative, where it has become, at least in numerical terms, the unmarked option for the expression of past time. Closer examination of the text shows evidence of paradigmatic (or analogical) diffusion also. That is, the empathetic identification of present with past self affects not only the handling of spatio-temporal deictics (exemplified by the WAS–NOW construction), but also epistemic and emotive expressions as Bunyan attempts to re-enter the 'dark and passionate plight' of the unenlightened soul that Baxter described (12a), but refused to recreate. The following is a typical instance:

(17) O how happy now was every creature over I was! For they stood fast and kept their station, but I was gone and lost. (61)

At the emotional level, the most obvious linguistic markers are the exclamatory construction and interjection, and, though it is possible to interpret these as expressing the narrating self's compassion for its former state, it is, I think, more natural to read them as the narrated self's exclamations of envy and despair. At the epistemic level, there is no alternative to an empathetic construal. From the vantage-point of the narrating self (and his contemporary readers) the statement *I was gone and lost* is known to be false. It can only represent the temporary delusions of a past despair. But Bunyan does not here qualify it with 'it seemed' or 'I thought'. Instead he replicates the epistemic certainty of his past self's belief.

A sequence like (17) would be unremarkable in nineteenth-century

examples of empathetic narrative, and it is further confirmation of *Grace Abounding*'s position as ancestor of that style that this example could readily be multiplied. The point of interest here is that it cannot be readily matched in the narratives of Turner or Powell. In these texts, empathy is almost wholly restricted to *spatio-temporal* expressions; statements of former emotions and beliefs are firmly embedded in the narrator's contrasting perspective. In form, they typically resemble *oratio obliqua*, in being dependent on a superordinate clause of speech or consciousness, for example:

(18) a. I would in a poor broken manner complain to God that I was in some fear that what I did was not according to his will. (Turner: 12)

b. I was resolved, if I perished, I would perish here at the feet of Christ. (Turner: 32)

c. I was resolved if I knew God would Damn me, yet to have as few sins as I could to answer for hereafter. (Powell: 9)

In all these cases the reportive mode of narration predominates over the experiential. This is most striking in (18a). Here Turner describes, but does not attempt to imitate, the 'broken manner' of her complaint (contrast Bunyan's use of exclamation in (17)), and the emotive word *poor* expresses present compassion towards the emotions of her past state, rather than empathetic participation in them. In (18b) and (18c), the proximal deictics (*here* and *hereafter*) indicate empathy on the spatio-temporal level and, perhaps correspondingly, both writers weaken the effect of subordination by suppressing the complementiser. But the grammatical frame remains in place and the past resolve is not allowed to take on independent existence. Contrast Bunyan's more radical syntax:

(19) but now a Word, a Word to lean a weary soul upon, that I might not sink for ever! 'twas *that* I hunted for. (80)

The anaphoric deictic (here italicised) simultaneously distances the reported desire (it is *that* rather than *this*) and subordinates it to a summarising verb of reportive narration (*I hunted for . . .*). But this happens only *after* Bunyan has first exposed the reader to an experiential recreation of his mental hunt, in which the spatio-temporal *now* is supported by the expressive reiteration (*a word, a word*) and the (apparently) free-standing optative modal.

Synchronic descriptions of empathetic narrative presuppose a formal coherence in the style which means that the WAS–NOW construction, for

instance, can be taken as the index of a whole set of defining features. This picture is not seriously threatened by recognising (as in section 2 above) that features are variable rather than consistent in occurrence. But what the evidence of this section suggests is that historically the constituent features of the style may develop at variable rates. In particular, it seems possible that the spatio-temporal expression of empathetic subjectivity develops earlier than (or independently from) its epistemic and emotive equivalents. It may be that there is an implicational hierarchy of features, in which, for example, the presence of empathetic epistemic expressions in a narrative implies the presence of empathetic deictics, but not vice versa. And it may be that there is a crucial level of empathetic deixis – lying somewhere between Turner's 48% and Bunyan's 67% – which triggers the diffusion of empathy into other aspects of the subjective system.[10]

7.2 Conventionalisation

Even in the feature which Bunyan shares with Turner and Powell – empathetic deixis – there are differences in practice which illuminate further aspects of the process of stylisation. The most significant of these concern the realisation and the distribution of the WAS–NOW tokens themselves.

Table (20) below shows the results of two comparisons: first, in the realisation of the WAS–NOW construction, Bunyan employs a far higher proportion of the specific item *now* than either Powell or Turner; second, compared to them, he uses it far more frequently than the apparently synonymous expression *at this time*.

(20) Comparison of WAS–*now* and WAS–*at this time* as a percentage of WAS–NOW tokens

	now	*at this time*
Powell	10	10
Turner	31	36
Bunyan	65	5

There are, I think, two ways of accounting for these figures. One is to posit a difference in meaning, in Bunyan's usage, between *now* and its phrasal synonym *at this time*. The other is to see the preponderance of WAS–*now* within the class of WAS–NOW as a direct consequence of the preponderance of WAS–NOW within the class of WAS–(WHEN). That is, as Bunyan shifts the base-form of the narrative from WAS–THEN to WAS–NOW, he increasingly selects the most transparent realisation of

NOW, which thus becomes conventionalised as a marker of the empathetic style. If one of these explanations suggests that *now* is more specific in meaning than other members of its class and the second suggests it is less specific, the contradiction is less than at first appears.

That *now* is less specific in meaning than other proximal deictic adverbials hardly needs arguing. In appropriate contexts it can be substituted for any other member of the class (from *at this moment* to *during these years*). Yet the same could be said for *at this time*, and its rate of occurrence in both Powell and Turner suggests its semantic equivalence to *now*. Its *context* of occurrence, however, suggests something different. Although as (20) shows, *now* is not the predominant realisation of NOW in their narratives and, on statistical grounds, is no more likely to appear than *at this time*, it is the form that both writers select when they come to describe the central moments of change involved in conversion:

(21) a. now the Lord had opened my understanding, and now I hoped I should have more knowledge. (Turner:23)

b. now was the day of Gods power not only to make me willing but there was some change wrought in the whole soul . . . what before was dead had now some life and motion. (Turner:36–7)

c. and now the work of compunction and contrition began in me with many deep sighs and bitter tears, self-loathing and self-abasing. (Powell:5)

It is not that time is non-specific in these moments; on the contrary, they are the most significant moments in the writers' lives. But they are significant in internal not external time as opening new phases of experience or consciousness. *At this time* expresses its meaning analytically combining a proximal component (*this*) with a temporal component (*time*), and for this reason its temporal reference is difficult to forget. By compacting both components into a single form, *now* allows the temporal to be backgrounded in favour of the proximal, and the shift in balance, while bleaching *now* as a marker of temporal location, gives it new colour as a marker of experiential immediacy.

The conversion passage from Baxter ((14) above, abridged below) supports this analysis:

(22) I had no lively sight and sense of what I read till *now* . . . The same things which I knew before came *now* in another manner, with Light, and Sense, and Seriousness to my heart . . .
Yet whether sincere Conversion began *now*, or before, or after, I was never able *to this day* to know . . . (My italics)

Like Turner and Powell, Baxter selects *now* for the time of his conversion experience, and, even more strikingly, when, at the close of the episode, he compares the moment of conversion with the time of writing, he uses *now* for the first and *this day* for the second. Experiential time gives way to locative time: *this day* is translatable as, say, 5th February 1680; *now* is the moment when, in Bunyan's words, 'God did visit your soul'.

On this analysis, the higher incidence of *now* tokens in Bunyan's narrative would follow as a natural consequence of his revision of the genre, which changes conversion from a punctiliar or cumulative process into a recursive one. But the number is further increased by his practice of deploying *now* in clusters in a paragraph, often using it in three or four successive sentences, as here:

(23) And *now* was I both a burthen and a terror to myself, nor did I ever so know, as *now*, what it was to be weary of my life, and yet afraid to die. Oh, how gladly now would I have been anybody but myself! (47; Bunyan's italics)

The most common reason for repeating *now* is to refer to two different points of time ('*now* you see it *now* you don't'; '*now* I'm adding the eggs, and the cream goes in *now*'). In (23), as Bunyan's italics make clear, the purpose is rather to mark the intensity of a single moment of the experience. The same is probably true of the double *now* in Turner ((21a–b) above). But, whereas these are the *only* instances of this practice in Turner, in Bunyan it is recurrent, and *now* occurs in clusters rather than pairs.[11] This has two related consequences – *now* itself is increasingly associated with experiential rather than temporal force, and the WAS–*now* combination is generalised in function from foregrounding a moment of change (as it does in Turner) to marking a mode of narration.

In other words, in Bunyan's narrative, as empathetic deixis stylises into empathetic narrative, *now* subjectivises from temporal to experiential meaning and WAS–*now* shows signs of turning into a fixed conventionalised combination, as if it were *en route* to becoming grammaticalised as an experiential past tense.[12]

8 Conclusion: speculations on stylistic history and on the subjectivisation hypothesis

In a by now classic paper, Traugott (1982) puts forward the hypothesis of a unidirectional drift in language change towards the subjectivisation of meaning. She suggests that linguistic forms undergoing semantic

change are more likely to move towards meanings grounded in the speaker or the context of speaking than in the reverse direction. If my account of the history of empathetic narrative is correct, its bearings on Traugott's hypothesis are complex and in many ways contradictory.

In favour of the subjectivisation hypothesis, it could be argued that as empathetic deixis stylises into empathetic narrative, the constituent elements of the WAS–NOW construction lose their original temporal reference and become, in the first phase of the stylisation process (epitomised by Bunyan) a marker of memory, and in the second phase (epitomised by (1a–c)) a marker of fictionality. In other words, the construction shifts from the (relatively) objective function of describing time, to the subjective function of expressing forms of epistemic modality. And within epistemic modality, it shifts from the relatively less subjective mode of memory (making past events present) to the relatively more subjective mode of hypothesis (making imagined events present).

But, for the style as a whole, another line of argument seems equally tenable. There is a reading of its history in which it is plausibly described as a process of *de-subjectivisation*, in the sense that terms which originally derive their meaning by reference to the speaker or the context of speaking (for example, *now*, *here*, *oh*) are progressively re-centred on the non-speaker. In the first phase of the stylisation process (seventeenth century), the non-speaker is the speaker's past self, in the second phase (nineteenth century), it is an external referent, i.e. a fictional consciousness.

If the de-subjectivisation hypothesis is correct, then it provides a basis for the diachronic ordering of synchronic variants of the style. For instance, although the particular examples I have given of type (1b) and (1c) were written only a decade apart (and both continue to be productive stylistic types), the de-subjectivisation hypothesis predicts that (1b) represents an earlier historical development than (1c).

In (1b) there are subjective expressions whose interpretation demands reference to a narrating agent: *poor*, *that day* cannot plausibly be construed as representing the viewpoint of the characters. And this means (if we take (1b) as a coherent text) that tense is also centred on a narrating agent. Here, as in Bunyan's narrative, the WAS–NOW paradox has to be construed as a fusion of two perspectives on the narrated event: that of a narrator for whom the event is distant, by being past (in the case of the autobiographer) or fictional (in the case of the novel narrator), and that of the character, for whom the event is part of current experience. (1b) may be classed as an example of the 'dual voice' variant of empathetic narrative, in which a 'personalised narrator' is liable to intrude

into, and comment on, the represented consciousness of the characters (Pascal 1977:76–97). By contrast, in texts of type (1c), there are no linguistic indicators of a narrating agent *apart from* person and tense. And, in the absence of such indicators, the past tense appears to lose its deictic force and become a marker of narrativity or serial ordering, rather than designating the past-to-me.[13] The result is the type of narration known within literary criticism as impersonal (or figural) narration, and the prediction that it would be a later development historically than type (1b), while requiring empirical investigation, finds *prima facie* support in most standard accounts of literary history, which attribute the appearance of (1c) in the English novel to the generation of Joyce and Hemingway.

A second prediction that follows from the de-subjectivisation hypothesis is that (1c) might be succeeded by a further development, in which subjective expressions are anchored in no person at all and identified with no particular viewpoint. In late twentieth-century narratives, especially in journalism and certain forms of historiography, there are signs of this happening, in that sentences of the following type, which occur sporadically in earlier texts, seem to be moving from sporadic to systematic status:

(24) a. War clouds were now gathering over Europe.

b. The operation now entered its most dangerous phase. Holes appeared in the roof and prison officers were making them.

c. *Vanity Fair* was to be published in 1848. Thackeray's reputation would soon enter a new phase.

When we read texts of this kind, we seem not to be invited to construct an experiencing self, for whom this is a current perception or anticipation, but rather to position ourselves in proximity to the time spoken of, as though we were watching a documentary reconstruction. De-subjectivisation leads here not to the loss, but to the generalisation of subjectivity in a new variant of empathetic narrative, which we might call *experiential reportage*.[14]

Supposing this account of stylistic history to be substantially (and substantiably) correct, what are its implications for linguistic history? More particularly, where does it leave the subjectivisation hypothesis?

I think what I have here is a partial counter-example to Traugott's claims. The main focus of her work has been what might be called 'classic' grammaticalisation phenomena, and where my data comes closest to hers – the conversion of temporal to experiential meaning in the context of a tense–adverb combination used as an exponent of aspect

– her hypothesis seems to apply. The more widespread development of transferred subjectivity that might be construed as evidence of a progressive *de*-subjectivisation takes place in a somewhat different domain, at the level of style or discourse type. The question for future research to address is whether this is an isolated instance, attributable to the special literary character of the discourse type, or whether it provides grounds for positing de-subjectivisation as a distinct historical process, coexistent with, and complicating, the well-attested drift towards subjectivisation.

But it would be a mistake to begin such research from the assumption that there is a clear-cut boundary to be drawn between the literary and the non-literary or between the history of grammar and the history of style. If the stylistic evolution that turned (1c) into (24) proceeds to turn (24) into the unmarked form for the narration of past events, it may have the grammatical repercussion that the main-clause past progressive of (1c) and (24b) loses semantic markedness in Modern English, as it arguably has in Modern French (Reid 1970:162–5).[15] Or, from another point of view, the progressive as an aspect and empathetic narrative as a discourse type may both be changing their distribution and value as part of a larger historical drift in which the distinction between experiential and non-experiential forms is being lost. I note that in a phone call I have just made to consult a colleague on these matters, I was asked by the telephonist: 'how are you spelling your name?'

NOTES

1 This study, first published in 1994 in *Transactions of the Philological Society* 92/1:55–88, developed from one part of a paper presented to the Philological Society in 1985 under the title 'Some syntactic and semantic problems in Early Modern English'. I am grateful to the Council of the Society for inviting me to speak and to all members of the Society who were present on that occasion for the fruitful discussion that followed. In expanding and revising the original paper, I have benefited from the responses that successive versions have attracted from participants at research seminars in the Universities of Cambridge, Manchester, and London (UCL and KCL) and at the Bunyan tercentenary conference at the University of Durham. For their helpful comments on earlier drafts of the present version, my thanks go to Laurel Brinton, Nik Gisborne, Roger Lass, Terry Moore, Elizabeth Traugott, and, especially, John Woolford.

2 The texts used in this study are:
Sidney – *The Countesse of Pembroke's Arcadia* ed. Feuillerat, Cambridge University Press, 1912 (1590 text), pp. 5–144.
Nashe – *The Unfortunate Traveller* in *An Anthology of Elizabethan Prose Fiction* ed. Salzman, Oxford University Press, 1987 (1594: 1st edition text), pp. 205–309 (text checked against the facsimile reprint of the 1594 2nd edition text, Menston: Scolar Press, 1971).

Bunyan – *Grace Abounding* and *The Pilgrim's Progress* ed. Sharrock, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1966 (original publication dates: *GA*, 1666; *PP*, 1678). All page references are to these editions.

3 Bunyan's preference for *oratio recta* to either empathetic narrative or *oratio obliqua* as a means of reporting speech is shared by both Nashe and Sidney, and probably reflects the high value that Renaissance writers in general placed on oral and oratorical modes.

4 Lyons suggests that the distinction between these two forms of memory has a syntactic correlate in the distinction between (a) and (b) below:

(a) I remember that I switched off the light (propositional)
(b) I remember switching off the light (experiential)

For fuller discussion, see Lyons (1982:107–9).

5 That the experiential conception of memory had become dominant well before Romanticism is perhaps suggested by the fact that all those senses of *memory* which equate it with memorial or historical record appear to have been obsolete by the end of the eighteenth century (*OED* senses 8–11).

6 See Tyndale – *An Answer to Sir Thomas More's Dialogue*, ed. Rev. Henry Walter for the Parker Society, Cambridge, 1850, pp. 20–22 and passim; More – *Confutation of Tyndale*, ed. L. A. Schuster et al., *Complete Works*, vol. 8, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973, part 1, especially pp. 144ff.

7 The texts added for this study are:
Turner, J. – *Choice Experiences*, London, 1653, pp. 2–40.
Powell, V. – *The Life and Death of Mr Vavasour Powell*, London, 1671.
Baxter, R. – *The Autobiography*, ed. J. M. Lloyd Thomas, London and Toronto: Dent, 1925, pp. 3–48, 103–32 (text checked against *Reliquiae Baxterianae*, ed. M. Sylvester, 3 vols., London, 1696).
Hakluyt, R. – *Voyages and Discoveries*, ed. J. Beeching, Harmondsworth: Penguin English Library, 1972, pp. 77–102, 132–57 (text checked against the Hakluyt Society publication of the 1598–1600 edition of *The Principal Navigations*, Glasgow, 1903–5).
All page references are to these editions. For Baxter, page numbers of the form (22) refer to the Lloyd Thomas edition, numbers of the form (I, 3) refer to the Sylvester edition.

The fact that Hakluyt is earlier in date than the others in this group is deliberate. His travel narratives antedate the establishment of the conversion narrative as a genre so that there can be no question of cross-genre influence, such as appears, for instance, in Coxere's *Adventures by Sea* (*c.* 1690).

8 In (12b) Baxter antedates the earliest *OED* citation for the modern meaning of the *subjective–objective* opposition (approximately the reverse of its meaning in medieval philosophy). His attitude to the opposition (seen in the value he places on *objective evidence*) anticipates connotations of the words that did not become common until the nineteenth century. See *OED* entries and the fuller discussion in Williams (1976:259–64).

9 The capitalised instance may be misleading to the modern reader. Though a simple past tense in form, *I was never able to this day* is equivalent to a present perfect in Modern English. See Harris (1984) on the disparity between the aspectual systems of Early Modern and Modern English.

10 To investigate these suggestions would require a method of quantifying epistemic empathy equivalent to the scale of nowfulness for spatiotemporal empathy. My hunch would be that whereas empathetic deictics predominate in *Grace Abounding*, empathetic epistemics are more sporadic, making it even more clearly a transitional text.

11 For other instances of *now* clusters, see paragraphs: 32, 37, 77, 82, 92, 128, 142, 149, 157, 160, 188, 189, 232, 249, 257, 259.

12 Bunyan is perhaps pressing for a modal–aspectual distinction not available in the grammar of his time. The main clause past progressive, which provides a specialised experiential past tense for empathetic narrative in the modern period (see Banfield 1982:105–7, 157–9), was a rare form before the nineteenth century and progressives of any kind occur only sporadically in the seventeenth. In the grammar of *Grace Abounding* (which is conservative in this respect) the past progressive is associated overwhelmingly with temporal meanings (durative, habitual, and iterative). It is worth noting here that Austen, often cited as the first English writer to make systematic use of third-person empathetic narrative, shows a markedly higher incidence of main clause past progressives than her contemporaries (Strang 1982). For further discussion of the status of the progressive in the seventeenth century, see Wright (this volume).

13 Lyons notes that many languages have a special non-deictic 'consecutive tense' (Lyons, 1977:689). In English a special non-deictic use of the past tense would correspond to the non-deictic use of *then* to mark serial ordering, in the narrative formula 'and then . . . and then . . .'.

14 Its emergence as a distinctive narrative type (as opposed to a sporadically occurring sentence type) may correlate at the level of genre with the rise of the 'faction' and with what became known in the early 1970s as the New Journalism. Writers of this school deliberately incorporated into the narration of non-fictional events the techniques of 'third-person point of view' associated with the nineteenth-century novel, but with different aims. They saw the style as a means of achieving 'the absolute involvement of the reader' in the events described, not, as it had been for Austen and James, a method of representing the evolving consciousness of a character (Lodge, 1981:184–6).

15 For the link between empathetic narrative and main clause past progressive, see note 12 above and Ehrlich (1990:81–94). For the link between the categories progressive/simple and experiential/non-experiential, see Lyons (1982:116–20).

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