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**Whorfianism of the third kind: Ethnolinguistic diversity as a worldwide societal asset (The Whorfian Hypothesis: Varieties of validation, confirmation, and disconfirmation II)\*†**

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**ABSTRACT**

Two hypotheses associated with Benjamin Lee Whorf,  $W_1$ , or the linguistic relativity hypothesis, and  $W_2$ , or the linguistic determinism hypothesis, have overshadowed a third,  $W_3$ , that champions ethnolinguistic diversity for the benefit of pan-human creativity, problem solving and mutual cross-cultural acceptance. With respect to  $W_3$ , Whorf is a disciple of Johann Gottfried Herder (1744-1803) with whom he shares many themes and basic perspectives. It may be that different basic methodologies and philosophies of science, particularly those that distinguish linear, quantitative experimentalism from the reborn holistic and ethnographic stress on meaning, will ultimately make it just as difficult to conclude what has been empirically demonstrated with respect to  $W_3$  as it already is with respect to  $W_1$  and, particularly,  $W_2$ . Nevertheless,  $W_3$  has a valuable humanizing and sensitizing effect on the language-related disciplines. Indeed, in that respect it may well have value above and beyond its scientific validity. (Whorfian hypothesis, Johann Gottfried Herder, multilingualism/multiculturalism, methodology-theory relationships in the language sciences.)

We are currently witnessing a revival of Whorfianism in linguistics and anthropology and it is a wondrous sight to behold (see, e.g., Alford 1978, Friedrich 1979, Silverstein 1979). This revival is all the more a phenomenon worth pondering given that previously some two generations of researchers (primarily working within research traditions that come closest to replicating natural science paradigms within the social sciences) had overwhelmingly passed negative judgments upon the most crucial as well as the most stimulating hypotheses of Benjamin Lee Whorf. Indeed, for some 25 years (at least from the late 1950s to the late 1970s) it was exceedingly hard to find a good word on behalf of Whorf in hardnosed, quantitative, experimental social science circles per se, or in the philosophical-theoretical circles derived from and influenced most directly by the social scientists. During many of these years only a few courageous stalwarts

among the leading lights of the language-related disciplines (Dell Hymes first and foremost among them [1966]), kept the faith insofar as Whorf and Whorfianism are concerned; but even they obviously did so in conjunction with more holistic and nonquantitative "poetic" perspectives than the empirical tradition of American hypothetico-deductive science is either accustomed to, comfortable with, or impressed by. What was generally overlooked during this long period of widespread skepticism or outright rejection of Whorfianism was that his defenders and his detractors were not always reacting to the same facets of Whorf's thinking, were not apparently always concerned with exactly the same theories and, finally, were, therefore, not impressed by the same data, proofs, or tests.

METHODOLOGICAL DIFFERENCES: INTERPRETATIONAL DIFFERENCES

Now, as the worm turns (or begins to do so), it seems clear to me that for a quarter century many of us in the language-related disciplines have been so mesmerized (positively or negatively) by two theories commonly associated with Whorf (the *linguistic relativity hypothesis*, which I will call  $W_1$ , i.e., "Whorf-sub-one," and the *linguistic determinism hypothesis*, which I will call  $W_2$ , i.e., "Whorf-sub-two") that the rest of Whorf's work remained correspondingly obscured. It was all the more difficult to recognize that much of Whorf was being substantially neglected in the process, when not only were  $W_1$  and  $W_2$  recurrently found wanting, but when they were so found by what was then a new breed of researchers who themselves initially represented and expressed a significant expansion of what the language-related disciplines had formerly been. Let us remember that the 1950s and 60s (and even the 70s) constituted a time in which a definite methodological tradition matured and diversified within the language-related disciplines: the tradition of quantitative experimentation following classical independent variable-dependent variable lines of inquiry, proof, and argumentation. This tradition, let us also remember, was drastically different from the more text-analytic, descriptive-anecdotal, ethnographic, holistic, and nonlinear commentary and analysis that Whorf had employed and that most of his adherents preferred (and prefer to this very day). Given these major differences as to the nature of evidence and the nature of proof that obtained between Whorf and his critics (and, more recently, between his staunchest defenders and his critics), it is now evident, insofar as  $W_1$  and  $W_2$  are concerned, that not only do the critics and the defenders disagree as to what has been proven but that they also disagree as to what Whorf's hypotheses were to begin with.

Clarification of "what Whorf really meant" is no easy matter. It is complicated by the fact that Whorf died in 1941 at the regrettably early age of 44. All of his professional writing transpired between 1925 and 1941. Thus, he has now been dead for almost two-and-a-half times as many years as he had available to clarify and finalize his own hypotheses. During his own life time he was aware of some doubts and misunderstandings - even in the circle of his friends and admirers,

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including Sapir – and began to revise, restate, and reinterpret his own views and the inconsistencies that inevitably were to be found among them, given the fact that they were always evolving rather than fixed and final in his own mind. Nevertheless, he was granted very little time for such revisions and emendations, and as a result, left us only the equivalent of one slim volume of professional writings (totaling under 300 pages). Interpretations, tests, and evaluations of  $W_1$  and  $W_2$  are by now obviously much more voluminous than Whorf's work itself. Although he has become a legend (hero or failure, as the case may be) that status has added nothing to either the clarity of his own writings or to the uniformity of interpretations to which they have been subjected.

### *The critique of criticism*

Increasingly, current-day defenders of Whorf attack his detractors as either never having read his work, or vulgarizing him. The "never having read Whorf" criticism seizes upon the extensive anti-Whorf literature and accuses the critics of having largely read one another, thereby merely contributing exegeses of each other's texts, rather than having examined Whorf's original views. Whether justified or not in this particular case, there is an obvious danger for methodologically different traditions to be ideologically disinclined to read each other. This disinclination stems not only from the formalized and avowed higher level differences that separate them, but also from the fact that reading each other's literature is often a truly aggravating and unenlightening experience, given that it is accompanied every step of the way by lower level disagreements as to what is *data*, what is *interpretation*, and what is *demonstration*. The "vulgarization of Whorf" criticism is also preceded in the annals of cross-methodological and cross-philosophical/ideological debate. Not unlike criticism of Marx or Freud, much criticism of Whorf has been labeled simplification, reductionism, atomization, distortion, and so on (e.g., note Alford's 1978 criticism of Brown 1976, Berlin & Kay 1969, Cole & Scribner 1974, Slobin 1971; on the other hand, note the critiques of Whorf in each of the above mentioned sources. For an exhaustive list of quantitative-experimental criticisms of Whorf in connection with  $W_2$  in particular see Sridhar 1980). Similarly, the defenders of Whorf have not escaped unscathed, having been dubbed mystics, romantics, dogmatists, and anecdotalists.

The underlying point here is one of wide significance, its implications going far beyond Whorfian hypotheses  $W_1$  and  $W_2$ , and even beyond linguistics or the language-related disciplines. The problems sketched above with respect to defining and confirming various theories may be expected to multiply rather than to diminish, precisely as a by-product of disciplinary growth and interdisciplinary stimulation. The broader and the more inclusive a field of inquiry becomes – and the language-related disciplines taken together are certainly among those that have experienced the most remarkable flowering and expansion during the past quarter century – the more likely just such problems are to arise. What is data,

what constitutes proof, what is disconfirmation – indeed, just what is the problem – these all become less rather than more consensual as interdisciplinary perspective increases. Indeed, this is the price we pay (and that work on the Whorfian hypotheses has paid) whenever we focus disparate methodological perspectives on the same problem. Different methodologies are different languages. They are not duplicates of one another. They intertranslate only roughly rather than exactly. They are different *weltanschauungen* and, therefore, rather than being articulate in any fine grained manner they are immediately valuable precisely because they highlight different aspects of reality. Ultimately, a type of bilingual/bicultural accommodation may be attainable between them but that takes more time, effort, and good will than science or scientists can frequently spare.  $W_1$  itself would have predicted that maximally different methodological languages would be maximally divergent in defining and discussing  $W_1$  and accordingly in deciding on its validity.

Quite understandably the rise (or return) during the past decade of ethnography, holism, linguistics of intent, and anthropology of meaning has resulted in a new view of Whorf's work and in new hope among those who are intuitively or philosophically "attuned" to him, not to mention those few who stood by him during the long dry spell from the 1950s through to the late 1970s. For many others, however, the recent change in *Zeitgeist* (*Methodengeist*?) has left the basic issue either unresolved or in a distinct state of contention – and particularly so with respect to  $W_2$  – not only as to the truth of the matter (i.e., as to what has or has not been proven), but even with respect to the issue itself (i.e., as to what Whorf himself did or did not claim in that connection). While I will not dwell upon my own views on these matters here,<sup>2</sup> I will briefly reiterate my considered opinion that regardless of what our (or posterity's) personal judgment with respect to the above matters may be, the past quarter century's intellectual struggle with these hypotheses has been eminently worthwhile. Not only have  $W_1$  and  $W_2$  been reexamined and possibly rehabilitated, but more importantly, the struggle has stimulated and even fathered a number of related fields of unquestioned worth and vitality. Such fields as language universals (at least in their Greenbergian realizations, viz. Ferguson 1978), ethnosciences (including ethnotypologies and ethnocognition as a whole) and sociolinguistics might all be weaker today if some of their leading formulators and adherents had not quite consciously been either struggling with or for Whorf (i.e., with or for  $W_1$  and/or  $W_2$ ) as they rightly or wrongly understood him. Even if  $W_2$  in particular were ultimately to be discarded as untenable, the stimulation that it has provided, both to its erstwhile supporters and its erstwhile detractors – not unlike the stimulation provided by certain unconfirmed hypotheses of Freud and Marx – will have resulted in permanent gains for the disciplines on either side of the issue that have considered it seriously. This too, should be a lesson to us for the future: the interaction between *Zeitgeist* in methodology of the social sciences, on the one hand, and

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Zeitgeist in the sociology of knowledge, on the other – inescapable though it may be – may nevertheless be worthwhile. Every orthodoxy, being simultaneously an orthodoxy in both of the above respects (i.e., in respect to what is known and in respect to how knowledge may be pursued) – whether this be Chomskyism, ethnomethodologism, ethnographism, or natural scientism in the language-related disciplines – leads away from certain topics, sensitivities, and questions as well as toward others. If we are lucky the gain may equal or exceed the loss, and if we are wise, no orthodoxy – not even our own – will remain unchallenged for very long.

### YET ANOTHER SIDE TO WHORF: THE VALUE OF ETHNOLINGUISTIC DIVERSITY

As mentioned earlier, interdisciplinary and intermethodological struggles with and about  $W_1$  and  $W_2$  have tended to obscure from sight another aspect of Whorf. I am referring to Whorf as a neo-Herderian champion (linked to Herder by the usual intellectual linkage system of students to teachers and the teachers, in turn, to their teachers, and in this particular case via Sapir, Boas, Wundt, and von Humboldt – this complete linkage system not yet being fully confirmed but quite clearly reasonable, see Y.M. 1974) of a multilingual, multicultural, world in which “little peoples” and “little languages” would not only be respected but valued (Fishman 1978). The advisability of such a world order has long been a bone of contention in Euro-Mediterranean thought in which for some three-and-a-half thousand years distinctly opposite views with respect to this issue have been recurrently restated and reexamined. The two poles mentioned above were occupied, on one hand, by ancient Hebrew and Greek prophets and social philosophers, and, on the other, by spokesmen for the Western Roman Empire and the Western Catholic Church. The former conceived of the world ethnocentrically, (Patterson 1977) perhaps, but yet ethnopluralistically, viewing ethnolinguistic diversity as part and parcel of the fundamental nature of human society, ethnolinguistic stability or the intactness of any ethnolinguistic collectivity as sanctified (and, if “properly” enacted, i.e., enacted in accord with the divine mission or design that existed for each and every people, as eternal). In accord with this view, transethnification and translinguification were viewed as cataclysmic tragedies whereas ethnolinguistic intergenerational continuity, if “properly” enacted, was viewed as its own reward: ennobling, authentic, fulfilling. This tradition, initially encoded via classical Judaism, Eastern Orthodox Christianity and early Islam – all of which yielded systems of thought and valuation which are still generally in accord with these views to this very day – first reached Central Europe via Slavic (i.e., Eastern Orthodox) influences on Czech and German medieval social philosophers (Jakobson 1945). It was then available – with ever increasing stress on a language aspect of authenticity – to become an

ingredient of early Reformation thinking and, subsequently, has had numerous Western as well as Central and Eastern European spokesmen and defenders (Deutsch 1942).

Meanwhile, the Western Empire and the Church that it adopted (and that finally became its major heir), had developed a theory of language and ethnicity more in accord with their own needs, opportunities, and much greater technical capacities. From their point of view, small and localized ethnolinguistic collectivities were quite natural and even desirable early stages of social organization, but no more than that. As greater opportunities, rewards, understandings, and benefits (spiritual as well as material) became available, populations were expected to naturally reethnify and relinguify accordingly, in pursuit of their own best interests. Thus, except for lags attributable to temporary breakdowns in the reward system and to the self-seeking stubbornness of local leaders (afraid of being deprived of their prerogatives) what the East viewed as sanctified and eternal the West viewed as open, changeable, and reward-determined. Any particular ethnolinguistic boundary came to be viewed in the West as no more than a functional and possibly temporary reflection of the authoritative flow of rewards in the past, and, therefore, as naturally and even joyfully invalidated by newer, more effective, more beneficial reward arrangements. The outer limit of this process - both for the Western Empire/Church and its more modern, secular substitutes and replacements - was a unified mankind within a single unified realm, subscribing to a universal value system and, as a result of all of the foregoing, speaking a universal language. Thus, what has come to be viewed by some as the epitome of rational self-interest and enlightened pan-human concern - including predominant present-day liberal, statist, Marxist, and neutralist sociological schools of thought - is viewed by others (usually operating on a more local and intimate scale) as the epitome of dehumanization and self-destruction. Many modern societies - including the USA and the USSR - have simultaneously inherited major segments of both of the above traditions and, therefore, are *internally* conflicted as well as being conflicted with viewpoints from outside their own borders. In this respect, as in many others, Whorf is an avowed Easterner rather than a Westerner. To show this clearly requires another brief detour in order that we may review Herder's major premises.

JOHANN GOTTFRIED HERDER (1744 - 1803): *PRAECEPTOR SLAVORUM*<sup>3</sup>

Herder's unique contribution to the above sketched arena of competing values and purposes was to sidestep either extreme - or to co-opt them both - via the view that the entire world needs a diversity of ethnolinguistic entities for its own salvation, for its greater creativity, for the more certain solution of human problems, for the constant rehumanization of humanity in the face of materialism, for fostering greater esthetic, intellectual, and emotional capacities for humanity as a

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whole, indeed, for arriving at a higher stage of human functioning. It is precisely in order to arrive at this higher stage and in order to participate more fully in it that less powerful ethnolinguistic collectivities must be protected, respected, and assisted, because it is they who have the most vital contribution to make to these desirable goals.

While he shared the Hebreo-Greek view that loyalty to one's authentic tradition is a *sine qua non* that inevitably brings its own rewards, he went beyond that tradition in two major respects. Within any authentic tradition he stressed the authentic language as constituting the very center on which all else depended. Furthermore, the rewards of fidelity to language and way of life he considered to be available not only to the community in which these originated but to all of mankind. For Herder, and for genuine pluralists since Herder, the great creative forces that inspire all humanity do not emerge out of universal civilization but out of the individuality of separate ethnic collectivities – most particularly, out of their very own authentic languages. Only if each collectivity contributes its own thread to the tapestry of world history, and only if each is accepted and respected for making its own contribution, can nationalities finally also be ruled by a sense of reciprocity, learning and benefiting from each other's contributions as well. In this fashion Herder encompasses both the particular and the universal. He considers political and economic arrangements that unite and that transcend individual peoples as possible and desirable, but only if they are built upon and derive from a genuine prior cultivation of ethnolinguistic individuality, because it is only the latter that can render the constituent parts active, creative, contributing, self-respecting, and other-accepting members of any supranational design. For Herder, the two levels, the smaller and the larger, are ultimately simultaneously ongoing, rather than the latter displacing the former.

Even from the above brief paraphrasing it should be clear how much of current thinking (and how much more of current feeling) in the language-related disciplines is Herderian in origin. Members of these disciplines are often deeply saddened to learn of mother-tongue-loss and of cultural assimilation on the part of small and powerless ethnolinguistic entities. Indeed, in deeply unconscious and prescientific ways, convictions such as these are among the very ones that brought many of us to linguistics, to anthropology, to bilingual education, and to a variety of ethnic studies. It is Herder who most clearly and forcefully formulated these views. He did not wince at their romanticism, as many of us do now, for, unlike us, rationalists at least in our professional guises, he firmly believed that it was at the level of the intuitive or prerational that the most profoundly human and creative experiences were to be encountered. Nevertheless, though our science clothes our prerationality far more fully than did Herder's literary, esthetic, and folkloristic interests, most of us can still recognize in him hidden parts of ourselves. If we are also attracted to Whorf on some prerational, intuitive level it is because Whorf, too, is an unabashed Herderian. Via his hypotheses  $W_1$

and  $W_2$  he seeks to control and tame or discipline the Herderian passions within him. But the passions are there nonetheless, and, scientific or not, it is high time we looked at that part of Whorf directly rather than indirectly.

WHORF AND HERDER: OVERLOOKED SIMILARITIES IN BASIC VALUES

Herder's defense of backward Slavic Europe, a defense which stresses the untutored refinement and wisdom of peoples that have not capitulated to the massive blandishments of Western materialism, who experience life and nature in deeply poetic and collectively meaningful ways, are paralleled by Whorf in his defense of Native Americans in particular and of non-Western wisdom and perspective in general. For Herder the specter of uniformation hovering over Europe appears in a French guise, for Whorf the danger that approaches is predominantly Anglo-American and English in nature. It is not only that he views the Hopi language as revealing "... a higher plane of thinking, a more rational analysis of situations than our vaunted English... (which) compared to Hopi is like a bludgeon compared to a rapier (1956 [1936]: 85)", but that he recurrently finds the West in general and the English-fostering West in particular to be conceptually inferior, intellectually biased, and interculturally overly proud, even haughty. Whorf's view that the Greeks "debased" linguistics after the Hindus (Pānini) had founded it at an exceptionally advanced level (1956 [1940]: 232) is too well known to require citing here. Less well known is his view that

... the ideal of worldwide fraternity and cooperation fails if it does not include ability to adjust intellectually as well as emotionally to our brethren of other countries. The West... has *not* bridged the intellectual gulf; we are no nearer to understanding the types of logical thinking which are reflected in truly Eastern forms of scientific thought or analyses of nature. This requires... the... realization that they have equal scientific validity with our own thinking habits (1941: 21).

Here we find not only Herder's theme that the universal is a fraud, a mask for the self-interest of the dominating over the dominated, but an insistence on putting the case precisely in terms of science itself. This, indeed, is one of Whorf's major themes: that science itself must accept the non-West as an equal and must come to view itself as no more obviously rational and objective than the so-called mysterious East. The West is highly irrational in Whorf's eyes, particularly Western science, since it tends to confuse power with insight and understanding.

... (Do) our cultivated wheat and oats represent a higher evolutionary stage than a rare aster restricted to a few sites in the Himalayas(?). From the standpoint of a matured biology it is precisely the rare aster which has the better claim to high evolutionary eminence: the (Western) wheat owes its ubiquity and prestige merely to human economics and history. The eminence

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of our European tongues and thinking habits proceeds from nothing more (1956 [1936?]: 84).

As with Herder, therefore, there is a sharp antiestablishment bite to Whorf. Herder attacked French and Francofied interests in Europe as a whole and among Germans in particular; Whorf points his finger at the West as a whole and at Anglo-American imperialism in particular. In so doing, both Herder and Whorf not only are opposing long standing (taken for granted) intellectual assumptions but they are also foregoing the safety and patronage that normally come from siding with the social and political establishment. Whorf's digs at the English language are particularly noteworthy if we consider that Anglo-American and other Western linguists were (and often still are) hard put to detach themselves from its purported superiority.<sup>4</sup> Not only was Whorf completely free of any such popular wisdom vis-à-vis English, but he was particularly dubious about schemes to foster Basic English or some other natural or artificial auxiliary language as the basis of world unity. There was no easy road to world unity as far as Whorf was concerned, and the best that native speakers of English (particularly scientists who were native speakers of English) could do in pursuit of that goal was to supplement their English with "the point of view of multilingual awareness (1956 [1941]: 244)". More generally he warned:

Those who envision a future world speaking only one tongue, whether English, German or Russian, or any other, hold a misguided view and would do the evolution of the human mind the greatest disservice. Western culture has made, through language, a provisional analysis of reality and, without correctives, holds resolutely to that analysis as final. The only correctives lie in all those other tongues which by aeons of independent evolution have arrived at different but equally logical, provisional analyses (1956 [1941]: 244).

Although Whorf's overriding interest in language and cognition permeates all of his writing – even most of that which is of a semipopular or lay nature (and which we also tend to overlook today, even though he was immensely involved in such writing as a public service) – his Herderian stress on diversity, on "all those other tongues," on genuine universality being attainable only via a "multilingual awareness" which accepts and utilizes the languages and perspectives of non-Western peoples, shines through and underlies all that he writes. Like Herder he believes that the world's little languages and peoples are a treasure trove of wisdom and refinement. Only if this human treasure is valued and shared can biases be set aside and a genuine (rather than a self-serving imperialistic) universal perspective be attained. It is no wonder that among American linguists Hymes has been the most outspoken opponent of the impoverishment that would result from seeking universals based on English alone (1970 [1974]), doing so precisely by invoking Herder.

The Whorf of  $W_3$  is directly linked to much of the social consciousness of the

language-in-society related disciplines. As such he is related to pluralistic language policies, to cultural democracy and language maintenance efforts, to enrichment bilingual education, and to sympathy and assistance for the Third World in efforts to attain pan-human sanity and salvation. Whorf died still hoping against hope that a bilingual awareness might arise to reform the misguided Western world before it was too late, before "the impending darkness" (1956 [1942]: 270) that he feared would descend upon us all - including the world of science - without such an awareness. It is Whorf's abiding faith in the benefits of linguistic diversity that attracted many of us to him and to the language-related disciplines and that may well continue to do so regardless of the fate of  $W_1$  and  $W_2$ .

COMING FULL CIRCLE: THE SCIENTIFIC STATUS AND  
METHODOLOGICAL IMPLICATIONS OF  $W_3$

Can the Herder-Whorf vision of a better world based upon sharing a multiplicity of little languages and appreciating a variety of little peoples be tested, confirmed, or revised and refined? Does it have a scientific rather than "merely" a humanistic or philosophical future? I think so, because even though neither Herder nor Whorf were marked by much econopolitical sophistication they might nevertheless both have been right (or wrong) on an empirical sociopsychological level alone. Much of the recent and ongoing work on global consciousness and international understanding has consistently demonstrated that active and advanced multilingualism is a significant independent variable in their prediction (Barrows, Clark, & Klein 1980). In addition, much of Wallace Lambert's work on the greater cognitive flexibility of bilinguals (1962, 1973) is in direct agreement with the  $W_3$  school of thought. There has thus far been no explicit link between  $W_3$  and either of the above research endeavors but that is largely because  $W_1$  and  $W_2$  have substantially hidden  $W_3$  from sight. However, if that were no longer to be the case and if a veritable ground swell of interest in  $W_3$  were to develop I predict that the consequences would be manifold, quite independently of their directionality in any substantive sense.

Some  $W_3$  researchers will doubtlessly seek to render the status of this hypothesis more precise by operationalizing quantitative measures of its independent and dependent variables and by assigning subjects to randomly constituted, maximally contrasted treatment groups for the purposes of controlled experimental comparison. Other researchers, however, will quite definitely take a quite different and more qualitative route toward testing  $W_3$ . The two approaches may well disagree with respect to some of their findings, interpretations, and, indeed, with respect to their claims of fidelity to the original  $W_3$  hypothesis. Still other researchers will continue to believe (or, indeed, to disbelieve) in  $W_3$ , entirely as a matter of devotion, as a value, regardless of what the findings might be, since the language-related disciplines, like all disciplines, are

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themselves also value systems (and in the West, internally conflicted value systems). As such, they are protective of kindred values and of those who subscribe to them. Finally, midway between the more internally consistent approaches to  $W_3$  mentioned above, there will be those who will seek to combine both this world and the next, that is, to refine their "values" via "science" and to guide their "science" via "values." The hypothesis as such is necessarily too broad ("necessarily" because it derives not from science per se but from values more basic than science) and science as an enterprise is too variegated to entertain only a single interpretation, operationalization, or formulation thereof. It is consistent with the entire spirit of  $W_3$  to conclude that such must be its fate in any free scientific climate.

### THE LEGACY OF $W_3$ FOR LINGUISTICS AS A SCIENCE

The past quarter century's experience with  $W_1$  and  $W_2$ , and the coming quarter century's experience with  $W_3$  can serve to remind linguistics-as-a-science that linguistics is also very significantly a humanities field and an applied field as well. As a result, even more so than were linguistics to be a science and only a science, it corresponds to certain pervasive, soul-satisfying, meaning-and-value needs of its "members." These needs can also have dignifying and protective value for the discipline qua science. Our frequent advocacy of the weak and as yet unappreciated peoples and languages upon which  $W_3$  focuses, dignifies not only them but us, safeguards not only them but us, for it keeps us from following (or straying) in the footsteps of Hitler's professors (Weinreich 1946) along a path which glorified  $W_1$  and  $W_2$  without experiencing the tempering impact of  $W_3$ .

Certainly, linguistics as a science and linguists as scientists cannot and should not try to escape from the values and loyalties, dreams and intuitions, visions and sensitivities that move them and that touch them. If these prerationalities are not self-aggrandizing (and neither Herder's nor Whorf's were, if they lead to greater assistance, appreciation and dignity for the world's little peoples and little languages), then these are prerationalities to be proud of. If we each of us will but carry them on our sleeves in our country rather than merely in someone else's - whether our own country be the USA or Israel, Egypt or Mexico, Canada or Yugoslavia, China or the USSR - then these are prerationalities that will be good for us as individuals, good for linguistics as a discipline, and good for mankind as our common concern. That, ultimately, was the very kind of linguistics that Whorf envisioned.

### NOTES

\* One of a series of invited papers commemorating a decade of *Language in Society*.

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1. I do not consider it necessary at this late date to more than mention the well documented fact that neither  $W_1$  nor  $W_2$  were hypotheses original to Whorf. Others in Whorf's immediate circle of colleagues had acknowledged interest and sympathy for these views prior to Whorf's focus upon them, and such views had been articulated for approximately two centuries by various European (particularly German) thinkers (e.g., Herder, von Humboldt, and Wundt to name only a few), and the basic notions in one or both of these hypotheses occur several times throughout two-and-a-half thousand years of Euro-Mediterranean language-related speculation (Culjak 1968, Fishman 1980) and are probably of at least similar vintage in India, China, and perhaps even elsewhere. Nevertheless, today we not only parsimoniously but also rightfully call these hypotheses "Whorfian," because it was precisely Whorf's stimulating focus upon them that returned them to modern debate and inquiry, particularly in the United States. To call these hypotheses *Whorfian* is, therefore, as technically mistaken as to call the Western Hemisphere *The Americas* (after Amerigo Vespucci) but, at the same time, it is also equally justified and, by now, equally traditional to do so.

2. My documented view (Fishman 1960, 1977, 1980) is that Whorf did entertain both of the hypotheses here referred to as  $W_1$  and  $W_2$ , although he was considerably less certain and less consistent with respect to the latter than the former. Furthermore, my evaluation of the empirical literature leads me to the conclusion that  $W_1$  has been confirmed over and over again, not only by Whorf and since Whorf, but prior to Whorf, whereas  $W_2$  has not been confirmed as a stable phenomenon at the lexical level by methods that recognize the independent variable-dependent variable distinction and the canons of publically confirmable reliability and validity. Even less confirmation of  $W_2$  has been forthcoming in accord with the above research paradigm at levels higher than the lexical. (See Haugen 1977 for recent further confirmation of this conclusion.) If investigators following ethnographic, holistic, and nonlinear research strategies were to become fully convinced of the validity of  $W_2$  (I do not sense any such conviction among them at this time; indeed, I sense a tendency among such researchers to ascribe  $W_2$  not to Whorf himself but, rather to those who misunderstand him, e.g., Alford 1978, Silverstein 1979), I would conclude that the two different interpretations/operationalizations of the hypotheses involved were responsible for the difference in findings. These methodological differences might or might not prove reconcilable. As long as they were not, I would tend to consider the hypothesis contested or unconfirmed (but, hopefully, in a state of productive tension) regardless of my own preferences in the matter.

3. Since a paper on Whorf is hardly the right place for extensive quotations from Herder I will satisfy my urge to use such quotations by summarizing Herder's views on various topics and referring the reader to the original sources where these views can be found. The best account of Herder's life is Haym 1877-85. For a fine account and interpretation of Herder's manifold direct and indirect interests in language and ethnicity/nationality, see Ergang 1931. It is directly to Herder's *Sammtliche Werke* (1877-1913) that the reader must turn for the full treatment of the view that: there is nothing more central than language in the life of any ethnic collectivity (*Volk*) (see e.g., XI 225, XVII 58, XVIII 337 and 384); neither individual nor collective creativity are possible if the authentic ethnic language is lost (see e.g., XVI 46, XVII 59 and 288-89, XVIII 387); learning from other peoples and languages poses no problem if one does it without forgetting or dishonoring one's own (see e.g., I 407, VI 217, VIII 336); early and consistent education in the mother tongue is a necessity regardless of whatever else one learns (see e.g., I 380-81 and 406, IV 301, XXX 129); the universal can be participated in fruitfully (rather than slavishly) only through the authentic (see e.g., XIV 448, XVII 211-12, XVIII 248). A typical formulation of the latter view urges: "Let us contribute to the honor of our nationality - and learn incessantly from and with others - so that together we can seek the truth and cultivate the garden of the common good" (XVII 211-212); also "Let us, therefore, be German, not because German is superior to all other nationalities, but because we are Germans and cannot well be anything else and because we can contribute to humanity at large only by being German" (Ergang 1931: 265).

4. Whorf's lack of positive hyperbole with respect to English is all the more remarkable given sentiments such as the following which were nurtured by linguistic culture prior to his time: (a) "The Anglo-Saxon language is the simplest, the most perfectly and simply symbolic that the world has ever seen . . . [B]y means of it the Anglo-Saxon saves his vitality for conquest instead of wasting it under the juggernaut of cumbersome mechanism for conveyance of thought" (McGee 1895). (b) "The English language is a methodical, energetic business-like and sober language that does not care much for finery and elegance, but does care for logical consistency and is opposed to any attempt to narrow-in life by police regulation and strict rules, either of grammar or of lexicon. As the language

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is, so is the people . . . It must be a source of gratification to mankind that the tongue spoken by two of the greatest powers of the world is so noble, so rich, so pliant, so expressive and so interesting" (Jespersen 1938 [1905]: 235). Ironically, the latter author's laudatory view that "as the language is, so is the people" would probably be characterized in recent days as revealing "extreme Whorfianism," whereas Whorf's sharply critical views insofar as English is concerned have nevertheless not spared him from being similarly characterized.

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